

# Conclusions

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In the Dominican crisis of 1965—66, President Johnson wanted to prevent the establishment of a “second Cuba” in the hemisphere but in such a way as not to open the administration to charges of “another Hungary.” He succeeded on both counts. Whatever possibility existed that Communist groups would seize power vanished with the introduction of U.S. troops, whereas a subsequent political agreement between the two warring Dominican factions obviated the use of all-out U.S. force to suppress a popular revolt, as the Soviets had done in Budapest.<sup>1</sup>

From the perspective of U.S. security interests in Latin America, the intervention was a *qualified* success. With the election of Balaguer, a stability acceptable to the United States returned to the republic. To be sure, the methods used to maintain this stability, while by no means comparable to the excesses of the Trujillo regime, have at times seemed harsh by U.S. standards. Hundreds of politically motivated killings “continued into the early 1970s,” and other drastic measures were used to repress radical opposition to the Balaguer government.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the 1965 settlement failed to eliminate the country’s deep-rooted economic and social weaknesses. Still, while repression continued and discontent exists, the magnitude of the problems, when compared to the upheaval of 1965, have given American citizens and policymakers little cause for alarm. For the U.S. government, an occasional riot in Santo Domingo pales in comparison to the ongoing guerrilla war in El Salvador or the U.S.-backed insurgency against the Sandinistas. Relatively speaking, the Dominican Republic appears to be one of the more stable countries in the Caribbean area.

There are other reasons for considering the Dominican intervention only a qualified success. Through their actions, the Johnson administration and the U.S. military establishment raised doubts and evoked criticism in several quarters. Among various groups in Latin America and the United States, LBJ’s decision to deploy the 82d Airborne Division without consulting Latin American allies provoked anger and heightened fears of a resurgence of U.S. imperialism in the hemisphere. Resolutions establishing an OAS negotiating commission and multinational peace force were supposed to deflect criticism of U.S. unilateralism, but opponents of the intervention dismissed these measures as little more than a pretext for the assertion of U.S. power

and influence. Political divisions in Latin America over the intervention sapped the OAS of its effectiveness, while the pressures Washington brought to bear on the organization and the domination U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker asserted over the second OAS Committee caused the image of the OAS to suffer. Many Latin Americans had always regarded the OAS as a tool of U.S. imperialism. During the Dominican crisis, critics joked that the Spanish acronym for the organization, *OEA* (*Organización de Estados Americanos*), really stood for "*Otro Engaño Americano*" (another American trick).<sup>3</sup>

Not only did the United States provide the vast majority of soldiers and supplies to the Inter-American Peace Force, U.S. officers also tried to block the appointment of a Latin American general as the IAPF commander. Of the military considerations behind this effort, the desire to retain America's freedom of action was paramount. When this rationale became public knowledge, however, it seemed to contradict the spirit of multilateralism the White House was espousing. Even though some Latin leaders applauded U.S. policy, either publicly or privately, the number of Latin American states who declined to send soldiers to the Dominican Republic in most cases illustrated the depth of anti-American feelings generated by the intervention. As Abraham Lowenthal observed in 1969, "The idea of an Inter-American Force composed of units from democratic countries in the hemisphere . . . seems to have died as a result of its premature birth in the Dominican context."<sup>4</sup>

Above all else, the crisis demonstrated to Latin Americans that when the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor conflicted with vital U.S. interests, the latter, usually explained in terms of anticommunism and the preservation of hemispheric solidarity, would hold sway over the former. The United States, as a great power, would do what it considered in its best interests. Although it would prefer to act in association with allies and friends, it would go it alone if need be. This position is axiomatic for all great powers. Still, when the unilateral approach is followed in this hemisphere, Latin American countries, ever sensitive to infringements on their sovereignty and to the historical record of U.S. interventions and gunboat diplomacy, will become understandably agitated and resentful.

Many countries outside the hemisphere condemned the intervention. Predictably, the Soviet Union was one of its severest critics. The intervention gave the Kremlin a long-lasting supply of ammunition for public denunciations of U.S. imperialism. In private conversations with American officials, however, Russian references to the intervention have assumed a more expedient cast, as U.S. incursions in the Caribbean area are equated with Soviet intervention in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan—countries that Russia considers to be within *its* sphere of influence.

President Johnson anticipated the criticism he received from abroad, though he underestimated its range and intensity. He was not prepared for the criticism he received at home, especially from fellow liberal politicians and statesmen and from academicians. The criticism developed around three overlapping themes. One asserted simply that the United States had displayed bad judgment and an "arrogance of power" (to use Senator William

Fulbright's phrase) in intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. A second theme charged the administration with grossly exaggerating Communist involvement and the threat of a Communist victory in the Dominican revolt. A list of supposed Communist agents actively participating in the revolt was compiled by the CIA on short notice to silence critics on this point, but the list contained so many errors—duplicate names, the names of dead people, people out of the country or in jail—that it only fueled the controversy and brought down LBJ's wrath on the agency. A third theme held that the administration had misinformed the American people and the world about its reasons for intervening in the Dominican Republic and about its "neutrality" in the civil war. Taken together, these charges against the administration created the first crack in the bipartisan cold war consensus that had provided the underpinning of U.S. foreign policy for twenty years. With Vietnam, this weakened foundation and the edifice it supported collapsed. But it was the Dominican intervention, not the Vietnam War, that opened the "credibility gap" that would simultaneously undermine presidential prerogatives in international affairs and bring about a long overdue reassessment of the basic tenets of U.S. foreign policy.

LBJ was hardly the first president to suffer criticism for his handling of an international crisis involving U.S. forces. (The Truman-MacArthur controversy during the Korean War comes readily to mind.) But the Dominican intervention represented the first time in historical memory (meaning, for most Americans, World War II and after) where U.S. troops in the field became the subject of adverse commentary. Field commanders who had fought against Hitler, Tojo, or Kim Il-sung, had generally regarded media correspondents as allies in the war effort. Eisenhower's deal with Darlan in World War II or MacArthur's call for total victory in the Far East during the Korean War may have stirred controversy, but units engaged in combat were generally immune from such critical analyses.

That immunity expired with the Dominican crisis. There were several basic reasons for this. One was that the administration's insistence on maintaining the fiction of U.S. neutrality during the first month of the crisis forced military public affairs personnel to echo the official line in press briefings in Santo Domingo, even though correspondents covering the city could readily see and hear evidence to the contrary. Of the correspondents who inundated the Dominican Republic beginning in late April, only the most dimwitted—or those old-timers who believed that patriotism dictated an uncritical acceptance of the official line—could overlook U.S. assistance to the Loyalists in the form of advice, equipment, intelligence, and moral support. The Loyalists themselves sought to identify their cause with U.S. goals, which did not help U.S. credibility. Realizing this, the State Department, at one point, informed Bennett that it "would be particularly helpful if [Wessin] could be persuaded to stop playing the 'Star Spangled Banner' over [the] San Isidro radio station."<sup>5</sup>

Responsibility for the deteriorating relationship between the media and the military in Santo Domingo rested in part on those correspondents who, through bias, chose to discount official accounts that *were* correct or who

distorted news for the sake of a good story (as in the case of the CBS report of Loyalist troops entering the LOC).<sup>6</sup> Other newsmen simply misinterpreted events they witnessed in the city. For its part, the military also contributed to the strains that developed. As General Palmer conceded at the time, the military "simply did not have a first-class press and public affairs set-up in the DOMREP," and thus, "our handling of the press was not well done." When correspondents confronted briefers with discrepancies between America's proclaimed neutrality and the military's close ties to the Loyalists, the briefers often refused comment or misrepresented the facts, thereby reinforcing the media's skepticism. Some correspondents stopped attending the daily military briefings; some offered to hold press briefings for the military.<sup>7</sup>

The military's ongoing conflict with certain correspondents in the Dominican Republic became a matter of public record. Other problems, namely those that afflicted the military in planning and executing the intervention, either were not publicized or were not considered newsworthy. The military itself would have to remedy these problems, which, in the tradition of the services, were addressed in an avalanche of after-action reports, debriefings, roundtable discussions, and interminable official studies. To begin at the top and work down, the JCS, the president's principal military advisers, found themselves locked out of several critical meetings where military operations were discussed by LBJ and his civilian advisers. To be sure, Secretary of Defense McNamara served as a conduit between the White House and the JCS, but this did not compensate for the inability of the Joint Chiefs to perform their advisory function under optimum conditions. On those occasions when General Wheeler, the chairman of the JCS, was called on for advice, he often presented the views of the JCS eloquently. There were critical times, however, when the JCS was simply ignorant of what was happening further down the chain of command. During the deployment phase, for example, units were often in the objective area before the JCS had issued the necessary execution orders. One can only speculate on the reaction of a task force commander on receiving a message to prepare for an operation that had already been completed. And one can only imagine LBJ's state of mind when, in attempting to control operations from the top, he received inaccurate or outdated information.

The problem of military communications permeated the chain of command. Wheeler bristled when he could not obtain timely information from LANTCOM or the commander of JTF 122, a shortcoming attributable in part to the inadequate U.S. communications equipment located at the scene of the action. The difficulties Masterson encountered in trying to talk directly to Embassy officials during the first week of the intervention brought into question the relevance of a naval officer having operational control over a land operation that he could not be present to direct. That the Navy did not seem to comprehend the procedures and requirements of a large airborne force further called into question naval direction of Power Pack. Little wonder that Wheeler insisted on the appointment of a land force commander and then instructed him to report directly to the JCS as well as through

the chain of command. Once Palmer received adequate communications facilities to comply with this instruction, JTF 122 became irrelevant to the operation and, according to existing doctrine,<sup>8</sup> was disestablished. At the same time, CINCLANT found that his operational command over the land forces involved in the intervention had become more nominal than real.

Poor coordination, communications, and command and control had a disruptive effect on virtually every requirement for sending an Army division, Marine MEB, and other forces to the Dominican Republic. With respect to coordination, the CINCLANT OPLAN listed the forces that could be called on for the purpose of intervening in a Dominican crisis, but it provided little useful information concerning the target area itself. In addition, the OPLANs of the Army and Air Force components were woefully outdated. While no OPLAN can anticipate all contingencies and requirements, the above deficiencies complicated the hectic planning efforts on the part of hastily convened, inadequately informed, geographically separated, and insufficiently manned joint staffs. Considering these handicaps, it is notable that the staffs accomplished what they did during the first few days of the alert. Indeed, their work might have sufficed had it not been for competing demands, such as the Blue Chip exercise, and the unanticipated and rapid escalation of troop requirements. Last-minute priorities set by higher authorities further complicated matters, hindered better coordination, encouraged the tendency toward inflexibility, and added to the general confusion.

The number of commands and headquarters taking part in the deployment phase of the operation hindered orderly communications and aggravated the problem of effective coordination and control. At one extreme, CINCLANT often bypassed CINCSTRIKE in an attempt to facilitate deployment. At the other extreme, planners would be contacted by too many "higher authorities" hoping to play some part in the operation. The XVIII Airborne Corps or 82d at Bragg, for example, would often receive verbal messages from one source, only to have them contradicted by follow-up messages from another source. York's admonition that "Headquarters at all levels must phase out of operational channels as quickly as possible . . ." and that "If the shots are to be controlled at DOD/DA or higher level, intervening headquarters should provide support but not attempt to interpret guidance," constituted sound advice under the circumstances.<sup>9</sup>

Once in the Dominican Republic, York and Palmer sent urgent requests for more combat troops and then waited, partly because political decisions had to be made, partly because of problems in planning and deployment procedures. Delays in sending the kinds of troops and equipment requested by the field commander occurred when key personnel refused to deviate from load and deployment plans or, conversely, when chaos resulted from the failure to observe any plan. Higher headquarters added to the confusion when they rearranged transport priorities without consulting with the commanders in Santo Domingo.

Once the troops did arrive in the Dominican Republic, they knew little about the situation. In part, their ignorance resulted from a dearth of accu-

rate information. Assessments contained in State and CIA cables were often unsubstantiated, biased, or irrelevant. When accurate political and mission-oriented information did exist prior to the commitment of troops, it was withheld from some key officers because of an obsession with operational security. Most of the intelligence essential to the operation was acquired by U.S. troops *after* they had entered the country and made direct contact with Dominicans on both sides. Military intelligence officers bemoaned the low priority given HUMINT (intelligence acquired from people instead of from technical devices) prior to the intervention, and valuable time was later spent in setting up the networks and facilities for acquiring such information (one of the most productive sources of intelligence in military operations short of all-out war).

The intelligence failure, together with the delays in sending combat troops and supplies, could have had fatal consequences had the United States confronted a formidable conventional force or well-trained urban guerrillas. Had that occurred, the marines and paratroopers would have ultimately prevailed, but the U.S. casualty figures would have been much higher than 47 dead (27 in combat) and 172 wounded. Fortune was kind. The Constitutionalist forces the Americans faced lacked discipline, training, cohesion, and sophisticated weapons. Because the U.S. Navy and Air Force could interdict any supplies, troops, or aircraft entering the country from external sources, the rebels could expect little more than moral support from sympathetic countries. Also, by intervening during the early days of the civil war, the United States did not allow either side to develop a conventional or unconventional threat that could inflict heavy casualties on U.S. forces. Noting these advantages, Palmer, in his first commander's summary, emphasized that the Dominican intervention should be regarded as "a special case," not necessarily applicable in larger countries where an insurgency had had a chance to plant firm roots. "If the situation has been allowed to deteriorate," Palmer wrote, "we had better think twice before we commit our force to a large country—it may be a bottomless pit."<sup>10</sup> Palmer's ability to grasp the larger ramifications of a specific operation had been one of the reasons for his selection as the commander of U.S. forces in the Dominican intervention.

Palmer was also one of a small group of U.S. officers who truly grasped the "political-military" nature of the undertaking. In all cases in which the United States employs military force, political authorities define the strategic objectives of an operation. This function has traditionally been within the purview of America's foreign policy establishment. Indeed, the military expect policymakers to define these objectives, but in clear terms so that military personnel know what is expected of them and can plan accordingly. In the Dominican crisis, the goal of preventing a Communist victory was made clear from the start. But whether the military would help achieve that goal through intimidation or force could not be determined until several weeks after the initial U.S. forces landed. At the time, and in retrospect, critics have faulted U.S. political authorities for not understanding or not paying attention to the military's requirement for a clear mission statement. But

this criticism, while it has some merit, fails to comprehend the perspective of the president and his advisers. For a variety of reasons, they wanted to avoid ordering the military to mount a major offensive. But until they were certain that the rebels could not overthrow the Loyalist junta or Imbert's GNR, an unequivocal decision as to the precise employment of U.S. troops could not be made. Uncertainty, with its consequences for political-military coordination, was inherent in the rapidly changing situation in the Dominican Republic.

Just as the determination of strategic objectives by political authorities was in keeping with tradition, so, too, was the president's choice of what military units would be committed to the intervention. All parties privy to the deliberations culminating in the president's decision to send in an overwhelming force in hopes of intimidating or, failing that, defeating the rebels were in agreement. The consensus broke down, however, over the control Washington wished to exert over military activity and operations. That political authorities would assume direct control of military operations had immediate repercussions. As noted, CINCLANT's operational command over U.S. forces committed within his area of operations was at times nominal. Just as CINCLANT often excluded CINCSTRIKE from the chain of command, so Washington often bypassed CINCLANT or only perfunctorily involved him in the making of critical military decisions. Unified commanders had been taught to play a more important role during a crisis.

As the two principal land force commanders in the Dominican Republic, York and Palmer realized upon their arrival that they and their subordinates would not have the free hand in operational and tactical matters that military tradition revered and officers expected. Washington's delay in sending both men the combat troops they requested and Palmer's ordeal in getting Washington to approve the LOC brought home the lesson that political considerations would govern the scope of military operations. Neither general liked the constraints placed on him, but whereas York, a commander who was very close to the troops of his division, refused to accept the validity of the restraints, Palmer, as the "theater commander," adjusted to them. While Palmer never ceased to be an on-the-scene spokesman for military necessity, he gradually came to comprehend the complexity of the Dominican situation and to accept the wisdom of a political settlement. It went against his professional experience and training to enforce the more odious rules of engagement, but he carried out his orders knowing that a political solution would, in the long run, be best for U.S. interests and for the Dominican Republic. Had a general officer not possessed of Palmer's "political sensitivity" been in charge of the U.S. forces, the outcome of the crisis might have been decidedly different.

For the marines and paratroopers who faced rebel bullets, the stringent rules of engagement imposed by Washington and USFORDOMREP made little sense. The troops had been trained to fight upon deployment. Yet with few exceptions, the combat they experienced in the Dominican Republic was against snipers, not formal military units. Soldiers cursed the restrictions and wondered why the military had not better trained them for political-

military operations. Such training no doubt would have been valuable, although the lesson of restraint can be quickly forgotten when a soldier comes under fire and is told he cannot defend himself unless he is about to be overrun. Some rules of engagement, such as the restriction against return fire unless one's position were being threatened, were ludicrous. Most rules, however, were essential for improving the prospects for a negotiated settlement. While officers in charge of combat units cannot be expected to appreciate rules of engagement that place the safety of their men in jeopardy and should challenge those that do so gratuitously, they should also be prepared in contingency operations to confront such restraints. Officers who expect a free hand in such situations are bound to become frustrated and disillusioned, perhaps to the point where their performance as leaders would be affected.

If restraint provided the key to a political solution to the crisis, discipline provided the key to restraint. By all accounts, the U.S. troops involved in the Dominican intervention demonstrated remarkable discipline in performing the full range of duties assigned to them and in resisting temptations to retaliate when provoked. The mere presence of the troops ended the worst of the bloodshed that characterized the first phase of the civil war. The discipline of U.S. troops ensured that thousands more would not join the almost 3,000 Dominicans killed prior to the intervention. For this, most of the population of Santo Domingo were grateful, although they did not always express their gratitude publicly.

In the context of a political-military operation, the Dominican crisis, at the time, seemed the apotheosis of limited war theories of civilian management applied to the real world. For civilian policymakers, the ultimate success of the Dominican enterprise encouraged the further application of the theories in Vietnam. The military came out of the Dominican Republic divided in its views. A few officers begrudgingly came to accept political management as inevitable and at times necessary in situations in which the primary purpose of military operations was to support efforts to arrange political solutions. Most officers, however, criticized "overcontrol and overmanagement" by civilians, unwarranted intrusions for which Johnson and especially McNamara were held in contempt. In late 1965, General Wheeler spoke for these critics when he asked "discretion for field commanders to 'exercise command . . . on the spot,' free of having their hands tied by . . . theorists at higher headquarters."<sup>11</sup> Between the poles of acceptance and criticism, several officers and enlisted men who served in the Dominican Republic recognized that neither the professional military nor the civilian policymakers and their representatives understood the needs, requirements, and problems with which the other had to grapple. From among the military personnel who lamented this ignorance, appeals emanated for greater training in political-military operations at all levels throughout the civilian and military chains of command. The appeals went unheeded. It was easier to use the management of the Dominican crisis as an argument for or against limited war theories than to derive from the experience insights that might promote better understanding and more efficient interaction between civilian

policymakers and military officers during times of crisis. (As a cautionary note, one should avoid overstating the benefits of better political-military understanding in a constantly changing situation. Understanding cannot always cut through the confusion and ambiguity inherent in an international crisis.)

Power Pack, in the final analysis, should be approached cautiously when used as a model for contingency and peacekeeping operations. Individual operations should be evaluated on their own merits and with an open mind as to the degree of political control and military restrictions necessary to achieve U.S. objectives. Nonetheless, the Dominican crisis provides us with useful insights and reveals recurrent patterns that arise in such contingency operations. Problems that developed in Power Pack have occurred all too frequently in other joint and combined operations. The experiences of Power Pack also indicate that the Vietnam War was not an aberration in terms of political-military interaction. In a world of nuclear weapons, the idea that a field commander and his troops will automatically be given complete freedom to perform their mission is outdated and inherently dangerous. This observation, however, does not make operating under politically imposed restraints any easier for men under fire, and in this sense, the Dominican intervention stands as a tribute to the discipline and training of American soldiers. Equally important, it demonstrated the ability of soldiers to adapt quickly when reality has failed to conform to their expectations and when changing circumstances involved new roles, force structures, and command relationships. Flexibility and adaptability were critical to the successful execution of missions to which the marines and paratroopers probably gave little or no thought prior to deployment.

Despite the frustrations and problems that surfaced during the Dominican intervention, Power Pack, when judged by the criteria Generals Johnson and Palmer established, fulfilled the requirements of a successful stability operation. The Marines and Army performed a variety of functions that included combat, civic action, civil affairs, psychological warfare, and special operations. The ramifications of these activities carried well beyond the strictly military sphere into areas affecting politics, economics, society, and public opinion. As a result of the stability operation, order was restored, a democratic system reestablished, and a possible Communist takeover prevented. While all the grievances that triggered the crisis were not redressed in the settlement of 1965—66,<sup>12</sup> the intervention helped set the stage for twenty years of relative peace (if not continuous prosperity) in the Dominican Republic. In a region known for its chronic instability, this is a significant achievement for which the soldiers who took part in Power Pack have expressed pride and satisfaction.

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# Appendix

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## Chronology of Crisis Events

|                           |   |
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| 1916—24                   | The United States occupies the Dominican Republic; creates national guard.  |
| 1930                      | The Trujillo dictatorship begins in the Dominican Republic.   |
| 1959                      | Castro comes to power in Cuba.  |
| 1960                      | President Eisenhower wants Castro and Trujillo "sawed off."<br>OAS and United States enact economic and diplomatic sanctions against Trujillo regime.<br>Kennedy elected president. |
| Apr 1961                  | U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs fails.  |
| May 1961                  | Trujillo is assassinated.   |
| Summer—Fall, 1961         | Kennedy administration prevents Trujillo family from restoring dictatorship.  |
| Jan 1962                  | OAS and U.S. sanctions against the Dominican Republic lifted as Balaguer promises elections.  |
| Dec 1962                  | Bosch elected president of Dominican Republic.  |
| Sep 1963                  | Military coup deposes Bosch.  |
| Nov 1963                  | President Kennedy assassinated.   |
| Dec 1963                  | President Johnson recognizes Dominican "Triumvirate."   |
| Early 1965                | Rumors of coup against Reid Cabral's "Triumvirate" increase.  |
| 24 Apr 1965<br>(Saturday) | Rebel plotters arrest Dominican chief of staff.<br>Military-civilian coup against Reid's regime begins.   |

- 24—25 Apr 1965 Rebels arm population; enter Santo Domingo.
- 25 Apr 1965  
(Sunday) Reid government overthrown.  
Molina sworn in as provisional president of rebel (Constitutionalist) government.  
Loyalist planes attack Presidential Palace, beginning civil war.  
JCS transmits order to move U.S. naval vessels off Dominican shore for use in possible evacuation of Americans from the Dominican Republic.
- 26 Apr 1965  
(Monday) U.S. naval task group arrives off Dominican shore.  
JCS alerts two battalion combat teams of the 82d Airborne Division for possible deployment to the Dominican Republic.
- 27 Apr 1965  
(Tuesday) Rebel gang threatens Americans at Hotel Embajador.  
Loyalist troops begin advance on Santo Domingo.  
Evacuation of American and other foreign nationals begins.  
Cable from Rusk outlines U.S. goals: restore law and order, prevent a Communist takeover of the country, and protect American lives.  
Ambassador Bennett returns to Santo Domingo at midday and meets with rebel leaders in the afternoon.  
After meeting with Bennett, moderate rebel political leaders seek asylum; Country Team believes Communists now control rebel movement.  
Constitutionalist movement appears on verge of defeat.
- 27—28 Apr 1965 Caamaño rallies rebels and plans counterattack against Loyalists.
- 28 Apr 1965  
(Wednesday) Loyalists form military junta led by Colonel Benoit.  
Rebel counterattack stops Loyalist advance.  
Bennett reports deteriorating situation to Washington; requests communications equipment for Loyalists.  
Bennett recommends landing U.S. marines.  
More than 500 marines come ashore at polo field.  
President Johnson justifies landing of marines as necessary to protect American lives and property.

- Bennett recommends that Washington consider armed intervention to restore order and prevent a Communist takeover.
- 29 Apr 1965  
(Thursday)
- 3d Brigade (2 BCTs), 82d Airborne Division, receives orders to depart Pope AFB for Ramey AFB in Puerto Rico.
- Vice Admiral Masterson, commander of JTF 122, arrives in Dominican waters.
- More than 1,500 additional marines land; Bennett proposes they establish neutral zone to encompass Hotel Embajador and U.S. Embassy.
- JCS selects Power Pack as code name for Dominican operation.
- 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Power Pack I), en route to Ramey AFB, receives orders to airland at San Isidro airfield in the Dominican Republic; Major General York, the division's commander, is designated land forces commander.
- 30 Apr 1965  
(Friday)
- Power Pack I reaches San Isidro at 0215.
- York and Masterson meet aboard *Boxer*; York requests more troops; Masterson relays request to JCS.
- President Johnson meets with advisers to consider further troop deployments to the Dominican Republic; authorizes sending rest of 82d, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and, if necessary, the 101st Airborne Division; activates Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps.
- U.S. paratroopers move toward Santo Domingo; secure east bank of Ozama River and Duarte bridge; establish a bridgehead on west bank.
- U.S. marines establish International Security Zone.
- OAS Council calls for truce in Dominican civil war.
- Ambassador Martin arrives on presidential mission to negotiate cease-fire.
- Papal nuncio, U.S. officials, Loyalists, and Constitutionalists sign cease-fire agreement.
- Loyalist troops move back to San Isidro, leaving gap between U.S. Marine and Army positions.
- 1 May 1965  
(Saturday)
- Lieutenant General Palmer arrives at San Isidro shortly after midnight; confers with York; refuses to recognize cease-fire so long as gap between Marine and Army units exists; calls

- for linkup of Marine and Army patrols later in day.
- Bennett, on Palmer's advice, asks Washington to send more troops.
- President Johnson again meets with advisers to reconsider troop deployments discussed Friday.
- Linkup between Marine and Army patrols occurs; linkup convinces Palmer that corridor between Army and Marine positions can be established.
- 2 May 1965  
(Sunday)
- Washington approves establishment of corridor.
- Ambassador Martin reports that revolt under Communist control.
- President Johnson, in television address, reveals anti-Communist motive behind intervention.
- 3 May 1965  
(Monday)
- At one minute past midnight, operation to establish corridor (LOC) begins; paratroopers establish corridor in just over an hour; 80 percent of rebel force is now trapped in Ciudad Nueva with no prospect of achieving a military victory.
- U.S. military begins participation in relief programs; launch Operation Green Chopper in interior of country.
- 3—5 May 1965
- U.S. troops expand LOC.
- 4 May 1965
- Rebel "congress" elects Caamaño "president."
- 5 May 1965
- U.S. Special Forces take over Green Chopper mission; relief supplies begin arriving from United States; U.S. PSYWAR unit begins broadcasting.
- 6 May 1965
- OAS meeting of foreign ministers approves resolution to establish an inter-American force for use in the Dominican Republic.
- 7 May 1965
- General Imbert becomes "president" of U.S.-backed Government of National Reconstruction (GNR).
- General Palmer is formally designated Commander, United States Forces, Dominican Republic.
- 13 May 1965
- Bennett and Palmer recommend unilateral U.S. action to clear rebels from northern Santo Domingo.
- 15 May 1965
- Bundy mission arrives in Dominican Republic.
- Imbert's troops begin sweep of northern Santo Domingo.

- 16 May 1965 Washington instructs Palmer to use U.S. troops to prevent GNR naval and air units from participating in northern sweep.
- 17 May 1965 U.S. troop buildup in the Dominican Republic reaches its peak of nearly 24,000.
- 20 May 1965 Fighting in northern Santo Domingo ends in GNR victory; Radio Santo Domingo is captured.
- 21 May 1965 New cease-fire goes into effect.
- 29 May 1965 General Alvim of Brazil assumes command of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).
- 1 Jun 1965 IAPF reaches agreement with Loyalists and Constitutionalists on status of National Palace.
- 4 Jun 1965 Second OAS Committee arrives in Santo Domingo to negotiate political settlement.
- Jun 1965 U.S. marines withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.
- 15 Jun 1965 Serious fighting breaks out between rebels and IAPF; U.S. troops seize and retain an area of thirty square blocks of rebel territory in Ciudad Nueva.
- 18 Jun 1965 OAS Committee puts forward general proposal for a political settlement.
- 30 Aug 1965 Constitutionalists and Loyalists accept OAS-sponsored Act of Reconciliation.
- 3 Sep 1965 Héctor García-Godoy sworn in as president of Provisional Government.
- 9 Sep 1965 IAPF stops General Wessin's attempt to overthrow Provisional Government; Wessin leaves country.
- 13—14 Oct 1965 By agreement, rebels evacuate Ciudad Nueva for the 27th of July barracks.
- 25 Oct 1965 IAPF moves into Ciudad Nueva.
- 19—20 Dec 1965 IAPF company rescues and evacuates Caamaño and followers from Hotel Matum in Santiago.
- 6—8 Jan 1966 García-Godoy announces that his military chiefs and certain Constitutionalist officers will be posted overseas; announcement precipitates a coup attempt by the military chiefs; IAPF negotiates end to crisis.
- Jan 1966 Generals Alvim and Palmer leave country to be replaced by Brigadier General Alvaro de Silva Brago of Brazil and Robert Linvill, respectively.

- Jan—Feb 1966 Caamaño, other prominent Constitutionals, and military chiefs accept overseas postings.
- 1 Mar 1966 Presidential election campaign between Bosch and Balaguer begins.
- 1 Jun 1966 Balaguer defeats Bosch in presidential election.
- 1 Jul 1966 Balaguer sworn in as president.
- 21 Sep 1966 Last U.S. units leave the Dominican Republic.
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# Notes

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## Author's Preface

1. Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": *The American Intervention in Lebanon*, Leavenworth Papers no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1981).
2. *Ibid.*, vii.
3. Herbert Garrettson Schoonmaker, "United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1977); and Lawrence M. Greenberg, *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention*, Historical Analysis Series (Washington, DC: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987).

## Chapter 1

1. The classic work on U.S. relations with Latin America from American independence into World War II is Samuel Flag Bemis, *The Latin-American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943). Other works on U.S.-Latin American relations during this period are listed in Richard Dean Burns, ed., *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1983).
2. This brief overview of the Truman administration's relations with Latin America is based on Raymond Estep, *United States Military Aid to Latin America*, Air University Documentary Research Study no. AU-200-65-ASI (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1966), 20–24; Federico G. Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), 189–208; Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 8–10, 50–55; Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 9–13; Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983), 88–109; Lester D. Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), 187–90; Abraham F. Lowenthal and Albert Fishlow, *Latin America's Emergence: Toward a U.S. Response*, Headline Series 243 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1979), 5; John Bartlow Martin, *U.S. Policy in the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 29–30; Chester J. Pach, Jr., "The Containment of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America, 1944–49," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Summer 1982):225–43; and Roger R. Trask, "The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945–59," *Diplomatic History* 1 (Summer 1977): 271–84.

3. Unless otherwise noted, this brief overview of U.S. relations with Latin America during the Eisenhower administration is based on Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 477, 504–615 passim; Gil, *Latin American-U.S. Relations*, 209–32; LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 109–43; Langley, *U.S. and the Caribbean*, 205–19; Lowenthal and Fishlow, *Latin America's Emergence*, 6–9; Martin, *U.S. Policy*, 31–47; Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 6; Jerome N. Slater, "The Dominican Republic, 1961–66," in *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, edited by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1978), 290–91; Jerome N. Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 6–8; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); José Zalaquett, "From Dictatorship to Democracy," *New Republic*, 16 December 1985:18; Wayne N. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), chapters 1 and 2; and Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).
4. The best work to date on the covert U.S. intervention in Guatemala is Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*. See also Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); Cole Blaiser, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); and Rabe, *Eisenhower*, 42–63.
5. On this point, see Stephen G. Rabe, "The Johnson (Eisenhower?) Doctrine for Latin America," *Diplomatic History* 9 (Winter 1985):95–100.
6. Whether Eisenhower knew of CIA plots to assassinate Castro is uncertain. On this point, see the appropriate sections of U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report no. 465, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), hereafter cited as Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*. A facsimile of the report was published commercially by W. W. Norton in 1976.
7. As in any complex government organization, not every person or agency accepted presidential policy. The American ambassador in Cuba remained a staunch defender of Batista even after the administration had taken punitive steps against the Cuban dictator. Also, as Wayne Smith has noted, CIA agents in planning the invasion of Cuba refused to deal with Manuel Ray, a disillusioned Castroite who by 1961 had organized an effective underground movement in Cuba. When it was suggested to one CIA man that the agency help Ray, he responded, "Absolutely not. Ray is anti-Castro, but he's something of a socialist himself. Why, he says he'd do away with the inheritance of wealth!" Smith, *The Closest of Enemies*, 72.
8. Histories of the country prior to the American intervention of 1916 include Selden Rodman, *Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964); and Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924*, 2 vols. (New York: Payton & Clarke, 1928). See also material in Richard W. Mansbach, ed., *Dominican Crisis 1965* (New York: Facts on File, 1971), 7–8; Martin, *U.S. Policy*, 74–75; and Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek, *The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 25–33.
9. From 1822 to 1844, the Dominican Republic was dominated by its neighbor Haiti, which occupies the western third of Hispaniola. It was a brutal experience that left many Dominicans willing to relinquish their newly found sovereignty to any country that could hold the Haitians at bay. For a brief time, Spain renewed its rule over the Dominicans. At one point during the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant, the United States also sought to annex the country, but the Senate rejected the treaty in 1870. Aside from this episode

- and the U.S. Navy's interest in a naval base at Samaná Bay, America by and large showed little interest in the affairs of Santo Domingo in the nineteenth century.
10. The best book published to date on the U.S. intervention of 1916–24 is Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984). See also Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916–1924* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974); Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–1934* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 117–65; Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 147–211; Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), passim; and Dana G. Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921–1934* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 44–70.
  11. Two insightful books in English on Trujillo's rule are Robert D. Crassweller, *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); and Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1970). See also G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The United States and the Trujillo Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1972); Mansbach, *Dominican Crisis*, 9–10; Martin, *U.S. Policy*, 74–75; Thomas G. Paterson, et al., *American Foreign Policy: A History*, 2d ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), 354–55; Rodman, *Quisqueya*, 128–52; Wiarda and Kryzaneck, *Dominican Republic*, 34–38.
  12. Roosevelt is quoted in Paterson, et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 355. Robert Pastor, in *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 3, 320, raises doubts that Roosevelt ever uttered this oft-quoted sentiment. Byrnes to Truman, 23 November 1945 and no date [March 1946], both in President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. For the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic's strong feelings against Trujillo, see two reports sent by the ambassador to the State Department in March and May 1954, respectively, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954*, vol. 4, *The American Republics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 946–63.
  13. On this point, see Rabe, *Eisenhower*, 157.
  14. The "Dracula" statement is quoted in Harold Molineu, *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 75.
  15. On U.S. involvement in the events surrounding the attempt to overthrow Trujillo, see U.S. Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 191–215. See also Memorandum of Conference with the President, 13 May 1960 [written on 16 May], *Declassified Documents Reference System* (Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1982), entry and microfiche no. 2473; hereafter citations from this source will be identified by document title, *DDRS*, year of publication, and entry number.
  16. A thought-provoking analysis of world affairs as seen from the perspective of the New Frontier can be found in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 198–236. Kennedy's comment on the "sweep of nationalism" is quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 418. President Kennedy's observation on the importance of Latin America is recorded in a Memorandum of Conversation, 15 February 1963, *DDRS*, 1983, no. 2563.
  17. The best overview and critique of the counterinsurgency doctrine developed by the Kennedy administration remains Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977). See also Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 417–42, 460–67; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Alliance

for Progress: A Retrospective," in *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role*, edited by Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 57–92; John Child, *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 143–87; numerous documents in the *DDRS*; Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3–127; and Stephen Lee Bowman, "The Evolution of United States Army Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Warfare: From World War II to the Commitment of Combat Units in Vietnam" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1985). On the "progressive" role of the Latin American military, see Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Athens: Ohio State University Press, 1966).

18. When Kennedy became president, the Special Forces numbered about 2,000 and had as their principal mission the organization of guerrilla units behind enemy lines during conventional war. By the late 1950s, the Special Force mission had begun to take on certain features of counterinsurgency. Kennedy accelerated this transformation, upgraded the Special Warfare Headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the Special Warfare Center under a brigadier general, authorized the wearing of the green beret, and increased Special Forces strength to about 12,000 by 1963. He also insisted that Green Berets be trained not only in counterinsurgency operations but in civic action, engineering, communications, sanitation, medicine, and a variety of other skills that would win the allegiance of the people in countries requiring Special Forces assistance. The president pushed through these measures over the objections of many U.S. officers who found elite units distasteful and who believed that any well-trained soldier could perform the unconventional tasks assigned the Green Berets. For an insightful, albeit sympathetic account of Special Forces development and activities, see Charles M. Simpson, III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983). See also, U.S. Army, 1st Special Forces, 8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), *Special Action Force for Latin America: Historical Report* (N.p., n.d.); this document covers the period 1962–65, and a copy is available at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, hereafter cited as USAMHI.
19. On the unified commands, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, *Special Historical Study: History of the Unified Command Plan* (Washington, DC, 20 December 1977), CONFIDENTIAL study declassified in 1981; U.S. Strike Command, *Strike Command History, 1961–1962* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL, n.d.), unclassified portions; Vernon Pizer, *The United States Army* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 100, 126–28; and Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army, "XVIII Airborne Corps—All the Way," *Army Digest* 22 (January 1967):12–14.
20. Unless otherwise noted, the brief overview of events in the Dominican Republic that follows is based on Atkins and Wilson, *U.S. and Trujillo*, 124, 133–41; Audrey Bracey, *Resolution of the Dominican Crisis, 1965: A Study in Mediation* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1980), xi–xiv; Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, *Dominican Action—1965: Intervention or Cooperation?*, Special Report series no. 2 (Washington, DC, 1966), 1–13; Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 11–17, 26–61; Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos*, Reprint 158 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1969); Slater, "Dominican Republic," 289–306; and Wiarda and Kryzaneck, *Dominican Republic*, 20–21, 38–40.
21. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 769.
22. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 11; Slater, "Dominican Republic," 291–97; Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 46–48.
23. Bracey, *Resolution*, xi.

24. George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 327.
25. Quinten Allen Kelso, "The Dominican Crisis of 1965: A New Appraisal" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1982), 25.
26. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 108.
27. The Alliance had promised more than it could deliver, given (1) the resistance or lukewarm support of Congress, U.S. government bureaucrats, American businessmen and financiers, Latin oligarchs, conservative campesinos, and even the allegedly "progressive" Latin military and middle class; (2) the population explosion in Latin America; (3) the use of aid to repay existing debts or to increase the oligarchs' wealth; (4) North American ethnocentrism and lack of technical expertise in projects relevant to the Third World; and (5) the tenacity with which the *ancién regime* would cling to its power and wealth, often under the guise of democracy and reform. The list goes on. For more detailed analyses of the failure of the Alliance, see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*, paperback ed. (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1972); Schlesinger, "The Alliance"; Walter LaFeber, "Inevitable Revolutions," *Atlantic Monthly* 249 (June 1982):74–83. LaFeber argues that by failing to deliver on its unrealistic promises to ameliorate unemployment, promote democracy, and bring about land reform and a redistribution of wealth and power, the Alliance helped to create a volatile situation that made the violent revolutions of the 1970s and 1980s inevitable.

## Chapter 2

1. Unless otherwise noted, the account of events leading up to 24 April 1965 is based on Slater, "Dominican Republic," 303–5; Slater, *Intervention*, 1–17; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 42–61; Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 107–74; and Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 28–29, 31–50.
2. Lowenthal, *Dominican Republic*, passim; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 33.
3. On the 1J4's rebuffs of "limited overtures" by one wing of the *PRD*, see Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 380 n. 258. Gleijeses argues that the 1J4's public appeals for a united front with moderate parties were calculated to embarrass the *PRD*, which, it was assumed, would reject making common cause with the Communists. When the *PRD* privately explored the possibility of a united front, the 1J4 rejected the overture out of hand.
4. On the Dominican military's dislike of American civic action programs, Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Smith wrote in 1968, "Conscious of their dominant military role, and as they are generally unresponsive to the needs of the people, the Dominican military leaders have felt no need to improve their 'image' among the people. *They accept a civic action program as a distasteful job, at the urging of the United States, as one of the conditions for receiving U.S. military assistance and equipment.*" Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Smith, U.S. Army, "The United States Military Assistance Program in the Dominican Republic, 1953–1965: A Lesson Learned?" (Student essay, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 18 January 1968), 11 [italics in original]. The essay is located in the Army War College archives at USAMHI.
5. Ambassador (ret.) W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., interview with author, Washington, DC, 12 November 1986.
6. Dominican officer, interview with author. By April 1965, the Dominican armed forces and police numbered nearly 28,000. The air force contained 3,700 officers and enlisted men and sported 30 F-51 fighter aircraft and 12 Vampire jets. The navy totaled 3,370 personnel and 35 "poorly manned and poorly maintained" vessels. Two destroyers and three destroyer escorts represented the "pride" of its fleet. The army rolls contained between

8,000 and 9,000 men. Membership in the national police neared 10,000 men, 3,000 of whom were stationed in Santo Domingo. *CEFA's* 2,000 men made up the remainder. What gave *CEFA* the advantage over the other military and paramilitary groups was its monopoly on tanks and recoilless cannon, its updated equipment, its superior training, and its being collocated with the air force base. This was by far the largest concentration of troops and weaponry in the country as well as its most effective force. Wessin's control over the *conjunto* was not seriously challenged until January 1965 when Colonel Juan de los Santos, a "man with his own mind," was given the temporary rank of brigadier general and made chief of staff of the air force. Wessin's influence over the 19th of November air base diminished as a result, but only slightly. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 128—30; and Smith, "U.S. Military Assistance Program," 13—14. Smith concludes that the United States produced few "positive results" with the MAP. By 1965, the military "was still far from being a professional apolitical force." With the crisis of April 1965, the Dominican armed forces virtually disintegrated. Smith blames this poor performance primarily on political factors. Smith, "U.S. Military Assistance Program," 13—14.

7. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 129.
8. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 48.
9. The CIA station chief argued for accommodation with Balaguer. *Ibid.*, 48—49. The station chief soon stepped down for medical reasons. His replacement, David Atlee Phillips, was told by his superior that the Dominican Republic "is sick, Reid is ailing politically, and we need a doctor." After reviewing the files on the country, Phillips informed his superior, "I'm afraid you don't need a doctor in Santo Domingo. You need an undertaker." David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 146.
10. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 47.
11. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 160.
12. Telegram, CRITIC ONE, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to DIRNSA, 24 April 1965, U.S. National Security Council History of Dominican Intervention, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, hereafter cited as NSC History. Further references to the Johnson Library will be cited as LBJL. Kelso indicates that Connett telephoned the State Department to report rumors of a coup over an hour before sending this cable. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 56—57.
13. Telegrams, CRITIC ONE, CRITIC NO. 2, and no. 1037, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 24 April 1965, NSC History.
14. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 173—74; Telegram nos. 1039 and 1040, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, both in *Crises in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories*, edited by Paul Kesaris (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), microfilm reel no. 5, hereafter cited as *Crises*; Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 14—16; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 69; Jack K. Ringler and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic, April—June 1965* (U) (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970), declassified document, 20; and Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 61—64.

Despradel's declaration of neutrality came Saturday afternoon. U.S. Embassy officials, apparently unaware of this, grew concerned about police inaction. No one seems to have challenged Despradel's assurances to the Embassy that he stood behind Reid but could not challenge the tanks and bazookas of the rebels. That the rebels had no tanks at that time, and few if any bazookas, apparently did not occur to U.S. officials receiving this information. Despradel's neutrality and the willingness of General de los Santos to meet with rebel officers Sunday morning left Hernandez's forces free to enter Santo Domingo Saturday night and Sunday morning. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 56, 58—60.

15. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 168—70; Telegram, CRITIC ONE, and Telegram no. 1034, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 24 April 1965, both in NSC History; Telegram nos. 1035 and 1036, 24 April 1965, and Telegram nos. 1038—1040, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, all in *Crises*, reel no. 5; entries for Sunday morning, 25 April 1965, "Chronology of Dominican Crisis—1965," undated document in NSC History, hereafter cited as "Chronology"; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 64—66, 68—69; Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 11—16.
16. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 70—74; Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 16—19, 22; entries for Sunday morning, 25 April 1965, "Chronology"; Telegram no. 633, Department of State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 25 April 1965, NSC History; and Telegram no. 1042, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, in *Crises*, reel no. 5. While he still occupied the Presidential Palace, Reid had asked the U.S. naval attaché about the possibility of U.S. military intervention. The attaché informed Connett of the request, but when Connett met with Reid that morning, the Dominican leader's comments on the military situation dealt exclusively with concerns over the loyalty of Dominican units. After Reid was arrested, a mob gathered at the Palace demanding his execution. Rather than let Reid fall into the hands of the mob, Caamaño allowed the deposed leader to "escape." Officials at the U.S. Embassy refused Reid asylum for fear it would compromise their officially proclaimed "neutrality," deemed essential if the United States hoped to effect a favorable outcome to the crisis. Reid consequently took refuge in the home of a friend.
17. Telegram no. 1051, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, NSC History.
18. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 81—82. Loyalist naval units joined in the attack on the Palace. At one point, an errant shell blew open an armory door, thus making more weapons available to the rebels. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 64.
19. Telegram no. 1051; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 80—81. Lowenthal states that some accounts claim that a U.S. military attaché ordered the Loyalist attacks. Lowenthal himself could find no evidence to substantiate the charge. *Ibid.*, 202 n. 13.
20. Entry for Saturday, 24 April 1965, "Chronology"; Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963—1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 187—88; Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 21—23; Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 40; and Bennett interview.
21. Entry for 25 April 1965, in *Daily Diary of President Johnson (1963—1969)*, edited by Paul Kesaris (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), microfilm reel no. 4, hereafter cited as *Daily Diary*.
22. According to Kelso, Richard Lippincott, State's deputy director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, arrived at the department at 0615. "He was soon joined by the Director of Caribbean Affairs, Kennedy Crockett, by the Dominican desk officer, Harry Shlaudeman, and by Acting Assistant Secretary of State Robert M. Sayre. Among their first actions was the organization of a task force within the Operations Center, . . ." Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 60. See also Telegram no. 1039; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 68—70. Except where noted, the discussion of the crisis management system in this section is based on Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 22—23, 25, 29, 67 n. 21, 74—83.
23. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 146—47.
24. LBJ's assessment of Castro's designs on the Dominican Republic are in Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 188. Reference to the infiltration of Communist agents into the Dominican Republic can be found in U.S. Forces, Dominican Republic, "Report of Stability Operations in the Dominican Republic" (Santo Domingo, 31 August 1965), pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 1, 4, hereafter cited as U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations." Johnson's statement linking Vietnam and the Dominican Republic is quoted in John Bartlow Martin, *Overtaken by Events: The*

*Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 661. On the argument that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was necessary to demonstrate American resolve and credibility as an ally, see Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, vol. 19 (Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square, 1980), 244–46; and Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 201–2, 206, 212–13.

25. Ball, *The Past*, 329.
26. On the then-current theories of limited war and the military's perception of its role in international crises, see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 8–15; and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security* 7 (Fall 1982):83–113. Rosen critiques the seminal works on limited war theory by such academicians as Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling. He includes the following observations in summarizing their views. "The object of [limited] war is political, to be obtained by negotiation and compromise, and not military, involving the physical destruction of the enemy. . . . Military problems had no proper place in a theory of limited war. This was because limited war was, essentially, a diplomatic instrument, a tool for bargaining with the enemy. . . . If limited war is to be a diplomatic tool, it must be centrally directed by the political leadership. The special needs of the military should not affect the conduct of the war. . . . If war is just another form of coercive diplomacy, then it should be run by the political leadership in Washington, not by the generals in the field. . . . Neither 'limited war' nor 'the strategy of conflict' are about war, but about diplomacy and bargaining. The conference table and not the battlefield is the center of the action." Rosen concludes his critique by arguing that the "military should *not* be given a free hand, but they must be allowed the freedom to solve the military problem within the limits set for them." For its part, the civilian leadership needs to learn "enough about military problems to set meaningful missions for the military."

On LBJ's reliance on McNamara, see Betts, *Soldiers*, 8; on not meeting with Wheeler until the 29th, see entry for 29 April 1965 in *Daily Diary*, reel no. 4.

### Chapter 3

1. Telegram no. 1051.
2. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 70; Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 60–61; Telegram no. 1056, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965; Telegram no. 633; and Telegram, JCS to CINCLANT, 1432Z 25 April 1965, all in NSC History. Telegram no. 1053, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, in *Crises*, reel no. 5; and entries for Sunday, 25 April 1965, in "Chronology."
3. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 91–92; Major General R. McC. Tompkins, U.S. Marine Corps, "Ubique," *Marine Corps Gazette* 49 (September 1965):34; Captain James A. Dare, U.S. Navy, "Dominican Diary," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 91 (December 1965):37–38; and Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 26–28. As described by Schoonmaker, the six ships in Task Group 44.9 were "the *Boxer*, an amphibious assault ship equipped with helicopters, the *Raleigh*, an amphibious transport accommodating helicopters, landing craft, tanks, and assault troops, the *Ruchamkin*, a high-speed troop transport, the *Fort Snelling*, a landing ship carrying helicopters, landing craft and tanks; the *Rankin*, an attack cargo ship, and the *Wood County*, a tank landing ship." Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 27. The 6th MEU was composed of "the 3rd Battalion of the Sixth Marines, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, the headquarters of the Marine Expeditionary Unit, a provisional Marine air group, and some force and division attached units. . . ." Dare, "Dominican Diary," 37. For additional information on Marine Corps force structure and weaponry in the mid-1960s, see James A. Donovan, Jr., *The United States Marine Corps* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 75–107, 146–69.
4. Dare, "Dominican Diary," 38–39; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 92.

5. Dare, "Dominican Diary," 39; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 20–21.
6. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 71–72.
7. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 72–73; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 83–84, 86–87; and Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 21, 24. As early as 1800 Sunday, a delegation of PRD moderates arrived at the Embassy and asked U.S. assistance in ending the air force attacks. U.S. officials refused to interfere in the matter but offered to arrange talks with the "legitimate military hierarchy," that is, the Loyalist officers. The PRD leaders demurred.
8. Dare, Dominican Diary, 40; Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 24; and Tompkins, "Ubique," 34. Telegram nos. 1080, 1091, 1095, and 1097, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 26 April 1965; Telegram nos. 1102, 1105, 1108, and 1109, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1965; Telegram nos. 634 and 641, State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 26 April 1965; and Telegram no. 643, State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 27 April 1965; all in NSC History.
9. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 85–90; and entries for Tuesday, 27 April 1965, in "Chronology."
10. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 92–93; Tompkins, "Ubique," 34; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 90; Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 26; entries for Tuesday, 27 April 1965, in "Chronology"; and Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 191–92.
11. For details of the evacuation, see entries for Tuesday, 27 April 1965, in "Chronology"; Dare, "Dominican Diary," 40–42; Tompkins, "Ubique," 34; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 22–24, 92–94.
12. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 90, 92–93; and Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 74–75, 78–79.
13. Telegram no. 1118, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1965, in NSC History; Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 79–80; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 90–93; and Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 24, 27–28.
14. Telegram nos. 1118, 1120, and 1121, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1965, in NSC History; Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 78–79; and Dare, "Dominican Diary," 41.
15. On the issue of mediation, Bennett told the author, "Mediation is a very precise thing, and once you mediate, you take on yourself the responsibility for the settlement. Those were not my instructions, so I said I had no instructions to mediate." Bennett interview. See also Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 82, 106 n. 54.
16. Telegram no. 1128, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1965, in NSC History; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 90; and Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 193.
17. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 94–96. Telegram no. 1125, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1965; and Telegram no. 653, Department of State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 27 April 1965; both in NSC History. Entry for 1015, 28 April 1965, "Chronology"; and Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 37.
18. Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 29, 31; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 96–98; and Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 48.
19. Bennett apparently reported to Washington that the Palace was seized not by General Montas but by General Antonio Imbert Barreras acting independently with his own group of armed men. Entry for 1015, 28 April 1965, in "Chronology."
20. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 75.
21. Telegram no. 1136, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, in

- NSC History; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 98; and Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 31–32.
22. Telegram no. 1143, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, in *Crises*, reel no. 5.
  23. Telegram no. 1144, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, in *Crisis*, reel no. 5; Tad Szulc, *Dominican Diary* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), 41–42; and Telegram nos. 1146 and 1147, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, in NSC History.
  24. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 100; and Telegram no. 1149, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, in NSC History.
  25. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 101; and Kelso, “Dominican Crisis,” 88–90.
  26. Telegrams, CRITIC FOUR and CRITIC FIVE, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to DIRNSA, 28 April 1965, both in NSC History.
  27. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 103–4; Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 195; and Telegram CINCLANTFLT to COMCARIBSEAFRON and to CTG 44.9, 2146Z 28 April 1965, in NSC History. Apparently, Mann informed Wheeler of the president’s decision to send in marines, while McNamara followed up by authorizing the JCS chairman to issue the necessary “execute orders.” See Kelso, “Dominican Crisis,” 79–80.
  28. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 102, 105; and U.S. Department of State, “The Dominican Republic,” in State Department Administrative History, 1965, LBJL.
  29. Telegram, CRITIC SIX, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to DIRNSA, 28 April 1965, in NSC History; and Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 40. A cable containing Benoit’s addendum did not arrive at the State Department until 0120 on the 29th. Telegram no. 1163, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1965, in NSC History.
  30. On the communication and coordination problems that arose during the landing of the first wave of marines on the 28th, see Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 24–25; Dare, “Dominican Diary,” 42; and “Military Operations in the Dominican Republic,” no date, teleconference between the Department of State and American Embassy, Santo Domingo, 28 April 1965, hereafter cited as Teleconference, 28 April 1965; Telegram, CRITIC SIX; and Telegram nos. 1155 and 1156, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965, all in NSC History.
  31. Dare, “Dominican Diary,” 42; Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 25–26; and Teleconference, 28 April 1965.
  32. “Alerting, Movement, and Execution Orders Directed by JCS” and Daily Report, 28 April 1965, both in NSC History; and *New York Times*, 29 April 1965:1, 14.
  33. Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 56–59.

## Chapter 4

1. Telegram no. 1155; and Kelso, “Dominican Crisis,” 117.
2. “Alerting, Movement, and Execution Orders,” in NSC History; John W. Ault, “Dominican Republic Crisis: Causes, Intervention, Lessons Learned” (Research paper, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1970), 30; Palmer, “XVIII Airborne Corps,” 16; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 4, 1, and vol. II, IV-A-1. For a more detailed discussion of the force structure of pentomic and ROAD divisions and the transition from one to the other, see Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76*, Leavenworth Papers no. 1 (Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 17–23.

3. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 15–18; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, III-B-1; Colonel John J. Costa, U.S. Army, telephone interview with author, 12 February 1988; and Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Bechtold, U.S. Army, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 29 October 1987. The Tactical Air Command’s unclassified report on the Dominican intervention refers to the benefits of Quick Kick VII but, unlike the Army and Marine histories, argues that the “cons” of the exercise outweighed the “pros” in that forces were still being reconstituted and consumables replaced when the crisis in Santo Domingo began. U.S. Department of the Air Force, *The Tactical Air Command in the Dominican Crisis, 1965* (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Office of TAC History, May 1977), 9–10.
4. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960–1983*, Westview Replica ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 94.
5. U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, IV-A-1; David W. Gray, *The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander’s Reminiscence* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1984), 43; and Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 36–37.
6. “U.S. Strike Command,” *Army Information Digest* 17 (May 1962):19–23; “USARSTRIKE: Ready to Go,” *Army Information Digest* 20 (October 1965):12–15; and General Paul D. Adams, U.S. Army, Oral history, 33–34, USAMHL. The Navy had opposed the creation of STRICOM from its conception in 1961, one reason, perhaps, why CINCLANT sought to bypass the unified command during the Dominican crisis. As a further hindrance to cooperation, there were officers in STRICOM who believed that the Caribbean should become their area of operational responsibility, not LANTCOM’s. After the crisis, Adams and CINCLANT Admiral Thomas Moorer attempted to work out their joint operational problems. A tentative agreement was reached but, according to Adams, was scuttled by Moorer’s superiors. Adams, Oral history, 40–42; and Haffa, *Half War*, 136 n. 77.
7. Schoonmaker, “U.S. Military Forces,” 86, 96 n. 39; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, III-B-1; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 30.
8. U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, III-A-1, E-15; J. D. Yates, “The Dominican Crisis,” Mitre Working Paper (Bedford, MA: Mitre Corporation, 1973), 14; U.S. Air Force, 464th Troop Carrier Wing, “History of the 464th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, January 1965–June 1965” (N.p., 1965), Narrative, vol. 1, 36 (this document is available at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama); U.S. Department of the Air Force, “Case Studies of Airpower: The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965,” Aerospace Studies Institute Project no. AU-434-66-ASI (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1966), 13; and Lieutenant General Eugene Forrester, U.S. Army, ret., interview with author, Washington, DC, 11 November 1986.
9. Planning for the deployment of the designated Army and Air Force units was accomplished at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base by staff officers from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d Airborne Division, the Nineteenth Air Force, and the 464th Troop Carrier Wing. As noted in the text, CINCSTRIKE also sent staff officers to assist in the planning. Because the text does not provide a detailed account of the planning activities of these officers, readers might wish to consult Schoonmaker, “U.S. Military Forces,” passim; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, secs. III and IV; USAF, “History of the 464th,” 35–36; USAF, “Case Studies of Airpower,” 9–12, 17–19; USAF, 9th Air Force, Airlift Task Force Tactical Operations, “Final Report on Power Pack” (Shaw Air Force Base, SC, 24 May 1965), copy at the Simpson Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; and USAF, *TAC in the Dominican Crisis*, 3–8.
10. On the disruptive effects of Blue Chip V, see U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, III-B-2 to III-B-4, IV-A-7 to IV-A-8; USAF, *TAC in the Dominican Crisis*, 10–11;

Major General William E. Klein, U.S. Army, interview with author, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 4 November 1986; and Forrester interview.

11. See references in note 9. Also see the Klein interview.
12. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-A-2; and USAF, *TAC in the Dominican Crisis*, 5, 8.
13. Intelligence problems during this early phase are discussed in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, I-3, II-3, III-C-1, IV-A-5, VI-3 to VI-4, and pt. 1, vol. I, C-19, C-20, D-1. Yates, "Dominican Crisis," 14; Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 91; and Lieutenant Colonel Steven Butler, U.S. Army, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 March 1986.
14. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, III-A-2; Colonel Eldredge R. Long, U.S. Army, ret., interview with author, Washington, DC, 5 November 1985; and Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 37.
15. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 27, 97–98. Telegram, CTG 44.9 to CINCLANTFLT, 0152Z 29 April 1965; and Telegram no. 1167, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1965; both in NSC History.
16. Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 113–16. Telegram nos. 1160 and 1161, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 28 April 1965; Telegram nos. 1173 and 1178, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1965; all in NSC History. Dare, "Dominican Diary," 45; and Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action*, 42.
17. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 107, 110–11; and Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 70 n. 47.
18. Telegram, CRITIC SEVEN, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to DIRNSA, 29 April 1965; and Telegram no. 1137, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1965; both in NSC History.
19. Telegram no. 1137; and Kelso, "Dominican Crisis," 126–27.
20. Dare, "Dominican Diary," 44–45; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 27–28.
21. At 1514 EDT, the JCS ordered the initial assault force of the 82d to proceed to Ramey Air Force Base. At 1630 EDT, CINCLANT relayed the order verbally to TAC and CONARC. The sources do not agree as to exactly when the first C-130s left Pope Air Force Base. Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 99, puts the time at 1900 EDT; Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 99, and previously cited Air Force histories put it at 1911 EDT; while the 82d Airborne's report in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-1, places it one and one-half hours later, at 2054 EDT.
22. Even though the departure of the first (and subsequent) echelons of Power Pack from Pope AFB suffered delays for a variety of reasons, troops, once they were marshaled by the aircraft, could not always use the additional time to their advantage. Thus, among the first-echelon troops, several departed Pope with A bags but not B bags. (The A bags contained minimal essential clothing, while the B bags contained additional clothing and articles.) For security reasons, troops were not able to use the extra time caused by delays to notify family members of the 82d's imminent departure. This resulted in numerous problems, ranging from inconvenience to desperation. Paratroopers had no time to give their wives paychecks, PX and commissary cards, car keys, or even to notify spouses and next of kin that the 82d was being deployed overseas. Consequently, many families who were left behind at Fort Bragg had no money for food or rent and no readily available transportation. To ease the plight of these families, wives and friends not afflicted by such problems pooled resources and offered assistance. Uncoordinated efforts soon acquired organizational status and became the forerunner of the Army Community Services. Bechtold interview; and Mrs. Hugh Cunningham, telephone interview with author, 29 March 1985. (Mrs. Cunningham's husband was, in 1965, the 82d's chief of staff.)

23. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 37—38.
24. *Ibid.*; and Tomkins, "Ubique," 36.
25. On the decision to airland at San Isidro and the condition of the area proposed for an airdrop, see U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-1 and IV-B-2; and Forrester and Klein interviews.
26. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 39.
27. Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 101; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, II-5.
28. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-3 to IV-B-4; Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 101—2; and Colonel Orlando Rodríguez Alvarez, U.S. Army, interview with author, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 5 November 1986.

## Chapter 5

1. Bowman, "U.S. Army Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Warfare," 129—30; and General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army, "Landpower Missions Unlimited," *Army* 15 (November 1964):41.
2. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., "Lessons to Be Learned from the Dominican Republic," Speech given 26 October 1966, Bruce Palmer, Jr., Papers, USAMHI.
3. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., interview with Senior Officer Debriefing Program, USAMHI, 161, hereafter cited as Palmer MHI interview.
4. It is misleading to depict the conflict between military tradition and political control of military operations simply in terms of military officers versus civilian policymakers. The Dominican case study itself offers a more complex pattern in which personalities and perspectives more than careers often determined which side one took on a particular issue. U.S. diplomats in Santo Domingo, for example, often sided with military officers who desired a freer hand in confronting the rebels militarily, while among U.S. officers there was no unanimity on this question, as demonstrated by the differences of opinion that emerged between Palmer and York.
5. By 30 April, the administration was beginning to prepare the American people for an announcement proclaiming the anti-Communist motive behind the intervention. On that date, President Johnson issued a statement in which he revealed that "there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. . . . The United States, . . . will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter." "Statement by President Johnson, April 30," *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 May 1965:742—43.
6. Telegram no. 1187, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1965; Telegram, JCS to CINCLANT, 0056Z 30 April 1965; Telegram no. 1196, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 30 April 1965; Telegram no. 693, State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 30 April 1965; all in NSC History. Various entries in "Chronology"; and Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 200—201.
7. Telegram nos. 1196 and 693; and Telegram, JCS to CJTF 122, 0527Z 30 April 1965; all in NSC History.
8. Telegram nos. 675 and 689, State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 29 April 1965, both in NSC History; and Slater, "Dominican Republic," 311.
9. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, II-5 to II-7, IV-C-2 to IV-C-3.

10. Ibid., II-5 to II-7, IV-B-3, IV-C-2 to IV-C-3. Telegram, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT [for JCS], 0608Z 30 April 1965; and Telegram, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 1440Z 30 April 1965; both in NSC History. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 32.
11. Telegram no. 675; Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 200; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 661–62; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 115–16.
12. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 115–17; and Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 660–62.
13. Telegram no. 695 [sanitized], State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 30 April 1965, in NSC History; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 118.
14. Telegram, CJTF 1122 to CINCLANT [for JCS], 0608Z 30 April 1965; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 100.
15. Telegram no. 1208, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 30 April 1965, in NSC History; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, II-7, IV-B-6; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 33.
16. The account of the 82d’s operations on 30 April is based on U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-4 to IV-B-10; Robert F. Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK* (Portsmouth, VA: Messenger Printing Co., 1965), 21, 24, 29, 34; Lieutenant Colonel Eldredge R. Long, U.S. Army, “The Dominican Crisis 1965: An Experiment in International Peace Keeping” (Thesis, School of Naval Warfare, U.S. Naval College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1967), 39–40; Long interview; and Schoonmaker, “U.S. Military Forces,” 123. On the question of the withdrawal of Loyalist forces to San Isidro, at least one study by a battalion commander indicates that the action was taken by agreement between Loyalist and U.S. officers on the spot, perhaps unaware that York and Masterson had other plans for those troops. Lieutenant Colonel Elbert E. Legg, U.S. Army, “The US Military Role in Coping with a Sudden Revolt in the Dominican Republic” (Course essay, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1968), 6.
17. Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 78.
18. Except where otherwise noted, the account of Marine operations on 30 April is taken from Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 33–36.
19. Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 79–80.
20. The 82d’s report on the cease-fire meeting implies that York merely *witnessed* the signing of the document; Bennett’s report to State indicates that York *signed* the document. The difference in these two positions would become a matter of some significance the next day. U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-9; and Telegram no. 1217, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 30 April 1965, in NSC History.
21. Telegram no. 1217; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 662–64; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 121–22.
22. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 37, 104.
23. Long, “Dominican Crisis,” 40–41.
24. U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. II, IV-B-10; Telegram no. 1217; Slater, “Dominican Republic,” 311; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 121.
25. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 668–71; Tompkins, “Ubique,” 38; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 48.
26. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 116; General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army ret., interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 1985; U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 2; Palmer MHI interview, 152, 154–55, 160; and General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army ret., to Dr. Roger Spiller, 15 November 1983, attached to letter of 16 November 1983, copies in author’s possession with General Palmer’s permission

- to cite. In his letter to Spiller, Palmer alleges that Wheeler told him that "once the situation was stabilized in the Dominican Republic, he intended to have the commander there report directly to Washington and to place CINCLANT in a supporting role. This was never carried out because of the strenuous objections of the Navy and Marines, as well as Moorer, and so CINCLANT remained nominally in the chain of command for the duration. The Secretary of Defense, however, directed that communications from my headquarters in Santo Domingo be transmitted for information to Washington at the same time they were sent to Norfolk." It should also be noted that Wheeler circumvented the chain of command in giving Palmer his instructions directly instead of going through General Harold K. Johnson, the chief of staff of the Army, primarily because Johnson was "in a dentist's chair" and Wheeler needed to talk to Palmer immediately. Palmer, in fact, left for Bragg that afternoon without having time to tell his wife he was leaving.
27. Palmer MHI interview, 156—57, 165, 170—71; and Klein and Forrester interviews.
  28. Palmer MHI interview, 165—67; U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 7, 9; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 209 n. 8.
  29. Telegram, COMLAN [Palmer] to JCS, 0720Z 1 May 1965; Telegram no. 1234, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 1 May 1965; "Alerting, Movement, and Execution Orders"; and entries for 1 May 1965 in "Chronology"; all in NSC History. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 7, 9; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 124—25; and Palmer, "XVIII Airborne Corps," 14.
  30. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-C-1 to IV-C-2; Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 37; Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 24; Rodriguez Alvarez and Long interviews; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 127.
  31. Telegram no. 718, State Department to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 1 May 1965; and Telegram nos. 1242, 1243, 1245, and 1249, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 1 May 1965; all in NSC History.
  32. "Alerting, Movement, and Execution Orders"; Telegrams, CINCAFLANT Command Post to CINCLANT, 0929Z 30 April 1965; CINCLANT to CINCSRIKE, 1252Z 30 April 1965; and JCS to CINCLANT, 1310Z, 1559Z, 1602Z, 1628Z, and 1804Z 30 April 1965; all in NSC History.
  33. Telegram, JCS to CINCLANT, 0026Z 1 May 1965, NSC History. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, enclosure 2 to chap. 4, 12; chap. 4, 4; and vol. II, II-19 to II-20.
  34. Telegram, COMLAN to JCS, 0720Z 1 May 1965, NSC History. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 4, 12, 14, and vol. II, IV-A-12. On the early insertion of medical units into the airlift, the 82d Airborne's report covering this development reads as follows: "... higher headquarters ordered major elements of the 15th Field Hospital and two ambulance platoons flown into the objective area early in the operation. Given the fact that early divisional build up included 2 clearing companies and 56 front line ambulances, the strategic air evacuation capability and the very short evacuation routes involved, it appears that the 400 bed capacity and the 24 panel ambulances were most wasteful of airlift. To compound the inefficiency, the Air Force flew in additional panel ambulances to discharge its responsibility for movement of patient to aircraft. Further, an Army helicopter evacuation platoon(-) was deployed although there was no real requirement for this unit. In fact, early in the operation it was decided that helicopter evacuation would not be used in view of the short distances and the paucity of landing areas in the city. The Marines already had adequate helicopters in the area to handle their evacuation needs." U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," vol. II, II-23.
  35. Entry for 1 May 1965, "Chronology"; Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, U.S. Army, "The Army in Support of Political Initiatives: The 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention" (Paper presented at the Missouri Valley History Conference, Omaha, Nebraska, March 1987), 7—8; and Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 120—25.

36. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 127—28.
37. Ibid., 128—29; Telegram, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, JCS, 0418Z 2 May 1965, in NSC History; entries for 1 and 2 May 1965 in "Chronology"; and entry for 0432 2 May 1965, in *Daily Diary*, reel no. 4.
38. Telegram, JCS to CINCLANT, 2340Z 1 May 1965; and Telegram, CJTF 122 to JCS, 0714Z 2 May 1965; both in NSC History. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 9—10.
39. Telegram nos. 1267, 1283, and 1284, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 2 May 1965; Telegrams, CJTF 122 to JCS, 0714Z and 0818Z 2 May 1965; all in NSC History. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 676.
40. Entries for 2 May 1965 in "Chronology"; and "Statement by President Johnson, May 2," *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 May 1965:744—48.
41. Palmer MHI interview, 171; Telegram no. 742; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 9. The reasons for leaving Radio Santo Domingo outside the U.S. corridor are not clear. Lowenthal argues that the troops sent to establish the LOC took a wrong turn south before they came to the station. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 131. Palmer has argued that the ESSO map used to plan the route simply failed to show the station and that those who knew about it failed to bring it up in a conversation concerned primarily with finding the safest route. Palmer interview.
42. Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 38.
43. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 9—10, and vol. II, IV-D-1, IV-E-4; Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army, "The Army in the Dominican Republic," *Army* 15 (November 1965):44; and Brigadier General James R. Ellis, U.S. Army, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 July 1987.
44. Palmer, "Dominican Republic," 44.
45. Ellis interview.
46. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 8—9; chap. 4, 15; and vol. II, II-16.

## Chapter 6

1. Telegram, JCS to CINCLANT, 2205Z 1 May 1965, in NSC History; and USAF, "Case Studies of Airpower," 9—10, 18—20, 27—29.
2. USAF, *TAC in the Dominican Crisis*, 20.
3. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 4, 13, and vol. II, II-19 to II-24, II-26. Entries for 30 April and 1 May 1965, in "Alerting, Movement, and Execution Orders."
4. Costa interview. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 19; chap. 3, 7; chap. 4, 5, 12—13; and vol. II, II-22, IV-C-4. York was also critical of the number of headquarters that became involved in the airlift by issuing oral and written messages, many of which contradicted one another or were ambiguous and confusing. His recommended solution was to establish direct communications between the ground commander and the Department of Defense or Department of the Army and to prohibit all intermediate headquarters from interpreting guidance between the top and the bottom. Ibid., vol. II, II-20. The Air Force had its own complaints about the airlift, beginning with the enormous problems created by last-minute changes to mission requirements that did not allow enough time for changing plans and disseminating procedural instructions to operating elements. Furthermore, the decision to send the 82d to the Dominican Republic overwhelmed the control and support capabilities at the crowded and ill-lit Pope Air Force

Base, an installation usually limited to the support of only one Troop Carrier Wing (twenty-nine C-130s). One Air Force study criticized the Army units for aggravating the overcrowded situation at Pope by delivering massive amounts of equipment, often incompletely configured and out of proper load sequence, to the runway aprons. The large numbers of aircraft returning from San Isidro in clusters also added to the problems at Pope. USAF, "Case Studies of Airpower," 35-39, 41.

5. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 4, 13-14, and vol. II, II-21 and II-27; and Long interview.
  6. In some cases, elements of the 82d relieved Marine units on a temporary basis, pending arrival of the IAPF. For further discussion of the IAPF, see chapter 8.
  7. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IV-E-1 to IV-E-2.
  8. Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 113, 124. My interviews with several U.S. soldiers who served in the Dominican intervention confirm these feelings toward the rebels.
  9. Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 34; U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 2-3, 9, and vol. II, II-6, VI-4 to VI-9; and MI officer, interview with author.
  10. MI officer interview; Sanford J. Unger, *FBI* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 241; and Phillips, *Night Watch*, 150, 155-56, 160. Phillips recounts how the chief of the FBI team, a close friend, confided to him that his agents lacked experience in gathering political intelligence, whereupon the two men worked out a plan to coordinate their efforts, even though in some ways this violated the rules prohibiting one federal agency from identifying its informants to another. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 160.
  11. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 2-4, 6, and vol. II, VI-7, VI-9; and Butler interview.
  12. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 3-4, and vol. II, VI-7, IX-1; and MI officer interview.
  13. MI officer interviews. While many U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic harbored personal doubts about the wisdom or morality of backing the Loyalists, most who entertained such doubts refused to dwell on the matter. Their view was that they were professional soldiers who had a job to do and that the moral issue was hardly so clear as to require them to challenge U.S. policy. Only a few soldiers became so disenchanted (or enamored of local conditions) as to "go native."
  14. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 7, and previously cited interviews of U.S. officers, e.g., Palmer, Long, Butler. The impact of the shortages in Spanish-speaking intelligence personnel, civilian clothing, and an in-country capability to produce false documentation are discussed in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 2, enclosure 1, "Clandestine Collection Effort," 1-3, 6. The report, for example, states that the failure "to deploy personnel with adequate civilian clothing and documentation to support its wear has severely restricted contacts with agents and unnecessarily exposed agents to possible hostile surveillance where knowledge that source is even contacting U.S. Army personnel could jeopardize both the agent's success and his personal safety."
- The CIA, of course, had been running its own agents and informants for some time. As to the delicacy of such operations, Phillips gives an account of how a classified report from the CIA to the Voice of America was inadvertently read over the air, the result being that a CIA deep-cover agent was on the verge of being compromised. Only a middle-of-the-night phone call to Carl Rowen, director of the U.S. Information Agency, made it possible to counteract the blunder and save the agent's credibility, not to mention his life. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 150-51, 58.
15. Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 78; USAF, "Case Studies of Airpower," 29-31; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 5-6, and vol. II, VI-10 to VI-11.

16. After the contending parties reached a tentative political settlement in September, the intelligence mission changed to one of collecting "little other than purely political information, or information with definite political overtones." U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 2, enclosure 1, 1.
17. Ibid., pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 3, and vol. II, VI-9; and Butler interview.
18. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 148—50.
19. Telegram JCS to CINCLANT, 2010Z 1 May 1965; and Telegram nos. 1265 and 1284, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 2 May 1965; all in NSC History.
20. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 3, 3. The most detailed, unclassified account of the Green Chopper operation is contained in pt. 1, volume III, of "Stability Operations," which is devoted exclusively to Special Forces operations. Annex D to this volume pertains to highly classified Special Forces operations and has been removed from the report. Palmer's report places the number of towns visited under Green Chopper at thirty-four; the Special Forces report says that the Green Berets visited forty-one towns but does not indicate if this number includes the seven visited prior to their assuming the mission. That the cover stories broke down is reported in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 7, enclosure 2.
21. This account of the command and control problems that plagued Palmer during his first week in the Dominican Republic is based on Roger Spiller to General Wallace Nutting, Memorandum, 30 September 1983, in author's possession; Palmer to Spiller, 16 November 1983; Palmer MHI interview, 158—60, 169—70; General Bruce Palmer, Jr., interview with Captain Richard S. Switzer, U.S. Air Force, 20 August 1974, 21, in Richard Switzer Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California; U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 7—8, and chap. 4, 7—8; U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, *Challenge: Compendium of Army Accomplishment—A Report by the Chief of Staff* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1964—April 1968), 39—40, copy located in Archives, USAMHI.  

Tactical communications also were substandard during the early phase of the intervention. Several 82d units had PRC-10 radios, which as one participant put it, "couldn't communicate across the street." The arrival of PRC-25 radios provided much better tactical communication. Bechtold interview.
22. For a more thorough discussion of political developments from 4 May to 7 May, see various entries in "Chronology"; and Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 680—84.
23. Various entries, 4—14 May 1965, in "Chronology." Telegram no. 1576, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 10 May 1965; Telegram nos. 1626 and 1644, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 12 May 1965; all in NSC History. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 685—94.
24. Telegram no. 1690, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 14 May 1965; and Telegram no. 1644; both in NSC History.
25. Telegram no. 1561, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 10 May 1965; Telegram nos. 1644 and 1656, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 12 May 1965; and Telegram, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 0645Z 13 May 1965; all in NSC History.
26. Telegram no. 1682, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 13 May 1965; and Telegram no. 1697, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 14 May 1965; both in NSC History.
27. Slater, "Dominican Republic," 322; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 4, 19.

28. Slater, "Dominican Republic," 322—23; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 694; Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 218, 228—30, 235, 244, 254—55; U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 14; and Palmer and Long interviews. On an evening newscast, CBS showed footage of what was purportedly truckloads of GNR troops crossing the LOC during the northern offensive. Upon close examination of the report, however, it became apparent from changes in the height of stacked sandbags passed by the trucks that the footage had been spliced from pictures taken of national police crossing the LOC over a period of days prior to the offensive. A senior CBS correspondent in the Dominican Republic later offered a personal apology to Palmer for what the correspondent admitted was deplorable journalism on the part of CBS executives who handled the footage in New York. Palmer and Long interviews.
29. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 694; Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 228, 242; Slater, "Dominican Republic," 323; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 15.
30. Slater, "Dominican Republic," 323—24; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 14, and vol. II, XIII-B-2.
31. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 13—14.

## Chapter 7

1. The author is indebted to Professor Richard Millett for providing copies of various fact sheets distributed to U.S. troops entering the Dominican Republic.
2. Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 91—92. The best published account of the lessons learned from urban combat in the Dominican Republic is Major William E. Klein, U.S. Army, "Stability Operations in Santo Domingo," *Infantry* 56 (May—June 1966):35—39.
3. Sergeant Kenneth White, U.S. Army, ret., interviews with the author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 14 and 16 May 1985.
4. Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, passim; Klein, "Santo Domingo," passim; and Long and White interviews.
5. Long interview.
6. Klein, "Santo Domingo," 38; Colonel Stephen Silvasy, U.S. Army, interview with author, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 29 March 1985; Peter T. Chew, "On a Lonely Point," *Army* 15 (June 1965):94; U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. III, C-6-1 to C-6-3; and Telegram, CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 0245Z 6 May 1965, in NSC History. One day before the ship *Santo Domingo* was sunk, the State Department informed the Embassy that a JCS situation report contained an item about an "unidentified ship tied up at Santo Domingo [that] may have been used to bring in weapons which were distributed to Rebels during *early stages* [of the] revolt." [Italics mine.] State requested that the ship be searched, if need be, by the Dominican Navy. It would be interesting to know if the "unidentified ship" was indeed the *Santo Domingo*. If it were, then it might have been targeted by the 82d unit that sank it—not because paratroopers witnessed it unloading arms but because they had received the report that it *might* have brought weapons to the rebels. Telegram no. 766, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 3 May 1965, in NSC History.
7. Klein, "Santo Domingo," 38—39. The author's interviews with several persons who participated in the intervention for the most part confirm the weapon assessment offered in the text.
8. Silvasy interview; Klein, "Santo Domingo," 38; and Colonel Herbert J. Lloyd, U.S. Army, telephone interview with author, 13 July 1987.

9. Klein, "Santo Domingo," 38.
10. White interview.
11. Long and White interviews; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, IX, and vol. IV, chap. 12, and pt. 2, chap. 1, 47.
12. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 12, 5—6; and Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 86.
13. Silvasy and Long interviews; Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 86; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. III, 3, and pt. 2, chap. 1, 47.
14. Ellis interview; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. III, 3.
15. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 11, and vol. II, II-24; Long interview; and Phillips, *Night Watch*, 152—53.
16. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 11—12, 21, vol. II, II-9, and vol. III, 2, C-3-1-1 to C-3-2-1; and Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 56. Telegram no. 821, Secretary of State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 5 May 1965; and Telegram, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 0645Z 13 May 1965; both in NSC History.

In a commander's summary covering the period 31 May 1965 to 25 October 1965, Palmer offered his impressions of the role of Special Forces in stability operations. "Special Forces demonstrated their versatility and skill in a clear-cut manner," he began. "They were profitably employed in a great variety of tasks, generally of a covert nature. I am convinced that the unconventional warfare field is their forte and that this is where they can make their most valuable contributions. However, by the very nature of their organization, equipment and operating methods, they cannot perform the hard-core role that combat forces play in stability operations, but rather they are invaluable adjuncts who can perform particularly sensitive and difficult tasks with skill and finesse. It was always reassuring to have this superb asset ready at hand for specially tough missions." U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 46.

17. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. III, C-7-4-1.
18. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the civic action-civil affairs programs is based on documents provided the author by Major Michael A. Dobry while he was assigned to the civil affairs section of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The efforts of Major Dobry prevented these documents, mainly situation updates, from being destroyed. Also consulted were Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 152—54; Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 38, 65, 74; Klein, "Santo Domingo," 36; Long interview; Ringler and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations*, 48—49; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 3, 13, vol. II, XIII-C-4, and vol. IV, chap. 10.
19. Telegram no. 712, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 30 April 1965, in NSC History.
20. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of psychological warfare operations in the Dominican Republic is based on U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 11; Lieutenant Colonel Wallace J. Moulis, U.S. Army, and Major Richard M. Brown, U.S. Army, "Key to a Crisis," *Military Review* 46 (February 1966):9—14; and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," in *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations*, edited by Ron D. McLaurin (New York: Praeger, 1982), 282—85.
21. Telegram no. 732, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 1 May 1965, in NSC History; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 3.
22. Telegram nos. 1301 and 1304, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 3 May 1965; and Telegram no. 1286, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 2 [4?] May 1965; all in NSC History.
23. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 45; and Palmer interview with Switzer.

24. Butler interview.
25. One fact sheet, titled "Your Duty in the Dominican Republic," warned U.S. soldiers arriving in the country that "many Dominican citizens are not pleased by the presence in their country of foreign troops . . .," although "the farther we come from the early days of violence and bloodshed that marked the revolution, the more reasonable the Dominican people will become in their attitude toward us." To hasten that transformation, the sheet urged "very correct" contacts with the people based on "our American sense of justice and fair play." Soldiers were to be friendly, but not ostentatiously so, when the occasion warranted and were to learn Spanish, or at least enough words "to help bring about a better understanding between the nations of the hemisphere that are represented here." If taunted by "unruly elements," soldiers were to "ignore it." They were also to "keep quiet" when Dominicans engaged in political discussions in their presence, and above all, they were to be "modest in talking to local people. The bragging Yankee does more harm than good and certainly is not respected." Professor Richard Millett provided the author a copy of this fact sheet.
26. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, XIII-C-3; Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 154; White, Silvasy, and Long interviews; and Telegram, SUB JIB AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to CINCLANT, et al., 0031Z 11 May 1965, in NSC History.
27. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Grace Under Pressure: The U.S. Soldier in the Dominican Republic," *Army* 16 (September 1966):42, 44.
28. Training programs abounded and included artillery firing, airmobile exercises, parachute jumps, jungle exercises (in preparation for Vietnam), and testing the Checkerboard concept developed by Colonel Harry Emerson of the Army War College for fighting guerrillas.
29. Palmer MHI interview, 161. A discussion and partial list of the rules of engagement can be found in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, XIII-A-1 to XIII-A-6.
30. Author's interviews with several veterans of the Dominican intervention, e.g., Long and Silvasy.
31. Harold K. Johnson to Colonel Frank Linvell, 15 May 1965, Harold K. Johnson Papers, USAMHI.
32. Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 34.

## Chapter 8

1. Telegram no. 1543, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 9 May 1965, in NSC History; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 16, and vol. IV, chap. 17, 1.
2. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 5, 16, and vol. IV, chap. 17, 1.
3. Child, *Unequal Alliance*, 164–65.
4. Entries for 1–3 May 1965, in "Chronology." As part of the lobbying campaign, Bennett was instructed to persuade the first OAS Commission, then in Santo Domingo, to recommend passage of the resolution. At first, the commission seemed reluctant to do so because, in Bennett's opinion, the deployment of Latin American troops would be construed as an "endorsement of our military intervention." But the commission's fear of a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic outweighed their reservations, and it made the desired recommendation in its report to the OAS. Entries for 2–6 May 1965, in "Chronology." Telegram no. 744, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 2 May 1965; Telegram no. 788, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 3 May 1965; and Telegram nos. 1338, 1350, 1359, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 4 May 1965; all in NSC History.

5. At the time, the acronym for the Commander in Chief, Southern Command, was CINCSO. Given the later use of the same acronym in reference to another unified command, I have chosen to use CINCSOUTH when referring to the CINC of the Southern Command. Telegram, CINCSOUTH to JCS, 1918Z 5 May 1965; Circular no. 2174, State Department to all ARA diplomatic posts (except Kingston, Port-au-Prince, and Port-of-Spain), 8 May 1965; Circular no. 2178, State Department to all ARA diplomatic posts (except Kingston, Port-au-Prince, and Port-of-Spain), 9 May 1965; and Telegram, CINCSOUTH to JCS, 2146 13 May 1965; all in NSC History. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 67, 69; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 1. Given the historical animosity between the Dominican Republic and its neighbor on the island of Hispaniola, the Johnson administration judged it prudent not to request a troop contribution from Haiti.
6. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 1-2, 5-6, Enclosures 2 and 3. Telegrams, JCS to CINCLANT, 2046Z 12 May 1965 and 0038Z 13 May 1965; and Telegram, U.S. Army Military Attaché, Honduras, to Department of the Army, 1538Z 14 May 1965; all in NSC History. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 71.
7. Telegram no. 856, State [Joint State-Defense Message] to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 6 May 1965, in NSC History.
8. Telegram no. 1526, AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 9 May 1965, in NSC History; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 1.
9. Telegram no. 1526.
10. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 1; Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 71; and entries for late May and early June 1965, in "Chronology."
11. Circular no. 2328, State to all ARA diplomatic posts (except Kingston and Port-of-Spain), 24 May 1965, in NSC History.
12. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 4-5; Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 70-71, 73; and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Turner, Jr., U.S. Army, "Experiment in Inter-American Peace-Keeping," *Army* 17 (June 1967):35.
13. In formulating the force regulations, Alvim used a draft prepared by the U.S. State Department. The Defense Department provided recommendations on several points, including the authority of the IAPF deputy commander, who, it argued, at minimum should be considered "the alter ego of the Commander and shall have full power and authority to act for the Commander and to exercise the powers of the Commander upon any and all matters concerning which the Commander is authorized to act pursuant to the Act Establishing the Inter-American Force and these Regulations." Defense also suggested, as an alternative to the above, wording that bestowed upon the deputy commander the appointment of "Commander, Ground Forces," with "operational control over ground operations subject to the policy guidance of the Commander." Telegram, Secretary of Defense to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 1400Z 27 May 1965, in NSC History.
14. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 73-74; and Palmer to Spiller, 16 November 1983.
15. Greenberg, *Dominican Republic Intervention*, 74. In a television interview that stirred some controversy, General Palmer declared that if he had to choose between obeying an order issued by Alvim and one by the president, he would be bound by oath to obey the latter.
16. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 15-16, and vol. IV, chap. 16, 5, and pt. 2, chap. 3, 4, 8-9.
17. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 16, and vol. IV, chap. 16, 4-6. One might note for the record that on at least one occasion, that of the U.S. intervention in northern Russia from 1918 to 1919, U.S. troops were placed under the direct command of a British general for the purpose of carrying out combat missions.

18. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. IV, chap. 16, 3; pt. 2, chap. 1, 3; pt. 2, chap. 3, 5, 6—8; and pt. 2, chap. 16, 4. Schoonmaker, "U.S. Military Forces," 172. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, invited into the country by Dr. Mora, also investigated atrocities while becoming involved, as well, in such matters as the treatment and exchange of political prisoners and alleged violations of human rights. For a discussion of the commission's activities, see Anna P. Schreiber and Philippe S. E. Schreiber, "The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Crisis," *International Organization* 22 (Spring 1968):508—28.
19. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 3.
20. Telegram no. 888, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, and CJTF-120, 7 May 1965, in NSC History; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 3, 1, and chap. 16, 5.
21. Long interview; Telegram, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 2311Z 14 May 1965, in NSC History; and entry for 10 June 1965, in "Chronology."
22. Entry for 14 June 1965, in "Chronology."
23. The account of the fighting on 15—16 June is based on the Palmer, Long, Forrester, Klein, and Butler interviews; Barry, ed., *POWER-PACK*, 25, 35, 66; entry for 15 June 1965, in "Chronology"; and Mansbach, *Dominican Crisis*, 91—92. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 17, pt. 2, chap. 2, and pt. 2, chap. 3, 2.
24. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 16, 5, 8; Mansbach, *Dominican Crisis*, 91—92; and Forrester, Klein, and Palmer interviews.
25. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 17.
26. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, chap. 3, 3, and chap. 6, 2; Slater, "Dominican Republic," 324; and entries for June and July in "Chronology."
27. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 3, 6—7.
28. The extent of rebel atrocities did not become apparent until late October when the IAPF cleared Ciudad Nueva.
29. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 8—10; and Phillips, *Night Watch*, 166—67.
30. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 5; Bracey, *Resolution*, 1—2; Palmer interview; and Phillips, *Night Watch*, 161.
31. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 5—6, and chap. 16, 11; and Palmer interview.
32. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 11—12, and chap. 3, 8.
33. Slater, "Dominican Republic," 326—27; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 10.
34. The Wessin affair is recounted in U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 14—16; and Palmer MHI interview. Alvim, Palmer, and the others had been preceded by the CIA station chief, who, in a similar visit to Wessin's home, had failed to persuade the general to resign. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 169.
35. Bracey, *Dominican Crisis*, 32; and U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 19—24.
36. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 2, chap. 1, 26—28.
37. *Ibid.*, 29, 31.
38. The account of the Hotel Matum affair is based on *ibid.*, 16; Butler and Costa interviews; Slater, "Dominican Republic," 327; and Bracey, *Dominican Crisis*, 36—37. Bracey raises the question of "why it took the IAPF so long [five to eight hours] to get to the scene to aid Caamaño." Some speculated that Garcia-Godoy deliberately held up sending the IAPF in hopes that the military in Santiago would eliminate Caamaño and the "remaining

constitutionalist hierarchy.” This explanation, as Bracey indicates, suffers from ignoring the close relationship between García-Godoy and Caamaño. “The delay,” Bracey concludes, “appears to have occurred for reasons internal to the IAPF itself.” Another explanation would take into account the time between the beginning of the firefight, the time at which the military intelligence officer made contact with XVIII Airborne Corps, and the time it takes to mount a rescue operation. The MI officer on the scene observed the situation develop before phoning the Marine Guard at the U.S. Embassy and, then, USFORDOMREP. More time elapsed while García-Godoy was notified, a decision made, and authorization passed down the chain of command to Costa. Once Costa was told to send a company to Santiago, the troops had to marshal at the Polo Grounds and at San Isidro. Flying time to Santiago airfield was less than an hour. After the troops arrived in Santiago, Costa had to be briefed and the troops had to march to the hotel. Given these activities, an interval of between five to six hours between the beginning of the firefight and the arrival of IAPF troops at the hotel does not necessarily connote political mischief.

39. Phillips recounts how, as CIA chief of station, he met with García-Godoy, who told him, “I am having real problems holding my government together. . . . It is essential that I broaden the political base of the provisional cabinet and my subministers. To do that I plan several new appointments. Some will not please your government. . . . I realize that I cannot keep this flimsy government together without American support, but I must have some young people of the left in my camp. Otherwise it will not work.” Phillips was sympathetic and, in a deal arranged by circumlocution and inference, ended up bending CIA rules by screening certain prospective appointees to see if their Leftist ties were strong enough to sound alarm bells in Washington. Phillips, *Night Watch*, 172–73.
40. Bracey, *Dominican Crisis*, 34, 37; and U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 2, chap. 1, 17–19, 24–25, 35–36.
41. Slater, “Dominican Republic,” 327–28; Bracey, *Dominican Crisis*, 37–38; and entries for 6–8 January 1966 in “Chronology.” Caamaño was killed in 1973 when he tried to reenter the Dominican Republic with a guerrilla force. As for Wessin, Imbert, Bosch, Balaguer, and other prominent Dominicans involved in the 1965 crisis, they are, as of this writing, still involved in Dominican politics and government.
42. Slater, “Dominican Republic,” 328–29; and U.S.F.D.R., “Stability Operations,” pt. 2, chap. 1, 36–37, 40.
43. Bracey, *Dominican Crisis*, 39; and Palmer MHI interview.

## Chapter 9

1. *New York Times*, 1 May 1985:2.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The Dominican Intervention in Retrospect,” *Public Policy* 18 (Fall 1969):140–41.
4. *Ibid.*, 141. Several policymakers and scholars have suggested that the failure of President Jimmy Carter’s administration to persuade the OAS to form a peace force for the purpose of intervening in Nicaragua to prevent the Sandinistas from coming to power can be traced, in part, to the reluctance of Latin American leaders to repeat the IAPF experiment in the Dominican Republic. On this point, see, for example, Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 145.
5. Telegram no. 753, State to AmEmbassy, Santo Domingo, 2 May 1965, in NSC History. For additional information on the credibility gap that developed between the military and some correspondents in Santo Domingo, see Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, passim; and Kelso, “Dominican Crisis,” 139–47.

6. One officer from the 82d remembers another example of television journalists deliberately distorting an event. After an anti-American rally had ended, the journalists in question asked several of the demonstrators to re-create the effect of the demonstration for the benefit of the television cameras. The journalists provided stage directions for what would be described to U.S. television audiences as a spontaneous event. Costa interview.
  7. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 6, 20; and Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, passim.
  8. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 57-10, *Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations* (Washington, DC, March 1962), 11.
  9. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. II, II-20.
  10. U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, vol. I, chap. 2, 2.
  11. The quotation on Wheeler's speech is taken from Betts, *Soldiers*, 11.
  12. *New York Times*, 1 May 1985:2.
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