

Example of failure in an amphibious operation:

The Gallipoli landing operation

Part IV. TURNING AN ENEMY'S COMBAT POWER AGAINST HIMSELF

Chapter I. Reverse Use and Manipulation of Momentum

1. Meaning of reverse use of momentum

a. Momentum

The term momentum, as used here, means the power of the enemy's offensive drive against us. In other words, it indicates the will and power and action of the offensive drive.

b. Reverse use of momentum

Reverse use of momentum is a principle of war that uses an enemy's momentum in reverse, seeking to seize superiority in use of relative combat power, and it has a thread of connection with the judo secret of "using the opponent's strength, applying our trick, and throwing the opponent."

c. Characteristics of reverse use of momentum

(1) If this principle of war is applied skillfully, the enemy can be forced into a decisive battle, or the opportunity can be grasped for a battle of extermination.

Also, to some extent, the greater the enemy's momentum, the greater the success will be, and a small force can well deliver a crushing blow to a large enemy force.

(2) In other words, initially, the enemy is caused to apply this momentum fully, and since, with our resistance, the enemy's momentum decreases during the course of the engagement and we gain superiority in posture, in the end, we gain superiority in relative combat power and attempt to defeat (destroy) the enemy.

(3) When the enemy's momentum is taken from the enemy, it is greater for us if the terrain includes a lure.

A lure is constituted in cases where the enemy is judged superior in relative posture and in combat power and able to destroy or defeat us, or in cases where there is a key terrain position that controls the battlefield or definitely should be secured for the conduct of military operations.

2. Decoying, entrapping

a. Meaning of decoying and entrapping

Decoying and entrapping mean the management of enemy momentum with the aim of

achieving superiority in relative combat power. In other words, it is to lure the enemy force into a place or direction that we desire (or have planned in advance) with the objective of creating a situation where defeat (destruction) of the enemy is possible (for example, a situation where, in view of posture and terrain, applying our combat power is easy and applying enemy combat power is difficult).

Also, in order to decoy and entrap, it is necessary to present the enemy with a lure. Among these lures are key terrain, dummy units, resources, etc.

b. Application of decoying and entrapping

The principle of war of decoying and entrapping can be applied in all localities of military operations (battles), but examples of its typical uses are as follows:

- (1) Battle of extermination
- (2) Decoying the enemy in order to shift to the offensive
- (3) Mobile defense
- (4) Ambush-attack tactic
- (5) Antitank pocket
- (6) Antiairborne pocket
- (7) Pocket of fire

Also, it is important to note that a reentrant position is not used with decoying and entrapping. The reason is that the attacker, avoiding the error of the reentrant penetration, necessarily attacks from one flank.

c. Cautionary items in decoying and entrapping

(1) It is desirable that the direction of decoying or entrapping coincide with the enemy's main approach route.



Fig. 52

(2) The size of the area into which the enemy is decoyed or entrapped is such that the enemy force that enters it is appropriate for our striking power.




Fig. 53

(3) Consideration of the relationship between the size of the area into which the enemy is decoyed or entrapped (troop strength decoyed or entrapped) and the frontage [Fig. 53]

(4) In regard to determining the area into which to decoy or entrap, consideration of terrain and our direction of strike, etc., after the decoying or entrapping.

(5) In regard to planning the decoying or entrapping, the following items are considered:

- (a) Full consideration of the character and usual tactics, etc., of the enemy force.
- (b) Avoiding excessively unnatural decoying and entrapping. (Our plans are easy for the enemy to detect.)
- (c) Having countermeasures prepared in case planned decoying or entrapping cannot be accomplished.

Since the enemy also has free will, it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration his not acting in accordance with our desires.

Historical examples:

Battle of Austerlitz (Battle of the Three Emperors)(1805, Napoleon against the allied Russian and Austrian armies)(example of decoying and entrapping)

See historical examples of extermination [Part IV, Chapter III]

Chapter II. Diversion and Countered Diversion

Section 1. Meaning and characteristics of diversion and countered diversion

1. Diversion

Diversion means drawing as many enemy elements as possible away from the desired area for our main force or preventing the enemy's freedom of action, with the objective of dispersing and reducing enemy combat power used in our main force's area and giving us the advantage in relative combat power in the main force's area.

2. Threat

a. Threat means threatening with force (with or without action) in order to cause the enemy to feel distress and to create a sensation of psychological disadvantage.

Threat is psychological. Since the sensation of psychological effect increases with increases in the extent that the opponent fears us, in cases where the opponent is excessively nervous or has memories of trying experiences, it is further increased. Hence, it can be said that, for the defeated, the enemy threat is great.

The effect of threat decreases in cases of "it is secure," "it is safe," etc.

b. Receptivity to threats

Since threat has the objective of psychological effect (causing a sensation of psychological disadvantage), the enemy's receptivity to threats is not simply an intangible problem, but differs according to the character of the enemy force, the place where the threat is imposed, opportunities, the degree of enemy preparation, the threatening force, etc.

In other words,

(1) Enemy's character

A nervous enemy, an enemy that has a feeling of fear of us > [= is greater (in receptivity) than] an enemy with great self-confidence from a great deal of combat experience.

(2) Place (area)

Front < [= is less than] flank < rear

(3) Opportunity

Opportunities that can be forecast < sudden, unexpected opportunities that exert great, general effect.

(4) Degree of preparation

Being prepared < being unprepared

Countering troop units and measures < noncountering troop units and measures

(5) Threat power

Diversion element having combat power that is small < combat power that is large

3. Relation between diversion and threat

Diversion is manifested as a result of a threat. In other words, if a threat is effective, it causes the enemy to formulate some countermeasures, and threat and diversion being mutually related, if a threat is successful, its result is a diversion.

Also, the threat is an action, and the diversion indicates the commander's plan or objective.

Note: Containing means to hold the enemy and not permit freedom of action.

In other words, it means a condition in which the effectiveness of a diversion is continued. Holding

means to keep the enemy grasped or to limit or stop the enemy's freedom of action.




Fig. 54

4. Measures and methods of the diversion

As stated above, for the diversion, it is necessary to present a major threat to the enemy, and for this purpose, there are the following measures and methods:

a. Method through attacking

(1) A determined attack has great receptivity for the threat it presents to the enemy, and it is the best method for a diversion.

(2) An attack against a prepared enemy front has little threat effectiveness. In this case, it must have sufficient power to cause failure of the enemy's battle line.

(3) In cases of diversion by an attack, sufficient consideration must be given to the following items:

- (a) Time of attack
- (b) Part of the tactical formation against which the attack is delivered
- (c) Power (violence) of the attack
- (d) Method of carrying out the attack

In other words, it is necessary to carry out a sudden, powerful (violent) attack at a time and place that causes most distress to the enemy and is as far as possible away from our main force.

Historical examples:

Attack from the eastern wing of the Yalu Army in the Battle of Mukden [1905]

Operation of Wingate's Special Force before the Imphal Campaign

b. Method through the existence method (method of being located at a given point and presenting a glaring threat)

In cases where it appears at a place that is distressful to the enemy, if the enemy leaves it alone, there are major results, and even without direct attack, the enemy can be diverted and held. However, since the enemy has sufficient time to take countermeasures, this method generally has little effectiveness.

- (1) Restriction of operational objective (direction) by the relative positions of both sides

(a) In the figure at the right, A has B as its natural tactical objective, but since C is in a position where it restricts that action, it is a case where some counter-measure first must be taken against C. A good example of this




Fig. 55

is the relationship of the Russian Army (A) with the German Army (B) and Austrian Army (C) at the beginning of World War I.

(b) The figure at the right is the case of occupying a position to the flank of the enemy's line of operations and forcing the enemy to change his line of operations and his operational front.



(2) Case of restricting the action of a unit

Fig. 56

(a) By the existence of airmobile units (airborne units, heliborne units, etc.), a constant threat is presented to the rear area, freedom of movement of the opposing units is limited, and they are held in the rear area.

(b) An opposing force is held in its area by means of the existence of a ranger (guerrilla) unit. A good example was in the Korean War, where one-third of the force had to be assigned to rear-area security to act against guerrilla bands of the Communist forces.

c. Method through defense

Since diversion through defense arises in conjunction with enemy offensive action, it is not possible to achieve a diversion at the time we desire. Also, diversion through defense is dependent upon self-confidence relative to the defense (strength of defense, strength of organization of firepower, etc.).

In cases where, if there is enemy offensive action, this is turned against the enemy, and we withdraw power [for use elsewhere] and, by defense against the superior enemy with inferior strength, can achieve diversion and a holding action. Hence, in cases of seeking diversion through defense, it is necessary to present a lure to the enemy and draw the enemy's offensive.

5. Effectiveness of diversion and its continuance

a. Effectiveness of diversion

(1) Proof of diversion success

(2) Proof of diversion failure




Fig. 57

b. Continuance of effectiveness of diversion

Diversion, in cases where its method of accomplishment is suitable, can achieve suitable effectiveness at the beginning, but with the passage of time, the

situation is perceived by the enemy, the enemy causes a countered diversion and takes countermeasures, and the effectiveness of the diversion is lost.

Since the effectiveness of diversion depends on interaction with the enemy's alertness, the character of the enemy general, etc., it generally is a completely unknown quantity, and estimating the probability of success is difficult. Hence, it is necessary to be fully aware that there are limitations to success.

6. Countered diversion

Countered diversion means a situation in which the unit assigned to the diversion is checked by a weaker part of the enemy force while the enemy concentrates his combat power in another area.

For the element effecting a diversion, there is always the possibility of a countered diversion.

Example 1: Case of being checked by a weaker element of the enemy, while the main force of the enemy maintains its freedom of action. [Fig. 58]




Fig. 58

Example 2: Shift from defense to countered diversion

(1) Diversionary attack by the enemy

Attempt at diversion of our
general reserve




Fig. 59




Fig. 60

7. Characteristics of a diversionary operation

- a. It is a secondary operation of a main operation.
- b. The opposing enemy is greatly superior.
- c. It is restricted in time and space by the main operation.
- d. In general, it is deceptive in nature.
- e. Basically a decisive battle should be avoided, but in some circumstances, a decisive battle is advantageous or necessary.

Section 2. Relationship between the main operation and secondary operation

1. Meaning of main operation and secondary operation

A main operation is an operation that orients the main effort of the unit engaged in the operation, that is, an operation that seeks to achieve the main objective of the operation. The secondary operation is an operation in an area separated from the main operation, for the purpose of facilitating the main operation, that is, it is an operation that seeks to achieve the secondary objective of the operation. Also, the front that is carrying out the main operation is called the main-operation front, and the front that is carrying out the secondary operation is called the secondary-operation front.

2. Relationship between the main operation and the secondary operation

a. There also are cases where a force has sufficiently great combat power to be able to take the offensive on two fronts at the same time, but, in general, a decisive battle is sought first on the main-operation front, and following that, strength is diverted to the secondary-operation front and a decisive battle occurs there. Hence, in such a case, ordinarily, during the initial period, a "delaying operation" is carried out in the secondary operation.

b. Victory in the two-front operation (an operation carried out simultaneously on two fronts that are strategically separated) is determined by the result of the decisive battle on the main-operation front in the initial period. However, the operation on the secondary-operation front exerts a large influence on the operation on the main-operation front and also governs the general outcome of the operation.

c. Until completion of the decisive battle on the main-operation front, the secondary-operation front necessarily is limited to the minimum necessary combat power and, in many cases, conduct of that operation is under extremely difficult conditions.

d. When the secondary operation fails, of course, even though the operation itself is evolving advantageously, to the extent that it exerts a bad effect on the main operation, there is a failure from the viewpoint of the overall operation.

e. The secondary operation, in order to facilitate the main operation, must simply take the offensive with the secondary objectives of the main operation of "repulse of the enemy in the given area," "possession of the given area," "threat," etc. (The offensive operations of the Yalu River Army in the Russo-Japanese War were of this type.)

3. Characteristics of the secondary operation

a. It is a subsidiary operation of the main operation.

b. It is limited in time and space by the main operation.

- c. It is an operation limited in combat power and in all other conditions.
- d. The opposing enemy is greatly superior.

Section 3. Delaying operation

1. Meaning and objective of the delaying operation

The delaying operation is an operation subsidiary to the decisive battle, and it is an operation which, in order to make the overall operation advantageous and easy, is conducted with the objectives of avoiding decisive battle and using combat power economically, forcing casualties from the enemy, and obtaining a margin of time or diverting and containing the enemy, etc.

Hence, this type of operation is carried out:

As an operation on a secondary-operation front subsidiary to the main operation (lateral relationship),

During the interval until the shift to a decisive battle on the main-operation battlefield (relationship in depth).

For example, the former is "the eastern operations of the German Army in the initial part of World War I" and the latter is "operations in the Korean War until the Pusan Beachhead."

2. Characteristics of the delaying operation

a. Since this operation is a subsidiary operation, it is restricted in time and space by the planning and actions of the decisive-battle force (main force), and the operation must be conducted under certain requirements.

b. This operation, in general, is an operation by an inferior force against a superior force.

c. This operation, sooner or later, is changed to a different tactical objective. Delaying-objective A is changed to delaying-objective B and finally is changed also to decisive combat.

d. In this operation, the combat power of the force conducting the operation undergoes many changes, for example, strength being withdrawn to be given to another force or the reverse, receiving strength from another force.

e. This operation initially should avoid decisive combat and try to preserve combat power, but, depending on the situation, there also are cases where, as an expedient, a decisive engagement is daringly effected.

In summary, a delaying operation is an operation under extremely difficult conditions, the measures and methods for carrying out the operation are varied and have no definite rules, and it must be conducted as a flexible engagement that displays all sorts of cleverness.

Also, the conduct of this operation requires judging appropriately the contradictions of thinking that seeks to fulfill the requirement of avoiding defeat through secure positioning and the necessity of taking hazardous decisive action when opportunities are seen. This is the reason that this operation is said to be difficult. Hence, it should be borne in mind that, if the delaying operation is not assigned a greatly superior commander and staff with a very well trained unit, achievement of the objectives of this operation will be difficult.

3. Measures and methods of the delaying operation

The delaying operation, in character, has great variety of condition, and its measures and methods cannot be judged by definite rules, but usually, one first considers the time that the delay should last and the terrain that should be used in accordance with the mission and the situation of both sides (particularly the relationship between the enemy's situation and the decisive engagement), then determines the "suicide site" position for the final decisive engagement, and with these as bases, determines the general course of the subsequent conduct of the operation.

Measures are offensive, defensive and combinations of those, but most cases decide upon the defensive.

a. Offensive

(1) In the delaying operation, the force conducting the operation must particularly maintain its freedom of operation, and the best method of doing this is the offensive. However, it must not, by rushing rashly, dissipate combat power too rapidly, and lose operational freedom. Especially in cases of a delaying operation with a large unit, it is planned to achieve the objective by the offensive, insofar as the situation permits.

(2) Attack (decisive strategic engagement)

In cases of a definite chance of victory or where achievement of minimum mission is not possible without an attack, an attack must be made resolutely. Of course, the attack is easy to conduct, and if it is successful, great combat success can be achieved, but dissipation of combat power also is rapid, and if it should end in defeat, operational freedom is lost. Hence, particular consideration is necessary concerning undertaking an attack.

Items that should be considered for an attack are as follows:

- (a) Consideration of achieving a minimum mission, even if the attack fails.
- (b) Giving particular attention to selection of the place for the attack.
- (c) Making advantageous an attack with a limited objective.
- (d) In many cases an interception tactic is advantageous.

- (e) There also are cases where it is advantageous to make attacks successively on various parts of the battle line in a systematically planned sequence.
- (f) There also are cases where attack is advantageous in conjunction with delaying action and other diversionary attacks.
- (g) Besides, there are the limited attack and the decoy attack.

b. Defensive

From the essential character of the delaying operation, an attack that risks the fate of our force, except in special cases, cannot be called appropriate. Hence, most cases are based on defensive methods.

Defensive methods include the following:

Defense (securing a definite area)

Delaying action

Using both in combination

However, since the defensive operation has the defect of easily exerting a bad psychological effect on the unit, this point requires particular attention.

(1) Defense

Defense is the strongest measure among the defensive actions, and use of this method for holding an area is a good plan, but we also have a danger from the essential nature and objective of the delaying operation, which is not very different from the attack in dissipation of combat power. In defense, if the enemy's strength decreases and he holds his position, it becomes a confrontation. In confrontation, interdiction and blocking of the [enemy's] line of communications are necessary.

(2) Delaying action

This action is a continuous operation that makes combined use of resistance and withdrawal, and since it naturally is easy to come to employ the unit passively, it is particularly necessary to maintain the unity and coordination of actions of all front-line units in order to preserve the discipline and freedom of the operation.

Also, characteristics of this operation are disruption of organizational unity, wavering and intermingling of units, decline in morale, attrition of strength, etc.

Historical examples:

Operations of the Allied forces in the Korean Campaign until the Pusan beachhead

Operation "Dan," Phase 2 and Phase 3, carried out by the [Japanese] Thirty-third Army in Northern Burma [1944]

c. Other

The items listed below are much used in strategic delaying and also are necessary in tactical delaying

- (1) Delaying by use of fortifications

It is organized laterally and in depth and there also are cases with use of islands. (Examples: Maginot Line, Siegfried Line)

- (2) Delaying based on ranger warfare
- (3) Propaganda strategy
- (4) Air assault

Section 4. Unit acting on the flank of the main force

1. Summary

In this section are discussed the operations of a unit that has the main mission of diversion and containment and that acts on the flank of the main force. This unit, in its time and space relationship to the main force, must give maximum consideration to whether it can somehow contribute to the operations of the main force.

In other words, it is the principle of war that "[if the main confrontation is] close, [the flank unit must operate] close," "[if the main confrontation is] distant, [the flank unit must operate] distant."

2. Form of threat

- a. The enemy first defeats our threatening unit in detail

- b. The enemy, enduring temporary distress, is intent on a decisive engagement

No effectiveness from the danger



- c. The enemy, with one part of his force, copes with our threatening unit

- d. The enemy experiences great distress




Fig. 61

Consideration of the form of threat is as in the above figure. Based upon this, a discussion of the desirable time for a diversion and relative positions of both sides is given below.

3. Time relationship (time of diversion)

a. The time when a unit with the mission of diversion imposes a threat must yield an effect that directly benefits the action of the main force or is usable by that force.

b. In cases where the timing of diversion is unsuitable, the diversion is ineffective and troops become poorly dispositioned or are defeated in detail.

For example, in the figure at the right, in cases where there is still a margin of time in the decisive engagement in the main-force area, if unit C, assigned to diversion, advances close to B, B would first defeat C in detail and then strike A.




Figure 62

[Unit] A cannot yet use these results. Hence, C must be placed where it is not defeated in detail and it must act in concert with A and engage in an action that is effective at the time of A's decisive engagement.

Historical example: The Russian Army's "Mishchenko cavalry group's operations near the sea district" in the Russo-Japanese War (example of error in the timing of a diversion).

4. Space relationship (relative positions of the two sides)

Example 1: Case where the main forces of both sides are far apart

a. In cases like that of the figure at the right, B, after defeating C or managing in such a way as to make a first strike impossible, moves against A. The effort of C may be great, but the diversion is ineffective.




Fig. 63

b. In cases like that of the figure at the right, if B tries to deal with C, action of A becomes easy, and if it tries to deal with A, C becomes distressed and the diversion is ineffective.




Fig. 64

Example 2: Case where the main forces of both sides are close together

a. In cases like that of the figure at the right, B is threatened in front by A and in the rear by C, and dealing with them is extremely difficult. If an attempt is made to deal with one of them, the other takes advantage of the situation, and if it deals with both, its strength is divided, and the effect [of the diversion] is great.




Fig. 65

b. In cases like that of the figure at the right, even though B sustains a threat temporarily from C, it first defeats A and then has the capability to move against C. However, at this time, there also are cases of effective diversion by advancing to key terrain on the enemy's route of withdrawal.




Fig. 66

5. Relationship between the decisive engagement of the main force and units operating on its flank

What is suitable as principles of war for units operating on the flank of the main force must be judged in the light of the timing and spatial (relative position) relationship to the main force. In other words, it is essential to be careful not to be defeated piecemeal, to contribute to the decisive engagement of the main force, and not to become poorly disposed remote from the action.

Examples may be shown as follows:

Time of decisive engagement of the main force	Action of extreme flank unit
Case of existence of relative margin (for example, 10 days or longer)	It secures subsequent freedom of action and advances into a suitable flank position where it cannot be defeated in detail
Case of no margin (for example, 2-3 days)	Advance to the enemy's rear (march distance of 2-3 days) or to near the flank or rear of the enemy

Beginning of decisive engagement	Immediately thereafter (uncertainty of the outcome)	Mounting a diversionary attack against the enemy's flank or rear
	Favorable case	Advance to the enemy's flank or rear (key position on the route of withdrawal)
	Unfavorable case	Attacking the enemy's flank or rear

Chapter III. The Battle of Extermination on the Battlefield

1. Meaning and characteristics of the battle of extermination

a. The battle of extermination has the ideal of annihilating and leaving no survivors; but, from ancient times, examples of such battles of extermination are relatively rare. Hence, one in which more than half of the enemy force is destroyed or captured is called a battle of extermination.

b. Characteristics of the battle of extermination

(1) Fortuitousness of the battle of extermination

The battle of extermination is related not only to our doing our utmost to achieve it but also to the nature of the enemy's actions, so that if the enemy does not have a determined will to fight, it occurs relatively rarely. In other words, when the conditions for occurrence of a battle of extermination listed below are met, it occurs, but there is no disputing the fact that it includes a large element of good luck.

(2) Riskiness of the battle of extermination

The normal form of the battle of extermination is annihilation of a weaker force with a strong will to fight, by an overwhelmingly stronger force, but it is always difficult to anticipate this.

In cases of acting with a force that is equal to, or weaker than, the enemy, fighting safely and comfortably by avoiding a position of defeat throughout the entire operation, it is too much to hope to annihilate the enemy. The principal requirements for occurrence of annihilation, all are unfavorable or dangerous for us. One must expect to confront very many unforeseen, dangerous situations when carrying out a complete envelopment, turning movement, rear attack, interdiction of the route of withdrawal, etc., which are inherently necessary in implementation of a battle of extermination.

2. Conditions for occurrence of a battle of extermination

a. It is both opposing forces planning a decisive engagement, or the enemy advancing with fierce momentum. With the battle of extermination, naturally, the probability [of occurrence] is greater, the greater the superiority of one side in combat power, and this is the reason that there are many historical examples of an inferior force annihilating a superior force.

The battle of extermination usually is difficult against an enemy that is carrying out a delaying operation.

b. One of the forces having a deterioration in morale and, with the final period of its offensive or the extension of its line of operations, experiencing a decline in combat power, the other force then being in a position where it can force the former into a decisive engagement.

c. Superiority in firepower and interdiction of the route of withdrawal

being possible at the decisive point.

d. There being superiority in command and control, particularly a great difference in the command abilities of both force commanders.

e. A unit being exceptionally strong, and its quality being greatly superior to that of the enemy.

f. There being many possibilities for surprise attack, in particular, there being superiority in concealing plans and in using tactical mobility.

3. Relation between risk and success

a. In order to obtain great success, great risk is necessary.

In order to obtain great success such as a battle of extermination, it is necessary that the enemy's momentum be large, and on that front, we must accept the possibility of slipping into an extremely dangerous situation. In other words, a great risk must be accepted.

b. In history, there are more examples of overcoming risks and obtaining a great victory than of being defeated because of hazardous action. However, there must be sufficient countermeasures against the risk.

"Great success lies in fearlessly taking risks, but before action, careful consideration is necessary" (the great Moltke).

c. In regard to taking a risk, the degree of risk to accept is determined simply by the characteristics of the enemy, the capability of our force, confidence in our commanding, etc. In other words, appropriately judging the degree of risk must be made with a knowledge of the enemy and knowledge of oneself. For that reason, it is necessary to consider the relationship between risk and results in the comparison of our courses of action (paragraph 4) in the [commander's] estimate of the situation.

Historical examples:

The envelopment annihilation Battle of Cannae (216 [B.C.], Roman army against Hannibal's army)

The annihilation Battle of Tannenberg (1914, German army against the Russian army)

Battle of the Masurian Lakes (1915, German army against the Russian army)

Battle of Caporetto (1917, German and Austrian armies against the Italian army)

Besides the above, the suicidally heroic battles of La-meng [Yunnan], Teng-yue [T'êng-yüeh (=Teng-chong, Yunnan, 1944)], Saipan, Attu, etc., strictly speaking, also are battles of extermination.