

official and private letters, and newspapers. It agreed, however, to undertake the delivery of parcels, and it organized special offices for the purpose.

MILITARY FORCE OF THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION.

Report of the 24th June, 1868.

The North German Confederation makes rapid strides in the organization of its military forces.

Prussia has laboured for two years, unceasingly to improve and complete, even to the smallest detail, the three new army corps formed in the three provinces, that she annexed in 1866, and has given to them, as well as to the Saxon contingent, Prussian consistency.

It is useful to report from time to time, how this work proceeds.

The writings published in Germany upon the state and composition of the military forces of the North German Confederation are not remarkable for their clearness. And of these the Austrian publication "Streffleur" (February number) gives the most erroneous account.

The following tabular view of the military forces of the North German Confederation, showing their composition and distribution, in June 1868, will, I think, be found clear and correct.

The States composing the Confederation are—

	Population,
I. Prussia	24,061,210
II. The Kingdom of Saxony	2,420,795
III. Hesse (North)	257,273
IV. Mecklenburg-Schwerin	560,578
V. Saxe-Weimar	282,856
VI. Mecklenburg-Strelitz	98,698
VII. Oldenburg	316,960
VIII. Brunswick	304,039
IX. Saxe-Meiningen.. .. .	180,193
X. Saxe-Altenburg	141,650
XI. Saxe-Coburg Gotha	168,290
XII. Anhalt	196,858
XIII. Schwarzbourg-Rudolstadt	75,132
XIV. Schwarzbourg-Sondershausen	67,542
XV. Waldeck	57,050
XVI. Reuss (elder branch)	44,172
XVII. Reuss (younger branch)	89,974
XVIII. Schaumbourg-Lippe	31,168
XIX. Lippe	112,599
XX. Lubeck	48,439
XXI. Brême	108,792
XXII. Hambourg	302,599
Grand Total	29,974,779

The military forces of the North German Confederation, comprise the whole military force, of these States.

None of them, except Prussia, and Saxony, has a sufficient population to form an Army Corps.

Prussia, taking advantage of this circumstance, has induced all, except Saxony, to allow their forces to be enrolled, as an integral part of her Army Corps, of which there are 11 in addition to the Guard.

For example, the troops of the Duchy of Anhalt and those of the Thuringian States form portions of the 4th and 5th Army Corps; those of the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg form part of the 9th Corps; those of Oldenburg and Brunswick are swallowed up in the 10th Corps, &c., &c.

Alone of all the States, of the Confederation, the Kingdom of Saxony has formed its troops into an Army Corps, termed the 12th.

To these 12 Army Corps, and the Guard forming the Federal Army, the contingent of Hesse must be added, which has by a special arrangement placed all its troops, both those of the portion south as well as north of the Main, at the disposal of the North German Confederation, under the denomination of the 25th Division.

It may therefore be said that the King of Prussia has at his disposal military forces, forming three distinct and very unequal portions.

1st. Those of Prussia and the other States (Saxony excepted) formed in 11 Army Corps and the Guard, and forming the real Prussian Army.

2nd. Those of Saxony forming the 12th Army Corps.

3rd. Those of Hesse, under the denomination of the 25th Division.

Before giving the detail of the actual strength, I will recapitulate several leading points.

General Synopsis.

Population of the North German Confederation, 29,974,779.

Proportion of the military force to the population:—

1st. Strength according to the estimates $\frac{1}{100}$, not counting officers; $\frac{1}{96}$ if officers be included.

2nd. Strength of the army on a war footing, $\frac{1}{33}$.

Number of young men reaching the age of 20 each year, from 300,000 to 330,000.

Annual contingent on an average, about 93,000.

This contingent is $\frac{1}{332}$ of the population.

Duration of military service, 12 years; namely:—

Three years with the colours (from 20 to 23 years of age).

Four years in the reserve.

Five years in the Landwehr.

From 17 to 42 years in the Landstrum.

I need not again describe the principles, on which the

military forces of North Germany are organized. The Confederation is divided into 12 great circles (I last year furnished a tabular account of them), each of these circles, recruits, organizes, and gives its name to one complete Army Corps. By Army Corps is understood in Prussia, the entire mass of the military forces furnished by the circle, including the troops belonging to the Regular Army, the Reserve, and Landwehr; that is to say, if requisite of all the men in the circle, aged from 20 to 32 years, who have served, or are serving. Thus, the Prussians say, with a certain amount of pride, that their Army Corps are composed of 70,000 men.

Each of these great Army Corps districts, is divided into four brigade districts, which correspond with the four Army Corps brigades. Each brigade district is divided into Landwehr battalion districts. The Landwehr battalion district is the true centre, both for recruiting and organization, and embraces, as already reported, a permanent depôt.

I pointed out in my report of December 1867 the new division of the territory of the Confederation into Landwehr battalion districts, and I now recapitulate the basis on which these have been fixed :—

1st. Each regiment of Infantry of the Line of three battalions, corresponds with a regiment of Landwehr composed of two battalions, which bears the same number, and the same provincial name as the regular regiment.

2nd. Each regiment of rifles of the Regular Army, corresponds with one battalion of infantry of Landwehr reserve bearing the same number.

3rd. The division of the Landwehr into first and second classes no longer exists. The men belong to the Landwehr until they are 32 years of age.

Two Landwehr battalion districts furnish the men for one regiment of infantry of the Line of three battalions, and of one regiment of Landwehr of two battalions.

I append table A, which gives for each Army Corps the number of infantry regiments, both Line and Landwehr; also the cavalry and artillery regiments, forming a portion of it. I continue to observe the distinction of the three groups, which I have previously pointed out, viz., the Prussian Army proper, the Saxon Army, and the Hessian division.

TABLE A.—Composition of an Army Corps.

Army Corps.	Where Recruited.	Regiments of Infantry of the Line.	Landwehr Infantry Regiments.	Battalions of Rifles.	Regiments of Cavalry.	Regiments of Field Artillery.	Regiments of Garrison Artillery.	Battalions of Pioneers.	Battalions of Train.
Guard ..	{ Throughout all the country.	} 9, including 1 Rifle	4 of 3 Bn.	2	8	1	1	1	1
1st Corps ..	Province of Prussia ..	9 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
2nd " ..	Pomerania ..	9 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
3rd " ..	Brandenburg ..	9 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
4th " ..	Province of Saxony ..	10 "	9 of 2 "	1	5	1	1 Div.	1	1
5th " ..	Province of Posen ..	8 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
6th " ..	Silesia ..	8 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
7th " ..	Westphalia ..	7 "	8 of 2 "	1	6	1	1	1	1
8th " ..	Rhine Provinces ..	7 "	8 of 2 "	1	5	1	1	1	1
9th " ..	Schleswig-Holstein ..	9 "	6 of 2 "	1	4	1	1	1	1
10th " ..	Hanover ..	9 "	6 of 2 "	2	5	1	1 Div.	1	1
11th " ..	Hesse Cassel, Nassau, Frankfurt	} 7 "	6 of 2 "	1	7	1	1 Div.	1	1
Garrison of Mayence	4 (belonging to the 8th Corps).	8 of 2 "	1	4	1	1	1	1
Total for the Prussian Army Proper	105 Regts. of 3 Bn.	89 Regts.	14 Bn.	68 Regts.	12 Regts.	9 Rgt. 3 Div.	12 Bn.	12 Bn.
12th Corps, Saxons	9 Regts.	4 of 3 Bn.	2 "	6 "	1 "	1 Regt.	1 "	1 "
Hessian Division (25th)	4 Regts. of 2 Bn.	2 of 3 "	2 "	2 "	1 Div.	..	1 Compy.	1 Compy.
Grand Total for the Confederation and Hesse	{ 118 Regts. or 350 Bn. }	95 Regts. or 200 Bn.	18 Bn.	76 Rgt. or 380 Sqds.	13 Regts. and 1 Div.	10 Regts. and 3 Div.	13 Bn. and 1 Compy.	13 Bn. and 1 Compy.

This table gives the exact composition of each Army Corps. It shows that the territory of the Confederation, including Hesse, on the left bank of the Main, is divided into 200 Landwehr battalion districts and 12 Landwehr reserve battalion districts (*vide* report dated 2nd December, 1867), Prussia proper and the other States, not including Saxony, are divided into 170 such districts, which, taken two and two, furnish 84 regiments of infantry of the Line of three battalions, and 85 regiments of Landwehr of two battalions. These States have also 11 Landwehr reserve battalion districts, corresponding with the 11 regiments of rifles.

I. THE PEACE STRENGTH (OR THAT BORNE ON THE ESTIMATES) OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

Article 60 of the Federal Constitution has fixed, until 31st December, 1871, the strength of the army on a peace footing at 1 per cent. of the population of 1867, officers not included, and as the population in 1867, amounted to 29,900,000, it follows that the strength of the army (officers not included) should be 299,000 men. If to this the number of officers (12,985), paymasters, veterinary surgeons, armourers, and saddlers, be added the number is raised to 313,583, which is the actual number borne on the estimates.

I append to this report an extract from the army estimates of 1869. It will be seen that the strength of the Federal army is in accordance with the number fixed by the Constitution. No notice is taken of the reduction of 12,000 men, made in May last, because the estimates were printed prior to that date. This reduction being only provisional.

I have drawn up table B with the greatest care; it shows the strength fixed, throughout the whole Confederation, for battalions, squadrons, batteries, and regiments of the different arms.

I include the musicians, as is done in Prussia, amongst the combatants.

The columns headed non-combatants include surgeons, veterinary surgeons, armourers, workmen, hospital orderlies, and soldiers of the train.

TABLE B.—Strength on a Peace Footing.

CORPS.	Officers.	Soldiers.		Horses.
		Combatants.	Non-Combatants.	
1 Battalion of the five old Regiments of Foot Guards (a) ...	22	662	26	7
1 of the five old Regiments of Foot Guards (b) ...	69	2,035	84	28
1 Battalion of the four other Regiments of Infantry of the Guard and of all the Regiments of the Line ...	18	514	24	7
1 of these Regiments ...	57	1,553	72	28
1 Battalion of Rifles ...	22	514	24	7
1 Squadron of Cavalry ...	5	137	5	139
1 Regiment of Cavalry (c) ...	28	679	42	744
1 Battery Horse Artillery ...	4	90	1	72
1 Battery Field Artillery, 4-pounders ...	4	109	1	40
1 Battery Field Artillery, 6-pounders ...	4	109	1	40
1 Regiment Field Artillery ...	84	1,581	80	734
1 Company of Garrison Artillery ...	4	99	1	...
1 Regiment of Garrison Artillery ...	45	835	41	...
1 Battalion of Pioneers ...	18	483	24	7
1 Battalion of Train ...	12	...	230	123
I. PRUSSIAN ARMY (11 Corps and the Guard).				
<i>Infantry.</i>				
9 Regiments of Foot Guards ...	573	16,425	708	252
96 Regiments of Infantry of the Line ...	5,472	149,088	6,912	2,688
14 Battalions of Rifles ...	308	7,196	336	98
Total for the Infantry ...	6,353	172,709	7,956	3,038
<i>Cavalry.</i>				
8 Regiments of Cavalry of the Guard ...	230	5,501	336	6,000
60 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line ...	1,630	41,220	2,520	45,000
Total for the Cavalry ...	1,910	46,721	2,856	51,000
<i>Artillery.</i>				
12 Regiments of Field Artillery ...	1,008	18,972	984	8,808
9 Regiments and 3 Divisions of Garrison Artillery ...	460	8,706	384	247
Total for the Artillery ...	1,468	27,678	1,368	9,055
Total for the Pioneers (12 Battalions) ...	216	5,796	288	84
Total for the Train (12 Battalions) ...	144	...	2,760	1,476
Grand Total for the Prussian Army Proper (d) ...	10,091	252,904	15,228	64,653
II. SAXON ARMY.				
Grand Total for the Saxon Army (12th Corps) ...	886	22,026	1,326	5,534
III. HESSIAN DIVISION.				
Grand Total for the Hessian or 25th Division ...	276	7,141	448	1,853
Total for the whole Confederation ...	11,253	282,071	17,002	72,040

(a) The five old regiments of Foot Guards are: the 1st Regiment, the 2nd Regiment, the 1st Regiment of Grenadiers, Emperor Alexander, the 2nd Regiment of Grenadiers, Emperor Francis, and the Rifle Regiment. These are stronger than the four other regiments of the Guard. (b) The 1st Regiment of Foot Guards has one Captain more on its Staff than the others. (c) The Regiment of Life Guards has 34 officers, 692 combatants, and 42 non-combatants. (d) It will be observed that these numbers are less than those given in the estimates, the cause of this is that they do not include the Staff and the various Military Establishments, &c.

TABLE C.—Strength on a War Footing.

CORPS.	Officers.	Soldiers.		Horses.	Carriages.
		Com- batants.	Non-Com- batants.		
1 Battalion of Infantry of the Guard or Line	22	1,002	26
1 of the five old Regiments of Infantry of the Guard, and the 4th Grenadier Regiment ...	69	3,055	90	121	16
1 of the 99 other Infantry Regiments (a) ...	69	3,017	90	121	16 (b)
1 Battalion of Rifles	22	1,002	31	40	10
1 Squadron of Cavalry	5	150	8	152	...
1 Regiment of Cavalry (c)	28	752	60	880	8
1 Battery Horse Artillery (4-pounders)* ...	4	143	7	207	15 (d)
1 Field Battery (4-pounders)	4	139	6	124	16 (e)
1 Field Battery (6-pounders)	4	145	6	126	16 (f)
1 Regiment of Field Artillery	69	2,051	174	1,937	237 (g)
1 Company of Garrison Artillery	4	203	1
1 Regiment of Garrison Artillery	42	1,633	99	12	...
1 Battalion of Pioneers	18	602	51	44	14
1 Battalion of Train	25	...	1,532	1,330	231
I. PRUSSIAN ARMY (11 Corps and the Guard).					
<i>Infantry.</i>					
9 Regiments of Foot Guards	622	27,381	808	1,089	150
96 Regiments of Infantry of the Line	6,624	289,632	8,640	11,616	1,602
14 Battalions of Rifles	308	14,028	434	560	140
Total, Infantry	7,554	331,041	9,882	13,265	1,892
<i>Cavalry.</i>					
8 Regiments of Cavalry of the Guard	231	6,027	487	7,040	64
60 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line	1,680	45,120	3,600	52,800	480
Total, Cavalry	1,911	51,147	4,087	59,840	544
<i>Artillery.</i>					
12 Regiments of Field Artillery, not including the Ammunition Columns	828	24,612	2,088	23,244	2,844
9 Regiments of Garrison Artillery, and 3 Divisions	432	17,049	2,915	120	...
Total, Artillery	1,260	41,661	3,003	23,364	2,844
Total for the Pioneers (12 Battalions)	216	7,224	612	876	168
Total for the Train (12 Battalions) ...	300	...	18,684	15,960	2,784
Grand Total for the Prussian Army Proper	11,241	431,073	36,268	113,305	8,232 (h)
II. SAXON ARMY.					
Grand Total for the Saxon Army, 12th Corps	983	37,259	2,993	9,784	715
III. HESSIAN DIVISION.					
Grand Total for the Hessian or 25th Division	303	12,264	731	2,855	257
Grand Total for the whole Confedera- tion	12,530	480,596	39,992	125,944	9,204

(a) The 34th Rifles has 3,036 combatants. (b) The Rifle regiments have 22 carriages. (c) The regiment of Life Guards has 35 officers, 763 combatants, and 67 non-combatants. (d, e, f) The 6 guns included. (g) The 90 guns included. (h) The 1,080 guns included.

* Hitherto the batteries, both field and horse, have in war had only 3 officers, because the fourth is left with the ammunition columns. For the future the battery will retain its 4 officers, and the only officers with the ammunition columns will be Train officers.

II. WAR STRENGTH OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

The strength of the battalions, squadrons, and batteries, as well as that of the regiments of the various arms of the service, pioneers and train, are shown in Table C.

An Army Corps on a war footing includes :

- A. 2 Divisions of Infantry.
- B. 2 Brigades of Cavalry.
- C. 1 Reserve of Artillery.
- D. 1 Battalion of Pioneers.
- E. Provision Train.
- F. Ambulance Train.
- G. Various Services.

A.—*Two Divisions of Infantry.*

Each division is composed of two brigades of two or three regiments and four field batteries, two 4-pr. and two 6-pr. batteries. The rifle battalion is attached, according to circumstances, to one or other of these divisions. The Guard and the 9th Corps form an exception in having each two battalions of rifles (*vide* Table A.)

B.—*Two Cavalry Brigades.*

Each of the two brigades detach one regiment with one of the infantry divisions of the Army Corps.

The guard alone has three brigades (eight regiments) which form a division.

One or two batteries of horse artillery are attached, according to circumstances, to each cavalry brigade.

C.—*Reserve Artillery.*

The arrangements which I here give are not in accordance with those described in books written on this subject. They are, nevertheless, those now in use, and were adopted, when the Prussians gave up the 12-pr. smooth-bore guns.

The artillery of an Army Corps is composed of the fifteen batteries (each of six guns) of the regiment of field artillery belonging to the corps, in peace time.

These fifteen batteries are divided into four divisions; and, when the mobilisation takes place—

The first division of field artillery (four batteries) is attached to the first infantry division.

The second division of field artillery (four batteries) is attached to the second infantry division.

One horse battery (sometimes two) is attached to the two cavalry brigades; and the remaining six batteries, viz., two horse, two of 4-pr., two of 6-pr., form the reserve artillery.

The divisional batteries march with only sixteen carriages, viz., six guns, six wagons, one forge, two store wagons, one baggage wagon.

The reserve artillery is composed—

1. Of the six batteries referred to.
2. Of nine ammunition columns.

An Army Corps has, therefore, at present—

Eight batteries with the two infantry divisions.

One or two batteries with the two brigades of cavalry.

Five or six reserve batteries.

Total fifteen batteries, or 90 guns.

The proportion is not quite three guns per thousand, for an Army Corps is composed of 36,000 men of all arms.

The Prussians have not, then, on a war footing, a more numerous artillery than ours; but it is divided differently. The divisional artillery is twice as numerous as ours, and the reserve artillery much weaker. The power which the Prussians thus possess of beginning an action, with an artillery twice as numerous as ours, deserves serious consideration, and has been the subject of many of my despatches to Paris. We must consider how we are to contend in the first phases of a battle, with an artillery which, leaving out of consideration its greater range, and much greater accuracy, will be twice as numerous as ours.

Of what use is a strong reserve, if at the beginning and during the first portion of the battle, our divisional artillery is unable to sustain the contest?

D.—*The Battalion of Pioneers.*

In the army of the North German Confederation the pioneers perform the duties both of engineers and pontoniers. In war they are also charged with the repair and demolition, of railways, and the telegraphic service. Each Army Corps has: the battalion of pioneers proper, one bridge equipage, for the advance guard, one train of tools and articles for encampment, one railway company, and, in addition for each army, one telegraph train.

I have described the composition of the various trains, in my report of 1866, as well as the provision trains, hospital trains, and various services (commissariat, treasure, post-office, printing-press, &c., &c.)

I now give two detailed tables of the strength of the Guard and some other Army Corps on a war footing.*

The cavalry regiments are composed of only four squadrons, the fifth being broken up, to raise the other four to a war footing.

The entire number of combatants, in an Army Corps may be summed up as follows:—

The combatants of the two infantry divisions.

The combatants of the two cavalry brigades.

Those of the reserve artillery.

Those of the pioneer battalion.

* We have omitted these Tables (Editor).

Or, altogether, for the Guard, 956 officers and 37,663 men. If to these are added the Staff, the total will be, in round numbers, 39,000 men.

For each of the First and Second Corps it is 883 officers and 35,201 men, or, in round numbers, 36,000 men.

III. PASSAGE FROM A PEACE TO A WAR FOOTING.

The Table B gives the strength of the North German Army, with the colours on a peace footing. To pass from a peace to a war footing, the battalions, squadrons, batteries, &c., are completed by calling up the reserve men.

I again beg to point out a very important subject, on which I have already reported in 1866, in a despatch entitled "Note on the Military Organization of Prussia." This point is, that Prussia can place all her Army Corps on a war footing, by calling up the reserves, and without calling on the Landwehr. The military organization of 1860 had chiefly this object in view, and it was attained by simply increasing the length of service in the reserve by two years. At present, the Landwehr is intended for the defence of the fortresses in the interior. It will not be called on to fight, with the army even in second line, except in extreme cases, and Prussia will (in theory, at least) only call on it to form railway companies, companies of bearers of the wounded, the telegraph service, &c.

Prussia can place all the Army Corps of the Confederation on a war footing by calling up only the Prussian reserves.

If the Tables B and C are compared, it will be found that—

1. To complete one battalion of infantry it is necessary to call up on an average 490 combatants. There are 368 battalions (350 of the Line and 18 rifles), or, $490 \times 368 = 180,320$ combatants.

2. To complete one squadron of cavalry 13 men are required. There are 380 squadrons; $380 \times 13 = 4,940$ men.

3. To complete the thirteen regiments of field artillery 6,123 men are required.

4. To complete the thirteen battalions of pioneers 1,547 combatants are required.

The total number to call up is, therefore, in round numbers, 193,000 men.

Now, what is the actual strength of the reserve at the disposal of the Confederation?

The exact number is very easy to fix for old Prussia, but rather difficult for the provinces recently annexed, and for those which with Prussia comprise the Confederation, for none of these States adopted, the Prussian military organization before 1866.

But if we regard Prussia as she was prior to 1866, we find that her annual contingent was 63,000 men, she can therefore, put her hands on $4 \times 63,000 = 252,000$ reserve men;

deducting four per cent. for losses by death of one year, with another, a high per centage, we get more than 200,000 men as the number at her disposal. Prussia, therefore, can complete the Army Corps of the entire Confederation with her reserves alone.

In case of war, Prussia would act, without doubt, as she did in 1866, when she organized with ease the largest possible number of depôt troops. She would call up in advance, the annual contingent, and would retain to instruct it a portion of the reserve. If this part proved insufficient in number, she would call up the men of the first year of the Landwehr.

In continuation, I cannot point out too clearly that at present the Landwehr acts no longer in regiments brigaded with those of the Line, as it did prior to the reorganization of 1860. It is of no importance to find out, in what proportion it would be employed, if circumstances required its employment to complete the strength of the Line battalions to a war footing. Whatever happens, this proportion will be less than it was in 1866, when it amounted only to one-tenth. Now, these Landwehr men, mixed in small numbers in the ranks of the battalions, will not only be equal to the best soldiers, but all the officers have told me that in 1866 they usually proved themselves to be better than others.

It is idle, therefore, to ask in what proportions the men of the Regular Army, Reserve, and the Landwehr, may be mixed in the ranks of the army of the Confederation.

As I pointed out in my report of the 23rd April last, the whole of the military force of Prussia offers this peculiar homogeneity, that the men are either soldiers, with the colours, or old soldiers of three years' actual service; and if the best contingents are considered as those in the third year of service and those in the first two years of the reserve, (23, 24, and 25 years of age), it must be acknowledged, at the same time that the reserves of the third and fourth years (men of 26 and 27 years of age) and the Landwehr men of the first and second years (men of 28 to 29 years of age) are, as good soldiers, as the recruits, and those of the second year.

In order to understand clearly the entire force, that the Confederation could mobilize, in case of a great war, we must not lose ourselves in details nor in suppositions. The Federal Army can be only compared with some gigantic machine, all the parts of which resemble one another, and are regularly prepared beforehand, so that they may be put together as rapidly as possible.

In composition the various Army Corps are almost identical with one another. Haste or alteration made at the moment of entering into action might interfere with the working of the machine. The Confederation can always complete its Army Corps to a war footing, by calling up the Reserve, and, if requisite, a portion of the Landwehr.

If, then, the number of combatants only, is considered, and

the strength of the Army Corps placed at 36,000 each and the Guard at 39,000, the North German Confederation has on a war footing a force of—

		Men.
The Guard, 39,000 combatants..	39,000
12 Army Corps of 36,000 combatants..	432,000
The Hessian Division of 12,000	12,000
Total		<u>483,000</u>

Or, in round numbers, including non-combatants, 540,000 men.

Such is the approximate strength of the active army which the Confederation can put in first line.

But as I have already pointed out, in previous Reports, the entire force at her disposal consists of twelve contingents, or about 955,000 men, viz. :—

		Men.
3 Contingents with the Colours	315,000
4 " " Reserve	310,000
5 " " Landwehr	330,000
12 " " Total	<u>955,000</u>

It follows from this, that, in addition to the 540,000 just referred to, as forming the active army, there are still disposable more than 400,000 men.

A portion of these would be formed, as in 1866, into one or more Reserve Corps, and the remainder would be used for the instructional depôts and home defence. If the strength of these Reserve Corps is estimated at 80,000 men, the following table may be drawn up as representing pretty nearly, the general distribution of the military forces which the North German Confederation could dispose of, in case of a great European war.

		Men.
Army in the Field	540,000
Reserve Corps	80,000
Depôt Troops, and for Home Service	333,000
Total	<u>953,000</u>

REMARKS UPON THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

Report of the 22nd July, 1868.

I am very desirous of bringing to notice some facts connected with the Prussian Army, in order that its qualities, the spirit that animates it, in short, its moral state, may be clearly understood. I am the more anxious to do this, as I am convinced that people in France live in the greatest ignorance of all, that concerns Prussia, the Prussian nation, and the Prussian Army.

How can it be otherwise, when the young men in France are taught nothing of that important portion of history which treats of the institutions, character, genius, and proclivities of modern nations; when no foreign language is taught thoroughly; and when a taste for study of any kind is never given?

It follows that one generation succeeds another, knowing nothing whatever, of neighbouring nations, except their existence, the religion they profess, and the names of the chief towns. Thus, for example: Is there one person, in France, who has followed the extraordinary development of the Prussian nation since 1815? Here is a people full of vigour, who, in fifty years, has doubled its population; who, basing its institutions on two great principles—compulsory education, and compulsory military service, for all citizens—as, upon two majestic columns, has placed itself in the first rank, amongst the enlightened nations of Europe; which has organised a formidable army, provided with an unrivalled armament, and led by the best instructed officers in the world: and all this remained unnoticed until, it was revealed by the thunderbolt of 1866!

Now, we begin to study the causes of these astonishing events. But already this irritable, energetic, and unscrupulous nation, numbering thirty millions of people, and which can put in the field, a million of soldiers, has pushed its frontiers nine marches on the road to Paris, no natural obstacle intervening.

I must not be accused of exceeding the bounds, of my Military Mission in giving utterance to the opinions which a careful study of the Prussian nation has induced me to form.

Nowhere, are the army, and the nation, more entirely blended together; nowhere, do we find the qualities of the one, more faithfully reflected in the other. I would add, that a careful observer learns more, by living in Prussia than he can learn by reading, any number of books. Precisely as a man is never thoroughly known, except by his daily associates. Details, apparently of no importance, even slight changes of manner greatly aid the judgment, as regards both nations and individuals. The study of historic facts, confirms and completes the opinion so formed.

Any unbiassed person, gifted with common clear-sightedness, can, without difficulty, discern the qualities which mark the North German character—energy, boldness, and a deep conviction of their own importance. This judgment is confirmed by history. Twice in a hundred years Prussia has surprised, and astonished the world. Under the great Frederick, with a population of barely four millions, she struggled for seven years against Austria, backed at one time by Russian, at another time by French armies; and, although Napoleon the First, in his "*Memoires*," has cleared away the halo which surrounded this period, yet it is not the less true that it bears ample testimony to the indisputable energy of the Prussian

nation, maintained and directed by the genius of her King. A hundred years afterwards, Prussia, with nineteen millions of inhabitants, a second time drew on herself the astonishment of the world, by defeating Austria, and her allies. No one can deny, that her conduct, during recent events, has not been marked, now as then, by boldness of conception, and vigour in execution.

During the period which separated these two epochs, the Prussian nation suffered the complete defeat of Jena. No period of her history, shows more clearly the energy which characterizes her.

Prussia was annihilated at Jena, the Emperor compelling her, to retire behind the Elbe, and imposing crushing war contributions, unfortunately humiliating her, by requiring that for the future her army, should not exceed 40,000 men. *Then* this manly nation, bowing to stern necessity, collected herself together. She studied the causes, that had produced this great disaster, firmly resolved to overcome them, and avenge herself. The most distinguished Generals, formed a commission, which reformed abuses, and organized the army, on just principles, fruitful of great results. Eminent men, excited the patriotism of the country, and formed secret societies full of hatred to France. The richest families gave examples of self-sacrifice, by giving a portion of their fortune, to the State. Supported by the feelings of the nation, and led by men of spirit, Prussia prepared to profit; by the first favourable opportunity, and baffle the humiliating conditions imposed by the Emperor, by unceasingly teaching her new Landwehr troops. When 1812 came, Prussia furnished to the coalition 200,000 men, remarkable for an unequalled exasperation, who pursued France, with a hatred, which exists at the present day in full vigour, amongst the descendants of these people.

One cannot but admire the energy of a nation, who converted an overwhelming defeat into a source of national regeneration. This opinion is so true, that the greater number of the Prussian books which give the history of the 19th century, express it. Many eminent men have said to me :—

“It is to France, we owe our awakening, our greatness; Jena caused us to reflect, and we have profited by the lesson.”

The energy of the people of North Germany may be better estimated if the history just sketched, be compared with that of Austria at the same period.

Twice in four years, in 1805 and in 1809, the Emperor crushed Austria. Did she draw from these repeated disasters any instruction whatever? Did she feel the necessity of invigorating herself, by strong institutions? No; this amiable, sympathetic, but pleasure-seeking nation continued to live on its daily round, without even feeling towards its conquerors, those sentiments of hatred which befit a vigorous race. Have we not all seen, during the Bohemian war, all the theatres and places of public amusement in Vienna open,

and filled with crowds of people just as usual? Berlin would have offered a different appearance if Prussia had met with disaster. I have brought this comparison to notice, as it appears to me to mark the solid and manly qualities of the Prussian nation; qualities, which I again repeat are disseminated throughout the army.

To these national qualities, must be added incessant vigilance, a love of progress, and a spirit of application, pushed to the utmost limits. To demonstrate the truth of this, I will make another comparison, which is not to the advantage of France. During the last fifteen years we have had two great wars, what military instruction have we obtained from these wars? Have we sought to perfect one of our institutions; to improve one of our services? It may, perhaps, be said that they were as good as they could be, seeing that we have been victorious; that we defeated first Russia, then Austria. Nevertheless, we should carefully meditate on the example that Prussia offers us. She, too, was victorious in 1866, does she conclude that the organization of her army has reached the limits of perfection? If any persons think she does, they must be profoundly ignorant of the character of this people, so serious, so watchful, so eager to improve.

More truly may it be said that the war of 1866, since its termination, has been looked on by all intelligent Prussian officers as an opportunity afforded to Prussia to test her military institutions. Many Generals have said to me, "We have not made a great war since 1815, and as our organization appeared to us to be good, we were very anxious to test it; but we committed many faults in 1866, and we see many details that may be much improved."

In fact, for two years they have, with the view of improving the various branches of the army, laboured unceasingly, without noise, without ostentation, but with much care, and thought, at the War Office, at the head-quarter Staffs of the various Army Corps, in the various branches, of the Service and its administration; to this end Commissions, composed of officers, who served in the campaign, study and examine everything, in order that the experience gained may be utilized.

I will describe in detail hereafter the modifications that have been introduced. Here I confine myself to enumerating them. They are—

The reorganization of the Railway Companies.

The modification of the Hospital Service.

The reorganization of the Companies of Bearers, of the Wounded.

The reorganization of the Telegraph Service.

Alteration of the composition of the Ammunition Columns, and Artillery Reserves.

Changing the amount of Ammunition for the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery.

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Augmentation of the Cavalry.

Increased attention to the Cavalry Sword Exercise; because, in 1866, it was observed, that when Cavalry were opposed to Cavalry, hand-to-hand fighting frequently ensued.

The formation of an Engineer Committee.

Forming Commissions for obtaining remount horses.

Creating a model Farriers' establishment, for instructional purposes.

Making alterations in the dress of Cavalry soldiers.

Creating two new Military Schools, two new Cadet Schools, and a new School for Non-commissioned Officers.

In addition to all this, the creation of a School for Military Telegraphy and a Railway School is in contemplation.

The service of vivandiers, to secure the better feeding of the troops, on the line of march, and the important question of the baggage of the army is also under consideration.

To which must be added, as being already accomplished, the following:—The new division of the territory of the North German Confederation into Landwehr battalion districts.—(*Vide* Report of the 2nd December, 1867.)

- The removal to Spandau of all Artillery establishments.

The improvement in soldiers' messing.

The increase of the officers' pay.

To say nothing about the incessant experiments, that are being made with artillery, as well as small-arms, both for army and navy purposes.

When we compare this labour, the fruit of the experience obtained in one fortunate war, with what we in France, have done since the Crimean and Italian Wars, we cannot but be much struck with the difference. In general, the activity displayed throughout the Army; what is being done in the War Office, by Commissions, by the Staff; what is being done in the detached and general instruction of the troops, as regards manœuvres, and studies, of all kinds, the activity displayed, I say, is prodigious. No European Army shows anything like it. They are like a swarm of bees.

To understand this incessant labour, the distinctive qualities of the nation must be remembered. Its sentiment of duty, application, taste for labour, are pushed to extreme limits, as it were, by the necessity recognized by everyone, of completing the military instruction of the men, in a very short period, on an average not exceeding two and a half years.

But these reasons are not of themselves sufficient to explain the extraordinary activity prevailing in the army. The great personal influence of the King must be taken into account. This is a very curious point, and one, I believe, of which foreigners are entirely ignorant.

The King of Prussia occupies, in reference to the Army, a situation unknown in any other country, Russia excepted. He is, in every acceptation of the word the Chief of the Army (*der Kriegsherr*, as the Germans say). It is universally

admitted, that the present occupant, of the Prussian throne, has such a passionate love, for the military profession, to the exclusion of everything else, that his subjects, even those most devoted to him, reproach him with it.

Last year, during the Exhibition, I was in a carriage with General Moltke, when M. Hausseman did the honours of Paris to his Majesty. The King and all his officers were astonished. General Moltke, who never says anything, but what he thinks, addressed me as follows :—“I am very glad the King has seen the magnificence of Paris ; he occupies himself almost entirely with the army. He can to day see that a monarch may, without neglecting the army (for yours is excellent), interest himself in all that contributes to the greatness of a nation.” And the General added, “I, perhaps, may be allowed more than anyone else to speak thus, for I have no cause, to complain of the King’s love for the army.

But in speaking thus, General Moltke forgot, that with a man like the King, seventy-two years old, tastes and passions do not alter ; and the King remains the same as he was prior to his visit to Paris in 1867 ; that is to say, that he occupies himself with the army in preference to everything else, and his passion for military things has not decreased. Always amiable and kind, he well knows how to render this passion entrancing and contagious. As prince, that is to say, for twenty years, he gave all his thoughts to the army ; as regent for ten years, and since he ascended the throne, in 1861, he has used his sovereign power but to carry out the projects previously conceived and studied.

It is he who is the instigator of all the reforms, made in the army during the last fifteen years, more especially, the great reorganization of 1860. It is he, and only he, who, by his boundless activity, has raised the army, to that pitch of *training*, to which I have previously referred.

The personal and direct influence of the King is so great, that there is no doubt, but that under another monarch more than one spring, of the huge machine would more or less slacken.

It is well known how active, and indefatigable, the King, despite his great age, is. The Prussians say, laughingly ; that this is due to his stomach, as with all the Hohenzollerns. Every day, and generally during several hours in each day, he labours either with the Minister of War, General Moltke, or with General Treskow, the chief of the Military Council.* As a proof that this is no exaggeration, it is only requisite to obtain a collection, of the back numbers of Prussian newspapers, and run over that part of the collection, termed the Hof Journal (Court Journal), where a diary of the daily

* It is known that the institution of the Military Council has been keenly criticised by the opposition. The King never separates himself from General Treskow, Chief of the Council. He is with him now during his stay at Ems.

acts of the sovereign is kept. Reading it is monotonous, for every day, the same stereotyped phrases occur—"The King has worked to day with the Minister of War." "The King has conferred with the Chief of the Military Council."

From another point of view, the King may be looked on as the *Permanent Inspector General* of the Army. In the month of February of each year, when the recruits have received about three months' instruction, he begins his inspection at Berlin, Potsdam, and Spandau, which are garrisoned by the Guard. He inspects, in the depth of winter, even single companies; thus, this year, during a severe frost, he went to Potsdam, to inspect, according to his custom, in the most minute manner, the two companies of the regiment of which he is chief. This caused the Crown Prince to say to me, "Is not the King astonishing? I do not think I should have the same courage."

Later, the King inspects separately the battalions of the Guard, numbering no less than 27. Then follow the regimental inspections, for the different arms, which take place in May. During three months the King thus sees passing before him all the troops of the Guard, and follows the progress of their instruction at every stage. The reviews proper are in addition to these inspections. As the infantry of the Guard is stationed at Berlin, Potsdam, and Spandau, the cavalry at Berlin and Potsdam, the King visits these places, and holds each winter eight reviews, called here "Parades," viz., three for the infantry—one at Berlin, one at Potsdam, one at Spandau; four for the cavalry—two at Berlin and two at Potsdam (the cavalry at each of these towns is inspected twice, once mounted and once dismounted); lastly, one for the artillery and pioneers. The King, in addition to these, inspects the School of Musketry at Spandau, the Battalion of Instruction at Potsdam, and the Company of the Bearers of the Wounded at Berlin. I ought not to forget to mention the meetings of the Military Society at Berlin, which take place every 15 days in winter, and at the greater number of which the King is present to encourage a taste for study and labour amongst the officers. It is worthy of remark that at all these inspections and parades the Sovereign is accompanied by the Princes, Generals, and a crowd of other officers, sometimes by the Ministers and civil functionaries, who may have rank in the Landwehr. The King is always attentive, and obliging, full of enthusiasm and good humour during these exercises, and it is easy to understand the stimulus this gives everyone, from the General to the private soldier. I have been allowed to accompany the King this winter at least 20 times. Finally, in the month of June, at Potsdam, the Battalion of Instruction celebrates its formation by an annual fête. The King, who attaches great importance to this solemnity, because it, as it were, puts him in contact with the whole army, goes each year with the Queen, the Princes, and Princesses.

This instructional battalion is composed of five or six men selected from each regiment of infantry of the North German Army. These men almost all engage to serve for more than three years, and remain with the battalion during the summer and return in winter to their respective regiments. The object of this institution is to give the army an element favourable to a uniform instruction.

But the greater number of officers with whom I have spoken on this subject deny the utility of this institution, and they would willingly see this battalion suppressed, if its organization had not a higher object—that of bringing together for some months, men of different regiments, and above all affording the King an opportunity of putting himself into personal contact with the representatives of the whole army. His Majesty neglects nothing to give the annual fête of the Battalion of Instruction all possible solemnity. Divine service is performed that day, the battalion is reviewed; there is a special dinner; and rejoicings in the evening. The King, Queen, Princes, and Princesses, mix with the soldiers and share their food.

What I have described gives an idea of the activity of the King during winter and spring, but this activity never relaxes during the autumn. I append to my report a programme of the exercises to be performed by the Guard, between the 20th of August and 13th September. The King will be present on his return from Ems. Then the manœuvres of division against division follow. To explain the causes of the state of enthusiasm that this army has reached, I should add that the King is seconded in his task, by the Princes and Commandants of the Army Corps, whose zeal is continually exerted by their desire to gratify their Sovereign. It is usually in June that each of them inspects the troops under his command. The Crown Prince has just inspected the 2nd Corps; Prince Frederick Charles the 3rd. The object of these Army Corps inspections is to ascertain the amount of *fitness for war* (that is the word used) that the troops have acquired. For everything else, the Commander-in-Chief receives the reports of the Generals placed under his orders, and the latter those of the Commandants of Regiments, who hold a different position and have a far greater responsibility, than the Colonels in the French army.

The officers who accompanied the Crown Prince, and Prince Frederick Charles, in their inspections, have given me information, which confirms in every respect that which, I witnessed at Berlin and in the neighbourhood, with reference to the exercises of the Guard. Everywhere the same activity, the same principles by which the actual duty of the troops in war, is kept steadily in view. The troops are exercised, in the open country, one day in one place, another day in another. The infantry being exercised in firing as skirmishers in different kinds of ground. The cavalry in reconnaissance and outpost duty. The artillery in firing at targets, the positions, both of batteries and targets, being continually altered, so that the officers may judge the

distances, and correct the range. Both artillery and cavalry are exercised in crossing obstacles—ditches, hedges, and brush-wood—at great speed.

Of all the Corps Generals, the Commander of the 3rd, Prince Frederick Charles, requires the least stimulus. As passionately devoted to the profession of arms, as the King, he well knows how to communicate his enthusiasm, to the soldiers of the 3rd Corps, who have the greatest confidence in him.

All these details show clearly the kind of activity that reigns here. In a word, the spectacle that Prussia offers to an observer, is on the one hand a nation full of stamina and energy, educated as no other nation in Europe is; wanting it is true all amiable or generous qualities, but endowed with others more solid; ambitious to excess, uncrupulous, bold, and trained for many years under a military régime. On the other hand, a man who, for twenty years as prince and for ten years as regent, has given all his thoughts to the army with an eagerness, a passion, and a zest which have made it a most formidable weapon. It was this army that won Königgrätz.

This spectacle is so striking, that I cannot but accuse those foreigners, who were not struck with it prior to 1866, of folly or culpable neglect; and if I express so plainly this conviction, it is not for the vain pleasure of casting blame, but rather to attempt to divide it. To refuse the evidence of my senses, to neglect to report the true state of affairs, would be to leave my duty unfulfilled. Now, I again repeat, in Prussia the nation and the army display a spirit, an energy, a discipline, and an instruction so great, that they will be, when we come to settle accounts with them, the most formidable opponents. "We can no longer despise Prussia," Prince Napoleon said to me, during his visit to Berlin. And I would add, "We should never have despised her. Everything that ignorant people have said of the Prussian nation did not prevent her from having the first breech-loading arm. Such things are only a visible manifestation of the intelligence of a nation. A curious coincidence is, that once before, during the seven years' war, Prussia owed a portion of her success, to an improvement in small-arms. I allude to the employment of the iron ramrod."

It is the fashion in France to overrate the Austrian Army, and those who do not, draw on themselves the common-place reproach, "In decrying the Austrian Army, you diminish our glory." That is not the question; we would only be embarrassed by a weight of evidence were we to seek historic facts, to prove that the Austrian Army, despite its qualities, is the least formidable army in Europe. Prince Frederic Charles, who esteems them but lightly, said to me, "The Austrians *are accustomed to defeat.*"

For my part, I have for two years carefully studied and compared the Austrian and Prussian Armies, and can say with

great confidence, "Let us be careful, if war break out, not to think that we will have to do with Austrian troops. The Prussian Army will oppose us with a vigour, a boldness, and a warlike science that we never encountered in Italy." Can anyone think, that events would have occurred in Italy in 1859 as they did, if, in place of an Austrian, we had had to deal with a Prussian Army? When war broke out, it would have been in Turin, before a single French soldier had crossed the Alps. At Solferino, the 4th Corps, despite its heroic efforts, would have been pierced in the middle of the day. This cannot be questioned, if we remember the energy displayed by the Prussian soldiers, and the intelligence their leaders showed in the war of 1866.

This war offers, amongst others, three struggles, which could with difficulty be surpassed, in the history of any other nation. On the 28th June, at the action, of Soor a battalion of the 2nd Grenadier, Emperor Francis Regiment, attacked an entire Austrian brigade, composed of seven battalions (the brigade Grivicic), and, notwithstanding enormous losses, gave time for another Prussian battalion to come up, and disperse the seven hostile battalions, which were never heard of again during the campaign.

The 3rd July, the Division Fransecky, at Königgrätz, numbering about 9,000 men, struggled for several hours, at first against one, then against two, Austrian Army Corps, and yet held its ground. The same day, the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard carried the heights of Chlun, and defended itself there for three quarters of an hour, against the attacks, badly directed it is true, of the two Austrian Reserve Corps still intact.* I will conclude by some remarks on the manœuvring qualities of the Prussian Army, and the warlike intelligence which study and labour develops amongst the officers. There is but one opinion, amongst the numerous foreign officers assembled at Berlin, that of admiration for the precision of the manœuvres of the young soldiers composing this army. It is astonishing to see the results obtained in this respect with so short a service. The troops have given brilliant proofs of their manœuvring powers in the war of 1866. In Bohemia, Prussian Generals have related several things to me, which, allowing for exaggeration, leave much to admire. They praise above all the coolness with which their soldiers closed their ranks, when rendered requisite by the enemy's fire. At the action of Skalitz,

* The resistance of the 1st Division of the Guard would be inexplicable if we did not know that Benedek was at that moment far from Chlun; that the two Austrian Reserve Corps only attempted to retake the position by disconnected efforts, and that a fine rain prevented the Austrians from seeing that they had to do with only a single Division, but the defence of the Division (Hiller) is not the less, one of the most wonderful feats of modern war. This General had received orders to halt before Horenowes and wait orders there; but stung by certain reproofs, the Prince of Wurtemberg, commanding the guard, on the 28th June, at the beginning of the action of Soor, had given him, he disobeyed, and attacked with his single division the heights of Chlun.

the 47th Infantry Regiment, advanced in line, drums beating, under a very heavy artillery fire, against the troops of the Austrian General Frager. The precision, the coolness, of the advance was such that this General, who believed, like everyone else, that the Prussian troops were good only for parade movements, cried with contempt to his men, "See there, those dirty pigs think they are on parade." He was killed, and his exclamation, reported by his orderly officer, who was captured, has become historic in the Prussian Army.

Would the Prussian troops preserve their regularity of manœuvres before the dash of our troops. I do not doubt it. We unfortunately have in France, a school of officers who deny the advantage of precision of manœuvre, and who seek to erect impetuosity, and disorder into a principle. God grant that our Generals would ponder well, what Napoleon the 1st has written on manœuvres, and would lean more on him. His soldiers had, at least as much dash as ours now have. Our impetuous disorder has succeeded against Austrians, but it will be very different against steady troops, such as the English, or Prussians. We may have to regret all this, when it is too late.

Science and warlike intelligence, I have already said, are fully developed amongst the Prussian Generals. Proofs of this abound, but I will confine myself to a very characteristic comparison, which a study of the war of 1866 has suggested, and which relates to the division into Army Corps. Napoleon the 1st has written, "Human faculties are so limited that no General can command on the same theatre of war more than five distinct units." Now, what do we see in 1866? Benedek had a disposable force of 7 Austrian Army Corps, the Saxon Army, 4 divisions of cavalry, and a reserve of artillery, in all 13 units. Did he ever think of forming them into several groups or armies? Not at all. He attempted to give direct orders, without any intermediate agency, to each of these 13 independent units. What a want of cohesion; what losses of time; what orders, and counter-orders resulted from this, during this short campaign, so fatal for Austria?

And what a contrast, with the dispositions made at Berlin. The three armies, that is to say, only three distinct units, received the general orders emanating from the head-quarters of the King. Each of the Commanders of Armies, preserved entire liberty in execution, and moved only four or five distinct units or Army Corps. Everything was simple and logical.

Singular fact, Austria, as regards the distribution of her army, committed in 1859 and in 1866 two faults the exact opposite of one another. In 1859 she formed two distinct armies. This is one of the worst possible arrangements, since there is neither centre nor wings, at least without breaking up the large commands. She adopted in 1866 a formation still more vicious, that of 13 distinct units without any bond of union between them. Do not such traits clearly prove the superiority of the

intelligence of the Prussian over the Austrian Army, for if in the latter, officers of high rank are ignorant, of the essential principles of war, which the greatest Captain has laid down in his memoirs, what can be expected from the officers of lower rank?

As can be seen, all that I have said of the Prussian Army, and in particular of its superiority, over the Austrian Army, follow in the clearest manner from the combined study of the character and institutions of the two nations.

I defy any officer, who will compare and study these things, not to be struck in the same way. He would observe in the Prussian Army, which embraces the intelligence, and the moral force of the entire nation, first the distinctive qualities, of the races of North Germany—energy, boldness, discipline, frugality, a feeling of duty and dignity; then unity, instruction, the science of manœuvring, an excellent armament; the best taught Staff in Europe, warlike knowledge developed amongst the officers by study and toil; all these things he would not find in the Austrian Army, or would find them in a far less degree.

It is almost useless to add that the military events of 1866, have not only increased in the Prussian Army, the idea of its own value, long before this period nothing was neglected to give the army absolute confidence in itself, to honour and encircle it with all possible consideration. All favours are for it, and everything tends to make it, in the eyes of the country a fundamental—I had almost said a sacred—institution, the military music borrows a religious character in the selection of sacred airs, such as the “National Hymn” and the “Retreat of the Army.” During divine service it is upon the King and the army the minister calls down before all others, the blessing of the Most High. The great bodies of the State are only named afterwards. The labours I have described are carried out with that calm dignity, with that earnestness, which stamp so essentially this grave, energetic, and well-taught people whose country reaches from the Vistula to the Rhine. What a contrast with the position filled by the army in France, where it is but a mass of men, the outcasts of fortune, who lose every day more and more discipline and military spirit.

FIELD GUNS OF BRONZE; CAST-IRON GUNS; ABANDONMENT OF SHRAPNEL SHELL; ARMS OF THE LANDWEHR; TWO DETAILS OF INSTRUCTIONS.

Report of the 29th July, 1868.

I. BRONZE FIELD GUNS.

On the 20th of last February, I referred to the ideas which divided the partisans of bronze, from those who approved of steel, as a material for field guns.

I alluded to the importance of this subject, both to the Prussian Army, and to Prussian manufacturers. To say nothing of its importance to the Government, who, having just completed its field material in steel, found itself compelled to consider if it had not been too hasty, in abandoning bronze.

As I pointed out, the number of partisans of steel diminished, and those of bronze increased daily.

It can therefore be easily imagined how much interest was attached to the trials made by the Commission with breech-loading bronze guns.

Six of these had been cast, two of which were 6-prs., and 4 4-prs. One of the requirements that these guns had to fulfil was, that they should fit the 6 and 4-pr. gun carriages actually in use, the projectiles and the rifling being the same. The method of closing the breech being a double wedge, as in the 4-pr. steel gun. The breech block is in copper, as in the siege guns.

The 4 4-pr. guns weigh each, 605 lbs., the breech apparatus included; two of these guns are 6·06 in length. The two others 5·181 in length, and, consequently, are somewhat stronger than the others. The weight of the charge is 1 lb. 1½ oz. The initial velocity is not yet determined.

The two 6-prs. weigh each 946 lbs.; the length is 6' 4·3"; weight of charge, 1 lb. 5½ oz.; initial velocity, 1003·68 per second. I was allowed to be present at one of these experiments, when the 4-pr. guns were tried. They had previously fired 1,300 rounds each, with satisfactory results, both as regards accuracy and durability both of guns and carriages. After 1,600 rounds have been fired these experiments will cease.

II. CAST-IRON GUNS.

M. Gruzon sent to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867 a cast-iron 4-pr. gun, surrounded with a steel jacket. The Prussian Government has consented, on the request of M. Gruzon, to experiment with this gun. Practice was begun

with charges of 1 lb. $15\frac{1}{2}$ oz., it being proposed to increase the charges to 3 lbs. $5\frac{1}{3}$ oz., but the gun burst with a charge of 2lb. 12 oz.

III. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE USE OF SHRAPNEL SHELL.

Up to the present time the box of the limber of the 4-pr. and that of the wagon each held 48 rounds, of which thirty-two were common shell and sixteen shrapnel. The Artillery not being satisfied with the fuzes hitherto proposed, the shrapnel has been given up, and, for the future, the forty-eight rounds in the limber boxes, will hold forty-four common shell, and four case shot.

IV. ARMS OF THE LANDWEHR.

I, some time ago, pointed out that the Landwehr would be all armed with the needle-gun in the course of the summer of 1868. This measure is now completed. Partly to hasten the operation, and partly for economy, the Prussian Government has converted the rifles, taken from the Austrians, in 1866. The number of these, I believe, is about 20,000.

V. TWO DETAILS OF INSTRUCTION.

I am ignorant of the alterations made in our rifle drill during the last two years; the Prussian drill differs from ours in the following details:—

1. With us, the soldier fires his weapon holding the right elbow on the same level as the shoulder. The Prussian rule, on the contrary, directs that the elbow should be raised as much as possible.

All the officers I have consulted agree in stating that the butt of the rifle is much steadier with the elbow thus raised, owing to the hollow so produced in the shoulder joint,

2. Formerly the intonation, of the order to fire, was the same with the Prussians as with us; but for several years orders have been given to alter the intonation of the word Fire! It is now given in a low, long tone with reference to the other words Ready! Present!—which precede it. It is said here, and justly, that the word Fire! should not surprise the firer, which must happen, more or less, if it is given in a sharp, loud tone of voice.

RETURN TO BRONZE; ACTIVITY OF THE KING; CONVENTION
WITH MECKLENBERG-SCHWERIN.

Report of 31st August, 1868.

I. RETURN TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF BRONZE.

To day, the 31st August, a decision of the greatest importance has been come to at Berlin. It is the return to the employment of bronze for the manufacture of field guns.

I refer to my reports of the 20th February and 29th July, 1868, to explain this result; and if I hasten to let it be known, it is because this decision will exercise great influence over the decision to which we in France, must come as to the material, bronze or steel, to be used in our future field artillery.

The return to the use of bronze, which the Prussian Artillery have determined on, is a fortunate thing for France, which has no steel foundry comparable to that of Krupp, and which possesses considerable supplies of bronze. I gave, on the 29th July, some details of the firing (before the Experimental Committee) at Tegel of six bronze breech-loading guns, four 4-pr. and two 6-pr. In consequence of the satisfactory results then obtained, the Committee met to day, and unanimously decided to return to bronze, in the manufacture of field artillery, and to adopt the experimental 4 and 6-pr.

The question will be shortly submitted to, what is called here, the "General Artillery Inspection," presided over by Prince Charles; but the decision of the Committee is not doubtful. It is requisite also, prior to such an important measure being finally settled, that the King should give his approval.

A dozen field guns of the new pattern will be commenced at once.

II. ACTIVITY OF THE KING.

I have already in a previous report pointed out the great activity of the King, and the influence he consequently exercises over the army. This is simply prodigious, and is a subject of astonishment, not only to the general public, but to those persons who habitually surround the Sovereign. His stay at Ems completed, the King, taking Frankfort, Thuringia, Erfurt, and Weimar, *en route*, returned to Berlin on the 27th August, after inspecting in 22 days the troops in all the towns and surrounding country through which he passed. The King said recently, with evident satisfaction, "Since I left Ems I have inspected 87 battalions.

The King at present is engaged with the brigade movements

of the Guard. This morning General Goltz (brother of the Ambassador at Paris), who commands eight regiments of cavalry of the Guard, manoeuvred five of his regiments. The various movements were performed, with a precision and accuracy, which our cavalry of the Imperial Guard is far from equalling. I repeat again, that one can only wonder at the results, obtained in regiments of all arms of the service, in the Prussian Army, notwithstanding the short period of service. These manoeuvres, and those of the divisions, have attracted a very great number of foreign officers to Berlin.

III. TREATY WITH MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN.

Prussia has just concluded with the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a Military Convention, in virtue of which the officers of the Mecklenburg contingent, can serve in the Prussian Army and *vice versa*. Prussia thus obtains the advantage of commanding the troops of Mecklenburg by Prussian Officers, and the officers of the Duchy are also placed in a position more favourable, to their promotion, on account of their being enrolled in the Prussian Army.

REPLY TO A NOTE SENT BY ORDER OF THE EMPEROR.

Report of the 16th November, 1868.

This note was to the following effect: "The Army of the Confederation is composed of 330,000 men. The French Army is composed of 400,000 men, the number of regiments is almost identical. But in Prussia a battalion is composed of 600 to 700 men, a squadron of 130 horses; whilst in France the battalion is composed of 400 men, and a squadron of 100 horses."

Reply. The number representing the exact effective strength of the Federal Army must be corrected. It is 315,000 men, and not 330,000.

Vide my report on this subject to the War Minister, dated 24th June, 1868, with the attached tables, one of which is an extract from the war estimates of 1869, giving the exact official strength of the army of the North German Confederation upon a peace footing. This extract shows the number estimated for as 313,585, but it includes neither the Surgeons nor Pay Department; taking them into account, the number is 315,000. But it must be remarked that this number does not include the troops of the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt forming the 25th division. This Duchy is divided by the Main into two portions, that situated on the right bank belongs to the Confederation, that on the left bank is independent but

the troops of the 25th division are not included in the estimate. I will take as a basis the official figures, 315,000 men, or the number of the Federal Army, not including the troops of the Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt.

It is undoubtedly the fact, as the note to which I reply states, that the number of regiments in the two armies is almost the same, but the numbers given as the effective strength of the battalions and squadrons are far from being exact, and should be corrected.

I will begin by pointing out that the effective strength of a battalion, and squadron, is not calculated nor fixed in France as in Prussia, and the difference is sufficient to produce a great difference, when the effective strength of the two armies is compared.

In France, when the effective strength of a regiment is spoken of, the regimental staff, the staff of non-commissioned officers, and "the company not in the ranks," are not counted, and consequently are not included in the effective strength of the battalion.

If we look, for example, at a three-battalion regiment quartered in France, we will find—

1 Regiment of 3 Batt..	{	Regimental Staff	18	} 152
		Staff Non-Commissioned Officers..	59	
		Company not in the Ranks	75	
		3 Battalions of	616	1,848
		Total		<u>2,000</u>

By this method of counting there are 152 men in a regiment who are not borne on the effective strength of the battalions; consequently, *the effective strength of a battalion is far from being one-third of the effective strength of a regiment.*

In Prussia, on the contrary, they have no staff non-commissioned officers, or "company not in the ranks," or more correctly, they are divided between the battalions and included in their effective strength, whence it results, *that the effective strength of a battalion is almost exactly one-third of that of the regiment.*

The effective strength of an infantry regiment of the Line may be analysed as follows:—

1 Regiment of 3 Batt..	{	Regimental Staff	20
		3 Battalions of 554	1,662
		Total	<u>1,682</u>

Thus, in Prussia there are only 20 men in a regiment who are not borne on the effective strength of the battalions. Whilst in a French regiment there are 152. But in Prussia, I repeat, each battalion of 554 men includes one-third of the total number of workmen, (tailors and shoemakers), armourers, hospital orderlies, &c., of the entire regiment.

A regiment has only 10 musicians paid as such on the estimates, the 30 others are taken from the ranks, and a certain sum is added to their pay by subscription amongst the officers. These 10 musicians are included in the regimental staff, and are looked on as combatants. The 554 men in a battalion may be analysed as follows :—

1 Battalion ..	{	532 Combatants, viz., 18 Officers, 53 Non-Commissioned Officers, 461 Soldiers (of whom 16 are fifiers and drummers).	
		22 Non-Combatants (workmen, armourers, hospital orderlies).	
Total ..		554 men.	

If it is desired to analyse a Prussian regiment exactly as is done in the French service, the following table results :—

1 Regiment of 3 Batt..	{	Regimental Staff	10	}	86
		Staff Non-Commissioned Officers..	28		
		Company not in the Ranks	48		
		3 Battalions of	532	1,596	
Total					1,682

Thus the battalion of 554 men is reduced to 532; but this analysis has no signification, because the staff non-commissioned officers, and the company not in the ranks, do not exist as separate bodies, but are divided amongst the battalions.

From what I have just stated, it is apparent that to compare the effective strength of the French and Federal Armies, the number and strength of the regiments, must be compared rather than the number and strength of the battalions. However, I give in the annexed table the two kinds of comparison.

This table shows that the Federal Army has 114 regiments of infantry, and 16 battalions of rifles. The French Army has 115 regiments, and 21 battalions of rifles, also 3 battalions of African light infantry. The total number of Federal battalions being 358 and French 372, and the effective strength of the two infantries is—

	Men.
Infantry of the Confederation	203,286
French Infantry.. .. .	263,000

The latter being thus 59,714 men stronger, because its regiments are stronger.

I do not know the exact number of infantry regiments in Algiers at present, I assume it to be 10. In the tables comparing the armies by battalions, I have taken the strength of the German battalions as they are counted in Prussia, viz., one-third of the strength of the regiment, less 20 men; and for the French battalions, the strength has been taken as in France, one-third of the strength of the regiment, less 152 to 160 men (152 if the regiment is composed of 2,000 men). These tables show the correction which should be made in the strength of the French, and Prussian battalions, referred to in the note to

which I reply. If the effective strength of a battalion is taken as the unit, on which to base the comparison between the two armies, the average effective strength of a battalion must be used.

Now the tables show that the infantry of the Federal Army is composed of 358 battalions of 560 men (the strength of a battalion being counted as in Prussia). The French infantry is composed of 372 battalions of 664 men (the strength being counted as in France).

The effective strength of the cavalry, gives rise to similar observations, or in other words, the effective strength of a squadron, is not based on the same data in France, as in Prussia. In France, the staff non-commissioned officers, and the troop not in the ranks, are counted separately; while in Prussia they are divided amongst the squadrons, and included in the effective strength. Whence it follows that the effective strength of a German squadron is much nearer one-fifth of a regiment (there are five squadrons in a regiment) than the effective strength of a French squadron is to one-fifth or one-sixth of a regiment (according as there are five or six squadrons in a regiment). The following table shows this:—

		Men.	Horses.
1 French Regiment of 5 Squadrons ..	{ Regimental Staff, Staff Non- Commissioned Officers, and Troop not in the Ranks .. }	110	..
		5 Squadrons of 1,140 men, and 110 horses }	700
	Total.. .. .	<u>810</u>	<u>550</u>

		Men.	Horses.
1 French Regiment of 6 Squadrons ..	{ Regimental Staff, Staff Non- Commissioned Officers, and Troop not in the Ranks .. }	113	..
		6 Squadrons of 140 men and 110 horses }	840
	Total.. .. .	<u>953</u>	<u>660</u>

The strength of the regiment exceeds, therefore, the strength of the five or six squadrons by 110 to 113 men.

1 German Squadron.	{ 142 Combatants, viz., 5 Officers, 16 Non- Commissioned Officers, 121 men, (including 3 trumpeters), and 139 horses. 5 Non-Combatants. }
Total ..	

		Men.	Horses.
1 German Regiment	Regimental Staff	14	..
	5 Squadrons of 147 men and 139 horses }	735	695
Total	<u>749</u>	<u>695</u>	

Here there is a difference only of 14 men between the

actual strength of a regiment, and five times the actual strength of a squadron.

I have estimated in the accompanying tables the strength of the German squadron, as is done in Prussia, including the staff non-commissioned officers, and the troop not in the ranks, and I have preserved for the French squadrons our system of calculation. The following are the results :—

For the Cavalry of the Federal Army—

370 Squadrons of 147 Men and 139 Horses.

For the French Cavalry—

348 Squadrons of 144 Men and 111 Horses.

Thus, we have not only fewer squadrons, but a smaller average strength per squadron, and, nevertheless, the total force of our cavalry is greater. This follows, I again repeat, from the method we adopt, of not including in the strength of the squadrons, the staff non-commissioned officers, and the troop not in the ranks, which are included in Prussia.

The recapitulation at the end of these tables gives the total effective strength of the Regular Army—infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and train. The Federal Army being 301,784 men, is 13,000 below the strength provided in the estimate (315,000). The French Army is 27,500 below its strength. The “gendarmerie” alone accounting for 21,556 of the last figure.

FEDERAL ARMY (315,000 MEN).

INFANTRY.

114 Regiments (of 3 <i>Battalions</i>)	} Total, 358 Battalions.
16 Battalions of Rifles	

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH ESTIMATED BY REGIMENTS.

			Men.		
114 Regiments	{	105 have	1,682
		4 " "	1,694
		5 " "	2,188
16 Battalions of Rifles have	560	} Total, 203,286 men.	

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH ESTIMATED BY BATTALIONS.

105 Regiments with 1,682 Men have	315	Battalions with	554	Men.
4 " " 1,694 " "	12	" "	558	"
5 " " 2,188 " "	15	" "	710	"
16 Battalions of Rifles have	16	" "	560	"
Total	358	"	200,816	"

This gives an average of 560 men per Battalion.

It may be therefore said that the Federal Army consists of 358 *Battalions with an average of 560 men.*

Remark.—The difference between the total effective strength (203,286) and that of the 358 Battalions (200,816), arises from the 20 men who in each regiment are not borne on the effective strength of the Battalions, *vide* page 98.

FRENCH CAVALRY.

63 Regiments of which 30 have 5 Squadrons, 33 have 6 Squadrons; total, 348 Squad.

		Men.	
30 Regiments with 5 Squadrons have	811	} Total { 57,200 men. 45,000 horses.
33 Regiments with 6 Squads.	{ 24 in France have	953	
	{ 9 in Algiers have	1,111	

54 Regiments in France have 294 Squadrons with 140 men and 110 horses.
 9 " Algiers " 54 " " 166 " 120 "

348 Squadrons, making { 50,924 men.
38,820 horses.

This gives an average of 144 men and 111 horses to each Squadron; or it may be said, the French Cavalry consists of 348 Squadrons of 144 men and 111 horses.

ARTILLERY.

22 Regiments (including Pontoniers) have 202 Batteries and companies.
 Effective strength 36,700 men, 19,200 horses.

ENGINEERS.

3 Regiments, effective strength 6,704 men and 699 horses.

TRAIN.

13 Squadrons { Artillery Train.. } Total strength, 8,954 men, 7,710 horses.
 { Train of Wagons }

RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	Horses.
Infantry	263,000
Cavalry	57,200	45,000
Artillery	36,700	19,200
Engineers	6,704	699
Train	8,954	7,710
<u>Total</u>	<u>372,558</u>	<u>72,608</u>

The difference between these figures and the number given in the estimates, is 27,500 men; this number represents the Gendarmes at home and in the colonies—

The Gendarmes of the Guard	21,556
The Paris Guard	2,896
The Fire Brigades	1,572
The Veteran Companies, Discipline Companies, and Remount } Dépôts	1,476
<u>Total</u>	<u>27,500</u>

FEDERAL CAVALRY.

74 Regiments with 5 Squadrons	Total.
	370 squadrons.
The 74 Regiments have 749 men and 744 horses	{ 55,449 men.
	{ 55,088 horses.

(Account is taken of the slightly greater strength of the regiments of Life Guards.)

Each Squadron has 147 men and 139 horses.

370 Squadrons have	{ 54,300 men.
	{ 51,430 horses.

ARTILLERY.

23 Regiments	{	12 of Field Artillery, each with 15 Batteries, one with 16 Batteries—
		196 Batteries.
		10 of Garrison Artillery, with 8 Companies, and 3 Divisions or 92 Companies.

Total Effective Strength 33,195 men and 10,000 horses.

ENGINEERS.

13 Battalions. Total Effective Strength, 6,747 men and 91 horses.

TRAIN.

13 Battalions. Total Effective Strength, 3,107 men and 1,599 horses.

RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	Horses.
Infantry	203,286	..
Cavalry	55,449	55,088
Artillery	33,195	1,000
Engineers	6,747	91
Train	3,007	1,590
Total	<u>301,784</u>	<u>66,778</u>

The difference between these figures and those shown in the estimates, or 13,000 men, is made up as follows:—

	Men.
Instructional Battalion, School for N.-C. O., Rifle Schools, }	2,845
Cavalry School	3,910
Landwehr Cadres	1,500
Officers not on the Strength of Regiments
Invalids, various Troops (Companies of Discipline and the }	4,715
Palace Guard)
Total	<u>13,000</u>