TOTAL ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM COURSEWARE

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

SUBCOURSE

320C/8

42
CREDIT HOURS

Center for Army Tactics

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Lesson number	Lesson Title	Credit hours	Scheduled completion date	Date mailed
1	Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine			
2	The Latin American Environment			
3	Joint Planning Practical Exercise			
4	Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise			

Schedule your own program for this subcourse by filling in a target date for each lesson.

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U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH , KS 66027

CORPS OPERATIONS
ERRATA TO COURSE BOOK

CHANGE ALL REFERENCE FROM ACADEMIC YEAR 98 TO ACADEMIC YEAR 99. THE COURSEWARE ISA REPRINT OF THE 98, PER THE COURSE POINT OF CONTACT AS REQUESTED.

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CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

PREFACE

The profession of arms requires continuous study to meet the challenges posed by modem warfare. Global responsibilities, high-technology weapons, joint operational emphasis, and integrated coalition operations are only a few of the complexities that demand the best from the military's academic institutions. Nowhere are these complexities more evident than in force-projection operations. S320C, *Corps Operations: Joint Force Projection,* allows you to experience the difficulties of projecting forces into an austere area that poses unique problems for the corps staff planner.

This subcourse takes you out of the well-developed European theater with its inherent advantages for supporting military operations. S320C will have you leave the comfort zone of operating in Europe, a comfort that was inevitable because your previous tactics instruction has been set in the European theater, Instead, this subcourse is set in Latin America (LATAM). This southern region demands you expand your horizons and learn to be flexible in planning tactical operations. The region is underdeveloped, requiring you to examine new missions, tailor forces differently, and consider additional planning factors,

S320C has been designed around three learning objectives that focus on force-projection doctrine, the regional environment, and the planning of corps operations. Lesson 1 prepares you for subsequent lessons by introducing major aspects of force-projection doctrine. This information will be used and reinforced as you work the practical exercises later in the subcourse. Lesson 2 focuses on the Latin American environment, the regional situation, US interests and objectives in the area, and US forces operating in the theater. This lesson completes your study of the five unified commands by acquainting you with the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Lessons 3 and 4 are designed around practical exercises. Lesson 3 introduces the exercise scenario and focuses on the use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) deliberate and crisis action planning by the USSOUTHCOM staff to respond to hostilities in its area of responsibility. In lesson 4, you will be a planner in an airborne corps practical exercise. This corps has multiple roles and missions at the joint and component levels in a force-projection operation in support of a request for assistance by the government of Honduras. You will modify the existing Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) operation plan and incorporate the requirements of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) execute order. The outcome of the practical exercise is to produce an operation order (OPORD) as Task Force (TF) Brown, a subordinate headquarters of JTFSO, the land component commander (LCC). Following lesson 4, you are ready to begin the exam. The subcourse examination uses the fictional island of Barbella to test your understanding of force-projection operations.

In short, the lessons of S320C will have you recall previous instruction, understand how and why planning considerations change, apply what you have learned under a different set of conditions, and gain competence in the joint, combined, and service aspects of force-projection operations. The nature of projecting forces to underdeveloped areas will test your ability to operate with less concrete information than your counterpart on the planning staff of a headquarters in a developed theater.

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CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

INTRODUCTION

GOAL

You will be competent in the concepts of force projection and application of corps-level tactical planning and execution processes which will enable you to synthesize basic tactical problems and perform command and staff planning and execution functions during war and operations other than war.

You will comprehend the strategic and operational environment in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of operations and the effects of that environment on the planning of corps and division operations.

SCOPE

The ability to project power has long been a cornerstone of US national foreign policy. Today, the dynamic change in world economies, the restructuring of governments, and the shifts in regional security interests are but a few factors causing the military to adjust to the changing conditions. The recent edition of FM 100-5, *Operations,* has been revised to keep doctrine in line with the forces of change. The manual emphasizes the importance of force-projection operations. Global commitments facing a smaller military require a greater capability to act quickly to crisis situations by deploying US forces to protect worldwide national interests and objectives.

As a field grade officer, you must understand the projection of forces in support of our National Military Strategy. Plans officers must understand the doctrine, the types of missions, and the planning circumstances inherent in conducting force-projection operations in an underdeveloped theater. This subcourse, S320C, *Corps Operations: Joint Force Projection,* will provide an opportunity to experience the complex demands of operating in the USSOUTHCOM theater-an area known for its austerity. Lesson 1 focuses on the doctrine for force-projection operations. You will learn that planning operations into underdeveloped theaters has considerations that are different from force projections to Europe—a developed theater, The lesson expands your knowledge of how the joint community operates in unison to support and tight in this environment. Lesson 2 continues to familiarize you with the unified commands and their area of responsibility. You will study USSOUTHCOM and understand how the command operates and supports its subordinate units in theater. Lessons 3 and 4 use practical exercises to study joint and Army responsibilities when conducting operations in the Latin American region. Support to the Honduran Govcrnment is the scenario basis used to generate thinking about the requirements of force-projection planning.

Force-projection operations require a flexible thinker who can adjust rapidly to changing situations and requirements. This subcourse will challenge you to keep an open mind, reflect on the civil-military aspects of the situation, and act quickly and decisively when confronted by sketchy intelligence typical of operations in an underdeveloped theater. Your thinking cannot be “business as usual’’—European style.

S320C is organized by lesson as shown below:

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine
Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment
Lesson 3. Joint Planning Practical Exercise
Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.00 TASK: Summarize the doctrine for corps force-projection operations in a joint environment.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The summary must include an explanation of US Army force-projection doctrine in an underdeveloped theater at the operational and tactical levels across the range of military operations. The summary must also include integrating Army capabilities with joint and combined forces and other Government and non-Government agencies IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-15, Joint Pub 5-00.2, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, ld, and le.

B.00 TASK: Explain the strategic and operational environments in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include political, military, geographic, economic, social, and historical factors affecting US security interests in the region IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, lb, ld, le, 3a, and 3C

C.00 TASK: Plan corps force-projection operations.

CONDITION: Given the requirement for a written presentation; assignment as a corps staff planner; general and special situations with maps; and a theater or joint task force (JTF) campaign plan with a Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL), an intelligence estimate, the commander's planning guidance, and theater/corps intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products with references.

STANDARD: The plans or staff recommendations must be tactically feasible and logistically supportable, consistent with joint and service doctrine, and justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in staff estimates and decision-making processes IAW FM 34-130, FM 63-3, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, FM 101-5 (Final Draft), Student Text 22-2, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Synthesis.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 2c.

PROGRAM FOR JOINT EDUCATION (PJE)—PHASE I

For some time now, congressional concerns have focused on ensuring that military education contributes effectively to the production of strategic thinkers and warfighters necessary to successfully support US national strategy and effectively wield the military instrument of national power.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986) makes the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal official to assist the Secretary of Defense in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) matters, including the joint curriculums at service schools, and gives the Chairman the responsibility for formulating policies to coordinate all rnilitary education.

The Chairman, in order to fulfill his duties, prescribed four objectives for the JPME program which are to—

- Provide officers a broad base of joint professional knowledge.

- Develop officers whose professional backgrounds and military education will improve the operational excellence of joint military forces throughout the spectrum of war.

- Improve the quality of military strategic thought.

- Develop officers skilled in attaining unity of effort across service, agency, and national lines.

The result of these objectives was the formulation of the Professional Joint Education Phase I program. This program includes 5 primary learning areas and 23 learning objectives. The learning areas are national military capabilities and command structure, joint doctrine, joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war, joint planning and execution processes, and systems integration at the operational level of war. The PJE learning objectives provide the foundation for the material taught in S320C and are listed with each of the lesson learning objectives as applicable. You can be certain that accomplishments of the prescribed curriculum will result in your gaining proficiency in these tasks and, therefore, meet the guidelines established by the Chairman. As you progress through the course, make sure you review those learning objectives so that you can focus your efforts in that direction.

EVALUATION

General

S320C is gradable instruction. Your final grade is based on your demonstrated understanding of the S320C learning objectives, associated terms, and concepts. The points you earn will be based on your performance on the end of subcourse examination. The exam contains multiple-choice questions and is 100 percent of your grade for S320C.

Grades

You will receive a grade of A, B, C, or U. You will be evaluated against the S320C learning objectives.

Points	Grade
90 to 100	A
80 to 89	B
70 to 79	C
Less then 70	Unsatisfactory

Examination

The subcourse examination will cover all material presented in the subcourse, to include your assigned readings and lesson guides. You must complete your assigned readings. Some exam questions will be covered only in the readings. Do not assume that all exam questions will be covered in the lesson guides. Some of the questions will be situation-type questions and will cause you to apply the skills and knowledge you gained during the course.

Upon completion of the exam, return your completed CGSC Form 207 and CGSC Form 309 to SOCS. DO NOT RETURN THE EXAM BOOKLET. As soon as you receive a passing grade for the subcourse, destroy your exam booklet. Read chapter 1 of CGSC Circular 351-3 for an explanation of the ethics standards.

Mail your completed CGSC Forms 207 and 309 in the preaddressed envelope provided to:

COMMANDANT, USACGSC
ATTN: ATZL-SWE-R
DIRECTORATE OF NONRESIDENT STUDIES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6940

COURSE PREREQUISITE

To succeed in S320C, you must have successfully mastered the skills and objectives of S3l0A, S310B, S320A, and S320B.

ISSUE MATERIAL

All lesson guides, practical exercise materials, and supplemental readings are in the S320C Course Book, the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and ST 100-7.

S324 LESSONS

Lesson	Title
1	Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine
2	The Latin American Environment
3	Joint Planning Practical Exercise
4	Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

USE OF LESSON GUIDES

The lesson guides were designed and written to help you complete the subcourse. They instruct you concerning the learning objectives, list the study assignments and readings, and guide you through each lesson. To be successful, read the subcourse materials as the lesson guide directs and follow the instructions. Lacking classmates and an instructor with whom to engage in meaningful, insightful discussion, you must complete lesson assignments by properly using the lesson guides.

The practical exercise in lessons 3 and 4 and other subcourse requirements will cause you to usc and apply the knowledge and skills you gain from your coursework. You will perform a multitude of learning activities that will approximate the kinds of work you do in an actual staff situation. To complete the exam successfully. YOU must do all the exercises and requirements.

For the best results, put yourself into the role of the appropriate staff officer in the situation given. Imagine that you are actually having to assess regional environments, project forces, and make recommendations to senior leaders who must make important decisions that have major national security implications.

SUBCOURSE ASSISTANCE

Address all questions regarding administration and grades to:

COMMANDANT, USACGSC
ATTN: ATZL-SWE-R
DIRECTORATE OF NONRESIDENT STUDIES
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-6940

For assistance by telephone, refer to the administrative flyer you received in your box of phase materials.

Address all questions concerning lesson content or material to:

COMMANDANT, USACGSC
ATTN: ATZL-SWT
CENTER FOR ARMY TACTICS
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-6900

PHONE: DSN 552-4742/5380, COMM (913) 684-4742/5380

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Appendix 1 to Course Introduction. References

The following references were used to develop this subcourse. You will not receive all of these references with your course materials; they are not necessary for your successful completion of the subcourse. This list is provided so that you will know what references to consult should you want additional information in a particular subject area.

FM 3-100	*Chemical Operations, Principles and Fundamentals, 8* May 96
FM 5-100	*Engineer Operations, 27* Feb 96
FM 6-20-40	*Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy), 5* Jan 90
FM 34-130	*Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,* Jul 94
FM 63-2	*Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 20* May 91
FM 63-20	*Forward Support Battalion, 26* Feb 90
FM 63-21	*Main Support Battalion, 7* Aug 90
FM 71-3	*Armored andi'mechanized Infantry Brigade, 8* Jan 96
FM71-100	*Division Operations, 28* Aug 96
FM 90-2	*Battlefield Deception, 3* Oct 88
FM 90-4	*Air Assault Operations,* 16 Mar 87
FM 90-21	*JAAT: Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations, 16* Oct91
FM 100-5	*Operations, 14* Jun 93
FM 100-10	*Combat Service Support, 3* Oct 95
FM 100-15	*Corps Operations, 29* Oct 96
FM 100-103	*Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, 7* Oct 87

FM 101-5	*Command and Control for Commanders and Staff,* (Final Draft), Aug 93
FM 101-5-1	*Operational Terms and Symbols,* 21 Oct 85
FM 101-10-1, Vol 2	*Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors,* 7 Oct 87
ST 22-2	*Writing and Speaking Skills for Senior Leaders,* Apr 91
ST 100-3	*Battle Book,* 1 Jun 96
ST 100-7	*OPFOR Battle Book,* Aug 96
ST 101-5	*Command and Staff Decision Processes,* Feb 96
ST 101-6	G1/G4 *Battle Book,* 1 Jul 96

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Appendix 2 to Course Introduction. Glossary

A/DACG	arrival/departure airfield control group
A/S	Avenger/Stinger
AA	assembly area
AAC	air assault commander
AADC	area air defense commander
AAF	Atlantican Armed Forces
AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAGS	Army air-ground system
AAR	after-action review
AASLT	air assault
AATF	air assault task force
AAV	amphibious assault vehicle
AB	airbase
ABCCC	airborne command and control center
abn	airborne
ACA	airspace coordination authority; airspace control authority; airspace coordination area
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACCS	airborne command and control squadron; Army Command and Control System
ACE	air combat element; air control element; Aviation Combat Element
ACF	Air Contingency Forces
acft	aircraft
ACL	allowable cargo load
ACofS	assistant chief of staff
acq	acquisition
ACR	armored cavalry regiment
AD	air defense
ADA	air defense artillery
ADCON	administrative control
ADP	automatic data processing
adv	advance
ADVON	advanced echelon
AE	aerial exploitation; assault echelon
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AECC	aeromedical evacuation control center
AELT	aeromedical evacuation liaison teams
AETACS	airborne elements of the theater air control system
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force base
AFFOR	Air Force forces
AFM	Air Force manual

AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AFOE	assault follow-on echelon
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOD	Air Force Special Operations Detachment
AFSOE	Air Force Special Operations Element
AFSOF	Air Force special operations forces
AGL	above ground level; automatic grenade launcher
AI	air interdiction
AID	Agency for International Development
AIMI	aviation intensive management item
AJBPO	Area Joint Blood Program Office
AJMRO	Area Joint Medical Regulating Office
ALCC	airlift control center
ALCON	all concerned
ALO	air liaison officer
ALOC	air line of communication
AM	amplitude modulation
amb	ambulance
AMC	air mission commander; Air Mobility Command; US Army Materiel Command; aircraft maintenance company
AME	air movement element; aeromedical evacuation
AMEMB	American Embassy
ammo	ammunition
AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
amphib	amphibious
ANGLICO	air and naval gunfire liaison company
AO	area of operations: fleet oiler
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOAP	Army Oil Analysis Program
AOC	air operations center
AOG	gasoline tanker
AOR	area of responsibility
APO	Army Post Office
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
APP	Atlantican People's Party
AR	armor; Army regulation
ARCENT	Army Forces, Central Europe
ARFOR	Army force(s)
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
armd	armored
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARS	air rescue squadron; Army Reserve Sustainment
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ARSOTF	Army special operations task force
arty	artillery
ASD(PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

ASL	authorized stockage list
aslt	assault
ASMC	area support medical company
ASOC	air support operations center
ASP	ammunition supply point
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATACMS	Army tactical missiles
ATC	air traffic control
ATF	amphibious task force
ATG	amphibious task group
ATICP	Accelerated Treaty Implementation/Consolidation Plan
atk	attack
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	ammunition transfer point
attn	attention
ATU	amphibious task unit
aug	augmentation
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
aval	available
AVGAS	aviation gasoline
AVIM	aviation intermediate maintenance
avn	aviation
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWADS	All-Weather Air Delivery System
BA	BARBELLA
BB	breakbulk
bbl	barrel
BCE	battlefield coordination element
bde	brigade
BLAH	Barbella Liberation Army of Honor
BLT	battalion landing team
bn	battalion
BSA	brigade support area
BSSG	brigade service support group
BTC	Blood Transshipment Center
btry	battery
C	Celsius
C^2	command and control
C^2W	command and control warfare
C^3	command, control, and communications
C^3CM	command, control, and communication countermeasures
C^3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C^3IC	command, control, communications, and intelligence center
C^4	command, control, communications, and computers
C^4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

CA	civil affairs; combat arms
CAA	coordinating authority for air
CAF	combat air force
CAP	crisis action procedures
CAS	close air support; crisis action system
CATF	commander, amphibious task force
cav	cavalry
CB	chemical-biological
cbt	combat
CC	container cargo
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCT	combat control team
CD	counterdrug
cdr	commander
CE	command element
CEB	clothing exchange and bath
cen	center
CENTAM	Central America
CESP	civil engineering support plan
CG	Chairman's Guidance
cgo	cargo
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers Course
Chap	Chaparral
CHOP	change of operational control
CI	civilian internee; counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander in chief
CINCFORSCOM	Commander in Chief, US Army Forces Command
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
CINCSTRAT	Commander in Chief, Strategic Command
CINCUSACOM	Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVADMIN	civil administration
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLF	commander, landing force
CLPSP	CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board
cmd	command
cml	chemical
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOTF	Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CMS	command management system
CNSWTG	Commander, Naval Special Warfare Task Group
cntnr	container
co	company
COA	course of action

COCOM	combatant command
CODES	Computerized Deployment System
CofS	chief of staff
COMACC	Commander, Air Combat Command
COMAFFOR	Commander, Air Force Forces
COMALF	Commander, Airlift Forces
COMARFOR	Commander, Army Forces
COMFORSCOM	Commander, US Army Forces Command
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMJCMOTF	Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
COMJPOTF	Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
COMJPOTFSO	Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force South
COMJSOC	Commander, Joint Special Operations Command
COMJSOTF	Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force
COMJSOTFSO	Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force South
COMJTF	commander, joint task force
COMJTFB	Commander, Joint Task Force Bravo
COMJTFBA	Commander, Joint Task Force Barbella
COMJTFSO	Commander, Joint Task Force South
COMMARFOR	Commander, Marine Forces
COMNAVFOR	Commander, Naval Forces
COMSEC	communications security
COMSOCSO	Commander, Special Operations Command South
COMUSAFSO	Commander, US Air Force South
COMUSARSO	Commander, US Army South
COMUSNAVSO	Commander, US Naval South
COMUSSOCSO	Commander, US Special Operations Command South
COMUSSOUTHAF	Commander, US Southern Command Air Force
con	control
CONPLAN	concept plan; contingency plan
const	construction
CONUS	continental United States
convl	conventional
COSCOM	corps support command
CP	command post
CPG	Chairman's Planning Guidance
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRC	control and reporting center
CRD	CINC's required date
CS	combat support
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSB	corps support battalion
CSG	corps support group
CSH	combat support hospital
CSS	combat service support
CSSD	combat service support detachment
CSSE	combat service support element

CT	counterterrorism
CTA	common table of allowances
CTF	commander, task force
CUCV	commercial utility combat vehicle
CVBG	aircraft carrier battle group
°F	degrees Fahrenheit
DA	Department of the Army; direct action
DAF	Department of the Air Force
DAT	deployment action team
DBA	database administrator
DBSL	Deep Battle Synchronization Line
DCA	defensive counterair
DCS	Defense Communications System
DCT	displaced civilians and transients
DDMP	deliberate decision-making procedure
DDS	dry deck shelter
DEFCON	defense readiness condition
det	detachment
DFSC	defense fuel supply center
DFT	deployment for training
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
dir	directive
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISCOM	division support command
dissem	dissemination
div	division
DIVARTY	division artillery
DJTF	deployable joint task force
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DN	Department of the Navy
DNU	*Direccion National de Unidad* (National Directorate of Unity)
DO	Deputy for Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAAC	Department of Defense activity address code
DofS	day of supply
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DP	decision point; displaced person
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DRB	division-ready brigade
DS	direct support
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSN	Defense Switched Network

DTACC	deployed tanker airlift coordination center
DTG	date-time group
DZ	drop zone
ea	each
EA	**engagement area**
EAC	echelon above corps
ECCM	electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EDRE	emergency deployment readiness exercise
EEI	essential elements of information
ELINT	electronic intelligence
elm	element
ELSEC	electronic security
EMC	equipment mission capable
EMCON	electronic emission control
engr	engineer
EO	executive order
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
equip	equipment
ESAF	El Salvadoran Armed Forces
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ESM	electronic warfare support measures
EUCOM	European Command
evac	evacuation
EW	electronic warfare
EZ	extraction zone
F	Fahrenheit
FA	field artillery
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAB	field artillery brigade
FAC	forward air controller
FAD	force activity designator
FAO	foreign area officer
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FAS	feasibility, acceptability, and suitability
FASCAM	family of scatterable mines
FAST	forward air surgical team; forward area support team
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FD	final draft
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FFA	free fire area
FI	fighter interceptor
FID	foreign internal defense
fin	finance

FIR	first-impression report
fltbrg	floatbridge
FM	field manual; frequency modulation
FMFEur	Fleet Marine Force, Europe
FMFLant	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFM	Fleet Marine force manual
FMFPac	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FMLH	*Frente Morazanista para la Liberation de Honduras* (Morazan Front for the Liberation of Honduras)
FMLN	*Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberation National*
FMLNA	*Frente Moranzanista para la Liberation de Atlantica* (Morazan Front for the Liberation of Atlantica)
FO	forward observer
FOB	forward operating base
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FPR	*Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias* (Popular Revolutionary Forces)
FR	final report
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FRN	force requirement number
FS	fighter squadron
FSB	forward support battalion
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSOP	field standing operating procedure
FSS	fast sealift ship
FSSG	force service support group
ft	feet
ft2	square feet
FUSEP	Special Security Corps [in Honduras]
fwd	forward
FY	fiscal year
gal	gallon
GAPR	geographic areas of prime responsibility
GCE	ground command element
GLO	ground liaison officer
gnd	ground
GOA	government of Atlantica
GOH	government of Honduras
gp	group
GPH	gallons per hour
GPM	gallons per minute
GRREG	graves registration
GS	general support
GSA	General Services Administration
HA	humanitarian assistance
HAF	Honduran Armed Forces

HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HDCV	human diploid cell vaccine
HE	high-explosive
hel	helicopter
HET	heavy equipment transporter
HHB	headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HLMA	helicopter, light Marine aviation
HMH	Marine helicopter squadron (heavy)
HMM	Marine helicopter squadron (medium)
HMMWV	high-mobility, multipurpose \vheeled vehicle
HNS	host nation support
HNSCT	host nation support control team
hosp	hospital
how	howitzer
hp	horsepower
HQ	headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
hr	hour
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
hv	heavy
hwy	highway
I&W	indications and warning
IAW	in accordance with
ICU	intensive care unit
IEW	intelligence and electronic \varfare
IFR	instrument flight rules
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMINT	imagery intelligence
in	inch
INDCOM	Indian Ocean Command
inf	infantry
info	information
TNTREP	intelligence report
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirements; infrared; intelligence requirements
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISSA	interservice support agreement
JA	judge advocate
JAAP	joint airborne advance party
JAAT	joint air attack team
JACC/CP	joint airborne communications center/command post
JAG	judge advocate general

JANAP	Joint Army-Navy-Air Force publication
JAO	joint area of operations
JAPO	joint area petroleum office
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office
JCCC	Joint Communications Control Center
JCCP	joint casualty collection point
JCGRO	Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCMEB	Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
JCMOTF	Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	joint communications support clement
JDC	Joint Deployment Community
JDMEC	joint document and materiel exploitation center
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JFACC	joint force air component command; joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component command; joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime (naval) component command
JFSOC	joint force special operations command
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component command
JFSOTF	joint force special operations task force
JFUB	Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIF	joint interrogation facility
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JINTF	joint intelligence task force
JMBPO	Joint Military Blood Program Office
JMC	Joint Movement Center
JMOC	Joint Medical Operations Center
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JPAT	joint planning and assistance teams
JPD	Joint Planning Document
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JRA	joint rear area
JRAC	joint rear area command; joint rear area commander
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JRS	Joint Reporting System
JRTOC	Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center
JSCE	joint support communications element

JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JSOI	joint signal operating instructions
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JTB	Joint Targeting Board; Joint Transportation Board
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTFB	Joint Task Force Bravo
JTFBA	Joint Task Force Barbella
JTFPM	Joint Task Force Panama
JTFSO	Joint Task Force South
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JUH	Joint User's Handbook
K	thousand
km	kilometer
kmph	kilometers per hour
LA	legal assistant
lab	laboratory
LAD	latest arrival date
LADD	low-altitude air defense
LAI	light armored infantry
LARP	light airfield repair package
LASH	lighter aboard ship
LATAM	Latin America
lb	pound
LCC	land component command; land component commander; landing craft, control
LCM	landing craft, mechanized
LCU	landing craft, utility
LCVP	landing craft, vehicle, personnel
LD/LC	line of departure is line of contact
LF	landing force
LFF	logistics factor file
LHA	amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
LIC	low-intensity conflict
LID	light infantry division
LKA	amphibious cargo ship
LO	learning objective; liaison officer
LOA	limit of advance
LOC	line of communication
log	logistics
LOI	letter of instruction

LOTS	logistics over the shore
LPA	amphibious transport
LPD	amphibious transport dock
LPH	amphibious assault ship (helicopter)
LPI/D	low probability of intercept/detection
LRSC	long-range surveillance company
LSA	logistic support area
LSD	landing ship, dock
lsn	lesson
LST	landing ship, tank
lt	light
LTON	long ton
LVTH	landing vehicle, tracked howitzer
LVTP	landing vehicle, track, personnel
LZ	landing zone
m	meter
M^2	square meter
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACS	Marine air control squadron
MAG	Marine aircraft group
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
maint	maintenance
MALS	Marine aviation logistics squadron
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARFOR	Marine force(s)
MASF	mobile aeromedical staging facility; mobile air-evacuation staging facility [joint]
MASH	mobile army surgical hospital
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MASS	Marine air support squadron
MATCS	Marine aviation tactical control squadron
MBPO	Military Blood Program Office
MCA	military civic action
MCC	military coordinating committee; movement control center
MCI	meal, combat, individual
MCT	movement control team
MDdeP	*Movimiento Democraticas del Pueblo* (People's Democratic Movement)
mdm	medium
MDM	military decision making
mech	mechanized
med	medical
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEDRETE	medical readiness training exercise
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MEF (Fwd)	Marine expeditionary force (forward)

MEMO	minimum essential maintenance only
METT-T	mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MEU (SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MFRFP	methodology for regional force planning
mg	machinegun; milligram
MI	military intelligence
MIC	mid-intensity conflict
MILGP	Military Group
MLO	military liaison office; military liaison officer
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
mm	millimeter
MMC	materiel management center
MOP	memorandum of policy
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MOS	military occupational specialty
MOUT	military operations on urbanized terrain
MP	military police
MPF	maritime pre-positioning force
MPL	*Movimiento Popular de Liberation* (Popular Liberation Movement)
MPS	maritime pre-positioning ship
MRE	meal, ready to eat
MRL	multiple rocket launcher
MRT	movement regulating team
MSB	main support battalion
MSC	major subordinate command: Military Sealift Command
MSE	mobile subscriber equipment
MSL	mean sea level
msl	missile
MSO	minesweeper, ocean
MSR	main supply route
MST	maintenance support team
MTF	medical treatment facility; message text format
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTMCTEA	Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency
MTOE	modification table of organization and equipment
MTON	measurement ton
MTT	mobile training team
mtz	motorized
MWCS	Marine wing control squadron
MWSS	Marine wing support squadron
N	notification
NA	not applicable
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVCHAPGRU	Navy cargo-handling and port group
NAVFOR	Navy force(s)
NAVSOC	Naval Special Operations Command
NAVSOF	naval special operations forces
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NCS	National Communications System
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NET	not earlier than
NGO	nongovernment organization
NIST	national intelligence support team
NLT	not later than
NM	nautical miles
NMCC	National MiIitary Command Center
NMS	National Military Strategy
no	number
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy; nonself-sustaining
NSSD	National Security Strategic Document
NSW	naval special warfare; Navy special warfare
NSWTG	naval special warfare task group
NSWTU	naval special warfare task unit
NTU	national turbidity unit
OADR	Originating Agency's Determination Required
OAS	Organization of American States
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
obj	objective
OCA	offensive counterair
OCJCS	Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
OCONUS	outside continental United States
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OO	on order
OOTW	operations other than war (stability and support operations)
op	operation
OPCON	operational control
OPG	operation planning group
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPREP	operational report
OPROJ	operational project stocks
ops	operations
OPSEC	operations security
OR	operating room; operation readiness
ord	ordnance

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTH	over the horizon
PA	Panama; public affairs
PAC	People's Aviation Command
PACOM	Pacific Command
pax	passengers
PB	patrol boat
PDA	Party for Democratic Atlantica
PE	practical exercise
pers	personnel
petrl	petroleum
PHOTINT	photographic intelligence
PID	plan identification number
PIR	priority information requirement; priority intelligence requirement
PJE	Program for Joint Education
PL	phase line
plt	platoon
PM	preventive medicine
PNP	Panamanian National Police
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POG	psychological operations group
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political adviser
POM	preparation for overseas movement
pop	population
PPA	People's Popular Army
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PPWRMS	pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks
prev	preventive
Prime BEEF	prime base emergency engineering force
Prime RIBS	prime readiness in base services
prot	protection
PSA	port support activity
PSC	personnel service company
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup
PSYOP	psychological operations
PSYWAR	psychological warfare
pub	publication
purif	purification
PW	prisoner of war
PZ	pickup zone
QM	quartermaster
RAOC	rear area operations center
RCA	riot control agent

RDD	required delivery date
rdo radio	
recon	reconnaissance
RED HORSE	rapid engineer deployable, heavy operations repair squadron-engineers
ref	reference
reg	regulating; regulation
regt	regiment
rep	repair
RFA	restrictive fire area
RII	request for intelligence information
RLT	regimental landing team
RO/RO	roll on/roll off
ROE	rules of engagement
ROWPU	reverse osmosis water purification unit
R R F	ready reserve fleet
RS	reconnaissance squadron
RSSP	ration supplement sundries pack
RTD	return to duty
RWCM	regional wartime construction manager
S&T	supply and transport
SA	security assistance; strategic attack
SAG	surface action group
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM	strategic analysis methodology; surface-to-air missile
SAO	security assistance organization
SAPO	Subarea Petroleum Office
SAR	search and rescue
SATCOM	satellite communications
SBU	special boat unit
SCPA	USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs
SDV	sea-air-land team delivery vehicle
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
sep	separate
SF	special forces
SFG	Special Forces group
SFG(A)	special forces group (airborne)
sig	signal
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIGSEC	signals security
SITREP	situation report
SLOC	sea line of communication
SMEE	subject matter expert exchange
SO	special operations
SOA	special operations aviation
SOAD	special operations aviation detachment

SOC	Special Operations Capable; special operations command; special operations commander; special operations components
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCCT	special operations combat control team
SOCOORD	special operations coordination element
SOF	special operations forces
SOG	special operations group
SOI	signal operation instructions
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOS	special operations squadron
SOW	special operations wing
SOWT	special operations weather team
SOWT/TE	special operations weather team/tactical element
SP	self-propelled
sp	special
SPF	Special Purpose Force
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
spt	support
sqdn	squadron
SR	special reconnaissance: strategic reconnaissance
SRC	standard requirement code
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
SS	self-sustaining
SST	special tactics team
ST	student text
STD	sexually transmitted disease
STON	short ton
strat	strategic
STU	secure telephone unit
sub	submarine
sup	supply
surg	surgical
svc	service
sys	system
T	ton; towed
T-AK/T-AKR/T-AKX	MSC cargo ship
T-AO	MSC oiler
T-AOG	MSC gasoline tanker
TA	theater army
tac	tactical
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACFIRE	tactical fire direction system
TACON	tactical control
TACP	tactical air control party; tactical air control position
TACS	tactical air control system
TACSAT	tactical satellite

TAD	temporary additional duty
TADC	Tactical Air Direction Center
TAI	target area of interest
TALCE	tanker airlift control element; theater airlift control element
TALO	theater air liaison officer
TAMC	transportation aircraft maintenance company
TASCOM	theater army support command
TASOSC	theater army special operations support command
TASS	tactical air support squadron
TAT	tactical analysis team; to accompany troops
TBD	to be determined
TBP	to be published
TCAE	technical control and analysis element
TCF	tactical combat force
TDM	tactical decision making
TDMP	tactical decision-making process
TDY	temporary duty
TE	tactical exploitation
TEA	Transportation Engineering Agency
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TF	task force
TFE	transportation feasibility estimator
TFS	tactical fighter squadron
TG	task group
tgt	target
TLAM	Tomahawk land attack missiles
TLD	target laser designation
tm	team
TMDE	test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment
tml	terminal
TMT	transportation motor transport
TOA	transportation operating agency
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided [missile]
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TPT	tactical petroleum terminal
trans	transportation
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TRAP	tactical recovery of aircraft, equipment, and personnel
trf	transfer
trk	truck
TRS	tactical reconnaissance squadron
TSTARS	TRANSCOM situation transportation analysis review system
TWCM	theater wartime construction manager
UBL	unit basic load
UCFF	unit consumption factors file

UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
unclas	unclassified
US	United States
USACGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USAF	US Air Force
USAFSO	US Air Force, South
USAHSC	US Army Health Services Command
USAR	US Army Reserve
USARF	US Army Reserve Forces
USARSO	US Army, South
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USCG	US Coast Guard
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, US European Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USCINCSPACE	Commander in Chief, US Space Command
USCINCSTRAT	Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USDA	US Department of Agriculture
USIA	US Information Agency
USIS	US Information Service
USMC	US Marine Corps
USMTF	US message text format
USN	US Navy
USNAVSO	US Navy, South
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USS	US ship
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSOCSO	US Special Operations Command, South
USSOUTHAF	US Southern Command Air Force
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
USSPACECOM	US Space Command
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
UTM	universal transverse mercator
UW	unconventional warfare
vet	veterinary
VFR	visual flight rules
vic	vicinity
VMA	Marine attack squadron
VMAQ	Marine electronic warfare squadron
VMFA	Marine fighter/attack squadron
VMGR	Marine aerial refueling squadron

VMO	Marine observation squadron
VOA	Voice of America
vol	volume
VSTOL	vertical and short takeoff/landing
WIN	Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network
WO	warning order
WP	white phosphorus
WRSA—K	War Reserve Stock for Allies—Korea
WTCA	water terminal clearance authority
WW	Wild Weasel
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System
xplt	exploitation

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Appendix 3 to Course Introduction. S320C PJE Phase I Learning Objectives

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Area 1. National Military Capabilities and Command Structure

1a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces,

lb. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

lc. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the National Command Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs).

ld. Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

le. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multinational operations.

Area 2. Joint Doctrine

2a. Comprehend joint doctrine.

2b. Give examples of the factors influencing joint doctrine.

2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

Area 3. Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

3a. Summarize the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war,

3b. Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.

3c. Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

3d. Explain wars, campaigns, and operations and explain the link between national objectives to supporting military objectives, and the importance of defined conflict termination.

3e. Summarize the relationship between the strategic, operational. and tactical levels of war.

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Area 4. Joint Planning and Execution Process

4a. Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationships between national objectives and means availability.

4b. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.

4c. Explain how the defense planning system affect joint operational planning.

4d. Explain how national intelligence organizations support joint force commanders.

4e. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.

Area 5. Systems Integration at the Operational Level of War

5a. Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C^4ISR) systems apply at the operational level of war.

5b. Comprehend how Joint and Service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.

5c. Understand that opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

GENERAL

Your previous instruction and this lesson provide the foundation for the practical exercises (PEs) in lessons 3 and 4. During the first part of the lesson, you will learn the planning considerations for a corps in a force-projection operation into an underdeveloped theater. Then, you will address a joint task force (JTF) and what a corps does when it is a joint task force. The last part of the lesson will look at four specific topics that are important to force projection into an underdeveloped theater: amphibious operations, contingency air operations, light forces, and special operations forces (SOF).

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A. 00 TASK: Summarize the doctrine for corps force-projection operations in a joint environment.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The summary must include an explanation of US Army force-projection doctrine in an underdeveloped theater at the operational and tactical levels across the range of military operations. The summary must also include integrating Army capabilities with joint and combined forces and other Government and non-Government agencies IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-15, Joint Pub 5-00.2, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, 1 d, and le.

A. 10 TASK: Explain the key planning considerations for corps force-projection operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must address force-projection operations in underdeveloped theaters. Operational characteristics, objectives, missions, logistic arrangements, and planning considerations will be explained IAW FM 63-3; FM 100-5, chapters 3, 4, and 5; FM 100-15, chapters 3 and 4 and appendix A; student issue materials; and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: lb, ld, le, 2c, 3a, 3b, and 4e.

A. 11 TASK: Explain the logistic concepts and planning considerations for logistic support of corps force-projection forces in underdeveloped theaters.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include the corps logistic responsibilities in the absence of an in-place theater support structure, deployment and redeployment considerations, logistic support of dissimilar combat forces (heavy/light), interrelationships of combat service support and civil affairs units, logistic buildup and base development, and combined (host nation support) and joint task force logistic planning considerations IAW FM 63-3, FM 100-1 S, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, 2a, 2c, and 3c.

A.20 TASK: Describe joint task force (JTF) functions and organizations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The description must include the following topics IAW Joint Pub 0-2; Joint Pub5-00.2, chapters 11 and IV; student issue materials; and study requirements:

- Purpose, establishment, responsibilities, authority, command relationships, and service component organization.

- JTF headquarters major organizational elements of command and joint staffs, augmentation detachments, communications support, headquarters support and sustainment, and security support,

- Functions of the chief of staff, the staff, and the JTF liaison officer

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, lb, lc, ld, le, 2c, and 3a.

A.21 TASK: Describe a joint task force (JTF) commander's authority and responsibility during a crisis action situation.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The description must include preparations for executing deployment, employment, and redeployment operations IAW Joint Pub 5-00.2, chapter III; student issue materials; and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: lc and ld.

A.30 TASK: Describe amphibious operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references,

STANDARD: The description must include a review of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) amphibious capabilities and limitations and fundamental planning considerations IAW AFSC Pub 2, chapter 2; student issue materials; and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 1a.

A.40 TASK: Describe contingency air operations in an undeveloped theater.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The description must include infrastructure capabilities and limitations to support theater combat air operations and planning considerations for the use of close air support (CAS), strategic airlift, and command and control IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, 3a, 3c, and 4e.

A.50 TASK: Describe the employment considerations for light units in force-projection operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The description must include planning considerations for offensive and defensive operations, logistic implications, and command relationships IAW FM 71-100, appendix D; student issue materials; and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 1a and lb.

A.60 TASK: Describe special operations forces (SOF) in support of force-projection operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include employment considerations, capabilities and limitations, and command and control relationships for joint special operations forces during precombat, combat, and postcombat operations IAW Joint Pub **3-05.** FM 100-5, FM 100-25, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 1a, lb, 1d, 2a, 2c, 3a, 3c, 4a, 4d. and 5c.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to help you achieve the learning objectives. Follow instructions in the lesson guide, and read the materials listed below at the suggested time. When you complete the reading assignment, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide, and follow the instructions.

READINGS:

a. FM 100-5, *Operations,* chapters 3,4, and 5 (23 pages previously read for S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations).*

b. Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Force-Projection Planning (12 pages).

c. FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* chapter 3. Scan appendix A of FM 100-15

d. FM 63-3, *Corps Support Command,* "Support of Joint Operations" (pages 1-39 through 1-43), and appendix D (12 pages previously read for S320B).

e. Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces, (5* pages).

f. Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test), *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures (19* pages).

g. Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From AFSC Pub 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces (19* pages).

h. S320B, *Fundamental.s of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations,* Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Air Operations in NATO (6 pages previously read for S320B).

i. Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, JFACC: Key to Organizing Your Air Assets for Victory (10 pages).

j. FM 71-100, *Division Operations,* pages 1-4 to 1-9

k. Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Planning Considerations for Airborne and Air Assault Operations (3 pages).

l. Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (10 pages).

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

In our new world "disorder" with reduced forward-deployed US military presence, almost all crises requiring a military response will begin with projecting military forces into a confusing, rapidly changing environment, To meet this challenge, our Army, including the Active and Reserve Components, must become a force designed to deploy swiftly to meet diverse challenges ranging from war to operations other than war.

As a field grade officer, you may suddenly find yourself involved in a contingency operation in a part of the world with which you are totally unfamiliar. You may serve on the planning staff for the operation or on the staff of a subordinate unit. Consequently, it is important that you understand the nature of such operations beforehand. They are not simple. Given time constraints, political considerations, and complex crisis situations, it is important to prepare yourself now by mastering the fundamentals of how a corps conducts force-projection operations. Remember that each crisis is unique; no solution fits all situations. Yet, if you know the questions to ask, if you can apply doctrinal considerations, and if you understand the Army and joint systems, your chances for meeting the challenge greatly improve.

This course, Corps Operations: Joint Force Projection, will help prepare you to serve as a corps and joint task force (JTF) staff officer during a contingency operation. In this subcourse, you will study planning considerations, both for a corps and a joint task force, and will conduct practical exercises on force projection and combat operations in an underdeveloped theater. Naturally, this will involve joint and combined issues. The course is designed as shown here:

S320C OVERVIEW

LESSON	TITLE
1	**Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine**
2	**The Latin American Environment**
3	**Joint Planning Practical Exercise**
4	**Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise**

You will first learn the planning considerations for force projection into an underdeveloped theater to meet an unanticipated contingency. This includes both the Army and joint roles that a corps might fulfill. A summary of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) then provides an understanding of the regional strategic environment. Next, you will conduct a scenario-driven practical exercise in the deliberate and crisis action planning process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). In this exercise, you will be a member of the USSOUTHCOM staff and then a member of a joint task force staff, The course ends with a final planning practical exercise, in which a corps conducts joint and combined operations in an underdeveloped theater. After the instruction and practical exercises, you will be ready for the examination.

Lesson 1, Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine, will help you understand what a staff officer must consider when a corps becomes a joint task force responsible for a contingency operation in an underdeveloped theater. This lesson is organized as shown here:

LESSON 1 OVERVIEW

Force-Projection Planning
Joint Task Force
Amphibious Operations
Contingency Air Operations
Light Forces
Special Operations Forces

Lesson 1 begins with the planning considerations for force projection. It then focuses on a joint task force, The lesson ends with four topics that are important when conducting force projection into an underdeveloped theater: amphibious operations, contingency air operations, light forces, and special operations forces.

Now that you know the organization of the course and lesson, you can begin by looking at planning considerations for force-projection operations.

FORCE-PROJECTION PLANNING: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the Army today is the ability to respond quickly to regional crises anywhere in the world. This requires a force—Active, Reserve, and civilian-trained and ready to react with little or no notice, a capability demonstrated in Grenada, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia.

Scan chapters 3,4, and 5 of FM 100-5, *Operations* (23 pages). This assignment provides you a review of current doctrine for force-projection, joint, and combined operations.

FM 100-5 defines force projection as "the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world." From this definition, force projection clearly involves more than deployment. It includes actions ranging from preconflict mobilization to postconflict demobilization. Successful force-projection operations require trained and ready units, as well as leaders who can respond quickly to rapidly changing situations. Forces can move as reinforcements to a forward-deployed theater or as initial forces of a contingency operation into an underdeveloped theater.

A contingency is a rapid reaction to a crisis. Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines a contingency as "an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and service procedures. " Contingencies require force-projection operations. Although force-projection and contingency operations are related, they are not exactly the same.

From your readings in FM 100-5, what are the characteristics of a force-projection operation ? What should you expect as a corps staff officer? Jot down the description of the environment a corps staff officer would find when notified of a force-projection operation.

As you may expect, the number of responses is unlimited. Each situation is unique, but some common characteristics are likely to exist in a force-projection operation, such as:

- The operation will be in response to a *crisis,* probably in a part of the world where the crisis could not be predicted.

- The operation will probably be a *contingency* operation as defined in Joint Pub 1-02

- *Time will be limited.* If no plan exists, which is likely, the staff will find itself doing multiple, complex things simultaneously, such as beginning deployment while planning for operations in theater.

- Planning will be difficult given a situation that is confused politically as well as militarily. *Information will be sketchy, often incorrect, and constantly changing.*

- Deployment will probably entail movement of joint forces from multiple locations, within and outside the continental United States (CONUS), into an *underdeveloped theater.* In an underdeveloped theater, there are usually numerous unknowns and almost insurmountable short-term logistic and operational challenges.

- By their nature, force-projection operations will usually consist of *joint and combined* operations in the theater.

- The *variety of possible missions is* vast, ranging from war to the complex. multifaceted operations other than war. It is likely that the mission will evolve over time, Some of the possible missions are—

  — Noncombatant evacuation.
  — Arms control.
  — Support to domestic civil authorities.
  — Humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.
  — Security assistance.
  — Nation assistance.
  — Support to counterdrug operations.
  — Combating terrorism.
  — Peace enforcement.
  — Peacekeeping.
  — Show of force.
  — Support for insurgences or counterinsurgencies.
  — Attacks or raids.
  — Combat operations.

As you should recognize from S520, *Operations Other Than War,* and from this list. the variety and complexity of potential operations span the range of military operations. You may have to conduct several missions simultaneously; none are simple. In an underdeveloped theater with changing political objectives resulting from changing threat assessments, the force-projection commander and staff will, particularly early in the operation, deal with numerous political and military issues—diplomatic, joint, and combined. Recent operations in the Persian Gulf and in Somalia emphasize the complexity of these operations.

Remember, how planners respond to the crisis will set the initial conditions in theater that will assist or hinder mission accomplishment later in the operation. A crisis will constantly change because of uncertain

political objectives and lack of concrete, reliable intelligence. Political considerations will always affect the operation, from beginning to end. The rules of engagement (ROE) will also change throughout the operation.

Never forget that the challenges presented by operations in an underdeveloped theater far from CONUS and other bases often make overcoming geography, infrastructure shortfalls, and logistic problems a major concern. In fact, at times, these challenges may be more critical than the enemy threat. You studied in S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations,* that force projection into an underdeveloped theater is significantly different from operations in a theater that has a developed infrastructure. The words *austerity, fog,* and *friction* describe the situation.

Austerity pertains to forces making do with less of everything initially—logistics, intelligence, infrastructure, basic knowledge of the theater, and time.

Fog describes the situation when increased unknowns and constantly changing perceptions of the situation are the norm. The only constant will be change.

Friction occurs when commanders and forces, both joint and combined, meet for the first time during a crisis. Limited communications, little or no time for rehearsals, and the need for a steep learning curve for the entire force while conducting multiple, complex tasks, such as deployment and employment from multiple locations, with forces separated in time and space, are a perfect recipe for things to go wrong through misunderstanding and through the friction created by too many moving parts.

Before you goon to the next requirement. take a break.

Read Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Force-Projection Planning (12 pages) which expands the force-projection information in FM 100-5. Read FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* chapter 3 and appendix A, for the doctrine about a corps contingency operation.

The Corps in Force-Projection Operations

From your readings, you learned that the corps can fulfill multiple roles during force-projection operations. What four roles could a corps expect to perform during a force-projection operation ? What are the responsibilities of each?

1.

2.

3.

4.

This question is designed to highlight the multiple roles that a corps could perform during a force-projection operation. Your readings stated that the corps could serve as a joint task force (JTF), the Army force (ARFOR) headquarters, the joint force land component command (JFLCC) headquarters, ardor a subordinate to a higher Army or joint headquarters.

As a *joint task force,* the corps assumes a critical planning role before deployment using the crisis action planning procedures of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Planning would consider deployment and employment of all assigned and attached forces. Augmentation by Army and joint assets would be necessary. During Operation Just Cause, USSOUTHCOM designated the XVIII Airborne Corps as Joint Task Force South, and Joint Task Force South conducted combat operations in Panama. You will read more about a joint task force later.

If the corps became the *joint force land component command,* it would assume responsibility for all land combat operations in theater, which could include Army, Marine, and combined forces. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander chose to remain the land component commander (LCC), but he could have assigned it to Third Army, the senior Army unit in theater.

As the *senior Army unit* in theater, the corps could find itself designated the *ARFOR* headquarters. This would expand its responsibilities for all Army forces in theater, not just for those in the corps sector. The ARFOR headquarters has logistic and administrative responsibilities for all Army forces in theater. Third Army, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, served as the ARFOR headquarters, as well as an operational Army headquarters responsible for the ground combat operations of its assigned subordinate corps. In Somalia, as the senior Army unit in theater, the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain), became the ARFOR headquarters. As senior Army command, the ARFOR will have operational responsibility for some or all Army forces.

As a *subordinate to an Army or joint headquarters, the corps* would deploy to the theater and conduct operations as directed. Army augmentation from both the Active and Reserve Components might be required depending on the mission and the theater. During Desert Storm, both the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps served as subordinate units in Third Army, the theater ARFOR command.

To tackle any of these roles—joint task force, subordinate to an Army or joint headquarters, ARFOR headquarters, or land component command headquarters-remains a daunting challenge, particularly in a time-sensitive, no-notice situation. Depending on its assigned role, the corps would consider the planning considerations for force-projection operations from either an Army or a joint perspective.

***Given your readings from FM 100-15, Corps* Operations, *and your previous instruction on the tactical decision-making process, how does the use of the tactical decision-making process by the corps relate to the deliberate and crisis action planning process in JOPES that you studied in S530,* Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Space?**

This important question requires you to reflect on previous instruction. The corps staff will use the same tactical decision-making process that it uses to plan any operation. During a crisis, time is short. The corps will either work from an existing plan or create a new one. Regardless, the plan must be completed quickly. Since the combatant commander, the unified commander in chief (CINC), is developing a plan at the same time, the corps must *parallel plan* using the warning order the CINC provided during the initial stages of phase III (course of action (COA) development) of CAP. The corps staff uses the tactical decision-making process to prepare the plan at the same time the CINC is preparing and securing Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of his plan. The corps staff will use standard Army formats for its plans and orders to subordinate Army commands, but it will use JOPES formats for plans and orders going to other members of a joint task force or to the CINC. Although the formats are similar, they are not the same.

Force-Projection Planning Considerations

Although getting into the theater is a complex task that will tend to absorb the time and focus of the corps staff, remember that the purpose of any force-projection operation is to accomplish the assigned mission quickly, not merely to arrive in theater. Planners must always look beyond getting into the theater and consider how to accomplish the mission and how to develop the preconditions necessary for success. Consequently, it is important that you clearly understand each of the planning considerations mentioned in your FM 100-5 and appendix 1 reading assignments.

List the 10 planning considerations for force-projection operations, and explain the significance of each.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The key planning considerations for force-projection operations identified in FM 100-5, *Operations,* are—

- Lethality for the deploying force.
- Anticipation.
- Force tailoring and teamwork.
- Intelligence.
- Battle command.
- Training.
- Combined operations.
- Media impact.
- Postconflict considerations.
- Logistics.

Now, you will read about these key planning considerations. Be sure you understand the importance of each one.

Lethality for the Deploying Force

● *Introduce credible, lethal combat forces early.* Initial forces must secure airfields and ports to permit prompt arrival of follow-on forces.

● *Deter the threat and protect the arriving force, which is the initial goal.* Initial forces must be ready for combat operations. This should deter or, if required. delay the threat to permit time for the arrival of follow-on forces.

● *Ensure lethality to complete the mission, which is the final goal.* The total forces in theater must have the combat power—air, sea, and land—to accomplish the mission quickly and decisively.

Anticipation

● *Be ready to deploy—trained and flexible-Active and Reserve Components and civilians.* A force-projection Army must be ready; that is, trained and mentally prepared for the challenges. As proven during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this must include the entire force: the Active and Reserve Components and the civilian workforce.

● *Anticipate the questions to ask, the information to seek, and the problems to solve.* Each situation will be unique, but the problems to be solved and the information needed will be similar for many underdeveloped theaters.

● *Expect changes and things to go wrong.* In a short-fused, no-notice crisis with designated forces and headquarters separated in time and space, miscommunication will occur, and things will not go as planned. In addition, the initial information available and guidance provided, both military and political, is likely to be in a state of flux.

● *Seek information actively; that is, expect incomplete, inaccurate, and changing information. Be* proactive; that is, seek frequent clarification.

● *Coordinate aggressively to ensure as few surprises as possible.* Establish redundant communications, and provide liaison officers to key headquarters, units, and locations.

Force Tailoring and Teamwork

● *Determine the right force package—balance the need for combat forces to secure and protect the force with the need to build a sustainment base for future operations.* This is a crucial and difficult task, particularly in the middle of a crisis that projects military force into a little-known, underdeveloped theater.

● *Determine the proper sequencing of forces into the theater based on the mission and current situation-opposed or unopposed entry.* In a confused political and military situation, entry is a risky task. You should always expect to conduct an opposed entry operation, but take advantage of host nation or US forces in the region to secure the airfields and ports necessary to expedite movement into the theater.

● *Develop a spirit of cooperation and teamwork—you will need it.* Given the nature of the potential operations, the dispersion of forces, and the joint and combined requirements for successful mission accomplishment, it is important that the commander insist on a friendly spirit of cooperation and develop a concept to bring the disparate units together quickly into a team.

● *Plan for simultaneous deployment and quick employment of forces.* Do not focus only on deployment. Never lose sight of why you are deploying. This requires an employment concept for mission accomplishment and provides continuity between the stages of force projection.

Intelligence

● *Expect a confused changing, and uncertain situation.* Response to a crisis in an underdeveloped theater that is suddenly important probably means that the region previously had a low priority in the intelligence community. The detailed, focused information desired by the force-projection commander will probably not be readily available from the intelligence community.

● *Employ key intelligence personnel and equipment early.* To fill the information void, it is important to deploy intelligence assets quickly to develop an intelligence capability in theater.

● *Request national assets early.* It takes time to deploy strategic assets that are not very responsive to rapidly changing requirements. Do not be surprised if national assets become unavailable because of higher priority intelligence-gathering missions elsewhere in the world.

● *Develop information on the capabilities of the host nation as well as the potential threat.* Equally important with gathering intelligence about the threat is the early collection of information on the host nation's logistic capability and its infrastructure to support deployment, employment, and redeployment of the force-projection units.

● *Establish timely, accurate, detailed, and continuous intelligence as soon as possible.* This requires the integration of national, joint, service, and host nation intelligence assets and intelligence-gathering programs,

● *Expect intelligence problems to develop.* To begin with, expect bureaucratic, linguistic, and cultural difficulties. Intelligence processing and analysis assets may not deploy to the theater. This places a tremendous reliance and huge workload on the communications system. The intelligence system may find itself shifting from an emphasis on technologically developed intelligence—signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), photographic intelligence (PHOTINT)—to human intelligence (HUMINT), This will cause growing pains as well as delays in developing the detailed, reliable information needed by the commander.

Battle Command

● *Develop flexible, robust, and redundant command and control systems with secure, reliable, and timely capabilities.* This is just as critical during deployment and entry as it is later in combat operations.

● *Expect units to be separated in space and time.* This is the nature of the deployment and entry stages of force-projection operations. A solid command and control system permits monitoring, but unanticipated things will occur.

● *Expect things to go wrong; be demanding but tolerant.* Given the complexity and size of the organizations involved, the plan will not function smoothly; too many variables exist. When things go wrong, take quick, firm action to fix them. Don't expect zero defects. Remember that developing the command climate and building the teamwork begins prior to deployment.

● *Anticipate the simultaneous challenges of controlling and monitoring deployment, entry, and combat operations.* Each has different demands and preconditions, but all three will likely occur during the initial force buildup.

● *Keep things as simple as possible,* This helps counter the complexity and the enormity of the force projection from CONUS and forward bases, It is not a simple operation.

● *Seek robust intelligence systems.* As discussed earlier, the quicker a focused, redundant, and effective intelligence system exists, the quicker the commander gets the information needed for planning operations.

● *Develop flexible orders that encourage teamwork and initiative to work through force-projection, joint, and combined problems.* Reconciling different joint, and particularly combined, procedures and techniques facilitates trust and confidence on which effective teamwork develops. Detailed, centralized planning followed by decentralized execution worked well in the Persian Gulf.

Training

● *Keep training demanding and relevant, which obviously requires mastery of deployment procedures.* To project force quickly requires combat-ready units that have mastered the intricacies of air, rail, and ship movement.

● *Continue training throughout the operation in theater.* Joint and combined training exercises serve as excellent means for enhancing interoperability and for developing common tactics, techniques, and procedures. Training, especially rehearsal for operations, increases the chances for success and builds the trust and confidence essential for an effective joint and combined team effort.

● *Develop a system for incorporating lessons learned.* Fixing problems, particularly joint and combined, will produce solutions that need to permeate the force. Special operations forces seining as liaison and mobile training teams can develop lessons from the combined forces and can ensure that common lessons reach the combined units.

Combined Operations

● *Anticipate the problems of interoperability, the questions to ask, and the information to seek—expect differences in doctrine, training, force structure, equipment, culture, and language.* Interoperability does not just happen; it must be constantly sought.

● *Seek linguistic and civil affairs augmentation early.* Lack of information about the theater, compounded by limited linguistic capabilities, makes it imperative that specialized individuals and units be introduced into the theater early. The majority of the civil affairs units are in the Reserve Component.

● *Remember, unity of effort requires an extraordinary effort of liaison and information exchange,* The commander and his entire staff must clearly understand this. Consider creating specialized teams, such as using special operations forces as liaison teams with coalition forces. Good things do not happen automatically merely because of an order. Constant supervision and briefbacks ensure that the order accomplishes the task for which it was developed.

● *Develop mutual trust and confidence at all levels, which takes time.* Without smooth teamwork, the operation will be jeopardized. Allowing enough time and making constant efforts to work together make the best intentions a reality.

● *Consider using special operations forces as liaison teams and mobile training teams.* This worked exceptionally well in the Persian Gulf.

● *Consider the best command and control system-liaison, briefbacks, and meetings versus a combined staff.* This decision maybe difficult for the commander, and it can be politically sensitive. Two models that have worked well in the past are extraordinary liaison combined with numerous briefbacks and rehearsals (which worked well in the Persian Gulf) and a combined staff, which takes much more time to develop.

Media Impact

● *Anticipate the impact of media reporting.* With instantaneous reporting by news networks, the media has a role in shaping the perception of the environment within which the commander will operate. How best to work with the media is a constant question for the force-projection commander.

● *Prepare to accept limitations imposed by public reaction to media events.* Patience and flexibility are essential. Remember, in the Persian Gulf War, the impact that the bombing of the civilians in the Baghdad bunker had on the bombing campaign that followed. Events like this may happen often.

● *Understand that what is being reported maybe more important than the actual facts of the situation.* Again, remember the civilians in the Baghdad bunker.

Postconflict Considerations

● *Consider postconflict activities early, even during predeploynent activities.* This is critical. Failure to consider the outcome until required to by the tempo of events risks the success of the entire operation. This requires as much thought, planning, and supervision as does any other phase of force projection.

● *Focus on the strategic end state, typical postconflict activities, and the transition to peace.* By considering these, you will develop at least a 90-percent solution.

Logistics

● *Plan for logistics thoroughly.* This is absolutely crucial. particularly in an underdeveloped theater. You will read more about logistics later in this lesson.

Now that you have a firm foundation in the general planning considerations for force projection, take a stretch break. Return here to learn about the actual stages of force projection, one of the most important aspects of this lesson.

Stages of Force-Projection Operations

It is important that you understand each stage of force-projection operations and realize that the stages can occur simultaneously. You must consider the stages from both an Army and a joint perspective. Ideally, the completion of each stage would set the preconditions for the next stage, but in reality, it is not uncommon for several stages to occur at the same time, For example, during the initial stages of Desert Shield, some Reserve Component units were mobilizing, other Active duty units were undergoing predeployment, some units were deploying from CONUS and Europe, and the first units in theater were conducting entry and initial defensive operations.

Your readings in FM 100-5, chapter 3, identified and explained the eight stages of force-projection operations. They were further developed in appendix 1 to this lesson guide. These stages are listed here for you. Jot down the purpose of each stage and the specific planning considerations to remember for that stage.

1. Mobilization.

***2.* Predeployment activity.**

***3.* Deployment.**

***4.* Entry operations.**

***5.* Operations.**

6. War termination and postconflict operations.

***7.* Redeployment and reconstitution.**

***8.* Demobilization.**

Now, compare your responses with the information that follows.

Mobilization

The purpose of this stage is to increase the size and the capability of the US Armed Forces to resolve a specific crisis. Consider how to—

● *Implement the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).* The five levels of activity-selective mobilization, Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC), partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization—provide the tools available. Any level can be fully or partially applied. They do *not* have to occur sequentially.

● *Activate Reserve Component units or individuals in five phases:* planning, alert, home station, mobilization station, and port of embarkation (POE).

● *Mobilize early.* Many combat service support and civil affairs units reside primarily in the Reserve Component, and it takes time to activate them.

Predeployment Activity

The purpose of this stage is to prepare for the successful completion of the mission. It includes planning for deployment, entry operations, operations, and war termination and postconflict operations. Consider how to—

● *Tailor units to meet specific mission requirements.* This is crucial and will be difficult given the suddenness and uncertainty that surround force-projection operations into an underdeveloped theater.

● *Begin intelligence-gathering activities,* This includes gathering information on the host nation capabilities—military, logistic, and infrastructure (ports, airfields. and roads)—and on the threat forces.

● *Prepare for split-based operations.* Initially, and perhaps during the entire operation, support such as intelligence collection and analysis and some logistic functions may come from units outside the theater.

● *Anticipate logistic requirements.* This is critical and can be difficult. The size of the forces, the diversity of the forces (joint and combined) and the host nation infrastructure will all affect logistics. Many details will be unknown because of a lack of data about the host nation's capability and because of the uncertainty of the situation.

● *Complete initial planning.* This must include concepts for deployment, entry operations, operations, and war termination and postconflict operations.

● *Set priorities for airlift and sealift assets.* When considering the requirements in the theater, set priorities for scarce lift assets to ensure proper sequencing of units.

● *Update Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).* Accurate data on assets, equipment, personnel, and facilities in theater is necessary. It is difficult to make appropriate, relevant decisions with incorrect data.

● *Enforce operations security (OPSEC).* Effective operations security increases the chances for surprise and helps ensure the security of forces during deployment and entry operations. This may be extremely difficult given the ubiquity of the media.

● *Anticipate and forecast future events.* This is a constant in every stage. To anticipate what is needed now, what can go wrong, what could fix the problem, and what needs to happen in the future, both for the next stage and follow-on stages, is a constant concern for the commander and staff.

Deployment

The purpose of this stage is to move military forces into the theater of operations. Consider how to—

● *Monitor and control the movement of forces to the port of embarkation (POE) and port of debarkation (POD) using JOPES.* With units separated in space and time and with the possibility of problems arising, JOPES provides an important means to monitor, control, and adjust the movement of units from their home stations to the theater of operations.

● *Maintain a versatile and agile force mix.* The specific situation on the ground and the variety of tasks to be accomplished in developing a support infrastructure and in marshaling adequate forces for mission completion determine the initial mixture of forces deployed.

● *Balance combat capability, sustainment requirements, and lift assets.* Given the uncertainty of the situation, risk exists early during force projection. Try to secure a lodgment area to permit the buildup of follow-on forces.

● *Remain flexible.* When forces are separated in space and time, things will go wrong. JOPES will help identify problems in the deployment and assist in selecting possible solutions based on the changing situation in the theater.

● *Ensure early entry of intelligence and command and control assets.* It is crucial to gather critical information on the threat and on the host nation capabilities. A robust, redundant communications system will add to flexibility during deployment.

● *Begin integration with the host nation.* Obtaining information about the host nation and establishing agreements to use resources and facilities in country reduce the force-projection requirements and increase the likelihood of acting quickly. Civil affairs units (primarily in the Reserve Component) and special operations forces can be great assets in gathering information about the friendly and threat forces.

● *Anticipate and forecast future events.* Expect problems and changes during this stage and in all the follow-on stages. Keep focused on how to accomplish the mission and how to transition to postconflict operations.

Entry Operations

The purpose of this stage is to enter the theater of operations to secure a lodgment area for the expeditious movement of follow-on units. Consider how to—

● *Plan for an opposed entry.* Successful entry operations are essential. Always plan for opposed entry; but if unopposed, take advantage of host nation and other forces in theater.

● *Coordinate with the host nation.* Host nation support can secure entry airfields and seaports to facilitate the buildup of forces. Aggressive coordination and the gathering of critical information about the host nation infrastructure are important to verify plans for logistic support and for future operations.

● *Maximize joint capabilities.* The Army cannot deploy without help from the Air Force and the Navy. In addition, other US forces that can facilitate entry operations and deployment may already be in theater.

● *Project force rapidly.* Maximize the lift assets available to ensure a quick closure in the theater of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and essential materiel.

● *Maintain a balance of combat and sustainment capabilities.* In an underdeveloped theater where substantial logistic effort occurs, this critical task provides the foundation for successful combat operations.

● *Protect the force buildup by securing a lodgment area.* There can be no buildup of units or materiel without a secure lodgment area. US forces in theater, host nation units, initial force-projection units, or a combination of these forces can provide this security.

● *Develop an adequate sustainment base.* This is a precondition for successful combat operations. It is a major undertaking to support a significant military force in an underdeveloped theater,

● *Seize the initiative in the initial combat operations.* To protect the lodgment area and to keep the enemy off balance, it is important to gain the upper hand quickly. This may either defeat or deter the enemy's efforts to interfere with the force buildup.

● *Anticipate and forecast future events,* Expect difficulties and modifications during both the deployment and entry stages which can be caused by enemy action, changes in the political or military situation, mistakes, and problems inherent in these operations. Stay focused on building combat power and the logistic base to support decisive combat operations. Also focus on the requirements for war termination and postconflict operations.

Operations

The purpose of this stage is to conduct quick, decisive combat operations to establish the desired strategic and operational end states. Consider how to—

● *Maintain an adequate sustainment base.* This is the first prerequisite for continuous, decisive combat operations. It requires tremendous effort and careful planning by both operations and logistic staff officers.

● *Assemble and reposition sufficient combat power to support current and future operations.* To concentrate adequate combat power in theater and to position it properly require careful thought and detailed planning. Future operations are either facilitated or hindered based on the flexibility inherent in employing forces.

● *Synchronize operations in depth.* Combat operations—air, sea, land, special operations, and combined—require careful planning and coordination to strike the enemy simultaneously throughout the theater of operations.

● *Maintain continuous reconnaissance and constant force protection.* Constant intelligence gathering should make it possible to engage the enemy under favorable conditions. In addition, it will enhance the protection of the force, particularly the vulnerable combat service support, joint, and host nation facilities in the rear area.

● *Deceive the enemy.* With accurate and timely intelligence, it is possible to deceive the enemy as to the time, location, or manner in which we will strike. This facilitates decisive combat operations and must be a part of evevy campaign plan.

● *Seek decisive results; that is, accomplish the operational objectives of the mission quickly and with minimal casualties,*

● *Anticipate and forecast future events.* Have branches and sequels planned to make adjustments during combat operations to take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities. In addition, if more thought is given to war termination and postconflict operations, the smoother the transition and the more focused the effort will be to return the host nation to normalcy.

War Termination and Postconflict Operations

The purpose of this stage is to make a smooth transition from combat operations and to reestablish the host nation capabilities and the preconflict status quo. Consider how to—

● *Prepare for transition from combat operotions to operations other that war (OOTW).* It is possible to forfeit battlefield success by a lack of adequate, focused attention to the termination of combat operations and the transition to postconflict activities.

● *Restore order.* This is an initial requirement in the host nation and on any enemy territory occupied. Restoring order is not easy in the confused political situation that follows combat operations.

● *Minimize confusion.* Having a plan that considers the military, political, economic, and social conditions for postconflict operations in the theater is more likely to lead to success than if no plan is available.

● *Reestablish the host nation infrastructure.* It is essential that host nation facilities be restored quickly and smoothly.

● *Prepare units for redeployment.* Units no longer needed for combat operations should prepare for redeployment to their preconflict stations or to other hotspots in the theater.

● *Maintain a presence in theater.* During postconflict operations, a credible, lethal combat force should remain in theater to meet any contingencies that could arise.

● *Anticipate and forecast future events.* Accurately forecasting events in postconflict operations is extremely difficult; in fact, it is almost impossible. Expect mistakes, and be prepared to undertake nonstandard missions.

Redeployment and Reconstitution

The purpose of this stage is to return units to their preconflict locations or to other locations in theater for follow-on missions and to rebuild units by providing personnel, equipment, and training. Consider how to—

● *Redeploy unneeded assets.* Units no longer needed to support operations should withdraw, rebuild with personnel and equipment, and train to regain their preconflict status. If no longer needed in theater, they should be redeployed to their preconflict stations to continue reconstitution.

● *Maintain an ability to deploy on short notice.* Because of the uncertainty associated with postconflict operations and of the potential of conflicts arising in other regions, it is essential that forces prepare to redeploy anywhere in the world.

● *Protect the force.* A credible, lethal force needs to remain in theater until the last units have redeployed. The size of the force decreases as the threat reduces.

● *Begin reconstitution.* This should be a continuous process whenever there is a lull in operations. Units require personnel, equipment, and training time to reach their preconflict status.

Demobilization

The purpose of this stage is to return Reserve Component units and individuals to their preconflict locations and status. Consider how to—

● *Transfer equipment, individuals, and units to a premobilization posture.* This is a CONUS activity that ensures the quick, smooth, and efficient return of resources to their preconflict status.

In this first part of lesson 1, you learned about force projection: its general characteristics, the roles a corps might fulfill, its general planning considerations, and its eight stages. In the next part of this lesson, you will see how critical logistic considerations are when conducting force-projection operations into an underdeveloped theater.

Take a break and, when you return, you will be ready for logistic considerations for force-projection operations.

FORCE-PROJECTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS: LOGISTICS

According to the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, "logistic support for a force-projection army has unique characteristics. It takes on dimensions far different from moving units and supplies from the United States to an already-established theater. The Army relies on joint—and sometimes combined—support to project forces, which must be planned in detail prior to the onset of operations. Failure to anticipate needs properly and to provide security for LOCs [lines of communications], supplies, facilities, and infrastructures undermines the success of combat operations." (FM 100-5, *Operations*, June 1993)

Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that the often mundane and detail-ridden world of combat service support is the very lifeblood of an army, especially an army called to deploy, on short notice, to a hostile environment. Planners, at all levels, must meet the logistic challenges before combat power can be brought to bear and well after the dust of the battle has cleared. Never is this more evident than projecting a combat force into an underdeveloped theater.

In S320B, you focused on combat service support in a mature theater. During this part of the lesson, you will build on that knowledge by learning how a force-projection force is supported as it prepares, deploys, fights, and redeploys to and from an underdeveloped theater.

General Overview

Scan FM 63-3, *Corps Support Command,* "Support of Joint Operations," pages 1-39 through 1-43, and appendix D (12 pages), for information on logistical considerations.

You will look at the differences between logistic support of a forward-deployed corps and a force-projection corps.

In genera!, what are some of the differences? FM 63-3 lists the differences between logistic support for a forward-deployed corps and a force-projection corps as shown on the following chart.

FORWARD-DEPLOYED CORPS VERSUS FORCE-PROJECTION CORPS

FORWARD-DEPLOYED CORPS	FORCE-PROJECTION CORPS
Theater-oriented logistics with logistics forward deployed.	Force requirements-oriented logistics with logistics forces deployed before or with combat forces.
Allocation/OPLAN-based logistics.	Capability-based tailored logistics.
Established theater logistic infrastructure.	Possible bare-based logistics with logistic buildup required.
Component-tailored logistics.	CINC/joint-tailored logistics.
Support to known coalitions.	Support to ad hoc coalitions.
Logistic system operated primarily by military personnel.	Increased use of DOD, DA, and private sector civilians in the logistics system.
HNS agreements in place.	Contingency contracting and coalition support.
Commercially oriented communications exist.	Communications austere.

As you can see from the chart above, some of the major differences are based on the maturity of the area of operations or the theater of operations.

Normally, when we think in terms of the maturity of a theater, we are actually thinking in terms of a developed or underdeveloped theater.

In S410, you learned what constituted developed theater. Without going into great detail, think about some of the characteristics of an underdeveloped theater. An underdeveloped theater is exactly what the term

implies—underdeveloped. From a logistician's point of view, this usually means a deficiency in one or more of the following areas:

- Road systems.
- Rail systems.
- Port system (air and water).
- Water supply (potable and nonpotable).
- Host nation support (I-INS).
- Medical facilities.
- Base structures.
- Established/inplace logistical support system.

Each of these areas presents the logistician with multiple support challenges throughout the different stages of force-projection operations.

Stages of Force Projection

As you read earlier, force-projection operations follow a general sequence of stages beginning with mobilization and ending with demobilization. Take a few minutes to look at each of these stages through the eyes of the logistician.



Stage 1: Mobilization

FM 100-5 defines mobilization as "a process in which the armed forces augment the active component capability m preparation for war or other national emergencies." Mobilization includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components; assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and material; and certifying the proficiency of individuals and organizations.

Initially, you might not think that this stage is critical to logistic planning. However, a large percentage of the combat service support assets for a corps are in the Reserve Components. Depending on the duration and

and nature of the operation, the corps may have to request mobilization of those assets. A prime example where the Active Components require augmentation would be mortuary affairs and civil affairs (CA) units. Not all operations require mobilization. However, consider this statement from Lieutenant General John H. Tillelli, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army, on deploying a contingency corps: "If a contingency corps force package was deployed, about 100,000 Reserve Component soldiers would be required to support its operation, " *(The Army Green Book, 1993-94)*

The following is provided as backup information. The figures are from the *Army Reserve Special Report, 1993.*

● 60 percent of the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) for the contingency force comes from the National Guard and Army Reserve (General Gordon R. Sullivan).

● At the end of fiscal year 1993, the Army Reserve made up—

— 56 percent of the Total Army CSS units.
— 18 percent of the Total Army CS units.
— 6 percent of the Total Army combat units

● CS and CSS programmed for fiscal year 1996:

— 36-percent Army Reserve.
— 29-percent National Guard.
— 35-percent Active Army.

● Contribution by type of unit—Army Reserve and National Guard (as of September 1992) in percentages:

— Theater support groups	100	— CA units	97
— Water supply battalions	100	— Area support groups	49
— Hospitals	65	— Medical groups	77
— Corps support groups	73	— Medical brigades	86
— Corps support commands	50	— Chemical battalions	85
— Petroleum groups	67	— Judge advocate general units	100
— Ordnance battalions	77	— Railroad units	100
— Maintenance battalions	73	— Enemy prisoner-of-war brigades	100

Stage 2: Predeployment Activity

The second stage in force-projection operations is predeployment activity, which involves getting units assembled at POEs. This could involve movement by sea, air, or rail. In some cases, aviation assets may be able to self-deploy to the theater, allowing critical strategic transportation assets to be used for other movements, Transportation planners must take into account the ports or airfields available for debarkation in the theater. In most cases, especially in underdeveloped theaters, the PODS will be more restrictive than the PO Es, These ports have a major impact on the timing of the operation and may dictate how the force is tailored to accomplish the mission. For example, underdeveloped ports, both air and sea, may dictate that engineer and CSS units deploy ahead of some combat units. Anticipatory logistic planning must be

accomplished during this phase if the force is going to be successful in the later stages. Additional planning for the operation must be completed during this stage, to include determining the transportation assets required to support the operation. This includes strategic transportation assets that must be married with the units at the POEs.

Stage *3:* Deployment Operations

Rephrasing an old song, "get me to the theater on time," is what this stage is all about. This stage involves deploying forces from the POEs to the PODs. However, there is more to this stage than just deploying forces. Force packages must be tailored and echeloned to accomplish entry and follow-on operations. As you read in the preceding stage, when planners tailor their packages, they must consider the need for logistics, base development, and civil affairs support in theater. The tendency to put combat forces into the theater without the support they need must be avoided. This is especially true if forces are deploying to multiple PODs.

Stage 4: Entry Operations

A force-projection army must develop the logistic base while it builds combat power. Sequencing of the proper mix of combat and support units into the theater is critical during this stage. The tradeoff is between projecting forces rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and resources to accomplish the mission. As combat power builds, the logistic base must be dynamic to expand to meet the needs of the combat force. Therefore, proper sequencing of units into the theater is essential.

Stage *5:* Operations

Operations begin only after the required forces and sustainment have been established. Included in this are the development of the operating relationships with elements of the task force organization, CONUS logistic bases, and host nation officials.

Stage 6: Postconflict Operations

Although this is a separate stage, Iogisticians may still be required to support residual combat operations as well as postconflict operations. Activities during this stage could include medical assistance, humanitarian assistance, refugee control, demolition of unexploded ordnance, and so forth. Even though the corps may not be directly responsible for postconflict operations, it maybe tasked to provide support.

Stage *7:* Redeployment and Reconstitution

The objective during this stage is to redeploy those assets no longer required. This includes preparing units, equipment, and supplies for movement back to their home bases. Transportation requirements must be identified and coordinated to ensure an orderly redeployment. During this stage, contractor and host nation support may be required.

Stage *8:* Demobilization

During this stage, units, individuals, and material are transferred from Active status to a premobilization posture. This stage occurs only if Reserve forces were mobilized in the mobilization stage.

Force-Projection Characteristics

Now that you have an understanding of the stages of force-projection operations, think about some of the general characteristics of sustaining force-projection operations. Some of the general characteristics are:

● *Short lead time:* Because contingency operations usually require a rapid response, planners may or may not have enough lead time to adequately plan and prepare for the movement of forces and equipment.

● *Transportation:* The allocation of limited transportation assets must be carefully planned and executed, including the assignment of deployment priorities. Planners at all levels must decide which service components, units, and items of equipment will get the available lift by priority sequence and in the proper time sequence.

● *Planning:* Force projections, especially during stage 1, must be planned for almost every conceivable location and scenario. This is especially true for logistics where the location (underdeveloped areas) and scenario (opposed versus unopposed) dictate logistic planning.

● *Joint logistics.* Planning for every conceivable aspect of joint logistics is impractical. Force projections will inherently involve joint logistics operations that will not have all the details worked out in advance. Therefore, temporary or ad hoc procedures might have to be created during the initial stages until the details are worked out.

● *Uncertainty:* Contingency operations can run the range from operations other than war (OOTW) to actual combat, or they can evolve from combat into operations other than war and vice versa. Therefore, the logistician has to plan for the realm of contingency operations. This includes changes in planning factors, types of units needed (OOTW rely more on logistic units rather than combat units), and consideration of coalition and United Nations (UN) logistics.

● *Efficiency:* Assets must be fully utilized. This includes the efficient loading of strategic lift assets. However, based on the operation, the optimal load balancing (administrative) and efficient use of cargo space may be sacrificed for speed and tactical advantage. The key is effective use of strategic lift. In addition, logisticians must plan for the smartest, most efficient use of every resource. Planning must avoid duplicating effort and wasting valuable resources. A well-thought-out logistic system in force- projection operations will conserve strategic lift and reduce materiel consumption.

● *Control structure."* Some force-projection operations can create complex logistic control structures. For example, an Army corps could be designated as the ARFOR and/or the JTF headquarters. Because of this, the corps staff must be augmented by the unified CINCs, service components, or other agency's staff officers. A corps could be split up-part ARFOR, part JTF—which could further worsen the problem.

● *Unconventional preparatory actions:* Force projections often require actions that may be considered unconventional. For example, based on the host nation structure, medical, transportation, and supply units may not be the units you need to arrive in the theater first. Experience has shown that initial support may hinge on assets that are immediately available from the host nation. Thus, special contracting teams maybe required initially to facilitate and expedite local national support and services. The key point here is that early CSS actions must be focused toward setting conditions for operations of further phases, not mere adherence to doctrinal echelonment.

As you just read, force projection takes considerable planning by the logisticians. It also presents some unique problems.

Force-Projection Problems

Obviously, force-projection operations in an underdeveloped theater present the logisticians and CSS units with unique planning problems. Take a minute and consider the problems force- projection operations present for the corps CSS forces. Here are some possibilities you might have come up with:

● *Time:* The problem is that lead time is normally so limited that only Active duty forces can be used. Remember that much of our CSS assets are in the Reserve Components, and this can pose a problem. If a selective callup of Reserve forces is not authorized, C S S planners must use the forces available to them. Other factors that are affected by time are organizing and acquiring the proper amount of supplies, mobilizing strategic lift, and preparing equipment for deployment.

● *Distance.* The distance to the theater of operations must also be considered. When the distance and closure time to the theater are great, more CSS assets must be deployed to the theater, or host nation support must be found to augment the corps CSS capability. C S S assets may compete with combat forces for availability of transportation assets. Host nation support can ease the CSS problem significantly. However, in many cases, the theater may be an underdeveloped nation that can provide only limited support, Additional resources that may ease dependence on the CONUS sustainment base may come from pre-positioned war reserves, operational project stocks, third-country support, or joint contingency stocks maintained by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

In some cases, an intermediate staging base (ISB) is required to allow adequate buildup of forces and/or supplies prior to an operation. An ISB could be required if—

— Overflight rights cannot be obtained.

— Ports in the objective area are inadequate. Equipment (such as helicopters) requires reassembling before it can be employed in operations.

— The distances to the area of operations are so great that the lines of communication arc overextended.

— Vulnerability of the lodgment areas or landing zones in the objective area requires logistic bases be situated away from hostilities.

— The lodgment areas are too congested.

— A preparation site close to the area of operations is required for forced entry.

If established, the ISB could remain operational during the entire operation, or it could be disbanded as adequate facilities are established in theater.

● *Port facilities and infrastructure:* The status of the air and seaports and the infrastructure can have a major impact on the CSS forces. A theater with a poorly developed infrastructure may require additional terminal service units, transportation units, well-drilling units, and other types of CSS units. Contracting

essential supplies and services from the host nation or third parties may also be required to compensate for insufficient resources in the objective area.

● *Echelonment:* CSS units must be echeloned into the theater. CSS planners must determine the units and types of equipment required to support the operation. The structure of the supported force depends on the potential threats and the environment. CSS planners tailor their support organizations to the size and composition of the force and whether the entry is opposed or unopposed. Based on requirements; strategic lift; pre-positioned assets; host nation support; and factors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available (METT-T), the following teams, elements, or units might be required to deploy early in the operation:

— Movement control teams (MCTs) and movement regulating teams (MRTs).

— Direct support (DS) supply company or elements.

— DS ammunition company elements (ammunition supply points (ASPS) and ammunition transfer points (ATPs)) and habitual supporting truck companies.

●● Cargo transfer unit.
●● General support (GS) petroleum supply platoons and supporting truck platoons.
●● DS maintenance company elements and maintenance support teams (MSTs).

— Clothing exchange and bath (CEB) teams.

— Mortuary affairs collection platoons

— Military police (MP) company for security to advance party units.

— Headquarters element to provide effective command and control (C2) of these units, platoons, or teams.

● *Redeployment: CSS* packages must be tailored to support the last combat units until they depart. Civil affairs and postconflict operations will also require CSS assets, which CSS planners must also consider. If not planned for, these operations can divert significant CSS assets from the combat forces. Military police, engineer, transportation, supply and service, petroleum, and medical units will be required to support these operations. Rather than returning to a hero's welcome as the combat and combat support units redeploy, logistic units may be called upon to-

— Provide support to stay-behind combat, CS, and CSS units.
— Provide support for displaced civilians and repatriated prisoners of war.
— Perform reconstitution of US forces.
— Police the battlefield (for example, recovery of equipment and explosive ordnance disposal).
— Receive additional units for future missions.

Now that you have a general understanding of force-projection operations, turn your attention to the subject of joint logistics.

Joint Logistic Considerations

In the joint logistic arena, the operable term is *directive logistic authoriy.* Only the CINC of the combatant command (COCOM) can exercise directive authority over all aspects of logistics to accomplish his command's mission. This means that the CINC, within his command, uses directive authority for logistics to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations. In other words, he uses it to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among the command's service components.

One of the combatant commander's most common applications of directive authority is in determining the type of servicing to be used within a combatant command. Types of servicing are single servicing, cross servicing, common servicing, and joint servicing. The chart that follows defines each type. At the combatant command, servicing may encompass all of these servicing modes.

TYPES OF SERVICING

Single servicing	**Each service supports itself.**
Cross servicing	**One service supports another (reimbursed).**
Common servicing	**One service supports another (nonreimbursed).**
Joint servicing	**Jointly staffed and funded. Support of two or more services.**

To carry out his logistic support responsibilities effectively, the CINC may establish various joint boards or offices to comply with the essence of the term "directive authority." The following are some of the common joint boards or offices the combatant commander may routinely setup during a crisis or conflict:

- A Joint Logistics Readiness Center.
- A Joint Movement Center.
- A Joint Petroleum Office.
- A Joint Medical Regulating Office.
- A Joint Program Blood Office.
- A Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.
- A Joint Transportation Board.
- A Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board.
- A Joint Facilities Utilization Board.
- A Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board.

Keep in mind that directive authority of the combatant commander is not intended to—

- Discontinue service responsibility for logistic support.
- Discourage continued coordination, consultation, and agreements.
- Disrupt effective procedures, efficient use of facilities, or organization.

The main point you should remember is that the services retain the basic responsibility for supporting their component forces in a combatant command. The combatant commander directs how the services' component commanders furnish logistic support for the benefit of the joint forces. Regardless of the command arrangements within a combatant command, the service component commanders retain responsibilities for certain service-specific functions. For example, the Army has responsibility for mortuary affairs, conventional ammunition management, map requirements, and supply support to civil-military actions when operating in a joint environment.

Corps Support

In S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations,* you learned about the organization and capabilities of the corps support command (COSCOM). You know that it provides support to either a contingency corps force in underdeveloped areas or to a forward-deployed corps in an established theater of operations. During this part of the lesson, you will concentrate on how a COSCOM supports a contingency force during force-projection operations.

Contingency Force

A contingency corps force is tailored for rapid deployment. Corps forces are projected to contingency operations in underdeveloped areas where there is no existing US military base. The contingency corps is initially an austere organization with a mix of heavy and light maneuver forces. It establishes a lodgment with appropriate sea and air LOCs, often in conjunction with allied forces.

The composition of the contingency force depends on the situation, potential threat, and area of operations. While a contingency force that deploys with an entire COSCOM cannot be smaller than one division, it can expand to several divisions. A contingency combat force involving a division or larger would probably include forces from two or more US military services and possibly allied forces.

The COSCOM supports the Army components of the contingency force. It may also support other services attached to the force. To avoid duplication of logistic efforts, interservice support agreements, memorandums of understanding, and other documents assign logistic responsibilities.

As world events have shown, there is a high probability for contingency operations now and in the future. Army planners must be prepared to deal with the unique logistics of force-projection operations. A major aspect of logistics is the considerations for planning and conducting the echelonment of logistic forces and supplies into the force-projection area of operations.

As a corps planner, what are some of the preplanned support and logistic information available to assist in the deployment of forces?

Echelonment Planning Conditions

Before planning any echelonment, considerable research must be done to obtain logistic intelligence data on the area of operations and to determine any available prior planning that will affect force tailoring. This information will help determine the types of units, equipment, and materiel that must be deployed. Some of the types of preplanned support and intelligence available are—

● *Harvest Eagle:* This *is* a US Air Force (USAF) Air Mobility Command (AMC) asset that can provide readily air-deployable tent cities, latrines and showers, runway support systems, kitchens. power-generating systems, and housekeeping supplies. This asset can accommodate approximately 1,100 people.

● *Harvest Bare:* This is another AMC asset that includes prefabricated aircraft maintenance hangars; modular administrative buildings; bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage; and remote area lighting. Despite the name, Bare, it can accommodate about 4,000 people.

● *Army facilities component system:* This system contains drawings of standard engineer designs, specifications, bills of materiel, and planning guides for bare-based areas to provide utilities, facilities, and so forth.

● *Operational project stocks (OPROJ):* These stocks are primarily used for initial provisioning, not combat losses. These stocks may be any class of supply, major end items, common table of allowances (CTA) items, or commercial items necessary to support a contingency operation such as a tactical petroleum pipeline system or reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU).

● *Army Reserve Sustainment (ARS):* ARS is materiel aligned and designated to satisfy the Army wartime sustainment objective. This materiel is acquired in peacetime to meet increased military requirements during wartime. It is intended to provided support essential to sustain combat operations and postmobilization training to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS) as portrayed in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). ARS is further broken out as:

— ARS outside continental United States (OCONUS) (included in AR-2, AR-4, and AR-5) under the control of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and positioned in theater to meet initial sustainment objectives.

— Afloat pre-positioned materiel (included in AR-3), which includes critical equipment and/or munitions placed aboard ship to meet initial sustainment requirements worldwide.

— CONUS positioned stock (AR-l), which includes all ARS materiel stock not positioned OCONUS or afloat.

— War Reserve Stock for Allies—Korea (WRSA—K) (TR-7) that is owned and financed by the United States, but released to Republic of Korea Army on a declaration of Defense Condition 11 per existing multiyear omnibus acquisitions.

● *Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC):* This command is the reference point for studies done by the Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) on strategic lift requirements, ports around the world, shipping agencies and capabilities, and so forth. For similar data on airports, you would contact the Air Mobility Command.

● *Area studies:* Area studies can be obtained from numerous sources. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), US Department of State (DOS), and Jane's series of books have background information on the various regions around the world. This information includes data on local facilities, host labor, cultures, and demographics.

● *ArmedForces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC).* This center maintains information on diseases, hospitals, blood supplies, and sources of antivenin for all regions of the world.

All areas of logistic intelligence must be included when analyzing the environment of the area of operations (terrain, weather, and infrastructure) and the impact on the logistic aspects of water consumption, methods of water treatment, clothing, medical supply and treatment requirements, repair parts usage, and so forth.

Intelligence analysts must consider host nation support because of our continuing reliance on local support for logistics. Logisticians must ascertain as much as possible (time permitting) about the area of operations, population, and facilities. By doing so, the logistician can determine what to bring from CONUS or take from pre-positioned stocks.

As you have read, intelligence preparation has a significant impact on logistic preparation. In particular, it can determine how we echelon and tailor our CSS forces and materiel Consider the following in terms of echelonment and tailoring:

● *Time-Phased Force and Deployment Lists (TPFDLs):* An important aspect of echeloning and tailoring the force is the development of the TPFDL. After considering the available intelligence, the G4 must analyze other aspects of the operation in terms of equipment, supply and unit requirements, and capabilities. The G4 must then coordinate with the G3 to develop the TPFDL. Although TPFDLs are preplanned and included in OPLANS, some refinement is normally required based on METT-T, lift capability, units available. and so forth.

● *Echelonment:* This is not as simple as putting combat forces first, followed by combat support forces, and then combat service support forces. The objective is to select and tailor a force based on the assigned mission and the available resources. FM 100-15, *Corps Operations* states, "In every echelon, combat forces must be integrated with C^3I [command, control, communications, and intelligence], fire support, engineers, ADA [air defense artillery], and corresponding echelonment of CSS."

● *Entry operations.* Conditions in the objective area will influence initial CSS operations. Depending on the crisis, forces may be required to deploy into either a hostile or a benign environment. Naturally, a forced entry will be weighted with combat forces; however, combat units will still require some CSS support. This support may take the form of a multifunctional CSS "slice" that will provide limited support until lodgment areas are secured and expanded for the follow-on forces. Unopposed entry may allow CSS units to deploy early to prepare for the follow-on forces. However, even in an apparently benign entry operation, protection of the force remains a critical command decision.

Another aspect of entry operations that a CSS planner must consider is the possibility of supporting engaged and incoming forces at the same time. CSS units deployed during the early phases of an operation may find themselves simultaneously supporting arriving units and vessels as well as units operating in the combat zone. This will require setting priorities of workload and conducting split operations along separate lines of communication to support forces engaged in combat and noncombat operations. This may require

split-based operations. It is important that staff planners consider this dual mission when they design force packages and TPFDLs.

● *Duration:* Although no staff planner can predict exactly how long a contingency operation will actually last (remember Vietnam'?), time must be considered in the planning phase. The length of the contingency will influence the nature of the CSS structure. For your purpose here, time is defined in terms of short and long duration. Keep in mind that the National Command Authority's intent on how long to stay determines the actual duration.

What do you think are some of the CSS outcomes associated with a long-duration contingency operation ? Naturally, the longer a force stays in the theater of operations, the greater its CSS requirements become. Keeping that in mind, you are right on track if you came up with any of the following:

Long-duration operations increase demands for—

- Repair parts.
- DS maintenance units.
- Medical units, to include hospitals.
- Field services.
- Mortuary affairs.
- An increase in stockage levels (classes of supply).
- Storage facilities.

Some points to consider during long operations include the following:

- Do the initial troops need to be rotated back and replaced with fresh troops'?
- Are incountry units able to support cleanup, foreign nation support, or reconstitution efforts?

What about short-duration operations? The major consideration for short-duration operations is the type of units required. Short operations require a rapid medical evacuation capability as well as immediate surgical response elements. In addition, quartermaster (QM) airdrop supply companies and assault echelon logistic task forces may be required.

Joint Operations

Now that you have read about echelonment and tailoring, switch gears and see how the corps, specifically the COSCOM, operates in a joint environment. Corps forces can operate as part of a JTF as depicted in the chart below. Note that HNSCT stands for host nation support control team.

As the logistic command of the corps, the COSCOM supports corps units conducting joint operations. In a single-corps contingency environment, the COSCOM assumes the role of the theater logistic manager. As directed, it provides logistic support (SPT) to the other services.

In principle, each military service provides logistic support for its own forces. In practice, the joint task force commander tasks the service that is either the dominant user or the most capable to provide or coordinate support for all service components. For example, the Army (COSCOM) may provide all class I supplies, movement support, and/or water support to the JTF. Look at some of this support in more detail, and see the responsibilities COSCOM has or could have.



General Supply Support

Subject to directives from the CINC, service components provide support for their forces. Each service performs its own requirements and forecasting. The COSCOM, in this case, would consider high-priority materiel needed at the outset of an operation and significant time-phased materiel requirements necessary to support the operation plan (OPLAN).

Common Item Support

Common item support is provided by the service component command that is the predominate user. In this case, COSCOM would need to keep a file of materiel commonalties among the services.

Supply and Storage

Each service establishes priorities and computes requirements for storage, which includes refrigerated, covered, and open storage; tankage; and hardstands. The CINC allocates available storage among the services.

Map Supply

Based on agreements between the JTF commander and the Defense Mapping Agency, the Army's map distribution system supports the map requirements of the other services.

Subsistence

COSCOM plans and provides subsistence support to the Army forces and possibly to the other services of the JTF as directed.

Water Support

The Army is responsible for joint policy and procedures for all components responsible for water resources in support of land-based forces. The COSCOM plans for water support. Water support beyond a service's capability is provided by the Army (COSCOM) or another service as appropriate.

Ammunition Support

Ammunition support is not as clear cut as water support. Directive authority and dominate user theory apply here. COSCOM planners need to consider ammunition requirements of assigned US forces and augmentation forces being assigned to the area of operations (AO). In all probability, if the corps becomes the JTF as well as the ARFOR, then the COSCOM will pickup the common ammunition support for the other services.

Petroleum Support

The Army coordinates inland distribution of fuel to all US-based forces within an overseas theater. COSCOM coordinates with all supported units to develop plans based on time-phased requirements for class III support during the deployment phase.

Maintenance Support

Each service provides maintenance support for its own forces. COSCOM nondivisional maintenance units can establish maintenance facilities for joint service USC. However, service components provide maintenance of service-peculiar equipment.

Transportation Support

In a joint command, the commander normally assigns the responsibility for providing and coordinating surface transportation to support all US forces to the Army component commander. If a Joint Movement Center (JMC) is not established, the COSCOM has responsibility for intratheatcr transportation planning.

Field Service Support

Field services may be performed by one service as a result of interservice or cross-service agreements. Whenever possible, they should be performed by the host nation or by contractors. The services are responsible for providing mortuary affairs and personal effects distribution for their own forces. The COSCOM is responsible for operating one or more collection points for all the services. It provides for temporary internment until provisions are made for subsequent custody.

Health Service Support

Each service component provides hospitalization support for its forces. Each service provides health service support units for the interim care and treatment of its patients and, as required, for those of other services.

The COSCOM'S medical brigade or group can operate facilities for joint use. Hospitals are either staffed and used jointly or staffed by one service and used by all others. To maximize the availability of health service support, the services use the following jointly:

- Aeromedical staging units and aeromedical evacuation.
- Medical laboratory support.
- Blood product distribution.
- Dental facilities and services.
- Veterinary support.
- Preventive medicine survey and support.
- Optical support.
- Combat stress reconditioning centers.

Evacuation

The Army is responsible for all medical evacuation by land which includes inland water transportation within assigned areas. Except for areas supported by Air Force air-landed logistic support, the Army is responsible for short-distance aeromedical evacuation within the Army combat zone. The Air Force is responsible for long-distance aeromedical evacuation. The Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides aeromedical evacuation for joint operations.

Heavy-Light Division Mix

Now that you have had an opportunity to read about the various aspects of joint support, you need to understand how COSCOM goes about supporting a heavy or light task force.

Differences in force structure, types and quantities of equipment. and tactical doctrine between heavy and light forces result in differences in support required from the corps. To support such a mix, you need to understand the differences.

Before you actually get into the details, what are some of the categories these differences might fall into ? You get zero credit if you decided one is light and the other is heavy, although that is a true statement. Actually, you should do a more indepth analysis along the lines of the following:

- Bulk fuel requirements
- Ammunition requirements.
- Maintenance requirements.
- Transportation requirements.

Now, take a few minutes to read about these in more detail

Bulk Fuel

The COSCOM pushes bulk fuel to the division class III points based on fuel forecasts and status reports. Jet fuel is pushed from the corps rear area to the division aviation brigade. Light forces lack bulk fuel storage and distribution assets required by offensive operations. Therefore, the corps throughputs bulk fuel to the brigade support area (BSA) whenever possible.

Ammunition

There is major difference between the organic weapon systems in a heavy division and those in a light division. This results in a significant difference in ammunition consumption rates. The light infantry divisions rely on ammunition loads configured by nondivisional DS ammunition companies. For example, when a light division is cross attached to a heavy division, the COSCOM throughput a different mix of class V supplies to the ammunition supply point (ASP) in the light brigade BSA. The mix of new and old weapon systems technology and associated mix of class V required by heavy and light forces also places an additional burden on the corps class V distribution system.

Direct Support Maintenance

Unit maintenance support in the light infantry division (LID) is consolidated at the brigade level. COSCOM forces supporting LIDs rely on replacement over repair, with increased maintenance passback to the nondivisional DS maintenance units. The COSCOM attaches a maintenance support team (MST) and a missile maintenance team to the LID to offset maintenance passback to corps maintenance units. The COSCOM tailors its maintenance support to the equipment unique to the heavy and light forces. For example, the division support command (DISCOM) in a heavy division is not able to support equipment such as 105-mm towed howitzers and 60-mm and 81-mm mortars unique to light forces. And vice versa, light DISCOMs do not have the repair parts or maintenance capability to support a heavy division's systems. Planners must ensure that unit maintenance assets accompany light infantry forces of less than brigade size when they are cross attached to a heavy force.

Transportation

Mobility in the offense is critical to success. Inherently, light divisions and light brigades possess a transportation shortfall. If the light forces of a heavy-light mixed force are to keep pace with the heavy elements, corps transportation assets are needed to move light units and their supplies. In the offensive, lines of communication (LOC) need to be able to provide continuous support to the force. To relieve congested LOCs, COSCOM uses increased air delivery. Light brigades depend on corps aviation assets and aerial delivery.

Corps Slice

COSCOM planners coordinate with the corps G4 staff to determine the composition of the corps sIice needed to support the heavy-light forces. The tailored slice of support for heavy divisions might include a petroleum supply platoon (M1s have a great appetite), an ordnance section, a maintenance company, and medium truck companies. Augmentation specifically designed to support light forces could include LID maintenance support teams, aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) support teams, missile maintenance support teams, mortuary affairs, and CEB sections. Additional support for light forces might include an ordnance section, a DS maintenance company, medium truck companies, and an airdrop supply element.

Host Nation Support

Host nation support (HNS) includes civilian and military support services furnished by the host nation to forces stationed on host nation territory in times of peace and war. FINS helps to offset US manpower, equipment, and supply requirements. It is the preferred method of meeting unsatisfied military support

In previous subcourses, you learned about host nation support but from the standpoint of a forward-deployed corps in a developed theater rather than a contingency corps in an underdeveloped theater. Take a second to reflect on what you learned Are there any peculiar differences in host nation support as they pertain to contingency operations? The major difference is that HNS agreements for contingency operations probably would not be in place at the time that planning begins for the operation. Based on the environment in the area of operations and the length of time prior to stage 1, it may be possible to begin negotiations with the host nation or foreign national business firms before beginning operations. If not possible, civil affairs units or contracting personnel need to be inserted early into the TPFDL. Host nation support includes—

- *Government agency support:* Agencies build, operate, and maintain facilities and systems such as utilities and telephone networks. Police, fire departments, and border patrols may be available to support US forces.

- *Contractor support:* Host nation, third-country, or US contractors can provide supplies and services such as laundry, bath, bakery, transportation, labor, and construction.

- *Host nation civilians:* The host nation can provide skilled personnel, to include laborers, stevedores, truck drivers, technicians, and managers.

- *Host nation military units:* Host nation rnilitary units can provide support such as traffic control, convoy escort, cargo and troop transport, POL storage and distribution, and rear operations.

- *Host nation facilities."* US forces use host nation facilities or buildings such as hospitals, headquarters, billets, and maintenance shops.

- *Function or area support.* A host nation performs a particular function such as rail operations, convoy scheduling, harbor pilot services, and air traffic control.

- *Services:* Host nation facilities and personnel can satisfy many administrative services and morale, welfare, and recreational demands.

- *Supplies and equipment:* Supplies and equipment needed for mission accomplishment maybe acquired locally, precluding or reducing materiel shipments from CONUS.

The following excerpt from *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War,* by General Robert H. Scales, is provided to emphasize the enormous support the United States received in HNS during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.—"In time, ARCENT [Army Forces, Central Europe] would contract for food, fuel, long haul trucks and drivers, water, and other key items necessary for comfort and sustainment. In addition to port facilities and telecommunications, the Saudi government provided 4,800 tents, 1,073,500 gallons of packaged petroleum products, 333 HETs [heavy equipment transporters], 20 million meals, and 20.5 million gallons of fuel per day, as well as bottled water for the entire theater and supplies for Iraqi prisoners of war. "

Civil Affairs Units

Normally, we associate host nation support with civil affairs (CA) units. However, this is only one aspect of support they might provide. Look at some of the other types of support in more detail.

Take a second to think about some of the other types of support civil affairs units might provide to COSCOM during contingency operations. The COSCOM assistant chief of staff, G5, exercises staff supervision over civil affairs units or elements assigned, attached, or placed under the operational control of COSCOM. He prepares plans and recommends policies and procedures for CA activities. He coordinates and directs all CA activities in the COSCOM area of operation. CA support to COSCOM might include—

- Conducting area studies and reviewing HNS agreements.

- Identifying available local resources, facilities, and support.

- Providing input to the troop information programs on culturally appropriate behavior.

- Coordinating US requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local rcsources. facilities, and support.

- Facilitating initial coordination meetings between contracting agents and foreign agencies which agreed to provide a specific type of HNS.

- Minimizing local population interference with COSCOM operations

- Conducting analysis to anticipate population movement

- Coordinating with local agencies for assistance in controlling civilian population movement.

- Assisting the COSCOM commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local civilian population.

- Identifying local civilian sources for information concerning enemy order of battle and enemy activities.

In addition, civil affairs units, both Active (there is only one. the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Fort Bragg) and Reserve, possess the skills necessary to organize humanitarian assistance operations. They help the military establish a temporary military government, including administration and assistance in restoring the basic essentials for survival in occupied or conquered territories.

During this portion of the lesson, you have concentrated on the logistic aspects associated with deploying, employing, and redeploying a force-projection force. You have looked at both the joint and Army environment. The length of a CINC's operational reach will be determined largely by his logisticians. Remember that the concept of force projection requires an understanding that logistics is more than just sustaining the force in the field.

Take a break, and when you return, you will look at what a joint task force looks like.

JOINT TASK FORCE

As you read in force-projection operations, a corps can suddenly find itself a joint task force (JTF). Since 1948, over 240 unanticipated crises have required a quick response from US forces. For many of these crises, a joint task force was formed. Recent incidents requiring joint task forces include Grenada with a Navy-

commanded Combined Task Force 120; Panama with an XVIII Airborne Corps-commanded Task Force South; aid to the Kurds in northern Iraq with the Army-commanded Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, with an Army special operations Task Force Alpha and with an Army, Marine, and combined Task Force Bravo; and humanitarian assistance in Somalia with the Marine-commanded Unified Task Force. The variety of these operations should be apparent. A corps that becomes a joint task force before deployment assumes significant additional joint requirements that exceed its staffing and organizational capability.

During this portion of lesson 1, you will learn about joint task forces. The focus will be on the creation, organization, command relationships, staff organization, and functions of a JTF. It will also include the authority and responsibilities of the COMJTF (commander, joint task force). The lesson will include planning by reviewing how a joint task force uses crisis action procedures (CAP) and the deliberate planning process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). By the end of the instruction, you will understand what a joint task force is, how it is organized, what it does, and how it works.

Read Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified, Action Armed Forces (5* pages), and Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test), *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidancc and Procedures* (19 pages), which provide the doctrinal basis for the JTF instruction.

To begin with, jot down a response to this question: what is a joint task force?

You should include in your response that a joint task force—

- Is composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force. or two or more of these services.

- Must be formally designated a joint task force by the appropriate authority

It is important that you realize that a force composed of only Navy and Marine elements is *not* a joint task force. At least one other service, plus formal designation, would make a joint task force.

In the space below, write down some reasons to form a joint task force.

A joint task force can be formed for many reasons. Some of the major reasons you probably identified are—

- To accomplish a specific, limited objective. A joint task force can do a specific task; for example, the Unified Task Force provided humanitarian relief in Somalia.

- To provide command and control for a short duration. During Operation Sea Angel, typhoon relief to Bangladesh, a joint task force coordinated the relief effort.

- To command and control forces from two or more services in a situation that does not require centralizcd control of logistics. Combined Task Force 120 during Operation Urgent Fury and Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause are examples of joint task forces formed for this reason.

- To provide coordination within a subordinate area or to coordinate local defense of that subordinate area. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, which orchestrated aid to the Kurds in northern Iraq, created two subordinate task forces: Joint Task Force Alpha that worked with the refugees in the mountains and Joint Task Force Bravo that orchestrated the return of the refugees to their homes and towns in northern Iraq.

A joint task force can accomplish one or all of the above. From the examples above, usually two or more reasons apply.

Make a list below of who can create a joint task force.

1.

2.

3.

4.

You have learned from the readings that a joint task force can be established by—

- The Secretary of Defense.
- A unified or specified commander in chief (CINC).
- A subunified command commander.
- The commander of an existing joint task force.

Although any of the above can form a joint task force, normally a unified commander in chief forms a joint task force. During Operation Urgent Fury, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) created Combined Task Force 120, and during Operation Just Cause, the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) created Task Force South to conduct combat operations. As indicated earlier, during aid to the Kurds, Combined Task Force Provide Comfort created two subordinate task forces to perform specific tasks in specific geographic areas.

During the remainder of this lesson on joint task forces, assume that you are a member of a corps staff that has been designated a joint task force. This joint task force will conduct a force projection into an underdeveloped theater of ‘operations. This joint task force can create subordinate joint task forces.

Consequently, it is important to understand the factors which must be considered to determine whether a joint task force should be formed. JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test), chapter 2, paragraph 5a, provides some guidance.

By looking at four areas—mission, forces, area of operations, and command and control—what questions need consideration under each topic to determine whether to form a joint task force? List your questions on the following page

1. Mission.

2. Forces.

3. Area of operations.

4. Command and control.

You must always remember that as a member of a joint task force staff, you must think about all issues from a joint, not just an Army, perspective. Some questions you should consider are—

Mission

- What has to be done'?
- What is the commander's intent?
- What is the desired military end state'?
- What is the best way to reach that end state?
- How much time is available for planning'?
- How much time is available for execution?

Forces

- What friendly forces are available—joint and combined?
- What friendly forces arc needed—joint and combined?
- Where are those forces—location and Active or Reserve Component?
- Who is the enemy?
- What is the enemy capability?

Area of Operations

- Where are we to operate?
- What is the nature of the area of operations?
- Is the area developed or underdeveloped?

Command and Control

- What are the resources and limitations provided in the joint task force establishing order'?
- What is the best command and control arrangement for fostering unity of effort'?
- What is the best command and control arrangement for mission accomplishment?
- How can centralized direction and decentralized execution be best achieved'?
- What is the best way to enhance interoperability in the time available?

Careful consideration of these questions may lead the JTF staff to recommend that a subordinate joint task force be formed. If the decision is to forma joint task force, it is important to understand the actions taken to organize a joint task force so that it functions smoothly and quickly. If you become part of a joint task force, these actions will happen to you. If creating a subordinate joint task force, you must take these actions in forming that joint task force.

From your readings, how is a joint task force formed? Make your response below.

There are two things to remember when forming a joint task force. First. the establishing authority plays a crucial role. Second, constructing a joint task force follows a building-block approach.

The establishing authority sets the tasks and creates limits in the JTF establishing directive, which also appoints the commander, joint task force (COMJTF). The directive provides COMJTF with missions and objectives, a JTF area of responsibility (AOR) defined by geographic and/or time limits, initial guidance on the rules of engagement (ROE), and initial forces. During the operation. COMJTF can request changes based on the situation confronted at the time.

A joint task force develops from a building-block approach. First, the CINC designates a JTF commander and headquarters. Considering the mission assigned and the composition of the headquarters selected, augmentation detachments from joint and service assets, including the Active and Reserve Components. expand the headquarters' size and capability.

Again based on the mission, the joint task force receives specific assigned or attached forces. From your previous instruction on joint commands, you remember that the specific organization and command relationships of any joint command can take several forms. Look at Figure II-1, Sample JTF Command Relationships, in Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test), *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures. This* example clearly shows command relationships within and without the joint task

force. In this sample joint task force, we find Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force commanders who receive service administrative and logistic support from service components working for the CINC. This sample joint task force has two subordinate joint task forces: a joint special operations task force and a subordinate single service force. The specific mission and the establishing directive determine the actual composition and command relationships within the joint task force.

Do you remember the roles that a corps could fulfill during force projection'? Given this sample joint task force, your corps headquarters could find itself, particularly if it is the senior Army force in theater, functioning as the JTF headquarters, as a subordinate ARFOR commander to conduct combat operations, and as the Army component commander for the CINC, responsible for the administrative and logistic support for all Army forces in theater. In such a situation, even with Army and joint augmentation, the nucleus of the corps staff faces tremendous challenges.

COMJTF Authority and Responsibilities

What authority and responsibilities does the COMJTF have? Again, jot down your ideas in the space provided below.

1. COMJTF authority.

2. COMJTF responsibilities.

COMJTF Authority

Upon designation as the COMJTF, a corps commander assumes responsibility for the *entire joint force.* His authority includes—

- Exercise of operational control (OPCON) of assigned and attached forces. This can include Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, special operations, and combined units.

- Establishment of a succession of command. The COMJTF may designate a deputy commander, as well as the succession of command through his component commanders.

● Provision of tasks and guidance to OPCON forces. This requires a knowledge of capabilities and limitations, of organization and equipment, and of operational and tactical concepts of Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, special operations, and combined units. With this information, the COMJTF can develop plans to optimize each service's contribution for the best operational phasing.

● Organization and reorganization of forces to meet the situation in theater. Again, knowledge of joint and combined capabilities is critical.

COMJTF Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the COMJTF include—

● Assuming responsibility for control of the JTF area of responsibility (AOR). This includes control of the air, sea, and land environments.

● Determining the applicability of existing plans for the current situation and mission. If they exist, plans expedite planning. If they do not exist or if they do not meet the conditions in theater, then plans must be developed.

● Developing or modifying plans for approval by the establishing authority. COMJTF obtains approval of the JTF plan from the establishing authority. Throughout the operation, COMJTF keeps the superior headquarters informed of the current situation.

● Coordinating with attached and assigned joint forces. This essential task begins with planning before deployment and continues until redeployment or disestablishment of the joint task force.

● Requesting, coordinating, and ensuring cross-service logistic support. Knowledge of joint logistic concepts and capabilities is crucial to do this effectively.

● Coordinating with non-JTF organizations, This may include both US and host nation government agencies and combined military organizations.

● Conducting joint and combined training. This develops the teamwork and common procedures necessary for successful combat operations.

● Conducting combat operations. Successful operations require the best use of forces and the constant monitoring of the friendly and enemy situation.

Joint Task Force Staff

The organization and manning of the JTF headquarters constitute major tasks that COMJTF must immediately address. From your readings, you know that there is no standard JTF headquarters organization. There is no table of organization and equipment (TOE). Each COMJTF, based on the mission and his service background, organizes the staff as he sees best.

You read about the principles for organizing a JTF headquarters. Although the JTF headquarters can vary tremendously in composition and in size, several issues need careful consideration. These are the command section joint staff, augmentation detachments, communications support, headquarters support and sustainment, and security support.

Command Section

The COMJTF may remain dual hatted, commanding the joint task force as well as the service command; in our case, the Army corps. If the mission is complex and the forces are large, then the COMJTF will probably designate someone to command the corps, perhaps his deputy. Both the corps
and the JTF headquarters may need additional senior officers to fill command positions.

Joint Staff

The composition and manning level of the JTF staff depend on the mission. Joint augmentation for both the special and functional staff sections normally occurs. During the initial crisis, joint manning of the advanced echelon that deploys first into the theater can be difficult.

Augmentation Detachments

Joint and service additions to the staff provide the necessary technical and special expertise needed by the headquarters. This could include organizations such as civil affairs units from the Reserve Component. psychological operations units, and a Subarea Petroleum Office (SAPO).

Communications Support

Reliable, robust communications make effective command and control possible. To ensure this, a joint communications support element (JCSE) and a deployable Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) terminal and module often support the JTF staff.

Headquarters Support and Sustainment

The JTF staff, along with its attached supporting elements, requires administrative, logistic, and medical support. This additional augmentation can come from joint or service assets.

Security Support

Based on the threat assessment, a modularized security package deploys to protect the COMJTF and the joint staff.

The previous discussion generally describes how the JTF headquarters forms from service and joint assets. Now, look into how the JTF staff functions. The actual composition of the joint staff can vary.

Look at Figure IV-1, Sample HQ JTF Staff Organization, in Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test), *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures.* In this example, the staff consists of a deputy commander, chief of staff, personal staff, and joint staff. The COMJTF determines the

actual organization and procedures of the staff. This frequently conforms to the service staff characteristics of the COMJTF.

The deputy commander serves as directed by the COMJTF. The deputy commander can supervise specific fictional areas-operations, logistics, and combined; can work with all or particular services; or can serve as a "fireman" for the COMJTF. During Operation Urgent Fury, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf initially served as an Army adviser to COMJTF 120. As the operation progressed, COMJTF 120 made Schwarzkopf his deputy commander to make recommendatiom on Army and Marine operations ashore. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf, then US Central Command commander in chief, used his deputy as a " fireman" to address problems within the Army component and between the services. For example, to resolve disputes on air sortie distribution between the Army corps commanders and the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the deputy chaired a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB).

The *chief of staff is* a key person, seining as both principal staff officer and adviser to the COMJTF. The chief of staff oversees the operations of the joint staff. When a corps headquarters becomes a joint task force. the corps chief of staff often serves as the joint chief of staff.

The *joint staff* is divided into divisions. The head of each staff division may become a director or an assistant chief of staff. Our sample joint staff consists of these six staff sections.

- J1, Manpower and Personnel Division.
- J2, Intelligence Division.
- J3, Operations Division.
- J4, Logistics Division.
- J5, Plans and Policy Division,
- J6, Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division or Command, Control and Communications Systems Division.

Notice that the specific duties of each staff section listed in your readings parallel what Army staff sections do. A crucial difference exists in that the joint staff must consider its responsibilities from a joint, not an Army, perspective.

The *liaison staff* becomes extremely important in both joint and combined operations. Qualified, knowledgeable liaison officers (LOs) can greatly assist the COMJTF and the JTF staff. The exchange of liaison officers with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units should occur early. In a combined effort, selecting the appropriate liaison officers to host nation and coalition forces can make or break the unity of effort. Liaison officers must focus on maintaining an effective, continuous two-way flow of information between JTF elements and with host nation and coalition units.

What are the tasks the JTF staff performs? Jot down your response below.

The JTF staff performs numerous collective staff functions. These can include—

- Planning the JTF predeployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment activities.

- Developing courses of action (COAs) and conducting staff estimates on those COAs.

- Preparing plans and orders based on the COMJTF's decisions

- Directing, controlling. and coordinating the operations of assigned and attached forces.

- Coordinating the planning activities of subordinate component commands to ensure an integrated campaign plan.

- Providing information to supporting and adjacent commands.

- Coordinating with forces and agencies not assigned or attached to the joint task force

- Coordinating with forces and foreign governments when required by the establishing directive.

- Monitoring the progress toward accomplishment of the COMJTF's desired end state.

Although many of the collective staff functions are the same as Army collective staff functions, the complexity of the tasks increases with the joint nature of the staff responsibilities and the addition of new staff members from other services. The JTF staff must have the capability to plan within the JOPES. It must understand the capabilities and limitations. organization and equipment, operational and tactical concepts, and planning considerations for each of the forces assigned or attached to the joint task force. Understanding service peculiarities and joint issues facilitates the joint effort. Effective liaison cannot be overemphasized. Remember that the focus of the JTF staff remains *the entire joint effort,* whether its members are Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, or special operations forces.

You should recall from your readings and logistics instruction that the COMJTF can create joint centers, boards. and offices to assist the JTF staff with the myriad of tasks it confronts. These joint organizations resolve conflicts. allocate scarce resources. enhance efficiency?. and set priorities among the services. particularly in the area of interservice logistics. The COMJTF could activate all, or some, of the organizations listed below. The joint staff officer responsible for each joint organization is listed in parenthesis.

- JIC—Joint Intelligence Center (J2)
- JOC—Joint Operations Center (J3)
- JTCB—Joint Targeting Coordination Board (J3)
- JRCC—Joint Rescue Coordination Center (J3)
- JMC—Joint Movement Center (J4)
- SAPO—Subarea Petroleum Office (J4)
- JCMEB—Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (J4)
- JFUB—Joint Facilities Utilization Board (J4)
- JMRO—Joint Medical Regulating Office (JTF Surgeon)
- JMBPO—Joint Military Blood Program Office (JTF Surgeon)

- JCGRO—Joint Central Graves Registration Office (J4)
- JCCC—Joint Communications Control Center (J6)

Joint logistic organizations have already been covered. However, remember that combined operations may require similar multinational logistic organizations to serve the same purposes.

Some key joint organizations not covered previously include—

- The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) that plans and coordinates intelligence activities.

- The Joint Operations Center (JOC) that plans and coordinates combat operations.

- The Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) that plans and coordinates operational fires, to include coordination of target information, targeting guidance and priorities, and preparation and refinement of the joint target list.

- The Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) that plans and coordinates joint rescue operations for downed air crews.

- The Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC) that plans and coordinates operations in the joint rear area.

Before leaving JTF staff organization and functions, you should be aware of another important aspect of the command and control equation. Several unified commands-the US Atlantic Command, the US Pacific Command, and the US Southern Command-have formed deployable joint task forces (DJTFs) from the CINC's resources.

The deployable joint task force constitutes a standing mini-JTF staff formed from the CINC'S staff. It handles small-scale (up to brigade-sized) contingencies, such as disaster relief and permissive noncombatant evacuation.

The DJTF provides a newly designated COMJTF an invaluable asset. The DJTF deploys to help the JTF staff get organized and begin planning. The DJTF brings current regional and joint expertise straight from the CINC's staff to the COMJTF. Equally important, the DJTF arrives with a joint support communications element (JSCE) to facilitate communications between the CINC, COMJTF, and other assigned or attached forces. As you can tell, a DJTF makes the challenges facing a newly designated JTF staff more manageable.

During the lesson so far, you have learned about the organization and functions of a joint task force and its staff. Perhaps you will agree that you have earned a break. Go stretch, enjoy a cup of coffee or soda, or just rest for a while. When you return, the lesson will address JTF planning responsibilities and procedures.

Joint Task Force Planning

This part of the lesson will develop the planning tasks of the joint task force and explore the supporting joint systems available. From S530, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Space,* you should recall crisis action procedures (CAP) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). This section of the lesson will determine how these affect a joint task force during joint force projection into an underdeveloped theater.

During a crisis, a corps that becomes a joint task force faces significant planning tasks. Limited time requires that the COMJTF and the joint staff immediately become part of the planning process. If no operation plan (OPLAN) exists for the contingency, then the JTF staff must develop one simultaneously with the supported commander in chief (CINC). This occurs during crisis action procedures phase IV when the CINC's crisis action planning teams develop and publish an OPLAN. From the CINC's OPLAN and its parallel planning, the joint task force must issue its supporting OPLAN to attached and assigned forces. To make this process smoother, the CINC's deployable joint task force assists the JTF staff and ensures access to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). On the basis of time available, the program followed is either the time-sensitive crisis action procedures or the more deliberate Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Most often for a joint task force, crisis action procedures apply.

From your previous instruction, what does JOPES provide the JTF staff? Make your response below.

JOPES provides the JTF headquarters a useful tool. The COMJTF must identify early how and where access to JOPES occurs. In addition, trained personnel with special equipment arrive to assist in the planning. The initial effort includes determining and updating the deployment database.

With JOPES, the COMJTF can communicate directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the CINCs, Department of Defense agencies, and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This facilitates planning and speeds the flow of information to the necessary headquarters.

With its automated database that interfaces with joint management systems, JOPES provides a powerful planning tool useful for contingency planning, course of action (COA) development, predeployment planning, deployment planning, monitoring and controlling deployment, employment planning, and redeployment planning.

JOPES assists the JTF staff in undertaking its responsibilities for planning joint operations from predeployment through redeployment. Initial planning focused on the desired end state provides the planning basis for the entire joint force. To plan well, the JTF staff must know the key players, the key actions, and the reporting procedures for each phase of planning: predeployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment.

During predeployment planning, who are the key players, what are the key actions, and what are the reporting procedures ? Make your responses below.

1. Key players.

***2.* Key actions.**

3. Reporting procedures.

During predeployment activities, the planning focus goes beyond deployment to employment and mission accomplishment. The confused situation in theater, along with changing political and military objectives, makes communications between the joint task force and the other commands critical.

Key Players

The key players during predeployment activities are the joint task force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supported CINC, the services of assigned and attached units, and the supporting CINCs, which include USTRANSCOM with its deployment action team (DAT) that deploys to the joint task force.

Key Actions

Many activities occur during this stage. Although deployment is the immediate task, the purpose of the deployment is to accomplish a specific mission quickly and effectively. This requires planning beyond deployment from the beginning. Some of the key actions include—

- Determining the force list and available transportation assets. This information comes from a combination of sources. Information to refine the force list could come from the CINC, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or from any of the services. Transportation asset data comes from USTRANSCOM.

- Building and refining the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) with the deployment action team provides the joint task force current data on asset availability, as well as data on ports and airfields in theater.

- Identifying, correcting, or reducing shortfalls, constraints, and limitations. This never-ending task continues throughout the mission. However, the better it is accomplished in the beginning, the more accurate the data on which to base plans for deployment, employment, and redeployment.

- Using the USTRANSCOM deployment action team as a clearing house for all deployment support, the DAT assists the joint task force by ensuring an accurate database and by testing the transportation feasibility of different courses of action (COAs). The DAT enters movement requirement for the joint task force into JOPES.

Reporting Procedures

Remaining current in this chaotic environment is important to each of the key players. The JTF staff can request and receive information through both the Joint Reporting System (JRS) and JOPES.

Remember, the JTF staff must consider all issues from a joint, not an Army, perspective. Some forces may already be in theater or be deployed forward, which requires deployment from outside the continental United States to theater. Planning and coordinating these forces separated in time and space constitute a challenge even if the communications work flawlessly. Miscommunication is more likely from inadequate joint and service-specific information than from failure of the communications system. Knowledgeable liaison officers with positive, team-focused attitudes help ensure an effective effort.

Now that predeployment planning has been considered, what about deployment planning? Who are the key players, what are the key actions, and what are the reporting procedures? Make your responses below.

1. Key players.

2. Key actions.

3. Reporting procedures.

During deployment, the planning focus becomes the force movement to theater from numerous locations. The joint task force will use varied modes of transportation. However, the focus must include entry and initial combat operations to secure a lodgrnent for follow-on forces.

Key Players

The key players during deployment are the joint task force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supported and supporting CINCs, USTRANSCOM and its deployment action team (DAT), and the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). During this phase, things will go wrong.

Key Actions

Many activities occur during deployment. Deployment becomes the immediate task but with a constant focus on eventual operations in theater. Key actions include—

- Beginning deployment on receipt of the Joint Chiefs of Staff execute order. Planning for deployment and employment continue, but the deployment flow requires constant monitoring.

- Determining the manner of deployment—phased incrementally or mass movement. Often, availability of lift assets determines the manner of deployment.

- Dispatching deployment instructions to the Joint Planning and Execution Community. Deployment by different transportation modes from locations within CONUS and from overseas. The entire JPEC requires information to support the JTF deployment plan.

● Coordinating airlift and sealift After activation of JPEC, the joint task force coordinates the flow and monitors problems that arise to ensure prompt and effective action.

● Determining the concept of support for logistics, communications, intelligence, and security.

● Designating the initial command and control location and commander. During the flow, the joint task force may exercise control or the CINC may until the joint task force establishes itself in theater.

Reporting Procedures

Monitoring the flow of various transportation modes to theater requires reliable communications and accurate, timely information. As with predeployment planning, JRS and JOPES support the deployment-both planning and execution monitoring. The better the joint staff officer understands the players, procedures, and communications available through JOPES, the better the chances to monitor closely and effectively the flow into theater. Initially, however, the Department of State's embassy in the host nation may serve as the communications link with the joint task force until better communications exist in theater.

Once the joint task force arrives in theater, the focus turns to employment. Who are the key pla.yers, what are the key actions, and what are the reporting procedures ? Make your responses below.

1. Key players.

2. Key actions.

***3.* Reporting procedures.**

Once in theater, employment planning for successful combat operations and the war termination transition to postconflict activities become the JTF focus. Friendly capabilities, enemy actions, and the political situation will frame when and how operations unfold.

Key Players

The key players during employment focus within the joint task force and with its coalition partners, These include the joint task force, its supported CINC, the JTF component commanders, and any supporting commanders.

Key Actions

During employment, actions focus on reaching the operational end state that accomplishes the strategic mission. Some key actions include—

● Developing current and future plans.

- Monitoring friendly forces and their resources.

- Implementing operation orders by executing as directed; by monitoring air, sea, and land operations; by reviewing and updating the enemy threat; and by providing continuous logistic support.

Reporting Procedures

Reporting procedures vary somewhat. During operations, the JTF staff maintains contact with its supported CINC and with agencies such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency when directed. The JRS serves as the primary means of communication.

Upon completion of employment, the focus shifts again. During redeployment, who are the key players, what are the key actions, and what are the reporting procedures?

1. Key players.

2. Key actions.

***3.* Reporting procedures.**

During redeployment, the planning focus shifts to moving forces to predeployment locations or to locations to meet other contingencies. Security of forces in theater to support postconflict operations remains a critical consideration for the JTF staff.

Key Players

The key players during redeployment reflect those that were important for deployment. These include the joint task force, the CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USTRANSCOM with its deployment action team (DAT), the Joint Deployment Community (JDC), and the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

Key Actions

Actions similar to deployment occur in reverse. Although redeployment remains the immediate task, the security of forces left in theater is an important consideration. Key actions during redeployment include—

- Working closely with a DAT from USTRANSCOM. If the force succeeded quickly in accomplishing its mission, the DAT and deployment lessons learned should make redeployment smoother than the deployment.

- Reversing the planning considerations for deployment.

- Deciding the withdrawal method: phased, incremental. or modular. The postconflict situation plays a major role in determining the withdrawal sequence and method.

- Dispatching movement instructions to the JPEC. Just as with deployment, once the JTF staff makes the plan, frequent and accurate information exchange makes the operation flow better.

- Coordinating airlift and sealift. Assets will drive redeployment. In contrast, limited time and assets drove deployment.

- Ensuring the security of forces. The theater threat assessment plays an important role in this decision. Host nation forces may assume this responsibility.

Reporting Procedures

Accurate, timely reporting of unit status becomes important to the joint task force. Reporting procedures include reports from subordinate units on movement status and closures and updates to the supported CINC. Both JRS and JOPES serve as the means for these reports. Monitoring attached or assigned units remains a requirement until the dissolution of the joint task force.

This concludes this portion of the lesson. You should now understand what a joint task force is. why it is created, how it is formed, and what planning and operational responsibilities it has. Remember that a corps can become a joint task force during a contingency. Often, this means some sort of force projection.

It's time for a long break. Take some time off. When you return, you'll look at amphibious operations, a useful tool for a joint t ask force.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Forward-deployed military forces often are the first to respond to a regional crisis. Since the earth's surface is largely water, few countries can escape the reach of forces deployed at sea. The US Marine Corps (USMC), with its training, equipment, organization, and doctrine, handles many crisis situations by employing amphibious operations, The Marines were the first forces to reach Lebanon in 1957 and Vietnam in 1965. They also brought significant ground forces, along with an amphibious capability, to Korea in the early 1950s, to Vietnam from 1965 to 1972, and to the Persian Gulf in 1992.

Any joint task force commander near saltwater can anticipate having Marine forces assigned or attached to his command. The Marines bring an amphibious operations proficiency to the theater. Therefore, JTF staff members should understand amphibious operations and how the Marines prefer to organize for combat. Former Marine Corps commandant, General Al Gray, reminded us of the power of such a tool when he stated, "The ability to project power from beyond the horizon, by-passing first-line enemy defenses to insert forces deep into inland objectives, is an operational maneuver needed to meet our nation's crisis response requirements well into the 21st century. "

It is sometimes forgotten that, throughout its history, the US Army has conducted more amphibious operations than the Marine Corps. However, the Marines are clearly the experts and leaders in amphibious

operations, The National Command Authority (NCA) has tasked the Marines to develop the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment for amphibious operations and has assigned the Army the collateral task to conduct amphibious operations. Given this collateral tasking and the Marines frequent participation in JTF operations, the JTF staff must know the fundamentals of amphibious operations and the Marines' capabilities in conducting them.

Read Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From AFSC Pub 2, Service *Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces.* This extract covers Marine Corps operations. As you read, pay particular attention to Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and to amphibious operations fundamentals.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

From your readings, you should have a good understanding of a Marine air-ground task force. A MAGTF embodies the Marine approach to amphibious operations. Tailored to accomplish specific, assigned missions, the MAGTF's design exploits the combat power inherent in closely integrated air and ground operations. Each task-organized MAGTF consists of ground, air, and service support units.

What are some of the operational characteristics of a MAGTF? Write your response here.

MAGTFs provide the tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities that other military forces do not possess. These include—

● ● *Expeditionary force readiness.* Every day, MAGTFs make up a portion of the forward-deployed naval force throughout the world. On short notice, additional forces can reinforce or restructure the MAGTF to meet evolving threats in the region.

● *Strategic mobility.* MAGTFs can move across most of the earth's surface without concern for ports or overflight rights. As a dangerous situation develops, a MAGTF can move into the crisis area. It can intervene, if necessary, or it can do nothing Early in the humanitarian assistance efforts to Somalia, a task-organized MAGTF pre-positioned itself off the coast and was ready to perform any assigned missions.

● *Opposed entry capability.* MAGTFs possess the capacity to conduct both opposed and unopposed entry by going over the beach, over the horizon, or a combination of both.

● *Environmental versatility.* MAGTFs can operate in any region, year-round. Because of the diversity of regions bordering the oceans, Marine units must be ready to operate in temperate, desert, jungle, or arctic environments.

● *Independent action capability.* A naval task force with a MAGTF can operate for extended periods of time without reinforcement, particularly from air and ground forces. A MAGTF reacts quickly to the local situation by inserting or evacuating forces as the circumstances require.

● *Sea-air-land coordination.* Composed of air and ground units in a naval task force, the MAGTF coordinates air, sea, and land operations or any combination of the three, to accomplish the assigned task. MAGTFs can react without joint or combined forces.

● *Logistic self-sustainability.* Logistic self-sustainability from the sea characterizes each MAGTF. The size of the MAGTF dictates the logistic support that is needed. MAGTFs can react without establishing a sustainment base.

● *Flexibility.* MAGTFs can deploy in response to crisis situations. Once in the region, the task-organized MAGTF can deal with a range of potential situations as the circumstances dictate.

● *Tactical surprise capacity.* MAGTFs can create tactical and operational surprise by quickly entering a theater to meet a crisis in an unexpected manner, time, or location.

● *Naval, joint, and combined compatibility.* MAGTFs routinely operate with naval forces. They constantly consider air. sea, and land factors and often conduct exercises with other US and combined forces. Its day-to-day operations, training exercises, and forward deployment make the MAGTF a uniquely capable force.

Now that you know the characteristics of a MAGTF, consider how a MAGTF is organized What are its primary components ? How does it vary in size? Write your response here.

Each task-organized Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) has four components: a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element. The actual composition of each depends on the size of the force. Each MAGTF forms a part of a naval amphibious task force. Either a Marine ground or aviation officer can command a MAGTF.

From your readings, you know that a MAGTF varies both in size and capability.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

A MEU forms part of a naval amphibious ready group (ARG). A Marine colonel commands the MEU, which is routinely forward deployed. The MEU consists of a battalion landing team (BLT), a composite helicopter squadron, and a service support group.

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Fwd)

A MEF (Fwd) forms part of a naval amphibious task group (ATG). A Marine brigadier general commands the MEB, which is rapidly deployable. The MEF consists of a regimental landing team (RLT), a composite aviation group, and a service support group.

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

A MEF forms part of a naval amphibious task force (ATF). A Marine lieutenant general commands the MEF, the largest and most powerful MAGTF. The MEF consists of at least one division, an air wing, and a force service support group.

From your readings, you know the combat power and force composition—personnel and equipment—of each MAGTF. A MAGTF's size determines its suitability for different missions. Complete the following matrix to demonstrate your understanding of which MAGTFs best meet which missions. Under each MAGTF type, write "yes" if it can perform the task and "no" if it cannot.

MISSION	MEU	MEF (Fwd)	MEF
Conduct sustained combat operations against a significant enemy force.			
Conduct an amphibious assault.			
Conduct air defense.			
Establish an air control element (ACE) ashore.			
Conduct raids.			
Secure a port or airfield.			
Establish beachhead for follow-on forces.			
Provide humanitarian assistance.			
Conduct a military or civilian evacuation.			
Sustain operations logistically.			

Your completed matrix should look like this one.

MISSION	MEU	MEF (Fwd)	MEF
Conduct sustained combat operations against a significant enemy force.	NO	YES*	YES
Conduct an amphibious assault.	YES*	YES	YES
Conduct air defense.	NO	YES	YES
Establish an air control element (ACE) ashore.	NO	YES	YES
Conduct raids.	YES	YES	YES
Secure a port or airfield.	YES*	YES	YES
Establish beachhead for follow-on forces.	YES	YES	YES
Provide humanitarian assistance.	YES	YES	YES
Conduct a military or civilian evacuation.	YES	YES	YES
Sustain operations logistically.	YES* (15 days)	YES* (30 days)	YES* (60 days)

*Limited capability

A specialized MAGTF is the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU (SOC)). What is a MEU (SOC) ? How does it differ from a MEU? Write your thoughts here.

A MEU (SOC) is a specially trained unit tailored for specific missions. It trains closely with Navy special operations forces. The variety of missions includes—

- Conducting amphibious raids.
- Evacuating noncombatants.
- Providing reinforcement.
- Conducting limited objective attacks.
- Providing a show of force.
- Boarding ships and oil platforms.
- Conducting raids.
- Providing security for installations.
- Performing civic action.

- Conducting tactical deception.
- Providing fire support control.
- Performing counterintelligence.
- Providing initial terminal guidance.
- Conducting electronic warfare.
- Providing mobile training teams.
- Recovering aircraft, equipment, and personnel
- Operating in urban terrain.
- Rescuing hostages in extreme circumstances.

Although a MEU (SOC) conducts special operations, it is an integral part of the fleet and does not belong to the special operations force community. It is a Navy and Marine asset, *not* a US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) asset.

Now that you understand the MAGTF's capabilities and how the Marines organize them, it's time to look briefly at amphibious operations. Remember that this can be an extremely valuable tool for the joint task force.

Amphibious Operations

You need to begin with a definition of amphibious operations: "an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships involving landing on a hostile shore. " The Marines develop the doctrine. training, techniques, and equipment to conduct amphibious operations. Remember, the Army has a collateral task to conduct them also. Thus, an amphibious operation landing force can include Marines, soldiers, or both. During World War II, the Army conducted more amphibious operations than the Marines. Since then, however, the Marines dominate in conducting these operations. Unlike in World War 11 and Korea, today the Marines conduct amphibious operations using both helicopter and various amphibious landing vehicles.

Before an amphibious operation is conducted. three preconditions are sought:

- Superiority over enemy forces in the objective area.
- Local air superiority.
- Local naval superiority, both surface and subsurface.

Naturally, few military operations occur under ideal conditions. The fog and friction of combat operations do not always permit the preconditions to exist. When absolutely necessary, an amphibious operation can occur when a "reasonable total superiority of forces" exists.

A .ITF staff officer should know the types of amphibious operations. What are they ? Write a response here.

1.

2.

3.

4.

The four types of amphibious operations are assault, withdrawal, demonstration, and raid. Each of these provides a JTF commander with useful operational tools to influence the campaign plan.

Amphibious Assaults

These complex operations are attacks from the sea to secure a beachhead that captures a key facility or allows for the buildup of follow-on forces. During World War II, the Marines conducted numerous amphibious assaults in the Pacific-Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa to name a few. The Army conducted assaults in both the Pacific and Europe. The assaults at Sicily, Salerno, and Normandy were both joint and combined operations.

Amphibious Withdrawals

These operations are extremely dangerous, particularly when in contact with enemy forces. In World War H, Dunkirk provided an example of how dangerous these operations can be. The withdrawals at Gallipoli in 1915 and at Wonsan and Hungnam in Korea in 1950 provide excellent examples of carefully planned, well-executed operations.

Amphibious Demonstrations

These feints are designed to deceive the enemy by tying down forces that could affect the battle elsewhere. During World War 11 in the Pacific, and more recently during Desert Storm, Marine forces afloat diverted the attention of enemy commanders and caused them to deploy their forces against a potential, but not actual, threat. Assaults from the sea, along with the threats of such assaults, provide excellent operational tools for a JTF commander.

Amphibious Raids

These short, violent attacks from the sea are used to destroy key installations or to divert enemy attention. During World War II, amphibious raids occurred frequently. Raids, even when undertaken with careful planning and conducted under the best of conditions, always contain a high risk.

Your readings provide general information on amphibious operations. As a potential joint task force staff officer, you do not need to be an amphibious warfare expert, but you do need to understand how to use this capability. You must understand fundamental planning considerations and the command relationships before, during, and after an amphibious operation.

Amphibious and Reinforcement Operations

Marines can either conduct amphibious operations or reinforce forces ashore.

Amphibious Operations

The initiating authority, either a CINC or a JTF commander, directs the naval component commander to conduct an amphibious operation. The initiating authority assigns the naval component commander an amphibious objective area (AOA) that includes the air, sea, and land areas necessary to accomplish the mission ashore, usually the seizure of a port or airfield.

The Navy commander, amphibious task force (CATF), assigned the mission controls the air, sea, and land areas within the AOA, which includes control of all forces—air, sea, land, and special operations—within the AOA. The naval term for this is "authority therein. " The CATF is the supreme authority in the AOA. The AOA is established when the amphibious task force (ATF) or its advance forces arrive in the AOA. No one operates in the AOA without CATF approval. Remember, the initiating authority established the AOA and may have designated specific objectives, but the actual planning of the operation remains in the hands of the Navy and Marine commanders assigned the mission. *In other words, the units that conduct the operation plan the operation.*

Planning occurs within the naval amphibious task force. During planning, the CATF, the senior naval officer, and the commander, landing force (CLF), which is the senior Marine officer, confer as equals. Once the operation is planned, the CATF commands and controls its execution. The CLF serves as the CATF's subordinate commander of the landing forces. Command ashore passes from the CATF to the CLF when three preconditions exist: first, when the beachhead is secure; second, when the buildup of forces ashore is adequate to accomplish the mission; and, third, when the CLF is ready to assume command ashore. With the termination of the amphibious operation, the AOA ceases to exist.

Reinforcement Operations

Once ashore, Marine units can have several command and control relationships. The CLF may report to the Navy or Marine component commander while conducting operations within an assigned area of operations. If reinforcing the land campaign, the Marine force may serve as a subordinate to the joint task force or to an Army unit. For example, once ashore, a Marine expeditionary force (fwd) could seine as an independent joint task force unit. You might understand this better if you look at how it could be under the operational control (OPCON) of an Army division or corps.

The Marines were employed in Korea and Vietnam. During the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division demonstrated the flexible use of Marine forces. Initially, the 1st Marine Division, serving in the Army X Corps, made the dramatic amphibious "end run" at Inchon. It then moved inland with X Corps to liberate Seoul. After the fall of Seoul, it loaded on ships and landed on the east coast of Korea, leading to the heroic fight at the Chosin Reservoir and the subsequent withdrawal of X Corps from Wonsan and Hungnam. The 1st Marine Division joined the Eighth Army for the remainder of the war. Reinforcement of a ground campaign can be costly. During World War II at Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and Okinawa, the 1st Marine Division lost almost 20,500 personnel. During almost 36 months in Korea, its losses exceeded 27,000 personnel. In Vietnam, an initial Marine landing to secure airfields and port facilities evolved into a two-division Marine expeditionary force (MEF) with its own area of operations. The senior Marine commander reported to the Army commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. These examples show the use of Marine forces in our recent past.

This finishes the instruction on amphibious operations. You should now understand the organization, size, and capabilities of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and how to plan and conduct amphibious operations. As mentioned earlier, the use or threat of an amphibious assault constitutes an important tool for the joint task force commander.

Break time! Before you begin to investigate contingency air operations, take some time to relax, get a soda, or just call it a day.

CONTINGENCY AIR OPERATIONS

As demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm, airpower is a critical component for conducting successful military campaigns, particularly when rapid decisions and minimal casualties are necessary. Force projection into an underdeveloped theater creates special challenges for the deployment and employment of land-based airpower. An inadequate infrastructure, the lack of common procedures, and an evolving joint doctrine combine to hinder the optimal use of airpower. As a potential JTF staff officer, you must understand the capabilities and limitations of airpower. The JTF staff should understand ground operations like soldiers, air operations like aviators, sea operations like sailors, amphibious operations like Marines, and special operations like special operations forces. This portion of the lesson will focus on the conduct of contingency air operations and the critical role of the joint force air component command (JFACC).

Scan S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations,* Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Air Operations in NATO, for a general review of how air operations are organized in a theater. Read Appendix 5 to this lesson guide, extract from *Parameters.* This article describes joint force air component command issues.

Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC)

The joint task force commander will establish a joint force air component command (JFACC) to orchestrate the use of airpower to support the joint task force. The JFACC's basic mission is to support the joint task force commander. Whether in support of a forward-deployed force or of a contingency operation, the JFACC goes about this by—

- *Gaining and maintaining air superiority.* Establishing and maintaining some degree of air superiority remains the initial goal of any air commander. This denies the enemy the use of the airspace and permits the uninterrupted use of airspace by friendly forces.

- *Integrating air interdiction to support campaign objectives.* The JFACC develops its own air campaign plan that integrates aerial interdiction throughout the depth of the theater to support the operational goals desired by the joint task force commander.

- *Conducting close air support (CAS).* During ground combat operations. the JFACC provides close air support.

- *Conducting airlift operations.* The JFACC orchestrates all air operations in the theater, not just combat operations. With the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the US Air Force Air Mobility Command, the JFACC conducts both intertheater and intratheater airlift operations. The airlift of personnel, equipment, and supplies intratheater becomes crucially important to the joint task force commander in an underdeveloped theater.

● *Directing air search and rescue operations.* Because aircraft losses will occur, the JFACC orchestrates air search-and-rescue operations in theater.

None of these capabilities springs forth overnight. Effective deployment and employment of airpower require time, careful planning, close supervision, and a common focus on joint task force objectives. Although the services sometimes share common terms, the meanings, along with approaches to problem solving, are not always the same.

Of course, joint doctrine provides a means to bring each of the services together. As your readings make clear, it does not eliminate the need for a close understanding of each service's unique capabilities and limitations and of service-specific approaches to its tasks. Let's take operational art as an example.

From FM 100-5,* Operations*, what three questions need answers at the operational level of war? List them here.

1.

2.

3.

If a joint task force commander is the operational commander, he must answer these questions:

1. What military conditions will achieve the strategic objectives in the theater of war or the theater of operations'?

2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions?

3. How should the commander apply military resources within established limitations to accomplish that sequence of events?

The US Air Force addresses operational art from a slightly different perspective. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 states these four tasks accomplished at the operational level:

1. *Understand the theater and the joint force commander's (JFC's} vision.* Basically, this means understanding the operational environment.

2. *Create conditions for joint force success.* This means using airpower to produce the desired end state of the campaign plan.

3. *Adjust operations for revised intent and mission results.* This recognizes that things change. Friendly action, enemy reaction, fog, and friction will cause modifications in the pursuit of operational end states.

4. *Exploit theater opportunities.* The adjustments above permit the aerial exploitation of unexpected opportunities throughout the theater.

To accomplish these operational tasks, the Air Force has developed the following five principles for conducting theater air operations:

1. *Establish and maintain air superiority.* As expected, the first requirement remains to establish air superiority.

2. *Commit airpower early.* To establish air superiority to permit the uninterrupted flow of forces into the theater, airpower must arrive early and in strength. Enemy capabilities, the distance from current bases, and the theater airfield infrastructure will affect how this happens.

3. *Enhance aircraft survivability.* The cost and difficulty of replacing high-technology aircraft make it important to do everything possible to ensure aircraft survivability. The measures taken to do this include establishing air superiority; destroying enemy antiaircraft capabilities; creating low-risk, high-payoff techniques and procedures, and establishing maintenance and repair facilities.

4. *Leverage advanced munitions.* The use of "smart bombs" may permit the destruction of critical enemy targets with minimal collateral damage and minimal aircraft losses.

5. *Leverage modern surveillance, command and control, and intelligence assets.* Airpower has little value without adequate command and control. With our sophisticated airborne surveillance, command and control, and intelligence-gathering assets, air assets can provide the joint force commander much more than just air combat forces.

Now that you know some key Air Force operational concepts, what are some JFACC initial operational planning considerations ? Write your response here.

JFACC operational planning considerations would include—

- Establishing and maintaining air and maritime superiority.

  — What is the status of both?
  — How can we dominate both?

- Controlling space.

  — What is the status?
  — How can we dominate?

- Knowing and exploiting symmetries and asymmetries by putting strength on enemy weakness.

  — What are our symmetries with enemy forces—similar strengths and weaknesses?
  — What are our asymmetries with enemy forces-dissimilar strengths and weaknesses?
  — How can we exploit enemy weaknesses?
  — How can we avoid or destroy enemy strengths?

- Identifying centers of gravity at each level of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic) and attacking enemy centers of gravity while protecting ours.

  — What are the enemy's centers of gravity?
  — What are our centers of gravity?
  — How can we best attack the enemy's centers of gravity?
  — How can we best protect our centers of gravity?

After developing responses to these questions, the JFACC staff could begin a more detailed assessment for the deployment and employment of airpower.

What should the JFACC staff consider as it plans for deployment and employment of airpower? Space is provided for your response.

An initial assessment for the deployment and employment of airpower, particularly in an underdeveloped theater, might include—

- *Mission.* What are we to accomplish? What is the joint task force commander's concept of deployment and employment?

- *Enemy air capabilities.* What are the enemy air capabilities? Antiaircraft capabilities? What threat does tins pose to deployment? To employment?

- *Friendly air capabilities.*

  — What friendly air capabilities make possible a quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties? How can we best work with friendly air capabilities in theater?

  — What are the logistic and transportation infrastructure requirements? What do we need for deployment? For employment? How do we augment and improve current facilities?

  — What are the airfield capabilities? Are they suitable?

An incomplete or inadequate analysis of any of these areas can endanger operations, as it has in past operations.

During the Korean War, the initial high-priority airlift from Japan of two infantry battalions and a headquarters element of the 24th Infantry Division to Pusan and Pohang did not occur smoothly. Poor weather at visual flight rules (VFR) airfields and the breakup of runway surfaces from landing heavy transports slowed the airflow. However, by pushing weather limits and by substituting smaller, less-capable transports, the move finished almost 2 weeks late.

Recently, similar problems occurred in Somalia. The outlying airfields from Mogadishu appeared capable of handling C-141 transport aircraft. This proved inaccurate. Runway surfaces deteriorated, causing a delay in the delivery of humanitarian relief and military forces. Transloading of men, equipment, and supplies to C-130 transports became necessary.

Completing an accurate, detailed analysis of the infrastructure in an underdeveloped theater is a crucial, yet time-consuming, task. Often, inadequate time is available. This increases the chances for problems developing from inadequate and incorrect planning during deployment and early employment.

During a crisis, confusion and chaos tend to reign, making the exchange of accurate information difficult. As a member of a corps staff designated a joint task force, what Air Force liaison already exists on a day-to-day basis? Write your remarks here.

Liaison and coordination become special concerns during a crisis. Knowing the existing Air Force contacts facilitates planning. Already with the corps is an air support operations center (ASOC) with its associated air liaison officers. These include air liaison officers (ALOs), theater air liaison officers (TALOs), and tactical air control parties (TACPs). The three Active and two National Guard ASOCs will provide personnel as necessary.

In addition to Air Force personnel with the corps, Army personnel serve as liaison officers with Air Force units. The Army-staffed battlefield coordination element (BCE) forms a part of the air operations center (AOC). Many Air Force units have ground liaison officers (GLOs) assigned.

The JTF staff must consider many air-related issues early in the planning process. What are some issues the staff should consider? Write your answer in this space.

The mission and composition of the joint task force will determine which of the following actions to take—

- The JTF commander will appoint a joint force air component commander (JFACC) responsible for the task force air operations. During Desert Storm, Lieutenant General Chuck Homer, the senior Air Force commander, became the JFACC. Although an Air Force commander may serve as the JFACC during large-scale land operations, a Navy or Marine aviation commander could be selected to serve as the JFACC. It

depends on the mission and the desires of the joint force commander. The JFACC is normally appointed from the service with the greatest air assets. An Army aviator, with only rotary-wing experience, would not be an appropriate selection to orchestrate airpower for the joint force commander.

● Space assets can assist the joint task force tremendously. However, they do not become available automatically; they require an approved request. Space assets can provide photograph, weather, intelligence, mapping, and other coverages. Remember, as was mentioned earlier, space assets require time for repositioning. Also, they may be dedicated to higher priority national missions.

● Coordination with Navy and Marine aviation units assigned or attached to the joint task force maximizes the joint effort and minimizes redundant resources. If available in theater, air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) teams can ensure the proper use of these assets.

● Coordination of air defense and airspace requires the appointment of commanders responsible for area air defense in theater and for airspace coordination. These functions work best when closely coordinated with the JFACC.

Contingency Air Operations

As a member of a joint staff, what are some of the primary concerns of the US Air Force during its initial deployment to an underdeveloped theater? Write your response here.

The JTF staff must pay attention to the way it phases air assets into the theater, just as it does for ground elements. The actual sequencing, will depend on the situation. During World War H, Major General Kenney, who supported General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, developed a four-phased approach. First, he secured local air superiority over the area of operations. Then, he transported airfield engineers and security forces to nearby airfields. Those forces expanded the airfields to receive the follow-on forces. Finally, the follow-on forces moved into the area of operations to conduct combat operations.

Any Air Force deployment must address the need for command and control, base development, airfield security, and initial air combat forces. The actual composition and sequencing depends on the specific mission and the actual situation in the theater of operations. *No* single solution fits every situation.

Command and Control

Without effective command and control, the world's best air assets are of little value. Consequently, a high priority is placed on the early deployment of a US Air Force command and control element. The best command and control arrangement for coordinating with host nation forces and for monitoring the deployment of forces and the initial combat operations may not be evident at the beginning. An air operations center (AOC) with its subordinate air support operations center (ASOC) assigned to the corps designated a joint task force would deploy quickly. The air operations center would need augmentation by an air movement element (AME) to monitor the airflow into the theater, a theater airlift control element (TALCE)

for aerial movement within the theater, and a deployed tanker airlift coordination center (DTACC). Air Force surveillance assets, to include airborne elements of the theater air control system (AETACS), deploy early.

Base Development

Requirements for base development and for the improvement of existing facilities need to be determined early. The TRANSCOM situation transportation analysis review system (TSTARS) can provide information to help in anticipating base development requirements. The closure of all forces into the theater-ground, sea, air, and special operations-needs close coordination to ensure that combat forces have an adequate sustainment base with supplies and support facilities. This is a complex task, particularly when deploying to a crisis in an underdeveloped theater. Army engineers, along with host nation support, may need to assist the Air Force by improving aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). However, the Air Force has units designated to facilitate rapid deployment. These include the following packages:

- *Harvest Falcon:* Equipment to support bare-base operations. It includes just what is necessary to run an airbase.

- Harvest *Eagle:* Equipment for longer term, sustained base operations.

- *Rapid engineer deployable, heavy operations repair squadron--engineers (RED HORSE):* Unit to perform heavy and light engineering operations like expanding ramp space and repairing base defenses. Three Active squadrons of over 400 personnel each exist. Specialized units, such as water treatment and well digging, require activation from the Reserve Component. RED HORSE units have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capability.

- *Prime base emergency engineering force (Prime BEEF):* Unit to establish and maintain airbase tent facilities during contingencies. Simply, this unit keeps the lights on and the water running.

- *Prime readiness in base services (Prime RIBS):* Unit used to provide billeting, messing, laundry, and bath services for the airbase to sustain operations overtime.

Airfield Security

Host nation or US forces must secure the airfields and ports to ensure the uninterrupted flow of forces into the theater. Security forces could come from host nation military or police forces, US combat forces on the ground, special operations forces, or language-trained military police teams. Whatever the source, the task remains crucial during entry operations and during the buildup of forces.

Initial Air Combat Forces

With command and control established and the airfields secured, the initial deployment of air assets can occur. During the buildup, the primary air missions have two components, defensive counterair (DCA) and limited offensive counterair (OCA). DCA includes a package of F-15C, F-16, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and tanker aircraft. Limited OCA includes a package of F-15E, F/A-l8, F-16, and A-10 aircraft. In addition, Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) AC-130 and theater airlift C-130 aircraft may arrive early. A combination of fighters, fighter-bombers, command and control, and tanker aircraft makes the best mix. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) determines the specific package needed, depending on the situation in theater.

How does the JFACC support joint task force entry and deployment operations? Jot down your response here.

As the joint task force consolidates after entry and during deployment operations, the Air Force provides defense against enemy air attacks and surveillance for the JTF commander. All elements of the task force, including the Air Force, continue to deploy; improve the logistic infrastructure; build up units, supplies, and equipment for combat operations; and conduct joint and combined training. As the JTF commander prepares to execute the campaign plan, he focuses on creating a joint and combined team effort. As units flow into the theater, the tactical air control system (TACS) and the Army air-ground system (AAGS) take form and prepare for ground combat operations.

The US response to the 1972 North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam demonstrated the importance of having the right Air Force organization in place at the right time. The United States responded quickly and globally with airpower but with limited success. Why did this happen? At the time of the invasion, almost all US air controllers within the understaffed TACS had left South Vietnam. Airpower arrived quicker than an effective command and control system did. It took almost 2 weeks of emergency worldwide temporary duty (TDY) assignments to collect an adequate number of qualified TACS controllers to provide the command and control needed to develop a successful, cohesive air effort.

Phasing the arrival of aerial command and control assets continues. After the air operations center deploys, it depends on AWACS for its airborne command and control center (ABCCC) and communications links. A control and reporting center (CRC) then needs to be established. The situation in theater determines the arrival of air assets. Initially, air assets must conduct defensive counterair. Within the established rules of engagement (ROES) and the capabilities in theater, offensive counterair, strategic reconnaissance (S R), air interdiction (AI), and close air support (CAS) begin in support of the JTF campaign plan.

How does the JFACC provide air support during combat operations? Write your response in this space.

During combat operations, the JFACC executes its air campaign plan in support of JTF operations. The procedure for apportionment, allocation, and distribution of air assets remains unchanged from what you read in S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations.* The JTF commander's apportionment guidance provides the JFACC information for allocating specific assets to close air support, air interdiction, and strategic attack (SA) missions. After the JFACC allocates air sorties, the joint force land component command (JFLCC), in some cases the joint task force, distributes sorties to its subordinates. During Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf provided the apportionment guidance as CINC and distributed the assets to ground units as the joint force land component commander. After distribution, both the tactical air control systems and the Army air-ground systems ensure the final coordination and best employment of close air support for ground forces in contact.

From your earlier reading, you learned how the JFACC ran the air campaign during Desert Storm. Joint doctrine continues to evolve. Yet, when push comes to shove, the joint force commander (JFC) determines how the force is organized and how it conducts operations. How to integrate the effort of the forces remains the ultimate challenge for the joint force commander. Joint Pub 3-03.1, *Joint Interdiction of Follow-on Forces*, offers a solution. The joint force commander may assign geographic areas of prime responsibility (GAPR). Within each area, the joint force commander establishes authority for controlling the surface, air, and targeting.

GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

AUTHORITY	SURFACE CONTROL AUTHORITY	AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY[1]	TARGET CONTROL
Area of Operations (Land)	JFLCC	JFACC[2]	JFACC[3]
Area of Operations (Air)	JFACC	JFACC	JFACC
Area of Operations (Maritime)	JFMCC	JFMCC	JFMCC
Amphibious Objective Area[4]	CATF	CATF	CATF
Joint Special Operations Area	JFSOC	JFSOC[5]	JFSOC
Joint Rear Area (JRA)	JRAC	JRAC	JRAC[6]

[1]Normally, the airspace control authority is also the air defense commander.
[2]The JFLCC may control the airspace below 500 feet above ground level (AGL).
[3]The JFLCC may have target control authority behind the corps fire support coordination line (FSCL).
[4]Amphibious objective areas (AOAs) may be establised separately from the area of operations (maritime) and may remain separate until the landing force is established ashore; the AOA then maybe disestablished and placed under a component commander.
[5]The JFACC may exercise airspace control authority for this area.
[6]The JRAC is responsible for coordination of tires in the JRA.

JFLCC—joint force land component command
JFACC—joint force air component command
JFMCC-joint force maritime (naval) component command
CATF—commander. amphibious task force
JSOA-joint special operations area
JRAC—joint rear area command

You should now have an understanding of the JFACC and its role in integrating aerial fires throughout the theater of operations. This chart summarizes information on who controls the air, ground, and sea space in each area. A potential JTF staff officer must know the joint issues in the JFACC organization and the procedures that were employed during Desert Storm. Although a resounding success, Desert Storm did not require the joint force air component commander to make difficult decisions on using scarce air assets. The advantages we had during Desert Storm may not occur in a future force-projection operation. Thus, an understanding of the JFACC and contingency air operations will provide you the necessary information from which to make informed staff recommendations.

It is time to take a break Grab a cup of coffee or soft drink. When you `return,` you will look at light forces.

LIGHT FORCES

In 1983, Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham created the first light infantry divisions. Wickham emphasized rapid deployment of a force designed to fit into a minimum of aircraft sorties. Both the 82d Airborne Division and the 10lst Airborne Division (Air Assault) suffered reductions in personnel and equipment to enhance force projection. Light forces—light infantry, airborne, and air assault—provide crucial force-projection capabilities. They remain trained and ready to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. As such, a joint task force staff officer must know the capabilities and limitations of each, as well as the planning considerations for their employment. An understanding of their unique capabilities can lead to success; a failure to master their limitations can mean disaster. The fate of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem provides us an example from World War II of what can happen to an improperly supported light force.

Scan FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, pages 1-4 to 1-9, and read Appendix 6, to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Planning Considerations for Airborne and Air Assault Operations. This introduces you to the capabilities and limitations of each light force and to special planning considerations, particularly for airborne and air assault operations.

Light Infantry Divisions

From your readings, what are the capabilities of a light infantry division? Write your answer here.

Some major capabilities of a light infantry unit are its ability to—

- Deploy rapidly to a secure location.
- Defeat light forces or seize terrain.
- Operate for 48 hours without external combat service support.
- Conduct operations in restrictive terrain.
- Conduct military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).
- Conduct rear area security operations with limited mobility.
- Lift two infantry companies simultaneously with organic helicopter assets.
- Conduct economy-of-force operations.

Specially structured for force projection, the light infantry division (LID) deploys rapidly on fewer aircraft sorties than any other light force. In a crisis, it can quickly make an unopposed entry to secure an airfield, seaport, or other key facility. Once on the ground, LID training makes it well suited for operations other than war (OOTW). Against a light enemy threat or in restrictive terrain, LID units perform well. LID helicopter assets can lift two infantry companies simultaneously. These companies could assault from either ships at sea or an intermediate staging base (ISB) within range of the objective. Establishing an ISB is a time-consuming project that sacrifices surprise. Thus, an opposed LID assault from an ISB would require significant helicopter and combat support augmentation from corps.

The 7th Infantry Division (Light) deployed to Honduras and Panama for training exercises that were tied to potential crisis situations. In Panama, it took part in Operation Just Cause. The 10th Infantry Division (Mountain) sent units to Florida for hurricane relief, followed shortly thereafter by deployment to Somalia

for humanitarian relief operations. As the smallest light force, the light infantry division can deploy to counter limited threats or to deter hostile action in a theater.

As with all units, the light infantry division has limitations. What are the most significant? Make your response in the space provided.

Some major light infantry unit limitations include its—

- Limited tactical mobility.
- Reduced firepower.
- Limited artillery capability.
- Limited antiarmor capability.
- Limited air defense capability.
- Detailed intelligence requirement.
- External combat service support requirement.
- Lack of redundant systems.

Light infantry units have limitations. Limited firepower, lack of redundant systems, and restricted tactical mobility constitute the most significant. LID units can combat guerrilla and limited light infantry threats that do not require vast firepower. To fight heavy forces requires significant corps augmentation of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Once deployed to the theater, foot mobility dominates operations unless corps provides transportation assets—ground and aviation. For operations other than war, LID units do well. They still need logistic and transportation augmentation. For example, in Somalia, the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain) received augmentation from the United Nations and from the US Army, Navy, and Marine units composing Unity Task Force.

Airborne Divisions

The airborne division, another light force, frequently responds to crises. Its airborne capability makes it extremely useful for opposed entry operations.

What are the capabilities of airborne units? Write your answer here.

Major airborne division capabilities include its ability to—

- Deploy rapidly.
- Conduct parachute opposed entry.
- Conduct airlanded unopposed entry.

- Seize deep terrain objectives, but it requires rapid linkup with ground forces.
- Operate for 48 hours without external combat service support.
- Conduct operations in restrictive terrain.
- Conduct military operations on urbanized terrain.
- Conduct rear area security operations with limited mobility.
- Lift one infantry battalion simultaneously with organic helicopter assets.
- Combat armor better than a light infantry division.
- Conduct economy-of-force operations.

As with the light infantry division, the airborne division can react quickly to any crisis. The airborne division possesses the unique capability to make an opposed entry by parachute. It can be airlanded like a light infantry division, but requires more aircraft sorties to deploy. Once on the ground, airborne units have the same general capabilities as light infantry units. The airborne division has an increased ground antiarmor capability, additional helicopters, and a light armor battalion. It can air assault one infantry battalion simultaneously without corps augmentation. Airlanding as peacekeepers in the Dominican Republic in 1967, airlanding as combat reinforcements in Grenada, conducting an airborne assault into Panama, and deploying rapidly to the Persian Gulf as a deterrent during Desert Shield demonstrate the diversity of the 82d Airborne Division.

What are some limitations of airborne units? Respond below.

Airborne unit limitations include—

- Limited tactical mobility.
- Reduced firepower but more than a light infantry division.
- Limited artillery capability.
- Limited antiarmor capability but more than a light infantry division.
- Limited air defense capability but more than a light infantry division.
- Detailed intelligence requirement.
- External combat service support requirement.
- Dependency on the US Air Force (USAF) for aircraft.
- Vulnerability during movement into objective area.

Once on the ground, airborne units have the same general limitations as light infantry units. However, the airborne division possesses greater firepower than a light infantry division—antiarmor, armor, attack helicopter, and air defense assets. An airborne division can air assault an entire infantry battalion at one time, while the light infantry division can air assault only two infantry companies at one time. During opposed entry operations, reinforcement or rapid linkup becomes necessary to retain the seized objectives. Aerial resupply can provide limited combat service support beyond 48 hours. Close coordination between the airborne commander and the USAF air mission commander is essential for successful operations.

Air Assault Divisions

Air assault units constitute the last type of light forces. The air assault division requires more air sorties to move it than either the light infantry or airborne division. However, once in theater, the mobility, lethality, and versatility of the air assault division far exceed that of the light infantry or airborne division.

From your readings, what are the capabilities of an air assault division? Jot your ideas in the space provided.

An air assault division has the capability to—

- Conduct opposed entry from an intermediate staging base (ISB). within range of helicopters.
- Air assault an infantry brigade task force (-) simultaneously with its eight organic aviation battalions.
- Operate for 48 hours without external combat service support.
- Conduct intratheater air assault operations. but it may require a quick linkup with ground forces.
- Attack over restrictive terrain
- Defeat light forces or seize key terrain.
- Conduct operations in restrictive terrain.
- Conduct military operations on urbanized terrain.
- Conduct rear security operations.
- Conduct economy-of-force operations.

An air assault division deploys more slowly and requires more USAF air sorties than any other light force. Its opposed entry capability of a brigade task force (-) by helicopter requires an intermediate staging base, An air assault division can strike quickly throughout the theater of operations. For example, during Desert Storm, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) moved a brigade almost 100 kilometers inside Iraq to establish a forward operating base (FOB) from which to jump another force 80 kilometers to the Euphrates River. An air assault division possesses a significant helicopter antiarmor capability. The most versatile, lethal, and mobile light force is the air assault division.

What are air assault division limitations? Write your response here.

Limitations of an air assault unit includes its—

- Dependence on weather for flying conditions and helicopter lifting capability.
- Difficulty of conducting operations during battlefield obscuration.
- Reliance on secure air lines of communication.
- Vulnerability to hostile air, air defense, and electronic warfare actions.
- Limited ground antiarrnor capability.
- Reliance on the availability of pickup zones (PZs) and landing zones (LZs).
- Vulnerability to small arms and artillery fire on PZs and LZs.
- Limited tactical mobility once landed.
- Need for external combat service support after 48 hours.
- High aviation fuel (JP4) consumption.
- Requirement for detailed intelligence.

As with airborne operations, weather and enemy air defenses can hinder air assault operations. On the ground without helicopter support, air assault infantry units suffer the same weaknesses of limited firepower and restricted tactical mobility as light infantry and airborne units. High consumption of aviation fuel places special logistic constraints on air assault units. However, under proper conditions with marginal or better weather, suppressed or limited enemy air defenses, and adequate combat service support, air assault units provide a versatile, lethal force that can rapidly strike at great distances within the theater.

General Planning Considerations

Each light force shares one common characteristic. To conduct sustained operations against a significant enemy threat, they require additional combat, combat support, and combat service support assets. A corps normally provides these units. The specific size, location. and complexity of the mission affect the specific augmentation of assets.

What types of corps units are available to augment light forces? Use the space provided.

Corps assets available to augment light forces include—

- Maneuver units.
- Fire support units.
- Aviation units.
- Air defense artillery units.
- Engineer units.
- Chemical units.
- Military intelligence units.
- Military police units.
- Signal units.
- Combat service support units

Any or all of these type units could reinforce a light force. Ultimately, the mission determines the requirements for augmentation. Remember that ! No automatic reinforcement occurs; no approved solution exists. Each situation is unique. In FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* appendix A, you will find reference information on the types, sizes, and capabilities of corps units. Seldom will all corps units deploy to support light forces, particularly in operations other than war. Before augmentation, some questions a staff officer should consider are:

- Is there a requirement for additional units-combat, combat support, combat service support?
- What essential capability does this unit provide that is not already in theater?
- Does employment of this unit generate other augmentation requirements?

As discussed frequently in this lesson, combat service support considerations are extremely important in force-projection and light force operations. Decisions about combat service support create the logistic organization with its capabilities and limitations on which the corps or joint task force depends. Decisions about combat and combat support augmentation likewise affect the manner and speed of operations. Each force requires a specific task organization based on the mission. Joint and corps staff officers make critical recommendations on task organization.

Planning Airborne Operations

Corps or JTF staff officers must understand how to plan and conduct airborne operations. To direct such complex, hazardous operations without a solid understanding of what it takes to complete the operation successfully and without a knowledge of the proper corps or joint task force planning role would be irresponsible. Just as for amphibious operations, the initiating headquarters has an important role in directing, planning, and resourcing the operation. Although it oversees the planning of the units *actually* conducting the operation, the subordinate units do the detailed planning. It is the same for airborne operations.

From your readings, what are the planning responsibilities for a corps or joint task force as the initiating authority for an airborne operation? Write your answer here.

The initiating authority (in our case, the corps or joint task force) issues a directive. The directive provides the—

- *Mission.* This includes what is to be done, perhaps with specific objectives designated; the geographic limits of the area of operations; and anytime constraints.

- *Command structure.* This clarifies the chain of command. It may establish the relationships of supporting, supported, and subordinate units.

- *Participating units.* Army airborne and Air Force airlift units are identified.

- *Schedule of events.* This can include the time window for the operation, as well as a specific schedule of activities. Reinforcement or linkup information is also provided.

- Conditions for beginning, delaying, and ending operations.

Before drafting the initiating directive, the corps or JTF staff must carefully consider the area of operations, the forces required, and the linkup with or reinforcement of the forces in the airhead. With an understanding of both the operation and its planning, the initiating staff can assist, rather than hinder, the units that plan the details and conduct the operation.

The senior Army headquarters provides the specifics to the airborne commander. It specifies the area of operations and allocates aircraft. The senior Air Force headquarters provides the specific mission to the airlift commander.

Just how do the airborne and airlift commanders plan the airborne operation? Write your answer here.

Working together, the airborne and airlift commanders plan the operation in detail. Unresolvable differences are referred to the initiating authority for resolution. As in all airborne operations, the planning directive initiates a reverse planning process that produces a ground tactical plan, a landing plan, an air movement plan, and a marshaling plan. The initiating headquarters responds to requests for intelligence, resources, and other issues raised by the airborne or airlift commanders.

The airborne commander, an Army officer, develops the ground tactical plan. How to support the ground tactical plan, how to load the aircraft (to include the specific assignment of personnel and equipment), and how to sequence the sorties to the drop zones (DZs) are crucial decisions he must make.

The *airlift commander, an* Air Force officer, allocates aircraft for the mission. The delivery of the airborne units to the correct DZs and the conduct of resupply and evacuation missions are this commander's major concerns.

Jointly, the airborne and the airlift commanders work out the details. At the departure airfield, this includes supervising the joint airborne advance party (JAAP), securing the departure airfields, establishing control parties at the departure airfields, developing air movement tables, supervising the loading of personnel and equipment, conducting rehearsals, and coordinating communications procedures and frequencies. In the objective area, it includes selecting DZs, landing zones (LZs), and extraction zones (EZs); establishing control parties at DZs, LZs, and EZs; unloading aircraft at LZs and loading aircraft at EZs; and preparing for aerial resupply and evacuation. As with all complex combat operations, the plan merely establishes the framework of the operation. The constant, careful supervision of its conduct by the airborne and airlift commanders makes the operation happen.

To gain a better understanding of airborne operations, you could read FM 90-26, *Airborne Operations,* and historical works that address successful and unsuccessful airborne operations. Failure often provides clearer insights than success. A study of the World War 11 Operation Market Garden offers a rich mixture of successes and failures, as well as insights into the complexities of planning and conducting both airborne and heavy-light linkup operations.

Planning Air Assault Operations

Air assault operations are not airmobile operations. Air assault operations include more than moving troops and equipment by helicopter. They are a complex orchestration that includes air cavalry operations, lift helicopter assaults, attack helicopter support, helicopter-delivered ground combat units, and combat service support.

From your readings, what are the planning responsibilities for a corps or joint task force as the initiating authority for an air assault operation? Write your response here.

For an air assault operation, the initiating headquarters (in our case, a corps or joint task force), carefully considers the mission, area of operations, linkup or follow-on operations, and resources required. It does *not* plan the operation in detail. Just as for airborne operations, the initiating headquarters provides the air assault unit an initiating directive that specifies the mission; area of operations: command structure; participating units; schedule of events; and conditions to begin, delay, and end the operation. Normally, an Army aviator is the air mission commander, and he controls the helicopter assets.

How do the air assault and air mission commanders plan an air assault operation? Jot down your response here.

Working together, the air assault (infantry) and air mission (aviator) commanders plan the operation in detail. The air assault and air mission commanders use a reverse planning process that produces five plans: ground tactical, landing, air movement, loading, and staging. Just as for airborne and amphibious operations, the initiating headquarters responds to requests but does not interfere with the detailed planning of the air assault operation.

The *air assault commander (AAC)* first develops a ground tactical plan to accomplish the mission. This plan determines the sequencing of units into landing zones (LZs) and the loading of personnel and equipment. At the pickup zones (PZs), the unit establishes security and control parties.

The *air mission commander* (AMC) allocates helicopters to support the ground tactical plan and controls all aviation assets during the mission. The AMC delivers the air assault infantry units to the correct LZs and conducts resupply and evacuation sorties.

Together, the *air assault and air mission commanders* conduct rehearsals, select the PZs and LZs, coordinate communications procedures and frequencies, and prepare the landing, air movement, and staging plans.

To understand air assault operations better, you can read FM 90-4, *Air Assault Operations,* and study the planning and execution of the 180-kilometer-deep attack to the Euphrates River by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during Desert Storm, the largest air assault operation ever conducted.

Summary of Opposed Entry Capabilities

As stated earlier, light forces—light infantry, airborne, and air assault—provide the force-projection commander with a valuable tool for rapid deployment and an opposed entry capability.

From your readings, summarize the deployment and opposed entry capabilities of light forces.

Type Unit	Deployability	Opposed Entry
1. Light infantry,		
2. Airborne.		
3. Air assault.		

Each light force can deploy quickly and has an opposed entry capability. However, they all require reinforcement and augmentation if operations are prolonged.

The *light infantry division* deploys on fewer aircraft than any other light force. It is the weakest light force and is well suited to unopposed entry and to operations other than war. Its limited opposed entry capability consists of two infantry companies lifted by organic helicopters from either ships or from an intermediate staging base (ISB).

The *airborne division* can react just as quickly as a light infantry division, but the airborne division requires more air sorties to move by air or to make a parachute landing. It can make opposed or unopposed entries. With strategic reach provided by USAF aircraft, it is the only division that can make a quick opposed entry by parachute. It can make an opposed entry air assault from an ISB of one infantry battalion lifted by organic helicopter assets.

The *air assault division* can react just as quickly as the other light forces, but it takes longer and more air sorties to arrive in theater. It can make opposed and unopposed entries. From an ISB, it can make an opposed entry of an air assault infantry brigade task force (-) using organic helicopter assets. Once in theater, this is the most versatile, lethal light force.

You now know about light forces—types, capabilities, and limitations—and about the role of a corps or joint task force in planning airborne and air assault operations. Light forces frequently lead force-projection operations. Given a situation, airlift available, and the commander's guidance, you should be able to determine which light force to use and what augmentation to make from corps assets.

You now need a break. When you return, you will see how to use special operations forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Special operations forces (SOF) provide a necessary complement to conventional military capabilities. Special operations forces can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces to achieve objectives that might otherwise be unattainable. Corps and JTF staff officers need to understand how special operations forces organize and what they can and cannot do. You studied the organization of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and their capabilities and limitations in S310A, *Combat Operations.* This portion of the lesson reviews that material, adds joint special operations issues, explains Navy and Air Force special operations forces, and addresses how the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) works in support of a joint task force.

Read Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.* This reading assignment addresses Navy and Air Force special operations forces and the general planning considerations for special operations force employment. You may need to review your previous ARSOF instruction in S310A.

As a result of problems during Operations Eagle Claw (Desert One rescue attempt in Iran) and Urgent Fury (Grenada), Congress passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act) and modified it a few months later by the Nunn-Cohen amendment. Along with joint issues, these laws defined special operations and reorganized the special operations community.

Department of Defense Directive 5139.3,4 January 1988, defines special operations as:

> Actions conducted generally in *enemy-held, denied, or sensitive territory* by specially trained, equipped, and organized military forces in pursuit of *national* military, political, economic, or psychological *objectives.* Special operations are essentially of a *political-military nature* and are affected more directly by political considerations than conventional operations. They may *support (or he supported by) conventional operations* or be conducted *independently,* during *peace or hostilities,* when conventional operations are inappropriate or infeasible. Special operations are frequently of a *high risk* nature and characterized by *oversight* at the national level. They differ generally from conventional operations in their *operational techniques, mode of employment,* and dependence upon *operational intelligence* and *indigenous assets,*

Two points need to be emphasized: the political-military nature of special operations and the use of special operations forces throughout the range of military operations. Not only did the congressional legislation establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, but it also created the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to oversee each service's special operations forces. The Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), exercises command of all assigned special operations forces—Army, Navy, and Air Force. All forces assigned to USSOCOM, including psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units, are designated special operations forces. This includes approximate] y 43,000 Active and Reserve personnel in the three services.

From your previous instruction on Army special operations forces and from your readings on Navy special warfare (NSW) and Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF), you should know the capabilities, limitations, and organizations of each. Within each unified command, special operations components (SOCs), designated subunified commands, plan and control special operations forces in theater. When special operations forces

perform missions for a commander in chief or for a JTF commander, normally a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) provides the command and control for operations. Before YOU proceed, you need to review some of the basics about special operations forces.

Special Operations Missions

As a review, list the seven primary special operations missions, and briefly describe each. Write your response in the space provided.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

As you recall from S310A, the five primary special operations missions are unconventional warfare. direct action, strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism Recently. civil affairs and psychological operations became primary missions.

Unconventional warfare (UW) includes a range of activities including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion, and escape and evasion.

Direct action (DA) includes units that may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions or other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. These operations are normally limited in time and in scope. Detailed planning includes a withdrawal from the immediate objective area.

Strategic reconnaissance (SR), which is the term used in the congressional legislation, is called special reconnaissance in joint doctrine. It complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. When authorized, this human intelligence (HUMINT) function places “eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory.

Foreign internal defense (FID) includes actions taken to assist a friendly government threatened by insurgency.

Counterterrorism (CT) includes actions taken to resolve terrorist problems, including hostage rescues in extreme conditions. Selected special operations force units conduct counterterrorism.

Civil affairs (CA) include activities that help the military commander deal with civilian authorities and the local populace, to include coordinating host nation support (HNS) and refugee control. Remember that 97 *percent* of the Army civil affairs capability resides in the Reserve Component. With 172 authorized personnel, the only Active unit is the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Fort Bragg, NC), organized for foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. CA units come in two types: civil-military operations (CMO) and civil administration (CIVADMIN). CMO units can reduce the negative impact of military operations on the local populace and the civilian interference with military operations. Although CA units have little organic capability actually to conduct CMO, they have proven uniquely capable of assisting a commander by planning, coordinating, advising, and directing such operations. In contrast to CMO, CIVADMIN units become directly involved in the executive, legislative, and judicial issues of the civilian government.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) include activities that "convey selected information and indicators to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments. organizations, groups and individuals" (JCS Pub 1-02) in a manner favorable to our stated objectives. The Active Component has 1 of the 3 PSYOP groups and 5 of the 13 battalions. Almost *60 percent* of our PSYOP capability is in the Reserve Component.

In addition to the primary missions, special operations forces arc well suited for eight collateral activities. Although collateral activities are inherent in all military forces, not all forces are suited by training, organization, or equipment for some missions. Careful assignment of collateral activities precludes the overcommitment of limited special operations forces and the reduction of their ability to perform primary missions.

As with the primary mission** of **special operations forces, list the eight collateral activities, and briefly explain each.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

The eight collateral activities are security assistance, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, antiterrorism and related activities, personnel recovery search and rescue, special activities, coalition warfare, and National Command Authority (NCA)-directed missions.

Security assistance (S4) includes programs supported by mobile training teams that train indigenous personnel on defense equipment and services purchased through the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other appropriate legislation.

Humanitariam assistance (HA) includes actions to provide relief in the aftermath of natural or manmade disasters. Recent humanitarian relief operations assisted the Kurds in northern Iraq and the people of Somalia.

Counterdrug (CD) includes interagency activities to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. The primary role is to support US and host nation counterdrug efforts abroad by advising. training, and assisting host nation military, paramilitary, and, when specifically authorized, police operations targeted at the sources of narcotics and the lines of communication of narcotics movement.

Antiterrorism and related activities include training selected personnel in tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure that the physical security of important persons, facilities, and events meets acceptable standards.

Personnel recovery search and rescue (SAR) includes activities to recover personnel, normally downed pilots. As continuing missions, special operations forces are not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct SAR or combat search and rescue (CSAR).

Special activities arc governed by Executive Order 12333 and require a Presidential finding and congressional oversight. In these activities, US Government participation is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged.

Coalition warfare includes activities that capitalize on unique special operations force capabilities in language training, regional orientation and forward deployment. and independent small-unit actions to complement and to support coalition warfare objectives. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, special operations forces performed this crucial task by serving as the liaison detachment with coalition forces.

NCA-directed missions are assigned by appropriate authority.

Remember that special operations forces perform numerous, complex tasks across the range of military operations. *None of the special operations force units is trained, equipped, and manned to perform all special operations missions.* As your S310A text stated, “All SOF [special operations forces] do not conduct and support all SO [special operations]. ”

As a quick review, what are the types of special operations forces in each service? As you write the types of forces, think about the capabilities and limitations of each.

1. Army special operations forces (ARSOF).

2. Navy special warfare (NSW).

3. Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF).

Special operations forces include the following—

● *Army special operations forces (ARSOF)* consist of special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations units.

● *Navy special warfare (NSW)* forces consist of sea-air-land teams (SEALS), SEAL delivery vehicle teams, and special boat units.

● *Air Force special operations forces (AKSOF)* are equipped with MC-130s, helicopters, tankers, AC-130s, and EC-130s and operate with special tactics units.

Remember that the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU (SOC)) is *not* a special operations unit. Although it trains with Navy special warfare units, the MEU (SOC) is assigned to the fleet not to the US Special Operations Command.

Before you finish this part of the lesson, you might review Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide. Lesson 1, Extract From JCS Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,* to make sure that you understand the general planning considerations for the employment of joint special operations forces.

Theater Special Operations Organizations

After this review of special operations missions and units, can* you *recall how special operations forces organize in theater to support a contingency mission? Include in your response the organizations that exist from the theater level to the logistic support for SOF.

The key organizations to consider are the joint force special operations component command, the joint special operations task force, the joint special operations area, and the theater army special operations support command.

● *Joint force special operations component command (JFSOCC).* Just as air, land, maritime, and Marine component commands can compose a joint force, so can a special operations component command. The JFSOCC advises the joint force commander (JFC) on the employment of special operations forces and provides centralized control for assigned and attached special operations forces in the area of operations. Control can be exercised directly to or through a combination of subordinate service or functional special operations force components and joint special operations task forces.

● *Joint special operations task force (JSOTF).* This organization plans, conducts, and supports special operations on a mission or an area basis. It normally accomplishes a specific special operations mission or a campaign of limited duration in support of the joint force commander's campaign plan. A JSOTF can be established on a more permanent basis, with service special operations task forces assigned or attached. For example, the Army component could be an Army special operations task force (ARSOTF) that would report directly to the JFSOCC or a JSOTF.

● *Joint special operations area (JSOA).* The joint force commander designates joint special operations areas for the JFSOCC or JSOTF. The joint special operations commander controls the air, land, and sea space within the JSOA. When special operations forces operate in the conventional force's joint operations area (JOA), the joint force commander establishes a suitable JSOA within the JOA. All units must coordinate with the special operations headquarters or component before conducting any operations in the JSOA. Often, the JSOA becomes a restrictive fire area (RFA).

● Theater army special operations support command (TASOSC). The theater army (TA) or senior Army commander in a contingency-perhaps the corps commander-commands all Army forces assigned or attached to the joint force, less the Army forces operationally controlled by the joint or combined commander. The senior Army commander retains responsibility for all administrative and logistic support of all Army forces. Army special operations forces depend on the theater army for all logistic direct and general support. The TASOSC is a subordinate functional command under the theater army support command (TASCOM) or the corps support command (COSCOM) if the corps commander is the senior Army commander. The TASOSC has no operational mission: it has only a support mission. It does not layer itself between the special operations command (SOC) and the theater Army special operations forces. The TASOSC functions solely as a planner and coordinator and responds to the logistic needs of the Army special operations forces.

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces Operating With Conventional Forces

As mentioned previously, special operations forces can work alone or with conventional forces. When the corps is also operating as a joint task force, a staff officer needs to know how special operations forces are commanded and controlled. Now that you have finished reviewing the joint issues and organizations, you will look at how special operations forces work with conventional forces.

From your S310A instruction, how are special operations forces working with conventional forces commanded and controlled? Specifically, how does the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) differ from the special operations coordination element (SOCOORD)?

1. Special operations coordination element (SOCOORD).

2. Special operations command and control element (SOCCE).

The normal special operations forces contact with conventional forces is at the corps through two special operations organizations—the SOCOORD and the SOCCE. One is apart of the corps staff, and the other is a temporary command and control cell for special operations units supporting corps operations.

Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD)

At corps, the special operations coordination element forms a part of the corps G3 staff. Headed by an experienced Army special operations officer, this element provides information and recommendations on special operations to support the corps plan. The SOCOORD is not a command and control link for special operations: it recommends and coordinates special operations. Specifically, the SOCOORD—

- Provides staff expertise on special forces and ranger doctrine. procedures. and other special operations issues.

- Serves as part of the corps battle management center and corps tactical operations support element.

- Provides expertise and advice on targets that may be best attacked by special operations forces.

- Prepares the special operations estimate and annex to corps plans and orders.

- Identities specific requirements for special operations forces and conducts liaison with the joint special operations task force or theater special operations component command.

- Coordinates support requirements for the operational control of special forces or ranger units.

- Coordinates the requirement of a SOCCE.

Some special operations forces work directly with the corps. For example, civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) units normally are attached to the supporting units. Civil affairs and PSYOP units coordinate with the corps G5 and with the corps G3 respectively. When special operations aviation (SO A) flies in support of special operations in the corps area, it coordinates with the G3 Air.

Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)

The other major special operations organization that may temporarily beat corps is the special operations command and control element. The SOCCE provides command and control of special operations in the corps sector or in support of corps operations. Once the mission is completed, the SOCCE returns to the joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The SOCCE—

- Establishes and operates a cell in the main command post of the supported unit—normally a corps but could be a lower unit during linkup operations-on a 24-hour basis.

- Advises the supported commander on the employment, missions, current situation, capabilities, and limitations of supporting or supported special operations units.

- Advises the supporting special operations commander of the supported conventional commander's current situation, intentions, and requirements.

- Provides required communications links between special operations units, headquarters, and the supported unit.

- Synchronizes special operations with the conventional forces' operational and intelligence requirements.

- Coordinates conventional force support of special operations.

- Receives special operations operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports from deployed special operations forces and provides them to the conventional force commander and staff. This provides real-time battlefield information about the area of interest or area of operations before it is processed by the intelligence system.

- Deconflicts special operations with other combat operations.

- Assists conventional units with linkup planning when linkup with special operations forces becomes imminent.

Now, you know how special operations forces work with the corps-specifically, what a SOCOORD and a SOCCE are and what they do.

Special Operations Support of a Joint Task Force

Now you need to think about how special operations forces can be used to support a joint task force during force-projection operations in an underdeveloped theater.

In the space below, list the appropriate missions for special operations forces—Army, Navy, and Air Force-during peacetime, a crisis, a conflict, and postconflict.

SOF UNITS AND MISSIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

UNITS	PEACETIME	CRISIS	CONFLICT	POSTCONFLICT
ARMY				
Civil affairs				
PSYOP				
Rangers				
Special forces				
Special operations aviation				
NAVY				
SEALs, SBUs, SDVs				
AIR FORCE				
MC-130s, tankers, helicopters				
AC-130s				
EC-130s				
Special tactics				

This chart provides an answer to the question of what special operations forces can do during peacetime, crisis, conflict, and postconflict operations.

SOF UNITS AND MISSIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

UNITS	PEACETIME	CRISIS	CONFLICT	POSTCONFLICT
ARMY				
Civil affairs	HA SA CT	HA SA	CMO CIVADMIN	CMO CIVADMIN CT
PSYOP	HA SA CT	Defuse Crisis Clarify US Policies	Strategic PSYOP Operational PSYOP	Spt CMO CT
Rangers	CT	Show of Force	DA	CT
Special forces	HA SA Embassy Spt CT	SR FID Embassy Spt Coalition Warfare	UW SR DA FID SAR Coalition Warfare	HA SA CT
Special operations aviation	HA SA CT	Infil, Exfil Resupply Recon	Infil, Exfil Resupply Recon/Target Attack	HA SA CT
NAVY				
SEALs, SBUs, SDVs	HA SA CT	SR FID B&S	UW SR FID SAR B&S	HA SA
AIR FORCE				
MC-130s, tankers, helicopters	HA SA CT	Infil/Exfil Resupply SAR	Infil/Exfil Resupply SAR	HA SA CT
AC-130s	CT	Recon	Interdiction CAS	CT
EC-130s	CT	PSYOP	PSYOP	CT
Special tactics	HA SA CT	AOGS SAR	AOGS SAR	HA SA CT

ABBREVIATIONS USED
AOGS—air operations ground support
B&S—board and search boats and offshore facilities such as oil rigs
CAS—close air support
CIVADMIN—civil administration
CMO—civil-military operations
CT—combined training
DA—direct action
FID—foreign internal defense
HA—humanitarian assistance
Infil, Exfil—infiltration, exfiltration
Recon—reconnaissance
SA—security assistance
SAR—search and rescue
Spt—support
SR—strategic reconnaissance
UW—unconventional warfare

This ends your instruction on special operations forces. You now know the organizations, capabilities, limitations, and planning considerations for joint special operations forces supporting a corps or joint task force.

SUMMARY

This lesson has prepared you for upcoming lessons in which you will demonstrate your knowledge of force-projection operations, joint task force organization and operations, amphibious operations, contingency air operations, light force employment, and special operations force utilization in an underdeveloped theater.

Our Armed Forces are transitioning from a foward-deployed to a force-projection focus. As crises arise, military planners will find their forces involved in projecting military power into areas with which they maybe unfamiliar. When in a confused, time-sensitive environment, it is important that you (as a field grade officer) respond to the challenge quickly, effectively, and professionally. Lesson 1 gave you some basic doctrinal information. The remainder of this course is designed to prepare you for that challenge.

Your next lesson will focus on the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the unified command responsible for Central and South America. You will review the region from a strategic perspective to understand the day-to-day challenges USSOUTHCOM faces. This will acquaint you with the regional situation. geographic challenges, US interests, and issues confronting USSOUTHCOM.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Force-Projection Planning

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CORPS FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS

Force-projection operations include a wide variety of operations ranging from conventional war to any of the operations other than war as defined in FM 100-5, *Operations.* This wide range imposes both planning and training problems on the corps. Depending on the size and type of operation, the corps may be—

- The joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ) for the operation. In this case, the corps must designate an Army force (ARFOR) HQ. This could be done by splitting the corps staff or by augmenting a division HQ to perform this command fiction. The ARFOR HQ will, inmost situations, be the joint force land component command (JFLCC) for the operation. This is significant since Marine forces involved in the operation will normally become OPCON to the ARFOR once they have completed any amphibious operations.

- JFLCC HQ.

- ARFOR HQ.

- Subordinate to a higher Army HQ.

As the JTF HQ, the corps is subordinate to the combatant commander who is responsible for the operation. If the crisis is one that was anticipated in a joint planning document, the corps may have an existing plan that requires modification to conduct the operation. In the case where the crisis was not anticipated, the corps may have to develop an order with no supporting plan. The advantages of having an existing plan are obvious. In addition to concepts of operation and support, the existing plan will identify subordinate units and generally will contain a Timed-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) to get the units into the theater. The corps must modify this plan to fit the actual situation. In a no-plan situation, the corps must plan from scratch. Because a crisis normally requires quick action, the corps HQ will probably have little time to accomplish this planning.

It is critical to understand that, in a force-projection environment, the combat mission seldom accomplishes the political and strategic objectives in the region. Political considerations will impact heavily on the operation and will impose constraints both in planning and in execution. An example of this is Operation Just Cause. Accomplishing the military objectives of eliminating armed resistance and capturing Noriega did not end military involvement in Panama. The much larger problem of restoring the government and economy of Panama started after the combat objectives were achieved. Generally, the corps HQ will not be responsible for this phase of the operation but the corps will often have to support the HQ that is responsible. This support generally takes the form of providing logistics, engineer, and civil affairs assets and may even include combat forces.

The information in this appendix is from C320, *Corps and Division Combat Operations,* August 1993, appendix 1 to lesson 16, pp 16-5—16-18.

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This appendix discusses the stages of force-projection operations as they apply to a corps, the planning considerations in each of the combat fictions **as** defined in FM 100-5, and the determining conditions and objectives for each phase of the corps operation.

STAGES OF FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS

The following graphic shows the stages of force-projection operations. All of these stages may not be needed for a particular operation. The corps HQ must decide how to phase the operation, using the stages as a guideline. The phases of the operation often will not be clearly separated in time. The assault force needed to secure entry points into the theater may be deploying when follow-on forces are still marshaling and moving to ports of embarkation (POEs). The combat force may be involved with operations to secure its objective while forces needed for postconflict operations are mobilizing. Clear conditions and objectives for each stage are needed to preclude confusion in planning and execution.



Stages of force projection.

Stage 1, Mobilization

Stage 1, Mobilization, mayor may not be required for a particular operation. Most of the combat service support (CSS) assets for a corps exist in the Reserve components. Depending on the duration and nature of the operation the corps may have to request mobilization of these assets. The corps may also require assistance from the Reserve components in civil affairs. Mobilization of assets from the Reserve components is covered in more detail in FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization,* and will not be discussed here.

Stage 2, Predeployment Activity

Stage 2, Predeployment Activity, involves getting units assembled at POEs for deployment to the theater. This could involve movement by sea, rail, or air. In some circumstances, Army aviation assets maybe able to self-deploy to the theater, saving critical strategic transportation assets. The ports or airfields available for debarkation in the theater of operations must be taken into account when planning the movement to the theater. Inmost situations, port of debarkation (POD) capacity will be more restrictive than that of POEs. These ports

will certainly have a major impact on the timing of the operation and may dictate how the force is tailored to accomplish the mission. Planning for the operation must be completed during this stage, as well as the determination of the transportation assets required to support the operation. Strategic transportation assets must be married with the units at the ports of embarkation. In some cases, pre-positioned supplies must be sent to the area of responsibility (AOR) from the continental United States (CONUS), theater, or afloat locations.

Stage 3, Deployment Operations

Stage 3, Deployment Operations, involves deploying forces from the POEs to the PODs. Deployment operations generally overlap with other stages of the operation. Force packages must be tailored and echeloned to accomplish entry operations and follow-on operations. These packages must take into account the need for logistics, base development, and civil affairs support in the theater. The tendency to put combat forces into the theater without the support they need must be avoided. Transportation assets and PODS will nearly always limit the options of the commander and will dictate tough decisions to balance the combat power with the support needed. Due to these constraints, the buildup of combat power may be much slower than that desired by the commander. In some cases, forces and/or supplies must be pre-positioned in an intermediate staging base (ISB) to prepare for further stages of the operation.

Stage 4, Entry Operations

Stage 4, Entry Operations, may be opposed or unopposed or a combination of the two. Unopposed operations are desired. but, if there is any doubt about the situation in the theater, the corps should plan for opposed entry operations. It is far better to spend the time planning for an opposed entry that is not needed than to plan at the last minute an opposed entry that was not anticipated. Entry operations must establish suitable ports of debarkation to support stage 5, Operations.

Stage 5, Operations

Stage 5, Operations, accomplishes the combat objectives of the corps. These operations commence only after the required forces and sustainment have been established. The principle of overwhelming combat power applies here. History has show that entering this stage with overwhelming combat power saves lives, often on both sides. During Operation Just Cause, Panamanian Defense Forces were often induced to surrender because they were surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered. A lesser force might have encouraged these defense forces to fight much harder than they did. thus increasing casualties and collateral damage.

Stage 6, Postconflict Operations

Stage 6, Postconflict Operations, addresses the problems that led to the conflict in the first place. Postconflict operations involve a wide range of activities, such as education, the building or rebuilding of the economic infrastructure within the theater, repatriation, medical assist ante, establishmcnt of a government, and policing activities. As stated earlier, the corps often will not be responsible for these operations, but maybe tasked to provide support. This could include leaving behind some forces even after the corps redeploys. Although postconflict operations is a distinct stage, the corps must always be cognizant of these requirements. It may have to perform these types of activities simultaneously with its combatant capabilities throughout the operation. However, these activities should not be allowed to detract from accomplishing the combat mission.

Stage 7, Redeployment and Reconstitution

Stage 7, Redeployment and Reconstitution, involves redeploying corps forces to peacetime locations or to another theater of operations. Those forces and HQ not needed to conduct stage 6 will redeploy while stage 6 is ongoing. Units mayor may not reorganize while they are still in the theater. In most situations, reorganization will be conducted after the unit redeploys. Regeneration of units, inmost cases, will be out of the question in the theater due to the limited support available. Forces that maybe required for other force-projection operations should be redeployed first; for example, airborne forces used in the operation will generally be among the first forces redeployed.

Stage 8, Demobilization

Stage 8, Demobilization, is required only if Reserve forces were mobilized in stage 1.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

General

FM 100-5 defines the combat functions of intelligence, maneuver, firepower, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command. This discusses general planning considerations for the corps involved in force-projection operations for each of these combat functions. Mobilization and demobilization will not be discussed. These stages are addressed in FM 100-17.

A number of factors in force-projection operations make planning for a corps challenging. Corps response to a crisis must be rapid. A corps will seldom enjoy the luxury of having a great deal of planning time before executing the operations. Planning will have to begin before the combatant command order is finalized. Likewise, units subordinate to a corps will have to begin their planning before the corps order is complete. This forces all units involved in a force-projection operation into a parallel planning situation. A corps will begin its planning based on a warning order (WO) from the combatant commander, and divisions will do the same based on WOs from the corps. Often, the situation in the theater of operations is not well known, particularly in early stages of planning. Continuous coordination between the levels of command involved in the operation is essential.

If a corps is the JTF for the operation, it must establish liaison with other services and other nations involved in the operation. Ideally, the liaison elements sent to a corps should be knowledgeable representatives from the units that will execute the operation. These representatives should have some decision authority. A corps must also integrate civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), and special operations forces (S OF) operations into its plan, since these forces are often critical to the success of a force-projection operation. Liaison with the host nation and any other nations involved must be established early. Generally, a corps will have only a matter of days to plan the operation and begin execution.

Strategic and political considerations assume paramount importance in force-projection operations. Collateral damage is an extremely important consideration. Combat operations, by their nature, can easily make a situation worse rather than better. The people of the host nation must be convinced that the military forces are there to help. Inmost situations, there will be resentment at the outside intrusion of foreign military forces. The fact that the host nation government asked for the assistance will not eliminate this resentment. It is also important to integrate host nation personnel into the operation. US forces entering a theater and performing basic

services better than the host nation government can aggravate the situation and increase the frustration of the people with their government. This only adds to the long-term problem and could prolong US involvement in the crisis. Each crisis is different. Corps planners must carefully consider all factors, not just those important to military operations. Civil affairs, PSYOP, and SOF personnel can assist in this.

Based on the general rules of engagement (ROE) provided by the National Command Authority, corps must translate ROE into orders the common soldier in the field can understand. ROE that are too restrictive can cause unnecessary loss of life. On the other hand, ROE that are not restrictive enough can aggravate the situation and also cause unnecessary casualties. Collateral damage is always an important consideration in developing ROE. Concerns about collateral damage will often have a great impact on the way a corps conducts the operation and on the way it tailors force packages for deployment into the theater.

Intelligence

Accurate, timely intelligence is critical to the success of a force-projection operation. A number of factors make providing intelligence difficult in a force-projection situation.

In many cases, the enemy and friendly situations may not be well known. Telling the good guys from the bad guys may be difficult, particularly in insurgency situations, Accurate status reports on the location of friendly host nation forces may be nonexistent. The enemy may not possess a set organization or doctrine. It may not possess uniforms, or it may be using a mixture of uniforms and equipment that makes identification extremely difficult. Host nation sources of information may not be accurate. Thus, a corps may find itself going into a situation where flexibility and decentralized execution are key.

Much of the development of our intelligence systems has been oriented on a high-tech enemy. These systems will be of little use against the low-tech enemy common in many force-projection operations. It makes little sense to take a system designed to locate or jam radio communications to a theater where the enemy does not have radios. This factor alone may cause major changes in the way intelligence information is collected. The corps may rely heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT). Operation Just Cause illustrates one of the problems posed by HUMINT collection. During Operation Just Cause, there was no shortage of raw information. In fact, there was so much raw information that the intelligence system could not analyze it and provide meaningful information to subordinate commanders. Small unit commanders rapidly became their own intelligence processors and were forced to decide which leads to follow and which to ignore, without the assistance of analysis by higher HQ. HUMINT sources in Panama were often submitting fake reports to retaliate against people with whom they had a long-standing grudge. As combat missions were achieved and the ROE became more restrictive, troops became increasingly reluctant to investigate leads generated from HUMINT sources.

The analysis of intelligence data also creates a problem. Most of the analysis facilities are not deployable and cannot be taken to the theater of operations. Thus, raw data must be transmitted from the theater to the analysis facility and then, once it is analyzed, retransmitted. This makes intelligence operation communications intensive and untimely. A corps must have access to Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) assets to link it with the intelligence community.

One of the first things a corps planner generally does is request the redirection of strategic intelligence assets. While this certainly possible, there are some problems corps planners should be aware of. Whether a strategic asset is redirected to collect information in a force-projection theater depends on how important the force-projection operation is in relation to national strategic priorities. While the operation being planned is top priority

to the corps, it may not be the most important operation ongoing from the national perspective. Redirection of strategic assets is not automatic. It takes time to redirect these assets. Strategic assets generally are not very responsive to changing needs. In a fluid situation, the strategic asset may not be able to keep up with a corps' changing needs for information. This does not mean that a corps should ignore the redirection of strategic assets. However, corps planners should carefully consider all factors before requesting redirection. They should not rely on strategic assets as the sole source of information.

Special operations forces can be extremely valuable to a corps in force-projection operations. They may very well provide the only reliable eyes on the ground available to a corps. This can be particularly critical during opposed entry operations. Special operations forces may have conducted training in the theater or may have liaison personnel with host nation units prior to the deployment of a corps. In addition, a corps can plan selective reconnaissance missions through the special operations command and control element to gather intelligence information about specific areas of concern.

Maneuver

Force-projection operations encompass a myriad of diverse missions against a wide array of possible threats. A corps must be tailored to provide the appropriate forces for a situation that is often uncertain. Often, this will mean a mix of forces that may not be accustomed to working together. Corps planners must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of all types of forces to plan successfully. Operations involving a mix of light, airborne, air assault, special operations, and heavy forces are not uncommon and may well be the norm in the future. The value of qualified, competent liaison officers (LOS) cannot be overstated.

Corps planners must plan the deployment of forces with the political and strategic objectives, as well as combat mission, in mind. Civil affairs units that are not critical to the success of the combat mission will still have to be included early in the deployment. This may involve displacing some combat units and dictate a slower buildup than the corps commander desires.

In some cases, a corps maybe able to consider self-deployment of Army aviation assets. Once they are fitted with the appropriate external fuel tanks, the AH-64 (1,089 nautical miles (NMs), the UH-60A (1,114 NMs), the CH-47C (1,219 NMs) and the CH-47D (1, 179 NMs) can be self-deployed at the ranges indicated in parentheses. Self-deployment of these assets may require intermediate-level maintenance at the POEs and PODS to prepare the aircraft. Some of these aircraft require preparation time for reconfiguration and will not be available immediately on arrival in theater for combat missions. The alternative for aviation assets involves either sealift or transportation by C-5 aircraft, as appropriate. Sealift involves even longer periods to prepare the aircraft for combat.

Entry operations may require airborne, air assault, or amphibious forces. Locating suitable landing zones (LZs) and drop zones (DZs) for these forces is critical. Special operations forces can provide valuable information on the location of suitable areas and on the enemy activity in the area. in some instances, the host nation can provide assistance identifying and securing DZs and LZs.

Linkup operations with SOF and host nation forces are critical. Corps planners must know the locations of these forces. Special operations forces may provide special reconnaissance for a corps and, to a more limited extent, direct action raids in support of the operation. Special operations forces also provide liaison with host nation forces operating in the area.

Follow-on forces must be prepared to simultaneously deploy and employ to maintain the momentum of operations. Rapid transportation of maneuver forces from their POD to their area of operations (AO) will be critical as the lodgments expand. In many operations, securing lines of communications (LOCs) and protecting the force will be critical problems. Refugees from the area may clog the few existing LOCs unless adequate controls are established. Host nation forces should be used whenever possible to assist in refugee control and any other policing activities. Identification of the deep, close, and rear areas may be unclear in some situations.

Once a corps achieves its combat objectives, it must redeploy forces not required for postconflict operations. A corps should base priority of redeployment on the importance of the unit for other strategic missions. Airborne forces will generally be among the first units out, since they are critical to the ability of the nation to react to other strategic situations. In most circumstances, a corps must plan how it will hand off responsibilities to the host nation *or* to other forces coming into the theater. Border patrol, counterinsurgent, and policing activities are primary concerns. A corps must allow sufficient time in its plan for this transition.

Firepower

The ROE will have great impact on the use of fire support systems in many force-projection operations. Consideration for minimum collateral damage may preclude unobserved fire and the use of area-type weapons, such as the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). In populated areas, indirect fire of any kind may be precluded. Corps planners must take the ROE into account when organizing fire support packages to deploy to the theater. It makes little sense to waste critical transportation assets deploying MLRS to a theater when the ROE will preclude its use.

The JTF corps establishes a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) in the theater to consider what targets should be fired on and what systems are appropriate to engage targets. This board generally consists of representatives of joint and combined services as well as representatives of the host nation.

During opposed entry operations, corps plans pre-assault fires to isolate DZs and LZs. Host nation forces may be able to assist, provided the appropriate liaison and coordination arc established. In most situations, entry forces will rely on the Air Force for much of their fire support. Corps planners must ensure that they know the locations of all friendly forces operating in the area at all times. A corps must coordinate with the Air Force. The Air Force requires time to deploy the appropriate force mix to the theater and to build up the correct stockage levels of ordnance to support the operations. Since the Air Force is also responsible for securing the air lines of communication (ALOC) and providing counterair for the theater, close air support (C AS) of an entry operation may be difficult to achieve. Corps planners should also consider using Navy or Marine air assets, if they are available, to support operations. With the current assets the Navy has, tire support from a naval guns is generally insufficient to support land operations.

Deep operations are continuous and must be coordinated in each stage of the operation. In most theaters, the Air Force will be responsible for a large portion of deep operations until Army aviation and field artillery (FA) assets are deployed. The restrictions imposed on deep operations by the ROE maybe severe and must be taken into account by corps planners. Special operations forces special reconnaissance may be able to provide observers for some of these missions; however, in force-projection operations, there are usually more potential missions than there are SOF personnel. Planners should also keep in mind that SOF cannot respond quickly to changing requirements inmost circumstances.

The corps should carefully consider the amount and types of electronic warfare (EW) systems to deploy to the theater. Electronic warfare operations must be integrated with all other operations in the area. If the enemy force is low-tech and does not rely extensively on electronic communications, EW systems may not be worth deploying.

Air Defense

As mentioned previously, protection of the ALOC is primarily an Air Force responsibility. Corps forces involved in entry operations will rely heavily on Air Force and host nation assets to provide air defense.

The initial Army air defense (AD) assets that are deployed to the theater will most likely be Stinger. Stinger assets should be employed primarily on likely air avenues of approach to the port, DZ, or LZ. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield on the ordnance and delivery techniques used by the enemy is critical to the AD planner. To be successful, the AD system must engage and destroy the target before it can release ordnance. Placing AD assets far enough out along avenues of approach during the initial stages of entry maybe difficult.

As heavier AD assets such as HAWK and Patriot arrive in theater, a corps may transition from a point defense to an area coverage. These AD assets must be integrated into the Air Force C^2 structure to preclude fratricide. When a corps is the JTF, its AD clement also coordinates host nation AD support if any is available.

Mobility and Survivability

There is never a shortage of engineer requirements, only personnel and equipment. This statement is even more true in force-projection operations than it is in operation in an established theater. Two factors impose serious problems:

- Transportation to the theater is often limited. Engineer equipment, particularly construction and bridging equipment, requires a great deal of space on critical strategic transportation assets.

- The infrastructure in many force-projection theaters may be primitive and require a great deal of engineer work to support corps operations. LOCs in the theater may be long, undeveloped, and unsecured. making the engineer effort to support the force even more difficult.

One of the primary concerns for engineers is the availability of airfields or forward landing strips. In many cases, airfields will have to be repaired and improved to support airland operations in the quantity required by a corps. Airfield repair and upgrade packages, either joint or single service, must be deployed early. Host nation support (HNS) can be used when available, but in many theaters. HNS will be limited to manual labor with all of its associated security problems. The 82d Abn Div has light airfield repair packages tailored to support entry operations.

In addition to supporting combat operations, engineers will be required to support civil affairs and postconflict operations. Corps planners must understand these requirements.

Logistics

Force-projection operations present several problems for CSS forces.

● Time is normally so limited that only active duty forces can be used. Since much of the CSS of US forces is in the Reserve components, this can create difficulties. If a selective callup of Reserve forces is not authorized, CSS planners must make do with the forces available to them.

● The distance to the theater of operations is another factor to be considered. When the distance and closure time to the theater are great, more CSS assets must be deployed to the theater or HNS must be found to augment the corps CSS capability. CSS assets may compete with combat forces for the availability of transportation assets. Host nation support can ease the CSS problem significantly; however, in many cases, the theater may lie in an underdeveloped nation that can provide only limited support. Additional resources that may ease dependence on the CONUS sustainment base may come from pre-positioned war reserves, operational project stocks, third country support, or joint contingency stocks maintained by the Defense Logistics Agency.

● In some cases, an ISB is required to allow adequate buildup of forces and/or supplies prior to an operation. An ISB could be required because of an inability to obtain overflight rights. inadequate ports in the objective area, or equipment (such as helicopters) that requires reassembly before being employed in operations. If established, the ISB could remain operational for the duration of the operation, or it could be disbanded as adequate facilities are established in the theater.

● The status of the ports (air and sea) and the infrastructure in the theater can have a great impact on the CSS forces needed. A theater with a poorly developed infrastructure may require additional terminal service units; transportation units; well-drilling units; petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) transport units: and other types of units. Contracting essential supplies and services from the host nation or third parties may also be required to compensate for insufficient resources in the objective area.

Combat service support units must be echeloned into the theater. This means CSS planners must determine which units are required up front to support the operation and which units can wait until later in the flow. The corps support command (COSCOM) employs several airdroppable packages designed to support the early stages of a force-projection operation. These packages include forward area surgical teams (FAST) and airborne arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs). Redeployment is another consideration. CSS packages must be tailored to support “last out” units until they depart. Civil affairs and postconflict operations will also require CSS assets and must be taken into account by CSS planners. If not planned for, these operations can divert significant CSS assets from combat forces. Military police, engineer, transportation, service and supply, petroleum, and medical units will be required to support these operations. For operations other than war (OOTW), these same units maybe the main players of the mission.

Battle Command

Command and control of force-projection operations present several challenges for a corps. The vague and rapidly changing situation in most crises demands decentralized execution, allowing the maximum possible flexibility to subordinate commanders. If a corps is the JTF HQ for the operation, it must be augmented with liaison personnel from the other services and nations involved in the operation. The corps HQ will still require this augmentation from those services and nations whose forces will eventually become OPCON if it is the ARFOR and land component command for the operation.

Marine forces will be used as an example to illustrate the difference in corps planning and C^2 for a corps that is acting as the JTF command and one acting as the ARFOR. In both cases, it is assumed that the Marine force will conduct an amphibious assault into the theater in support of the operation. If a corps is the JTF HQ, the

Marine force will be OPCON to the JTF for the duration of the operation. In conjunction with the JTF, the amphibious task force (TF) will plan the amphibious assault and include this plan in the JTF order published for the operation. If a corps is the ARFOR and land component command, it will still have a Marine liaison, but will not be responsible for planning or controlling the amphibious assault. A corps would assume OPCON of the Marine force only after it had completed the amphibious assault. In this case, a corps is responsible for planning for and controlling the Marine force for any land operations involving the Marine force after the amphibious assault takes place. The amphibious assault itself is planned and controlled by the Navy and Marines in conjunction with the JTF commander.

As the JTF HQ, a corps is responsible for forming joint boards to control all aspects of the operation, Note here that the OPCON relationship established between the corps and subordinate joint and combined units does not include directive logistics authority unless this authority is granted to it by the combatant commander. A joint board coordinates the efforts of all forces to ensure efficiency with no duplication of effort. Joint boards are commonly established to handle intelligence, logistics, and targeting, as well as a variety of other tasks. As an example, a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) would coordinate the efforts of all the intelligence assets belonging to the subordinate elements. Collection tasks would be split among the subordinate units according to their capabilities. This prevents each unit from duplicating the effort of the others. The JIC also acts as a clearinghouse for information collected by subordinate units. It collects, analyzes, and disseminates the information to all of the units requiring it. Other joint boards operate in a similar fashion.

One of the most difficult tasks for a corps is the C^2 of host nation forces and the forces of other nations involved in the crisis. Forces that have operated together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) environment generally have developed an understanding of each other and have worked through many of the problems inherent in combined operations. Even so, C^2 remains a difficult task. In a force-projection environment, national forces that have never worked together may be combined under the JTF commander. Language, doctrinal, social, and equipment differences must be worked out. Special operations forces maybe able to provide liaison personnel to the host nation forces. Corps will have to provide liaison personnel to any forces SOF cannot cover. Fire support deserves particular attention in this area.

If SOF are working for a corps or operating in a corps area, the corps will need a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) in addition to the special operations coordinator. The SOCCE is a control element provided by the SOF group. It will assist a corps in planning and executing SOF operations and will provide a corps data on the locations of SOF in the corps AO.

Entry operations pose a significant problem for a corps. If possible, a corps should consider establishing an assault command post (CP) in the theater of operations before deploying combat forces. If entry is opposed, this may be impossible. Placing an Army C^2 team aboard an airborne command and control center (ABCCC) or aboard an Air Force C-130 configured for C^2 will help a corps coordinate initial entry operations. In any event, a corps must establish an assault CP as soon as possible. The remaining CPs should be echeloned into the theater with follow-on forces.

Additional communications support is available to a corps, if needed, from the joint communications support element (JCSE). A corps must request these assets through the combatant commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

CONDITIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Corps planners must decide how to stage the force-projection operation. The stages of force projection from FM 100-5 are recommended as guidelines. The stages of the operation are intended to ensure that the operation does not progress too quickly and outstrip the ability of a corps to support it and maintain the momentum. This does not mean that subordinate commanders are not allowed to exercise initiative. It does mean that the amount of initiative allowed for subordinate commanders must be controlled as in any other operation. To define the beginning and end of each stage, a corps should establish conditions necessary to begin the stage and the objectives of the stage. Subordinate units will do the same in their planning. The conditions and objectives for each stage should be clearly stated in the plan or order.

The following graphic illustrates the interlocking nature of the conditions and objectives for each stage. In general, the objectives for stage 1 become the conditions necessary to execute stage 2. This pattern repeats for all stages of the operation. As mentioned previously, stages tend to overlap. For example, follow-on forces may be preparing to deploy while the initial assault force is conducting entry operations.



Conditions and objectives

The graphic on the next page shows typical conditions and objectives, assuming the corps has decided to use stages that are identical to the stages of force projection.

Stage	Condition	Objective
1	Crisis occurs. Mobilization ordered.	Mobilization complete.
2	Stage 1 objective achieved. WO received.	Complete orders. Assault forces at POE. Establish C^2.
3	Stage 2 objective achieved. Deployment ordered.	Deploy assault forces. Marshal follow-on forces.
4	Stage 3 objective achieved. Entry operations ordered.	Lodgments established. Follow-on force deploys.
5	Stage 4 objective achieved Execution ordered.	Combat mission achieved.
6	Stage 5 objective achieved. Postconflict operations ordered	Selected units redeploy. Selected units change operational control. Corps HQ redeploy.
7	Stage 6 objective achieved.	Remaining units redeploy,
8	Phase 7 objective achieved.	Demobilization complete.

Corps stages.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Extract From JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*

From JCS Pub 0-2, *Unifed Action Armed Forces,* 24 February 1995, pages III-1 through III-12 and IV-9 through IV-19.

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

"I was informed that all the causes of delay had been repotted through the "usual channels, " but as far as those on the spot were aware nothing very much seems to have happened. It would seem best therefore to start from the other end of the "usual channels" and sound backwards to find where the delay in dealing with the matter has occurred."

Winston Churchill: Note for General Ismay, 26 January 1941

1. General

a. **Command. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.** Inherent in command (see definition in glossary) is the **authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates** and confers authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment. Although commanders may **delegate authority** to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the **responsibility for the attainment of these missions.** Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law (see Figure III- 1).

b. **Command and Staff.** Joint force commanders are provided **staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process.** The staff is an extension of the commander; **its sole function is command support,** and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the **smallest number** of qualified personnel who can do the job.

- The **command channel is** the term used to describe the chain of command from commanders to subordinates through which command is exercised.

- The **staff channel** is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

c. **Levels of Authority. The** authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. This document describes the various levels of authority used for US military forces, **four are command relationships--COCOM, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support.** The other authorities are coordinating authority, ADCON, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).



Figure III-1. Chain of Command and Control

d. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command is the **interlocking web of responsibility** which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires **clear delineation of responsibility** among commanders up, down, and laterally.

2. Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces

An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure III-2. All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense **"Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A** force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

a. As shown in Figure III-3, **forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands.** When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

b. **The combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM)** over forces assigned or reassigned by the NCA. Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise



Figure III-2. Command Relationships

OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. **OPCON** of assigned forces is **inherent in COCOM** and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command (CINC) or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

c. The **combatant commander** nor-**mally exercises OPCON** over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

d. In accordance with the "Forces for Unified Commands" and the "Unified Command Plan," except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be **assigned** or **attached to** and **under the command of** the **commander of that command.** Forces directed by the President or the Secretary



Figure III-3. Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force

of Defense may conduct operations **from or within any geographic area as** required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. **Transient forces** do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) boundaries.

3. Combatant Command (Command Authority)

COCOM is the **command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by** title 10, US Code, Section 164, **or as directed by the President** in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred.

a. **Basic Authority.** COCOM is the **authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces** involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be **exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.** Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides **full authority to organize and employ commands** and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

b. **COCOM includes the authority to:**

- **Exercise or delegate OPCON** of assigned or attached forces, as described in paragraph 4 below.
- **Exercise directive authority for logistic matters** (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).
- **Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces** necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- **Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas** specified in the UCP with other combatant commanders and with other US Government agencies or agencies of countries in the AOR, as necessary to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.
- **Function,** unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, as the **US military single point of contact** and **exercise directive authority over all elements of the command** in relationships with other combatant commands, DOD elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and agencies of countries in the AOR (if assigned). Whenever a combatant commander undertakes exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another combatant commander's AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be as mutually agreed to between the commanders.

- **Determine those matters** relating to the exercise of COCOM **in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external** to the combatant command **through the combatant commander.**

- Coordinate with subordinate commands and components and **approve those aspects of administration and support** (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), **and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.**

- **Establish personnel policies** to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.

- **Participate in the development and acquisition of the command's command, control, communications, and computer systems and direct their operation.**

- **Submit recommendations** through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense concerning the content of **guidance** affecting the **strategy** and/or **fielding of joint forces.**

- **Participate actively in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, as** follows:

  - **Submit** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **comments and recommendations** to be used in planning the proposed DOD policy, strategy, and force guidance for programming.

  - **Provide guidance** to subordinate commands and components on warfighting **requirements and priorities** for addressing their program and budget requests to the respective Military Departments.

  - **Provide an integrated priority list** of essential warfighting requirements prioritized across Service and functional lines for consideration by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USCINCSOC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense in developing the DOD program and budget.

  - **Review reports from subordinate component commanders** on the degree to which their program and budget requests meet the warfighting requirements of the command. Combatant commanders may communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USCINCSOC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning their assessment of operational capability deficiencies associated with program and budget requests.

  - **Review and provide comments and recommendations** on the degree to which Service defense agencies' programs satisfy warfighting requirements to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  - **Assess the impact of Office of the Secretary of Defense program and budget decisions** and **provide recommendations** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

•• As directed by the Secretary of Defense, prepare and submit budget proposals to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for activities of the command.

- **Participate actively in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)** and the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).** Combatant commanders' comments are critical to ensuring that warfighting and peacetime operational concerns are emphasized in all JSPS and JOPES documents.

- **Concur in the assignment** (or recommendation for assignment) **of officers as commanders** directly subordinate to the combatant commander and to positions on the combatant command staff. **Suspend from duty** and **recommend reassignment** of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command.

- **Convene general courts-martial** in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

- In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, **establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.**

c. When directed in the UCP or otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense, **the commander of US elements of a multinational command may exercise COCOM of those US forces assigned to that command.**

d. **Directive Authority for Logistic Matters.** Commanders of combatant commands may **exercise directive authority for logistics** (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary **to ensure** the following: **effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation;** and **prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.**

· **A** combatant commander's **directive authority does not:**

•• Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support.

•• Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.

•• Disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have **responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands,** subject to the following guidance:

•• **Under peacetime conditions,** the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be **consistent with the peacetime limitations** imposed by legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors

preclude execution of a combatant commander's directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

•• **Under crisis action, wartime conditions** or where **critical situations** make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to **use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.** Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.

A combatant commander will **exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs** (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command's area of responsibility that will have **significant effects on operational capability or sustainability.** When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Chief of the Service fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

4. Operational Control

OPCON is the **command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command** and can be delegated or transferred. (NOTE: This DOD definition of OPCON should not be confused or interchanged with the NATO definition of operational control. The NATO definition of OPCON more closely represents the DOD definition of TACON.)

a. **Basic Authority.** OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the **authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces** involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes **authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions** assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders, OPCON normally provides full authority to **organize commands and forces** and **employ those forces** as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. **It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.** These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate

functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate joint force commanders.

b. **Commanders of subordinate commands** and **joint task forces will** normally be given **OPCON** of assigned or attached forces by the superior commander.

c. **OPCON is the authority to:**

- **Exercise or delegate** OPCON and TACON, **establish** support relationships among subordinates, and **designate** coordinating authorities.
- **Give direction** to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.
- **Prescribe** the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- **Organize** commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- **Employ** forces within the command, as necessary. to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- **Assign** command functions to subordinate commanders.
- **Plan** for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of subordinate forces.
- **Establish** plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.
- **Conduct** joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.
- **Suspend** from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.
- **Assign** responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders.
- **Establish** an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such areas of operation for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable.
- **Delineate** functional responsibilities and geographic areas of operation of subordinate commanders.

d. The Secretary of Defense may specify **adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON** in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between combatant commanders. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating combatant commanders.

5. Tactical Control

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made availblae for tasking, **that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers** necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

a. **Basic Authority.** TACON may be **delegated to and exercised by commanders** at any echelon **at or below the level of combatant command,** TACON is inherent in OPCON.

b. **TACON** provides the authority to:

- **Give direction** for military operations.
- **Control designated forces** (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management).

c. TACON provides sufficient authority for **controlling** and **directing** the **application of force or tactical use of combat support assets.** TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

d. TACON is typically exercised by **functional component commanders** over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.

6. Support

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should **aid, protect, complement, or sustain** another force.

a. **Basic Authority.** Support may be **exercised by commanders** at any echelon **at or below the level of combatant command.** This includes the NCA designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it **conveys priorities** to commanders and staffs who are **planning or executing joint operations.** The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

b. The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander **understands the assistance required.** The supporting commander will then **provide the assistance needed,** subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander **cannot fulfill the needs** of the supported commander, **the establishing authority will be notified** by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

c. An **establishing directive** is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

- The forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort.
- The time, place. level, and duration of the supporting effort.
- The relative priority of the supporting effort.
- The authority, if any. of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

- The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort,

d. Unless limited by the establishing directive., the **supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort.** General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

e. **The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications** to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the **employment** and **limitations** (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the **integration** of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support **requirements** are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander's organization.

f. The supporting commander has the responsibility to **ascertain the needs** of the supported force and **take action to fulfill them** within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

g. Several **categories of support** have been defined for use within a combatant command to better characterize the support that should be given. These are shown in Figure III-4.



Figure III-4. Categories of Support

7. Other Authorities

Other authorities outside the command relations delineated above are described below.

a. **Administrative Control.** ADCON is the **direction or exercise of authority** over subordinate or other organizations **in respect to administration and support** including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in title 10, US Code. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. **ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander** at any echelon **at or below the level of Service component command.** ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

b. **Coordinating Authority.** Coordinating authority may be **exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.** Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of **two or more Military Departments** or **two or more forces of the same Service.** The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a **consultation relationship between commanders, not** an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more **applicable to planning** and similar activities than to operations, Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. **Assignment of coordinating authority** is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

c. **Direct Liaison Authorized.** DIRLAUTH is that **authority granted by a commander** (any level) to a subordinate to **directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency** within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more **applicable to planning** than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a **coordination relationship,** not an authority through which command may be exercised,



Figure IV-4. Subordinate Unified Command Organizational Options

assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned JOA or functional area. **The commanders of components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those listed for component commanders within a unified command.** The Service component commanders of a subordinate unified command will normally communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified command on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.

5. Joint Task Force

As shown in Figure IV-5, a **joint task force (JTF)** is a **joint force** that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (A naval force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps forces does not by itself constitute a joint task force.)

a. A JTF may be established on a **geographical area** or **functional basis** when the mission has a **specific limited objective** and does **not require overall centralized control of logistics.** The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. A JTF is **dissolved by the proper authority** when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

b. **The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces.**



Figure IV-5. Joint Task Force Organizational Options

c. The commander of a JTF **exercises OPCON** over assigned and normally **over** attached forces. The commander is responsible for making **recommendations to the superior commander** on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander. JTF commanders are also responsible to the establishing commander for the **conduct of joint training of assigned forces.**

d. The JTF commander may also be a **Service component commander.** When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for the forces belonging to the parent Service.

e. The commander of a joint task force will have a **joint staff** with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command.

SECTION B. THE COMMANDER, STAFF, AND COMPONENTS OF A JOINT FORCE

6. Commander Responsibilities

a. **Responsibilities of a Superior Commander.** Although specific responsibilities will vary, every **superior commander possesses the general responsibilities to provide the following:**

- **Timely communication** of clear-cut missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior's plan. Tasks must be realistic and leave the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.

- **Forces and other means** in a timely manner to immediate subordinates for accomplishing assigned tasks. This includes the requisite time to plan and prepare for military action.

- **All available information** to subordinates that bears on the changing situation including changes in plans, missions and tasks; resources; and friendly, enemy, and environmental situations.

- To **delegate authority** to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.

b. **Responsibilities of a Subordinate Commander.** In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, **all subordinate commanders possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following:**

- **The accomplishment of missions or tasks** assigned by the plans and orders of the superior. Wide latitude is normally given to the subordinate commander to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission: however, this latitude may be limited by coordinating directives issued by the superior commander to ensure effective joint operations. When required by a changing situation, a subordinate commander may depart in some measure from the plan if the action will not jeopardize friendly forces and is in the best interest of better accomplishing the overall objective. Any such departure from the plan by a subordinate commander should, if possible, be coordinated with other concerned commanders prior to departure from the plan. In addition, the departure must be communicated as soon as practicable to the superior.

- **Advice to the superior commander** regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to the subordinate command, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernment agencies, and other matters of common concern.

- **Timely information to the superior commander** relating to the subordinate commander's situation and progress.

c. **Responsibilities of Adjacent Commanders.** Commanders who share a **common superior** or a **common boundary possess the responsibility to provide for the following:**

- **Consider the impact** of one's own actions or inactions on adjacent commanders.

- **Timely information** to adjacent commanders regarding one's own intentions and actions, as well as those of nonmilitary agencies or of the enemy, which may influence adjacent activity.

- **Support** adjacent commanders **as** required by the common aim and the unfolding situation.

- **Coordinate the support** provided and received.

7. Staff of a Joint Force

"The military staff must be adequately composed: it must contain the best brains in the fields of land, air and sea warfare, propaganda war technology, economics, politics and also those who know the peoples' life."

General Erich von Ludendorff,
Total War (1935)

A joint staff should be established for **commands comprised of more than one Service.** The staff of the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, JTF, or subordinate fictional component (when a functional component

command will employ forces from more than one Service) must be composed of Service members that **comprise significant elements** of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that **Service representation** and **influence** generally reflect the **Service composition** of the force.

a. **Basic Doctrine**

- A JFC is authorized to **organize the staff** and **assign responsibilities** to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure **unity of effort** and **accomplishment of assigned missions.**

- A joint staff should be reasonably **balanced** as to **numbers, experience, influence of position,** and **rank of the members** among the Services concerned. In determining the composition of a joint staff, due regard should be given to the **composition of the forces** and the **character of the contemplated operations** to ensure the commander's staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component part of the force. The **number of personnel** on a joint staff should be kept to the **minimum** consistent with the task to be performed. For the staff to function smoothly and properly, the personnel who compose the joint staff should be assigned to it long enough to gain experience and be effective.

- **Each person assigned** to serve on a joint staff will be **responsible to the JFC** and should have thorough knowledge of the JFC's policies.

- The commander of a force for which a joint staff is established should ensure that the **recommendations of any member** of the staff **receive consideration.**

- **The degree of authority to act in the name of and for the commander is a matter to be specifically prescribed by the commander.**

- **Orders** and **directives** from a higher to a subordinate command should be **issued in the name of the commander** of the higher command **to the commander of the immediate subordinate command** and not directly to elements of that subordinate command. Exceptions may sometimes be required under certain emergency or crisis situations. Command and control of nuclear forces is an example of one such exception.

- To expedite the execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands, **a commander may authorize his staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands** concerning the details of plans and directives that have been received or are to be issued.

- **Each staff division must coordinate its actions and planning with the other staff divisions concerned** and keep them currently informed of actions taken and the progress achieved. Normally, each of the general joint staff divisions is assigned responsibility for a particular type of problem and subject and for coordinating the work of the special staff divisions and other agencies of the staff that relate to that problem or subject.

- **Joint staff divisions and special staff sections** should be **limited** to those functions for which the JFC is

responsible or that require the commander's general supervision in the interest of unity of effort.

- The authority that establishes a joint force should make the provisions for **furnishing necessary personnel** for the commander's staff.

b. **Staff Organization.** The staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in this section.

- **Principal Staff Officer.** The **Chief of Staff** functions as the **principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser** to the commander. The Chief of Staff coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. One or **more deputies** to the Chief of Staff and **a secretary** of the staff may be provided to assist the Chief of Staff in the performance of assigned duties. A deputy Chief of Staff should normally be from a Service other than that of the Chief of Staff. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the Chief of Staff and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records.

- **Personal Staff Group of the Commander. The commander's personal staff perform duties prescribed by the commander and are responsible directly to the commander.** This group, normally composed of **aides** to the commander and **staff officers** handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control, will usually include a political adviser and a public affairs officer.

- **Special Staff Group.** The special staff group consists of **representatives of technical or administrative services** and can include representatives from government or nongovernment agencies. The general functions of the special staff include **furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations** to the commander and other staff officers; **preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders** in which they have primary interest; and **coordinating and supervising the activities** for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of Service forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters. When a commander's headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions.

- **Joint Force Staff Divisions.** The general or joint staff group is made up of **staff divisions** corresponding to the major functions of command, such as **personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems.** The head of each staff division may be designated **as** a **Director** or as an **Assistant Chief of Staff.** The Directors or Assistant Chiefs of Staff provide staff super-vision for the commander of all activities pertaining to their respective functions.

•• **Manpower and Personnel Division (J-1).** The Manpower and Personnel Division is charged with **manpower management,** the formulation of **personnel policies,** and **supervision** of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command), and enemy prisoners of war. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the division should consider the established policies of the Military Departments.

•• **Intelligence Division (J-2).** The primary function of the Intelligence Division is to support the commander and the staff by ensuring the **availability of reliable intelligence** and timely **indications and warnings** on the characteristics of the area. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the Intelligence Division actively participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper enemy items of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The J-2 is responsible for the operation of the **Joint Intelligence Center** for the joint force commander.

•• **Operations Division (J-3).** The Operations Division assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations,** beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the division **plans, coordinates,** and **integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modem forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a Plans Division (J-5), it also performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the operation of the **Joint Operations Center** for the joint force commander.

•• **Logistics Division (J-4).** The Logistics Division is charged with the **formulation** of **logistic plans and** with the **coordination** and **supervision** of supply, maintenance. repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering. salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the established policies of the Military Departments should be considered. This division is responsible for **advising the commander** of the **logistic support** that can be provided for proposed courses of action. In general. this division formulates policies to ensure **effective logistic support** for all forces in the command and **coordinates execution** of the commander's policies and guidance.

•• **Plans and Policy Division (J-5).** The Plans and Policy Division assists the commander in **long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates** of the situation. The Plans and Policy Division may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses

to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When the commander does not organize a separate Plans and Policy Division, the planning functions are performed by the Operations Division.

- **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Division (J-6).** This division assists the commander in all responsibilities for **communications, electronics,** and **automated information systems.** This includes development and integration of C4 **architectures** and **plans** which support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as **policy** and **guidance** for **implementation** and integration of interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the mission. When a commander does not organize a separate C4 systems division, these functions may be performed by the Operations Division or by a special staff division or section.

8. Joint Command and Staff Process

a. **General.** The nature, scope, and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the commander to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. This may be viewed as part of a **continuing cycle,** \which is repeated when the situation changes significantly, The cycle may be deliberate or rapid, depending on the time available. However, effective decisionmaking and follow-through require that the basic process be understood by all commanders and staff officers and adapted to the prevailing situation. Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, **the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action; determine the course of action best suited for mission accomplishment; and carry out that course of action,** with adjustments as necessary, while **continuing to assess** the unfolding situation.

b. **Estimates, Decisions, and Directives.** These processes are iterative, beginning with the initial **recognition that the situation has changed** (e.g., change of mission, change in the friendly or enemy situation) requiring a new decision by the commander. **The staff assembles available information** regarding the enemy, friendly, and environmental situations and **assists the commander in analyzing the mission and devising courses of action. The staff then analyzes these courses of action and the commander makes a decision.** This decision identifies what the command is to do and becomes the **"mission" paragraph** of a plan or order. A format as depicted in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," may be used as a checklist to assist the staff and commander during the preparation of estimates and directives. Simulation and analysis capabilities can assist in correlation of friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses, as well as in analysis of courses of action.

c. **Follow-Through.** Having received and analyzed the mission, the commander determines how it will be accomplished and **directs subordinate commanders to accomplish certain tasks** that contribute to the common goal. Then **the commander** is responsible for carrying out the mission to **successful conclusion,** using supporting staff studies, coordination, and analysis relating to:

- Supervision of the conduct of operations.

- Changes to orders, priorities, and apportionment of support.

- Commitment and reconstitution of the reserve.

- After mission attainment, consolidation and refit in preparation for the next task.

9. Service Component Commands

A combatant command-level Service component command **consists of the Service component commander and all the Service forces,** such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations, including the support forces, **that have been assigned to a combatant command** or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force (forces assigned to the combatant commands are identified in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense). Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the Service component commander and contribute to the mission of the JFC. When a Service command is designated as the "Service component" to **multiple combatant commanders, the commander and only that portion of the commander's assets assigned to a particular CINC are under the command authority of that particular** CINC.

a. **Designation of Service Component Commanders.** With the exception of the commander of a combatant command and members of the command's joint staff, **the senior officer of each Service** assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is **designated the commander of the Service component** forces, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority, The assignment of any specific individual as a Service component commander of a combatant command is subject to the concurrence of the combatant commander.

b. **Responsibilities of Service Component Commanders.** Service component commanders have responsibilities that **derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services' support function.** The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. In the event that operational control of Service component forces is delegated by the JFC to a Service component commander of a subordinate joint force command, the authority of the Service component of the superior JFC is described as administrative control that includes responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions. **Service component commanders are responsible to the JFC for the following:**

- **Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment** of the forces of the Service component.

- **Accomplishing** such **operational missions** as may be assigned.

- **Selecting and nominating specific units** of the parent Service component **for assignment to other subordinate forces.** Unless otherwise directed. these units revert to the Service component commander's control when such subordinate forces are dissolved.

- **Conducting joint training,** including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service component's facilities and capabilities are suitable.

- **Informing their JFC** (and their combatant commander, if affected) **of planning for changes in logistic support** that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the combatant commander does not approve the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the combatant commander and the Service component commander, the combatant commander will forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component commanders will implement directives issued by the combatant commander.

- **Developing program and budget requests that** comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. The Service component commander will provide to the combatant commander a copy of the program submission prior to forwarding it to the Service headquarters. The Service component commander will keep the combatant commander informed of the status of combatant commander requirements while Service programs are under development.

- **Informing the combatant commander** (and any intermediate JFCs) **of program and budget decisions** that may affect joint operation planning. The Service component commander will inform the combatant commander of such decisions and of program and budget changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the combatant commander to express his views before final decision. The Service component commander will include in this information Service rationale for nonsupport of the combatant commander's requirements.

- **Providing,** as requested, **supporting joint operation and exercise plans with** necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the combatant commander.

c. **Service component commanders in joint forces at any level within a combatant command are responsible to the combatant command-level Service component commander for the following**

- **Internal administration and discipline.**

- **Training** in own Service doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques.

- **Logistic functions** normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority.

- **Service intelligence matters** and **oversight of intelligence activities** to ensure compliance with the laws, policies, and directives.

d. **Communication With a Chief of Service.** Unless otherwise directed by the combatant commander, the Service component commander will communicate through the combatant command on those matters over which the combatant commander exercises COCOM or directive authority. **On Service specific matters** such as personnel, administration, and unit training, the **Service component commander will normally communicate directly with the Chief of the Service,**

informing the combatant commander as the combatant commander directs.

e. Logistic Authority. The **operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised** by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the combatant commander. Joint force transportation policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System.

10. Functional Component Commands

Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTFs have the **authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations.** Functional component commanders have **authority over forces or military capability** made available to them. Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations **to perform operational missions** that may be of short or extended duration. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and **do not constitute a "joint force"** with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.)

a. The **JFC** establishing a functional component command has the **authority to designate its commander.** Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the command and control capabilities in selecting a commander.

b. The **responsibilities and authority** of a functional component command must be **assigned by the establishing JFC.** The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC.

c. The **JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking** by the functional component commander and the **appropriate command relationship(s)** the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., **a joint force special operations component commander** normally has **OPCON** of assigned forces and **a joint force air component commander is** normally delegated **TACON** of the sorties or other military capability made available).

d. The commander of a functional component command is **responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander** on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

e. **The functional component commander will normally be a Service component commander.** As a Service component commander. the functional component commander also has the **responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces.** When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the

constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned forces and the **responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders.**

f. When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, **the functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command** in order to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. **Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used** when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The **number of personnel** on this staff should be kept to the **minimum** and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.

SECTION C. DISCIPLINE AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

11. Responsibility

a. **Joint Force Commander.** The JFC is responsible for the **discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization.** In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization.

b. **Service Component Commander.** Each Service component commander in a combatant command is primarily responsible for the **internal administration and discipline** of that Service's component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the combatant commander. The JFC exercises disciplinary authority vested in the JFC by law, Service regulations, and superior authority in the chain of command.

c. **Method of Coordination.** The JFC should normally **exercise administrative and disciplinary authority through the Service component commanders** to the extent practicable. When this is impracticable, the JFC may establish **joint agencies responsible directly to the JFC** to advise or make recommendations on matters placed within their jurisdiction or, if necessary, to carry out the directives of a superior authority. A **joint military police force** is an example of such an agency.

12. Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ provides the basic law for discipline of the Armed Forces. The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (as amended), prescribes the rules and procedures governing military justice. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under article 22(a), UCMJ, and in Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 201(e)(2)(a) of the MCM, 1984, combatant commanders are given courts-martial jurisdiction over members of any of the Armed Forces. Pursuant to article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, subordinate JFCs of a detached command or unit have special courts-martial convening authority. Under RCM201(e)(2)(c), combatant commanders may expressly authorize subordinate JFCs who are authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such

courts-martial for the trial of members of other Armed Forces.

13. Rules and Regulations

Rules and regulations implementing the UCMJ and MCM are, for the most part, of single-Service origin. In **a joint force,** however, the **JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies** applicable to all Services' personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations should normally be published to cover hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market and currency control regulations, and other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

14. Jurisdiction

a. **More Than One Service Involved.** Matters that involve more than one Service or that occur outside a military reservation but within the jurisdiction of the JFC may be handled either by the **JFC** or by the **Service component commander** unless withheld by the JFC.

b. **One Service Involved.** Matters that involve only one Service, and occurring on the military reservation or within the military jurisdiction of that Service component, normally should be handled by the **Service component commander,** subject to Service regulations,

c. Establishment of Joint Military Police. The JFC may establish joint police agencies to **ensure consistent enforcement of military discipline** within the joint commander's area of responsibility or joint operations area. Joint police agencies will normally include members of all Services constituting the joint force. Members of the joint police agency will be **authorized to apprehend personnel of any Service** anywhere within the JFC's AOR/JOA, with due regard to host-nation law and applicable status-of-forces agreements. Establishing a joint police agency does not relieve the Service component commander of responsibility for enforcing discipline on the military reservation or within the military jurisdiction under the component's exclusive control. Responsibility for areas of overlapping disciplinary authority will be specified by the JFC.

d. **Action of Joint Military Police.** An offender apprehended by joint (or other than own Service) military police (or shore patrol) will be **turned over promptly to the offender's commanding officer, or** prompt notice of custody will be sent to the offender's unit or Service authority.

15. Trial and Punishment

a. **Convening Courts-Martial.** General courts-martial may be convened by the **commander of a combatant command.** An accused maybe tried by a court-martial convened by a member of a different Military Service when the court-martial is convened by a JFC who has been specifically empowered by statute, the President, the Secretary of Defense, or a superior commander under the provisions of the RCM, 201 (e)(2) of the MCM, to refer such cases for trial by courts-martial.

b. **Nonjudicial Punishment. The JFC may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any military personnel of the command,** unless such authority is limited or withheld by a superior commander. **The JFC will use the regulations of the offender's Service** when conducting nonjudicial punishment proceedings, including punishment, suspension, mitigation, and tiling. Except as noted below, appeals and other actions involving review of nonjudicial punishment imposed by a JFC will follow the

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Extract From JCS Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*

From JCS Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, 3* September 1991, chapters I through IV, and annex A to appendix E.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This publication establishes joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing, and redeploying a joint task force (JTF) for short-notice contingency operations. Information and procedures contained herein implement doctrine for JTFs set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

2. Applicability. Short-notice contingency operations potentially include a wide variety of military activities. These activities may involve ground, maritime, and aerospace Operations in any combination executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations. The command organization selected to execute a contingency operation depends primarily on the mission to be accomplished and the objectives to be attained in accomplishing the mission. Use of a JTF to execute a contingency operation is one of a variety of command organization options. This publication provides guidance when a JTF is the command organization selected to execute a short-notice (time-sensitive) contingency operation. The publication is intended to serve as an aid to the Joint Staff, JTF establishing authorities, JTF commanders and staffs, and supporting commanders and their staffs.

3. Authority. Joint Pub 0-2 states that "A joint task force (JTF) is a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force or two or more of these Services, that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a CINC, or by the commander of a subordinate unified command or an existing joint task force." When directed by the President, the Coast Guard will function as a part of the Navy and may have forces assigned or attached to a JTF.

4. Organization. This publication contains guidance and procedures involved in forming, staffing, deploying, employing, and redeploying a JTF. Chapter II describes the JTF purpose, responsibilities and authority, command relationships, organization, and establishment. Chapter 111 discusses JTF deployment, employment, and redeployment execution governed by the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Chapter IV discusses JTF HQ organization, functions, and liaison responsibilities. Appendixes A through H contain lists of staff responsibilities and selected checklists for JTF HQ staff consideration. Appendix J contains a sample CJCS WARNING ORDER. Appendix K lists reference information.

5. Terminology. The definitions contained in Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, " are applicable. Definitions applicable only in the context of this publication are provided in the glossary.

6. Special Planning Note. This publication is intended to be used in conjunction with the current Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and follow-on JOPES procedures. The overall JOPES planning process consists of five distinct and interrelated functions that govern both the crisis action planning process and the deliberate planning process. These five functions are Threat Identification and Assessment; Strategy Determination; Course of Action (COA) Development; Detailed Planning; and Implementation. The JOPES CAP process uses six phases: Situation Development; Crisis Assessment; COA Development; COA Selection; Execution Planning; and Execution. Figure I-1 provides a comparison between the functions of the JOPES deliberate planning process and the phases of the CAP process. (The conversion to JOPES will be complete with version 4, regarded as the initial operating capability (IOC), scheduled for early FY 1992.)

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

FIGURE I -1 JOPES Functional Comparison
Deliberate Planning VS. Crisis Actions Planning

CHAPTER II
THE JOINT TASK FORCE

1. Purpose. This chapter describes the JTF purpose, responsibilities and authority, command relationships, organization, and establishment.

2. General Guidance

a. Joint Pub 0-2 provides the following general guidance relating to JTFs:

"A JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving two or more Services on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved.

"The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces.

"The commander of a JTF exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces. The commander is charged with the responsibility for making recommendations to the superior commander on the proper employment of assigned forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander. JTF commanders are also responsible to the CINC for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.

"The JTF commander may also be a Service component commander. When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for the forces belonging to the parent Service."

b. Creating a JTF is but one subordinate command option available to a command authority. Where one commander may decide to use a JTF to accomplish a given mission, another may use a different subordinate command option to satisfy similar mission requirements.

3. Responsibilities and Authority. Following are major responsibilities and authority of the JTF establishing authority; commander, joint task force (CJTF); JTF component commanders; supported commanders; and supporting commanders:

a. JTF Establishing Authority

(1) Exercises operational control (OPCON) or Combatant Command (COCOM) of the JTF. COCOM is exercised solely by Combatant Commanders.

(2) Appoints CJTF.

(3) Assigns to CJTF the mission to be accomplished and objectives to be obtained.

(4) Defines the CJTF's area of responsibility in terms of geography and/or time (e.g., where and when military forces will be subject to the CJTF's command or control). The area of responsibility (AOR) should be assigned through the appropriate CINC and activated at the date and time specified by the establishing authority.

(5) Ensures the development and approval of rules of engagement (ROE) tailored to the situation.

(6) Determines, in coordination with CJTF, the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission and allocates or requests the forces.

(7) Monitors the operational situation and keeps superiors informed through periodic reports.

(8) Provides guidance to the CJTF (e.g., development of plans, planning guidelines, situations, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration, logistics, and organizational requirements).

(9) Informs CJTF of changes in plans and modifies mission and forces as necessary.

(10) Recommends to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding the various aspects of JTF operations.

(11) Ensures that administrative and logistic support is provided to the CJTF as required.

(12) Establishes or assists establishment of liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the crisis, contingency, or wartime operation.

(13) Determines if supporting forces are required. When forces are required, the JTF Establishing Authority prepares a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support (in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency)).

(14) Approves CJTF plans,

b. CJTF

(1) Exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces. CJTF is responsible for employment of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available to accomplish the assigned mission or objective according to guidance provided by the establishing commander.

(2) Develops a detailed plan within JOPES CAP guidelines for approval by the establishing authority. CJTF determines applicability of existing OPLANs, CONPLANS, and campaign plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of deliberate planning.

(3) Requests supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the assigned mission.

(4) Notifies the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned AOR.

(5) Ensures that cross-Service support is provided and the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting team. CJTF requests and coordinates the required administrative and logistic support activities of subordinate and supporting commands.

(6) Uses assigned forces to best perform the mission. The organizational form of the forces will depend on the mission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of the component elements of the forces assigned, and the phasing of the contemplated operation.

(7) Provides guidance to subordinate forces for the planning and conduct of combat operations. Responsibilities with respect to supporting forces are directed by the establishing authority.

(8) Monitors the operational situation and, as required, keeps the superior commander informed.

(9) Coordinates with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, as appropriate.

(10) Establishes, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

(11) Establishes the succession of command.

(12) Apportions to subordinate commanders, as necessary, those tasks needed to accomplish the plan.

c. JTF Component Commanders

(1) As authorized by CJTF, exercise OFCON of assigned and attached forces and control over supporting forces.

(2) As directed by CJTF, coordinate with commanders of other JTF components to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. Component commanders will coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

(3) Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.

(4) Monitor the operational situation and, as required, pass information to CJTF.

(5) Ensure administrative and logistic support of their respective forces, as required by Service regulations or as directed by CJTF. For greater efficiency, components may receive support from a single Service even though they may be constituted from more than one Service.

(6) Provide liaison personnel to CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by CJTF.

d. Supported Commander

(1) Exercises the degree of authority over supporting forces as determined by the common superior commander.

(2) Exercises general direction of the supporting effort as outlined in Joint Pub 0-2, unless otherwise prescribed.

e. Supporting Commanders

(1) Exercise OPCON (COCOM if the supporting commander is a Combatant Commander) over assigned and attached forces.

(2) Prescribe the tactics, methods, communications, and procedures to be employed by elements of the supporting force in fulfilling objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

(3) Coordinate with the supported commanders and other supporting commanders as necessary to ensure effective and efficient support.

(4) Monitor the operational situation and, as required, keep the supported commander informed.

(5) Provide liaison personnel to CJTF, JTF component commanders, and other supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by CJTF.

4. Command and Control

a. Composition of the JTF is delineated in the order establishing the force. A sample CJCS WARNING ORDER is provided in Annex A to Appendix J. Sample JTF command relationships for operations are shown in Figure II-1. Definitions and guidance applicable to command relationships are provided in Joint Pubs 1-02 and 0-2, respectively. CJTF exercises OPCON of assigned and attached forces through designated component commanders. Other forces may operate in support of, under the OPCON of, or under tactical control (TACON) of CJTF, as directed by the common superior commander. A coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. A coordinating authority is useful when coordination with two or more agencies is desired for a special common task without disturbing normal organizational relationships (in other matters). Authority for coordinating with external forces and/or foreign governments will be specified if required.

b. The common superior commander is responsible for determining the basis on which subordinate commanders will exercise command or control and for clearly assigning responsibilities, authorities, and command relationships in the directives issued to establish subordinate commands. The assignment of command relationships and the establishment of coordinating instructions are particularly important when commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.



LEGEND: ———— COCOM IAW JOINT PUB 0-2
– – – – – OPCON IAW JOINT PUB 0-2
. . . . . SERVICE ADMIN/LOGISTIC SUPPORT
·—·—·— SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

NOTE: This figure depicts a sample JTF organization. Expect the organization of each JTF to be unique, based primarily on the mission

1/ As appropriate--forces from two or more Services compose a JTF.
2/ Service admin/logistic support will be provided by appropriate Service component.
3/ Subordinate JTF (e.g., CJTF 100).
4/ Single-Service force.

Figure II-1. Sample JTF Command Relationships

FIGURE II-1 sample JTF command Relationships

c. OPCON may be delegated from the JTF commander to subordinate component commanders through the chain of command. When a superior grants authority not inherent in OPCON, such authority must be clearly specified. Likewise, any limitations on aspects of authority included in the basic definition of OPCON (e.g., organizational authority or directive authority for training) or any limitations by function, time, or location must be explicitly stated by the superior commander. If neither limitations nor additional authority are specified by the common superior commander, a subordinate commander exercises that authority delineated in the basic definition of OPCON. A JTF commander has full authority to organize all elements of assigned and attached forces as necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON will be exercised through the commanders of subordinate components. Normally, this authority will be exercised through Service component commanders.

d. The JTF commander may also exercise OPCON authority through functional component commanders. In designating functional component commanders, CJTF may assign a range of responsibilities as he deems appropriate to the situation, such as making recommendations on employment of forces and planning, coordinating, and conducting operations. The authority given to a functional component commander is commensurate with assigned responsibilities.

e. Special considerations are made for command and control of Marine Corps TACAIR in sustained operations ashore. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander that they are required for higher priority

missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in Joint Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." Joint Pubs 3-01.2, 3-03, and 3-56.23 contain more detailed discussions of command and control of Marine Corps TACAIR.

f. OPCON of special operations forces (SOF) may be further exercised through a subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander (see Figure II-1). The JSOTF may be specifically established as a joint organization to meet a specific task, or it may be formed around an existing force structure.

g. Commanders may decide to delegate to a subordinate commander authority different from that associated with OPCON. Three categories of such authority, in decreasing order, are attachment, support, and coordinating authority. These relationships are described in Joint Pub 0-2.

h. TACON provides authority that by definition is usually limited by location, function, and time. It provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. It does not provide organizational authority or the authority and responsibility for administrative and logistic support, which are retained by the commander of the parent unit unless otherwise specified by the delegating authority. TACON is particularly well suited to the local direction and control of elements (e.g., combat or combat support aviation) capable of rapid reaction to the tactical requirements of several commanders whose forces are dispersed over a large area.

i. Command relationships and procedures for changing the command relationships between the JTF and component and supporting commands should be specified by the applicable commanders before deployment begins.

5. JTF Organization

a. The mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained in accomplishment of the mission are the two most fundamental considerations in the establishment of command organization. Sound command organization provides for unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperability. Unity of effort is

necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces and can normally be achieved by clear communication of CJTF's intent to subordinate commands. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. Common doctrine is essential for mutual understanding and confidence between a commander and assigned subordinates, and among the subordinates themselves, so that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions. Command emphasis on interoperability will result in enhanced joint warfighting capabilities. Factors determining the organizational structure of a JTF (see Joint Pub 0-2) include:

(1) Responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned to the commander.

(2) The nature and scope of the operations.

(3) The forces (by characteristic, Service, and identity) available or to be made available.

(4) Geography.

(5) Enemy forces.

(6) Time available.

(7) Manner in which the commander decides to fulfill the mission.

b. The JTF commander may exercise OPCON through:

(1) Service component commanders.

(2) Functional component commanders (e.g., JFSOCC), if established for a particular operational purpose (see Joint Pub 0-2).

(3) A single-Service force reporting directly to the CJTF. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. Under exceptional circumstances, CJTF may establish a separate single-Service force.

(4) The commander of a subordinate JTF who reports directly to CJTF.

(5) Attaching elements of one force to another force.

(6) Retaining direct command of specific operational forces that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the commander.

c. Organizational Structure

(1) In Figure II-1, the CJTF has organized his subordinate commands using various options. Each component is under the OPCON of the CJTF, and the CJTF is under the COCOM of the CINC. A CJTF may also be a superior commander of a subordinate JTF. In that case, OPCON of assigned and attached forces will also be delegated to the subordinate CJTF. The JTF component commands will normally receive administrative and logistic support from their Service components supporting CJTF's superior commander or from Service components within the JTF.

(2) When both Service and functional component commands are included in the organizational structure of the JTF, the balance of Service forces or command and control capabilities should be the primary factors in selecting the functional component commander.

(3) If dual-hatting a component commander, the scope of assigned responsibilities, planned level of activity, arid any augmentation requirements should also be considered (e.g. , the Air Force component commander may be dual hatted if assigned as the area air defense commander (AADC) and/or joint force air component commander (JFACC)).

(4) Other command relationships may exist where supporting agencies and commands provide support or assistance to the CJTF or JTF subordinate component forces under the command relationships of attachment, support, or coordinating authority. A JTF may be organized with two or more Service components; however, Navy and Marine Corps forces are normally considered as one Service component when employed together and do not constitute a JTT.

6. JTF Establishment. The requirement for a JTF may be identified in either the deliberate planning process or the CAP process. Optimally, however, it should be established before or during CAP Phase III, COA Development, to allow the designated JTF commander and his staff to participate in the remainder of the CAP process (Figures II-2 and II-3 outline the CAP sequence of events).

a. CAP begins when a significant incident or event is reported to an appropriate government agency and ends when the crisis is resolved or forces are withdrawn.

b. Once CAP is activated, effective interaction is essential to optimize information flow and coordinate planning activities among NCA, Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, combatant commands, CJTF, designated forces, and other members of the joint planning and execution community. The CJTF staff must maintain a close relationship with the supported commander's staff during CAP Phases III-VI to ensure that planning activities are coordinated.

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	COA Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
• Event Perception • Problem Recognition • CINC's Assessment • CJCS-NCA Assessment	• Increased Reporting • CJCS-NCA Evaluation • NCA Crisis Decision	• CJCS Warning Order • JTF Establishment (optimal time) • COAs Developed - Major Forces - Support • COAs Evaluated • JOPES Data base Established • USTRANSCOM Deployment Estimates • Commander's Estimate	• Joint Staff Refine and Present COAs • NCA COA Decision	• CJCS Planning and/or Alert Order • JOPES Data base Completed • OPORD Developed • Force Preparation • Deployability Posture Reporting • NCA Execute Decision	• CJCS Execute Order • Execute OPORDs • JOPES Data base Updated • Reporting

Figure II-2. Phases of the Crisis Action Planning Process

Figure II-2, Phases of the Crisis Action Planning Process

CHAPTER III

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. This chapter describes how CJTF may prepare for and execute deployment, employment, and redeployment operations during crisis action situations.

2. Crisis Action Planning Process. Once the JTF is formed, CJTF participates in crisis action planning activities. During CAP Phase V (Execution Planning), the supported commander's crisis action staff publishes the supported commander's OPORD. CJTF conducts parallel, but mere detailed, execution planning and normally issues a supporting CJTF OPORD with detailed instructions to subordinates. (See Joint Pub 5-03.1, "JOPES Volume I," and Joint Pub 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)," for JOPES and JRS procedures.) Explicit provision should be made for CJTF input to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network (WIN) and the JOPES data base. Several of the key tasks the CJTF must plan for are listed in Appendix A (CJTF Key Task Checklist).

3. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. JOPES provides the capability to construct an automated deployment data base designed to interface with management systems of the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, USTRANSCOM, and Defense agencies. The CJTF and component commanders use JOPES for crisis action planning, involving COA development, detailed deployment planning, execution, and redeployment operations. JOPES is used, beginning with CAP Phase III, to assist in COA development by coordinating and providing force and deployment data, deployment estimates, transportation feasibility studies, etc. During deployment execution, JOPES provides Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, and the NCA the capability to monitor and control the deployment. Explicit provision should be made for CJTF to make inputs via WIN. Equipment and trained JOPES operators should be made available to CJTF if the mission requires JOPES capability. If physical constraints or other factors preclude JOPES equipment and operators from being assigned to the JTF HQ, the establishing authority will make explicit provision for CJTF to make input to the JOPES data base.

a. Normally, a JTF will be established by a CJCS WARNING or PLANNING Order. However, the JTF interface with USTRANSCOM depends on how the JTF is formed.

(1) If the JTF is preplanned, its movement requirement tasks may have been assigned by either OPLAN or CONPLAN. In this case, the interface with USTRANSCOM was previously established through the JOPES deliberate planning process.

(2) If the JTF is established to conduct operations outside the theater of a CINC and no OPLAN or CONPLAN has been developed, the crisis action planning tasks are the responsibility of the CJTF.

(3) If the JTF is subordinate to a CINC and no OPLAN or CONPLAN has been developed, JOPES requirements are the CINC's responsibility.

b. Under options one or two above (i.e., a previously established JTF or JTF created for a specific COA outside a CINC's AOR), the CJTF is responsible for requirements entered into the JOPES data base. JTF movement requirements must be entered in sufficient detail (e.g., level IV) in accordance with JOPES procedures.

4. Deployment Considerations. The JTF HQ may be structured for incremental deployment . Each deployment increment should include a capability to command and control forces assigned to or supporting CJTF and should come complete with logistic, communications, and security support. The design of each increment should consider the mission and whether forced entry into the AOR is required. It also should be noted that an afloat JTF organization will normally not deploy incrementally.

a. Initial Command and Control. Command and control of the deployment should remain with the superior commander or with the CJTF at his predeployment headquarters until sufficient JTF HQ deployment increments have closed at forward locations to provide the C3 capabilities required to control deployed or deploying forces.

b. Liaison Increment. When directed by CJTF, a liaison increment may deploy in advance of the JTF HQ. This increment is not designed for, nor is it capable of, the command and control of combat operations. It acts as an advance party for the JTF and assists in receiving the forces. In addition, it acts as an interface between local US and foreign agencies, often serving as a forerunner to a military coordinating committee (MCC).

c. Initial JTF HQ Increment-Advanced Echelon (ADVON). This increment should provide a minimum capability for command and control during the buildup of the JTF. It must be designed for the planned method of insertion (e.g., airborne, amphibious).

5. Detailed Deployment Planning. When notified by the Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM forms a crisis action team (CAT) to monitor the WIN teleconference established for the JTF and to provide the CJTF with the capability to build requirements in the JOPES data base. The CAT ensures the accuracy of the JOPES data base (OPLAN or no-plan) and assists in COA development. During CAP Phase V, Execution Planning, the CAT dispatches deployment coordinating instructions to the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) and coordinates airlift and sealift movement schedules. The JOPES capability available to assist the CJTF during detailed deployment planning is discussed below.

a. COA Development. During COA development, the CINC or CJTF, if appointed, is responsible for entering movement requirements into the JOPES data base. Members of the JPEC use movement requirement data to analyze the various courses of action. This analysis includes transportation feasibility, shortfall identification and resolution, constraints analysis, deployment estimates, coordination with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM component commands to pre-position common-user lift assets before execution, etc. This information is made available for inclusion in the Commander's Estimate.

b. Execution Planning. The execution planning phase represents refinement of gross planning conducted during COA development. During this phase, USTRANSCOM is the focal point for the JPEC. The CJTF ensures the refinement of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) in the JOPES data base, which includes combat, combat support, combat service support, and nonunit resupply and personnel. Initial nonunit resupply and personnel movement requirements are only estimates of what will be required during execution. TPFDD refinement can be initiated by loading an existing OPLAN or by creating a new OPLAN data base. The CINCs or commanders, supporting commanders, Services, and logistic agencies validate availability and source the CJTF's requirements. USTRANSCOM components, Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and Military Sealift Command (MSC), provide movement schedules for the requirements in the sequence requested by the CJTF. Initially, USTRANSCOM will focus on the first 3 to 7 days of air movements, including surface movements to aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and 30 days of sea movements. Additionally, USTRANSCOM provides the central point of contact for agencies preparing to support the deployment. Throughout the execution planning phase, USTRANSCOM will provide daily deployment situation reports (SITREPs) and ensure that the JOPES data base is kept current (see JOPES, Volume I, for more information).

6. Deployment Execution

a. Deployment begins as specified in the CJCS EXECUTE or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. USTRANSCOM monitors and provides to CJTF the status of MAC, MSC, MTMC, and organic movements from departure to arrival in the theater of operations. USTRANSCOM also maintains the joint deployment data base and provides analysis to the Joint Staff, supported commander, and CJTF. This analysis includes progress reports, status, problems, force closure, port workloads, daily movement statistics, and resolution of problems encountered with common-user transportation means. USTRANSCOM also provides CJTF with a capability to change or delete requirements during main force deployment. Any changes to main forces need to be accomplished as soon as possible to prevent allocation of lift assets that could have a detrimental impact on deployment. Relevant changes should be coordinated in the WIN teleconference established for the JTF to ensure the deployment community is kept informed.

b. Execution (CAP Phase VI) may be ordered without the benefit of the planning accomplished in CAP Phases I through V. In this case, execution and planning occur simultaneously. Upon receipt of the CJCS Execute Order, USTRANSCOM's actions are focused on deployment. If the CJCS Execute Order is received before completion of execution planning, USTRANSCOM will provide all available deployment information. Procedures for coordinating and monitoring deployment of non-unit-related personnel and resupply are also provided.

7. Employment Responsibilities. CJTF responsibilities during employment include:

a. Force and Resource Monitoring and Management. Monitoring the current status of assigned forces and their resources and providing information to aid in the allocation and movement of forces and material.

b. Planning. Preparing plans relative to current and future operations.

c. Execution. Directing the implementation of operation orders and monitoring the current ground, naval, and aerospace situation; ensuring support for combat operations; and reviewing the enemy threat and issuing follow-on orders, as appropriate.

d. Reporting. Submitting reports to the supported commander and heads of other agencies as prescribed in Joint Pub 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), General Instructions," and other directives.

8. Redeployment Considerations. Redeployment may be directed when operations have terminated or movement of the JTF is directed by higher authority. Commanders should make the same considerations for redeployment as for deployment in regard to phasing of command, combat, combat support, and combat service support elements out of the joint operations area. The JOPES will be used to provide redeployment status and to schedule common-user lift assets.

CHAPTER IV

THE JTF HQ

1. Purpose. This chapter discusses how a typical JTF HQ may be organized. It provides a guide for the CJTF and outlines the general functions of the HQ staff and specific functions of the chief of staff. Guideline staff functions, by "J" directorate, are addressed in Appendixes B through G. Procedures for liaison officers are in Appendix H.

2. JTF Headquarters Organization. The CJTF may organize his joint staff as he considers necessary to carry out his duties and responsibilities. When mission requirements exceed the JTF staff's capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), assistance must be requested through the superior commander. The authority establishing the JTF should make provision to furnish the necessary personnel, facilities, or equipment. Composition, location, and facilities of the JTF HQ will have a major influence on what CJTF and his staff can accomplish (e.g., an afloat JTF HQ may have limitations of space and equipment on certain flag ships, which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities). A sample organization structure for a JTF HQ is shown in Figure IV-1.

a. The establishing authority should use the force module concept as defined in the Glossary in staffing a JTF HQ. Whether developing joint or OPLAN-dependent force modules, commands should consider using a building-block approach to module construction. Force modules should progress from a basic command and joint. staff element, primarily manned from within the superior commander's headquarters, to elements that require staff augmentation from all components.

b. Each JTF HQ force module may consist of up to five major elements:

(1) Command and Joint Staff. This element consists of the command section and functional and special staff elements. It may require augmentation from Service component staffs and should consist of an ADVON staff designed to precede any JTF HQ module. Planning for the manning of JTF HQ staffs should cover the spectrum of anticipated operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), in a permissive environment or disaster relief to combat operations requiring a much larger HQ staff.

(2) Augmentation Detachments. These units are added to the JTF HQ to enhance its capability in technical and specialized areas. Examples are civil affairs,



Figure IV-1. Sample HQ JTF Staff Organization

FIGURE IV-1. Sample HQ JTF Staff Organization

psychological operations, mortuary affairs, and subarea petroleum office. Required specialized units should be planned for with joint unit type codes (UTC) or Service UTCs.

(3) Communications Support. Communications support may be available to a JTF from the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) or other CJCS-controlled communications resources. Procedures for requesting CJCS communications support are contained in CJCS MOP 3. CJCS communications capabilities are discussed in the Joint Pub 6-05 series, "Joint Communications Systems." A deployable WWMCCS terminal with supporting personnel is required for all modules. Minimum support packages for the ADVON through the largest elements should be planned.

(4) HQ Support and Sustainment. HQ support includes administrative and logistic support for the JTF HQ and attached elements. UTCs for all stages of support and sustainment of JTF HQ should be planned.

(5) Security Support. The inclusion of security forces in all HQ JTF planning is essential. Security elements should be modularized to provide compatible support to all JTF elements, depending on the threat assessment.

3. JTF HQ Functions. Functions of the JTF HQ may include:

a. Collective Staff

(1) Planning for deployment, employment, and redeployment of the JTF.

(2) Assisting the CJTF to direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned forces and to coordinate planning activities of subordinate component. commands.

(3) Developing courses of action and conducting staff estimates on COAs.

(4) Preparing plans or orders based on CJTF's decisions concerning COAs.

(5) Providing information to supporting or adjacent commands.

(6) Coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned.

(7) Coordinating with friendly forces and/or foreign governments when required by the order establishing the JTF.

(8) Monitoring accomplishment of the commander's decisions.

b. Chief of Staff. The chief of staff is normally the principal staff officer assistant and adviser to the commander and coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. His responsibilities may include:

(1) Representing CJTF when authorized.

(2) Approving actions, orders, and plans when authorized by CJTF; otherwise, obtaining the commander's approval.

(3) Ensuring that CJTF's decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities when necessary.

(4) Directing the JTF staff operations.

[5) Formulating and announcing staff policies.

(6) Reviewing staff actions to ensure that they are adequate and coordinated.

(7) Maintaining a master policy file and monitoring standing operating procedures.

(8) Ensuring required liaison is established with supporting agencies and commands, host nations, the US Embassy, Military Advisory Group, intelligence agencies, and any other required outside agency.

4. JTF Liaison

a. Past JTF operations have shown that qualified liaison officers (LNOs) contribute significantly to mission success. CJTF should consider the requirement for LNOs early in the planning process. Liaison should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting or assigned forces and the JTF HQ. LNOs to the CJTF HQ perform their duties within the JTF staff division that is normally responsible for JTF functions related to the LNOs' assigned duties. LNOs are representatives of their commanders and will normally attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JTF joint operations center (JOC) staff (see Annex A to Appendix D). LNOs function as prescribed by their parent

organizations, with the concurrence of the commander to whom they are assigned to assist. When working with foreign governments and their military units, a military coordinating committee, composed primarily of LNOs, is often required to coordinate plans and operations.

b. LNOs must be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services. Without these qualifications, LNOs are of little value to the gaining headquarters. Specific liaison procedures are in Appendix H.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX E

JOINT LOGISTIC CENTERS, OFFICES, AND BOARDS

Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards. Following are examples of joint logistic centers, offices, and boards that may be established by CJTF to coordinate the JTF logistic effort:

a. Joint Movement Center (JMC)

(1) The JMC is established under the supervision of the JTF J-4 to implement the tasking and priorities provided by CJTF.

(2) The JMC coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support CJTF's concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of strategic or theater transportation policies within the assigned AOR, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by CJTF. Joint Pub 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System," provides joint transportation procedures for use of common-user lift assets and should be consulted by the JTF logistic planner.

(3) The J-4 directs or recommends to the CJTF, as appropriate, courses of action with respect to allocation of common-user transportation capabilities when movement requirements exceed capability or when competing requirements result in unresolved conflicts.

(4) Functions and responsibilities of the JMC. While functions may differ, depending on circumstances, the JMC will normally:

(a) Interface with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies.

(b) Make recommendations concerning the validation and approval of airlift requests within the assigned AOR (excluding requests for movement over normally scheduled routes).

(c) Analyze user capabilities to ship, receive and handle cargo and recommend solutions to shortfalls.

(d) Advise the J-4 on transportation matters that would adversely affect combat contingency operations.

(e) Serve as the liaison with the host nation(s) for transportation issues.

(f) Disseminate information concerning host-nation transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel.

(5) Communication links that may be required to support the JMC are:

(a) With each of the transportation control elements (e.g., movement control center (MCC), airlift control center (ALCC), the water terminal clearance authority (WTCA), and others, as appropriate).

(b) With each Service component.

(c) Directly with USTRANSCOM and the transportation component commands (MAC, MSC, and MTMC).

b. Logistic Staff Officer for Petroleum and Subarea Petroleum Office

(1) Normally, the JTF logistic staff officer for petroleum can rely on the unified command Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) for wholesale bulk petroleum management support. Primary duties of the JTF logistic staff officer for petroleum are as follows (see Joint Pub 4-03, "Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine," for additional guidance):

(a) Coordinate petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) planning and mission execution matters.

(b) Coordinate the supply of common bulk petroleum and packaged petroleum products to JTF components.

(c) IAW DOD 4140.25M, coordinate with Service components in determining requirements for bulk petroleum that must be obtained from in-country commercial sources.

(d) Recommend necessary reallocation and apportionment of petroleum products and facilities to CJTF.

(e) Coordinate quality surveillance and procurement inspection programs.

(2) When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk petroleum in the JTF area

of operations, the JTF J-4, in coordination with the area JPO, may establish a Subarea Petroleum Office (SAPO). Staff augmentation will be provided by *Service* components. The primary function of the SAPO is to discharge the staff petroleum logistic responsibilities of the JTF. The SAPO will conform to the administrative and technical procedures established by the combatant command and the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) in DOD 4140.25M. Key duties of the SAPO are as follows:

(a) Review and consolidate area resupply requirements through the JPO to the DFSC.

(b) Release or reallocate pre-positioned theater war reserve material stocks (PWRMS).

(c) Notify the J-4, Joint Staff, by message when any item in the theater PWRMS (wholesale or retail) is used.

(d) Assist the DFSC in executing applicable support responsibilities in the AOR.

(e) Take continuous action to identify and submit requirements to host nations for petroleum logistic support.

c. Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)

(1) The JCMEB establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the assigned AOR.

(2) The JCMEB is a temporary board, activated by the CJTF and staffed by personnel from the components and agencies or activities in support of the CJTF.

(3) The JCMEB arbitrates all issues referred to it by the Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) and, if appropriate, assumes responsibility for the preparation of the Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP).

(4) The JCMEB will coordinate its activities with the regional or theater wartime construction managers (RWCM or TWCM) having responsibility for the assigned AOR. Construction and engineering requirements that the JCMEB cannot satisfy from within JTF resources will be elevated to the RWCM or TWCM for support.

d. Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)

(1) The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with JCMEB priorities.

(2) The JFUB is activated on order of the CJTF and chaired by the JTF J-4, with members from components and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs).

(3) The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the taskings of the JCMEB.

(4) JFUB actions will be guided by the provisions of Joint Pub 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Engineering Support."

e. CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB)

(1) Commanders coordinate contracting operations within their commands. This requirement may be met through the CLPSB, which is a temporary board designed to achieve a properly coordinated acquisition program.

(2) The CLPSB is chaired by a representative from J-4 and includes representation from each of the component commands.

(3) CLPSB functions:

(a) Coordinates with US Embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services, and for operations by contractors performing under US contracts.

(b) Arranges for single-Service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services, when appropriate.

(c) Provides an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.

(d) Provides guidance on the consolidation of purchases.

(e) Establishes procedures to coordinate procurement with the supply operations of the commander and area.

(f) Prescribes payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.

(g) Promulgates, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for Third World country national and indigenous employees, in coordination with appropriate agencies.

f. Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO). The JMRO is under the control of the JTF surgeon and coordinates and controls the movement of patients within and out of the assigned AOR. Area JMROs may be established, depending on the operational situation. The JMRO should be task organized to maintain flexibility in response to the tactical situation and mission of the JTF.

g. Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO)

(1) The JBPO, under the operational control of the JTF surgeon, is task organized to meet operational requirements, and is staffed by representatives from each Service who are knowledgeable in blood bank techniques.

(2) The JBPO plans, coordinates, and directs the handling, storage, and distribution of blood and blood components within the assigned AOR. It consolidates and forwards requirements for resupply to the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO).

(3) Area JBPO will be activated on order of CJTF if the station dictates.

h. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO)

(1) COMARFOR is routinely designated executive agent for the JTF mortuary affairs program, which includes the establishment and operation of the JMAO under the staff supervision of the JTF J-4.

(2) The JMAO plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs including graves registration, return of remains, and concurrent return programs. The JMAO will provide guidance to facilitate conduct of all mortuary programs and to maintain data (as required) pertaining to recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the assigned AOR. The JMAO will

serve as the central clearing point for all mortuary affairs information and will monitor the deceased/missing personal effects program.

(3) The JMAO is activated by order of CJTF and staffed by personnel of the Services, combatant commands, or component commands.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Extract From AFSC Pub 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces*

Marine Corps Roles and Functions

The Marine Corps is unique among the Armed Services. Its force structure is detailed by public law in Title 10, U.S. Code, which legislates the following:

- The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three aircraft wings, and such other land combat. aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.

- The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components. for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

- In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

- The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces.

- The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 expands on the statutory guidance for Marine Corps primary combatant functions as follows:

The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, includes expeditionary land combat, combat support. combat service support, and aviation forces. The Marine Corps is responsible for the preparation of combined arms forces necessary to effectively prosecute war and military operations short of war.

NOTE: The term, Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), contained in this reading, is now an obsolete term. It has been replaced by marine expeditionary force (forward).

From AFSC Pub 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces,* April 1992, chapter 2, pp 12-2-1 through 1-2-24.

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Primary Functions of the Marine Corps

To organize. train, equip, and provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms for prompt and sustained operations with the fleet-specifically, expeditionary forces for the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and the conduct of land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, including, but not limited to, the following:

amphibious operations
naval expeditionary operations
airborne operations in support of naval forces
electronic warfare operations in support of naval forces
aerial refueling operations in support of naval forces
intelligence operations in support of naval forces
land- and sea-based air operations in support of naval forces
land-based defense of advanced naval bases
aerial photography/reconnaissance in support of naval forces

To develop those doctrines, procedures, and equipment for all land forces that arc common to amphibious operations.

To providc detachments for service on armed vessels of the Navy and for the protection of naval stations and bases.

To participate in the development of joint doctrine.

Collateral Functions of the Marine Corps

To organize, train, equip, and provide combined arms forces to support land and space operations. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:

airborne/airmobile forces in support of land operations
air operations m support of land forces
land and air defense of the continental United States
special operations
forces for the occupation of territories abroad. including the establishment of temporary military governments
antisubmarine warfare operations
minelaying and controlled minefield operations
protection of shipping operations

In Joint Pub 0-2, *UNAAF,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff give additional amplification regarding Marine Corps responsibilities. which include the following:

● Designation of an appropriate command or agency responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations.

● Limitation of training and equipment for airborne operations to the transportation of Marine Corps forces by air, unless otherwise authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Marine Corps Manual adds three more functions:

● Maintain a Marine Corps Reserve for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security may require.

● Provide Marine officer and enlisted personnel in support of the Department of State security program overseas. This derives from a Secretary of the Navy task assignment based on the provisions of 10 USC 5983.

● Organize Marine aviation, as a collateral function, to participate as an integral component of naval aviation in the execution of such other Navy functions as the fleet commanders may direct.

U.S. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING STRUCTURE

As required by law, the Marine Corps has assigned all combat forces to the combatant commands. This is done by assigning forces to the fleet Marine Forces of the gaining commands: Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant), under the combatant command of USCINCLANT [Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM)], and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac). under the combatant command of USCINCPAC.

Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Europe (Designate) (FMFEur) is the general staff for Commanding General FMFEur (Designate). It coordinates matters involving Marine forces committed to EUCOM in wartime. When Marine forces deploy to EUCOM, the Commandant can activate this headquarters as FMFEur under the combatant command of EUCOM.

In addition, the Marine Corps, in fulfilling its Service responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping forces, has conducted extensive Service planning to support the joint and combined warfighters. This is to offer flexible, capable, useful, and sustainable forces for deployment across the spectrum of conflict. Strategic deployability and expeditionary character are hallmarks of the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps continues to focus its training and forces on furnishing expeditionary forces to meet the national defense needs of the future. Over the years this focus had led to the development of a unique organization for combat, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

The value of the MAGTF is measured in terms of presence, potential, and power. and its primary utility is in its “Fleet landing force” posture. When the MAGTF is embarked aboard amphibious shipping, close at hand and ready to strike, the enemy has to be concerned about all potential landing points, the speed with which those points can be attacked, and the combat power and sustainability that the MAGTF can bring to bear at one or more points. Marine forces have a vital role to play in both naval and land campaigns.

Given a mission, the Marine Corps organizes for combat by forming its forces into integrated combined arms MAGTFs specifically tailored to accomplish that mission. MAGTFs are task-organized for rapid deployment by airlift and/or sealift. They give the combatant commander a readily available, self-sustaining, combined arms combat force capable of conducting amphibious operations and defending advanced naval bases in support of naval campaigns.

The MAGTF is also capable of sustained operations ashore in support of a land campaign. MAGTFs can operate as the landing force of an amphibious task force; as a part of a joint, multi-Service, or combined task force; as a single-Service command; and across the spectrum of conflict.

● The Command Element (CE) is the MAGTF headquarters. It is composed of the commander, the general or executive and special staff sections, the headquarters section with requisite communications and service support facilities, and the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group or detachment. It furnishes the command, control, and coordination essential for effective planning and execution of operations.

● The Ground Combat Element (GCE) may be composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support units organized to conduct ground operations. It is formed around an infantry organization and vanes in size from a unit smaller than an infantry battalion to one or more Marine divisions.

● The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) maybe composed of the aviation command (including air control agencies), combat support, and combat service support units organized to conduct aviation operations required to support the MAGTF mission. Aviation operations may include all or a portion of the functions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and size of the MAGTF and its mission. The ACE, organized around an aviation headquarters, varies in size from an aviation detachment to one or more Marine aircraft wings.

Elements of a MAGTF *Figure I-2-1*



— MAGTF aviation is an integral part of naval aviation. It is organized, trained, and equipped to support the commander's objectives as part of an air-ground team. Operating as part of this concerted air-ground effort, MAGTF aviation has a powerful and direct effort in ensuring success in battle by striking the enemy whenever it is vulnerabIe and defending against the full range of threats.

— The ACE is task-organized to perform all or part of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees depending on the tactical situation and the MAGTF mission and size.

● The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) is organized to offer the full range of combat service support functions and capabilities necessary to support the MAGTF mission. The combat service support functions may include supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health service, and other miscellaneous services. The CSSE may vary in size from a combat service support detachment (C S SD) to a force service support group (FSSG).

TYPES OF MAGTFs

Four types of MAGTFs may be formed in support of national military strategy and Fleet and combatant CINC requirements. They range in size from small Special Purpose Forces (SPF) formed for specific mission or contingencies, through routinely forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and rapidly deployable and employable Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), to very powerful Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) capable of prosecuting operational campaigns against the most potent threat.

AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (ATF/MEF)
(30,000 to 60,000 Marines and Sailors)

Built around Divisions, Air Wings. and Force Service Support Groups

44-56	Amphibious ships
1-2	Tank battalions (70 tanks/battalion)
250-300	Helicopters
75-100	Medium and heavy artillery pieces
125-175	Tactical aircraft (USMC)
1-2	Assault amphibious battalions
2-4	Carrier air wings (USN)

Figure I-2-3

The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 30,000-60,000 Marines and sailors. is the largest and most powerful of the MAGTFs. It may range in size from less than one division to several infantry divisions and air wings, together with a force service support group. With 60 days of sustainability, a MEF is capable of conducting a wide range of expeditionary and amphibious operations in any geographic environment.

AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (ATG/MEB)
(4,000 to 18,000 Marines and Sailors)

Built around 2-5 Infantry Battalions, Marine Aircraft Group, and Brigade Service Support Group

15-21	Amphibious ships
17-34	Medium tanks
75-120	Helicopters
24-42	Artillery pieces
45-65	Tactical aircraft (USMC)
20-30	Assault amphibian vehicles
1-2	Carrier air wings (USN)

Figure I-2-4

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), with 4,000-18,000 Marines and sailors, is a MAGTF normally organized from a reinforced infantIryregiment, an aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. MEBs may be forward-deployed on amphibious shipping, deployed by strategic airlift to fall in on pre-positioned equipment and supplies, or deployed by strategic airlift. For sustained operations ashore the MEB may serve as the forward echelon of a MEF. Like the MEF, the MEB has special operations capabilities derived from the enhanced training and equipment within its organization. MEBs deploy with 30 days of sustainability.

AMPHIBIOUS TASK UNIT/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (ATU/MEU)
(1,000 to 4,000 Marines and Sailors)

Built around Infantry Battalion, Composite Aircraft Squadron, and MEU Service Support Group

4-7	Amphibious ships
5-10	Medium tanks
20-26	Helicopters
6-12	Artillery pieces
10-15	Assault amphibian vehicles
	USN and USMC tactical aircraft as available/required

Figure I-2-5

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with 1,000-4,000 Marines and sailors, is a MAGTF normally composed of a reinforced battalion, a helicopter squadron reinforced with deployed and on-ca!l CONUS-based fixed-wing air assets. and a service support group. The MEU is routinely forward-deployed as the immediately responsive, on-scene, sea-based Marine component of the Fleet commander's amphibious and power projection forces. Today, MEUs are forward-deployed in the Mediterranean and the Pacific aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping. The MEU is task-organized. trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional and specialized operations. For sustained operations ashore, the MEU may serve as the forward echelon of a MEB. The MEU, like other MAGTFs, also can deploy on very short notice by a mix of tactical and strategic airlift for contingencies in support of fleet and combat ant CINCs. ARG/MEUs normally carry 15 days of sustainability.

The MEU (SOC) (i.e., Special Operations Capable) is a task-organized, forward-deployed MAGTF. A contingency force, it is normally embarked aboard four to seven amphibious ships. It is task-organized to accomplish selected mission requirements. The MEU (SOC) is structured, trained, and positioned for the specific purpose of giving the fleet commander a force capable of timely response to a wide variety of contingencies.

The MEU (SOC) is not a special operations force. However, through enhanced training and additional equipment. it can achieve the capability to accomplish selected maritime special operations. MEUs (SOC) are routinely deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The general mission of the MEU (SOC) is to furnish an immediate response capability across a wide spectrum of crisis contingencies by conducting a variety of operational missions. These missions include the following:

- Amphibious raids. Conducted on short notice at night, under emergency conditions, via helicopter and/or surface means, from extended ranges.

- Show-of-force operations. Demonstrating the willingness of the United States to protect its interests and political resolve.

- Security operations. Conducted in a foreign environment to protect U.S. property and noncombatants, maintain a local security perimeter, and give personal protection to designated individuals.

- Mobile training teams. Training and educating foreign military units concerning weapons, equipment, and basic combat skills.

- Civic action operations. Furnishing medical and dental care, limited engineering, and minor construction repair of civilian facilities.

- Hostage rescue. Conducting a hostage rescue mission, at night, under emergency conditions, or at extended ranges.

Only forward-deployed MEUs arc formally designated special operations-capable. but all MAGTFs have inherent special operations and low-intensity conflict capabilities that arc continually being enhanced. At the least, MAGTFs are expected to begin mission execution, signified by launching of the force, within six hours of receipt of the warning or execute order.

Special Purpose Forces are small, task-organized MAGTFs configured to accomplish missions for which the MEF, MEB, and MEU are not appropriate. They can be cofigured, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional and other operations. They can be deployed by a variety of means, including amphibious or commercial ship, tactical or strategic airlift, or organic Marine Corps aviation assets. These forces are normally composed of Marines highly trained in day/night operations, including insert/extract, raid, and strike operations. They may have extensive surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that may include unmanned aerial vehicles, radio reconnaissance, and counterintelligence assets in addition to deep reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, and sensor control and management platoon personnel. These forces can be employed in a variety of missions, including those as mobile training teams. in security assistance operations, and as small independent action forces.

MARITIME AND GEOGRAPHIC PRE-POSITIONING PROGRAMS

Another significant MAGTF capability is the maritime and geographic pre-positioning programs. The maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) concept is a major leap forward in strategic mobility. It gives Marine Expeditionary Forces assigned to the unified CINCs a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness.

An MPF comprises a MEB and MPS squadron that has most of the MEB's combat equipment, about 30 days of supplies, and a Navy support element. A 16,500-member, armor-heavy fighting force can be deployed to vast reaches of the globe, off-load its equipment and supplies, assemble, and be prepared for combat in a few days. It triples the fleet commander's ability to employ Marine forces and does so with minimum strategic airlift and sealift.

MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MPF/MEB)
(16,500 Marines)

4-5	MPS ships
53	Medium tanks
96	TOWS
58-62	Helicopters (airlifted)
36	Artillery pieces
68	Tactical aircraft (USMC self-deployed)
95	Assault amphibian vehicles

Figure I-2-6

In addition, the Marine Corps maintains a MEB set of equipment and supplies in underground facilities on the coast of Norway. These MPF sets of combat equipment and supplies have been tailored to meet MEB-sized combat requirements in various parts of the world. The MPS vessels and caves in

Norway have been precisely loaded to meet the deploy-merit schemes of the designated MEB commanders. Pre-positioning offers the Marine Corps a significant and strategically flexible national capability, Among the numerous roles and missions that can be assigned to pre-positioning forces, two are of particular note. Moving an entire MPF or the Norway MEB to a designated area before the outbreak of hostilities sends a strong signal of U.S. resolve. This resolve may serve to dissuade potential adversaries from initiating a military conflict. Also, an MPF can reinforce an amphibious operation by rapidly surging forces into a secured beachhead.

Once these expeditionary forces are assembled, they have nearly a month's supply of ration's munitions, POL, and spare parts needed for waging combat operations. The self-sustainment aspect of the Marine Corps' pre-positioning forces is unmatched by any other U.S. airlifted force.

DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

MAGTF *Figure I-2-7*



Building Block Concept of Deployrnent

One of the cornerstones of the MAGTF is the ability to build forces rapidly to meet a threat. The structure of the MAGTF lends itself to rapid execution by enhancing the command element and then adding units to the other elements. Forward-deployed MEUs are ready for employment on very short notice. The MEU can become the lead element of the MEB, receiving and building the MEB as the forces arrive. Likewise, the MEB can act as the lead element of the MEF. The building of forces can be slopped at the desired level without affecting the ability of the MAGTF to fiction. This phased buildup allows the use of the most effective force and deployment option available.



The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy is that the division-wing teams deploy as MEBs and employ as MEFs. To ensure readiness, all MEBs and MEFs maintain planning staffs during peacetime. If a crisis arises, a MEB can deploy in hours or days to begin containing it or resupply forward Marines or Joint Forces already on scene. The follow-on MEF can deploy in days or weeks.

The MEF command element plans, directs, and controls all phases of Marine combat power committed to a crisis. In addition, each MEF is also a standing joint task force furnishing interoperability and expeditionary command and control. When required, as in DESERT SHIELD/STORM the MEF commander can serve as the theater commander's Marine Service Component Commander,

Deployment options and related force closure times can be greatly influenced by the type of force selected and the method of deployment. There are four major methods of MAGTF deployment, each capable of combining with another to take advantage of the strategic mobility assets at hand.

● Forward Basing. Forward basing offers a readily deployable force that will not require long-range staging and avoids the problems of the initial extended lines of communications. This also allows training to be conducted in probable objective areas.

● Sealift/Seabasing. Forces deployed in amphibious or MSC shipping can move rapidly to an area of interest and loiter until the need for employment arises. Once ashore, combat elements of the landing force can be supported for long periods by ships of the amphibious task force. Seabasing is routinely employed by the forward-deployed afloat MEUs and can be employed by a forward-deployed MEB. Reliance on seabasing minimizes U.S. presence in-country and enhances tactical flexibility and mobility.

● Airlift. Air Contingency Forces (ACF) are standardized across the Marine Corps as air-deployable MEBs. They are equally capable of deployment by strategic airlift or amphibious shipping. Airlift has the advantage of speed, and need not sacrifice combat power or sustainability when deployed in conjunction with pre-positioned equipment and supplies, such as that carried abroad the MPS Squadron.

● Pre-positioning. Significant MAGTF capabilities are found in the maritime and geographic pre-positioning programs.

— Maritime Pre-positioning Forces. As stated. the MPFs give the unified CINCs a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness. The MPF program involves a total of 13 ships, organized in three squadrons. MPSRON-1 operates in the Atlantic, MPSRON-2 in the Indian Ocean, and MPSRON-3 in the Western Pacific. They reduce MAGTF response time from weeks to days by pre-positioning the bulk of the equipment and 30 days of supplies for a 16,500-member MEB aboard specially designed, strategically deployed ships. A MEB can be airlifted quickly using only 250 airlift sorties from the United States to an objective area to marry up with its equipment at a secure site. Equipment and supplies can also be selectively off-loaded to support smaller MAGTFs.

— The maritime and geographic pre-positioning programs offer vital options to national leadership and the CINCs by enabling the rapid movement of forces to a designated area before hostilities. thus transmitting a strong signal of national resolve without the risk of initiating direct military involvement.

Figure I-2-9 graphically depicts Marine Corps capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

Employrnenf Capabilities Across the Spectrum of Conflict *Figure I-2-9*



LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC)

Stability Operations

● Show of Force/Presence Mission. MAGTFs deployed aboard amphibious shipping have a unique capability to demonstrate American military or political resolve to friends and potential enemies while not intruding on foreign soil.

● Humanitarian Assistance includes the following:

— Deliberate operations in which specific help is given by CONUS-based or forward-based MAGTFs according to plans previously approved by the countries concerned.

— Civic action operations in which MAGTFs help indigenous military forces in projects useful to the local population.

- Marine Corps Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) develop a self-training capability within a foreign armed service through in-country instruction of a training cadre.

- Security Operations. MAGTFs can conduct security operations to
  - protect lives and property of U. S. citizens or selected host-country individuals,
  - help maintain the existence or independence of a government in agreement with treaty provisions,
  - protect treaty rights,
  - develop security perimeters,
  - furnish security intelligence support to friendly governments, and
  - enhance the host nation's security capabilities.

- Peacekeeping Operations. A MAGTF can deploy readily and employ peacekeeping forces to deter or contain outbreaks of violence, while being supported from the sea.

- Counternarcotics Operations. MAGTFs can support agencies conducting counternarcotics operations by
  - conducting aerial and ground surveillance and reconnaissance;
  - furnishing command and control, and mission planning, for U.S. Government agencies:
  - furnishing military technical skills and training support;
  - providing supporting mobility (helicopters, boats, AAVs, etc.); and
  - conducting amphibious raids against drug production and distribution facilities.

- Counterinsurgency Operations. A MAGTF can contribute tailored forces to the civil-military strategy necessary to defeat an insurgency by meeting the needs of the society targeted by the insurgency. Contributions can range from logistics and engineering support to combat operations short of war.

Limited Objective Operations

- Peacetime Contingency Operations. A MAGTF can be configured to conduct
  - NEOs in benign or hostile environments;
  - amphibious raids on short notice under the most demanding conditions;
  - seizures of advanced naval bases or facilities:
  - reinforcement of international or national military forces;
  - tactical recovery of aircraft, equipment, and personnel (TRAP): and
  - *in extremis* hostage rescue operations.

- Counterterrorism Operations. MAGTFs can be tailored to support counterterrorism operations by
  - responding to an ongoing terrorist incident,
  - conducting preemptive action against a planned act of terrorism, and
  - retaliating against a terrorist base of support.

MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT (MIC)

MAGTFs, supported from the sea, can fight effectively without waiting for theater buildup of logistic structure. This offers the opportunity for early success against a disoriented enemy who is not prepared for engagement with U.S. forces. MAGTFs are also well suited to be the nucleus on which to build a JTF headquarters, if required. If extended combat is unavoidable, MAGTFs can serve to good advantage as the

operational reserve for the theater commander. MAGTFs can be kept at sea with the striking fleet. ready to be committed rapidly at the decisive time and place, forcing the enemy to overextend its defenses.

● Amphibious Operations. If the conflict requires forcible entry, it could consist of a MEB- or MEF-sized amphibious assault. A typical amphibious assault will hare the following characteristics:

— Surprise is gained by an over-the-horizon attack. preferably launched in darkness. with all assault elements landing before daylight.

— Helicopter-lifted units secure and occupy key terrain at the limits of the force beachhead.

— Deep reconnaissance and surveillance assets immediately focus on detection of enemy reinforcements.

— Offensive air furnishes close air support and attack of reinforcements, isolating the force beachhead and allowing rapid buildup of combat power ashore.

— Until an area extending to the range of enemy indirect weapons is secured, sustainability is primarily seabased and transported ashore by helicopter.

— As combat power is built up ashore, landing force helicopter operations also begin phasing ashore. *Some* amphibious decks could then be available for temporary use as forward loiter sites for VSTOL aircraft until appropriate sites are established and made usable ashore.

— The next stage of expansion to a MEF may be the arrival of an MPF as a component of the amphibious task force (ATF) through a port or beach and airfield in the force beachhead seized by the amphibious MEB, or through secured facilities outside the force beachhead.

— During MPF consolidation, the rest of the MEF may be in transit to the amphibious objectivc area (AOA) by self-deployment. assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) shipping. or continuing airlift.

— After U.S. forces have entered sustained combat operations in theater. amphibious redeployment of the MAGTF gives the theater commander great tactical flexibility. Highly skilled, special operations-capable MAGTFs of smaller size can conduct raids and strikes, which, when closely orchestrated with the theater commander's concept of operations. can greatly disrupt the enemy and destroy its cohesion. Alternatively, a larger redeployed MAGTF can give the theater commander and operational reserve or a major maneuver force.

Operations Ashore. MAGTFs support land campaigns through amphibious operations or reinforcement operations. Operations ashore for Marine forces under a theater commander in MIC are similar to operations ashore after an amphibious assault has secured the initial objectives. MAGTFs have significant characteristics that enhance their usefulness to theater commanders in the reinforcement role. Principal among these is the capability for independent action unique to a self-contained force and the interoperability of the MAGTF with other Services. The unity of the MAGTF is as crucial to its usefulness in reinforcement operations as it is in amphibious operations.

MAGTF SUPPORT OF CONTINENTAL CAMPAIGNS

While Marine forces are statutorily responsible for supporting naval campaigns, they have supported continental efforts on a number of occasions. In operations in support of a continental campaign, MAGTFs can be employed in the following ways:

- Strategic distraction, to force the opponent to disperse its forces along all vulnerable littoral.

- Raids, to destroy installations, units, or military personnel that may have a significant bearing on the course of the campaign.

- Lodgments, to gain enclaves for introduction of large-scale U. S. expeditionary forces.

- Extractions, to evacuatc an expeditionary force under enemy pressure.

- Strategic reserve, to exploit opportunities and counter threats that develop during the course of the campaign.

- Reinforcement, to join the continental campaign alongside Army and USAF forces

Mission related to strategic distraction. strategic reserve, raids, lodgments, and extractions may be assigned to MAGTFs within the context of fleet support to continental campaigns. The fleet, with its inclusive MAGTF, may be assigned the task of conducting naval operations that give the theater commander strategic or ground tactical maneuver beyond the capabilities of assigned continental land and air forces.

All the preceding employments, even reinforcernent, demand a flexible and strategically transportable force that can operate in a wide range of situations. It must also be reasonably extractable to offer the wherewithal for subsequent strategic redeployment to the theater commander. Accordingly, it must stay together, insofar as possible avoiding division or separation, and it must retain lodgment capabilities.

The most complex employment operation is the establishment of a major lodgment on an undeveloped region affording little or no host-nation support: the other employments (except reinforcement) merely exploit in-being capabilities that require little modification for continental application.

Used as a strategic distraction force (the 4th MEB during DESERT STORM is an excellent example), amphibious forces have considerable value as a strategically mobile threat capable of attacking at a multitude of different points. Until committed, such forces compel the enemy to dedicate forces to defend all areas of prospective amphibious employment.

Strategic Reserve. The principle of retaining a strong reserve is based on recognition of the strategic and tactical uncertainties of war. With such a force. the theater commander has a means for influencing the campaign: he may commit his reserve to counter catastrophes or to exploit opportunities.

While the MAGTF is functionally an element of the fleet. it is committed to action ashore, and accordingly land operations (and the associated air effort). Action ashore is where the MAGTF accomplishes the purpose for which it was organized and deployed. whether for political reinforcement, naval, or continental purposes.

Beyond the obvious similarities between Army and Marine operations, there are some salient differences that are sometimes overlooked.

● Strategic Mobility. Because of the range of missions assigned to Fleet Marine Forces, including afloat forward deployment, lodgment, and amphibious assault, MAGTFs must, above all else, be strategically transportable. While the Air Force and Army may have the luxury of transportable unconstrained force development because of continental forward deployment and pre-positioning, USMC operating forces achieve their greatest contribution to national security through worldwide strategic mobility and must size and equip their forces accordingly.

● Strategic Diversity. The diversity of prospective battlefields associated with U. S. interests worldwide is virtually unlimited. In addition to desert, mountain, forest, and arctic environments, urban areas-whether the sprawling European megalopolis or the economic and political power centers in developing nations—are becoming increasingly significant. There being no one combination of firepower and mobility that is uniformly advantageous in cities, steppes, and mountains, MAGTFs must be tailored expressly for each operational requirement through task-organization of available "type" units.

● Objectives. The most important difference between Army and Marine operations is related to objectives—why a force is committed directly influences how it operates and with what. Generally speaking. MAGTFs support campaigns; they do not wage them. Accordingly their missions and objectives generally feature greater limitations and definition than the classic land warfare aim of destroying the opponent's abilities and will to resist. MAGTF operational objectives generally are related to physical or cultural features (e.g., ports, airfields) the use of which (or denial to enemy use) is essential to the conduct of a larger naval or continental effort. Accordingly, MAGTF exploitation of successful engagement with the enemy must support the seizure and continued security of its assigned objectives and not distract from that fundamental purpose. On the other hand. continental operations are multiphased endeavors expected to result in decisive engagement. This ultimately shifts the focus of the force as a whole from real estate to destruction of the opponent's military forces or capabilities. Thus, where decisive engagement with an enemy force in land warfare should be rapidly exploited with pursuit and ultimate destruction, such followup by a lodgment force (with finite resources pending establishment of the pipeline) may carry the force away from the objectives it was landed to seize and reduce its capability to defend them against successive attacks.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

All the prospective tasks-political reinforcement. naval warfare, support of the continental effort-require a continued national capability for forcible entry, and the only practical means for that is amphibious assault.

● During peacetime, the forward-deployed naval task force with the Fleet Marines can be employed as a show of force in support of diplomatic leverage and to signal U.S. interests and intentions: it can conduct limited-objective operations ranging from evacuation to a sea-launched coup de main. Retaining the bulk of its support infrastructure afloat, a MAGTF can act quickly and retract, thereby limiting potential for escalation.

● In naval operations, MAGTFs can be projected to destroy or occupy enemy naval or air support installations, or they can be used for defense of U. S. advanced bases. They can also be used as a landward extension of naval air, furnishing, in essence, unsinkable aircraft carriers in support of fleet operations. Sea control is a fundamental mission of naval forces, and amphibious operations will be required to support that effort. In the continuum of a naval campaign, islands and littoral maybe seized to aid in extending sea control,

such extension being used as forward support for more distant fleet operations. If the decision is made to contain enemy seapower at its source rather than meet it on the high seas for a campaign of attrition, amphibious operations may be required early in the war effort to seize key terrain that dominates enemy access to the open ocean.

In developed objective areas, amphibious forces offer other unique capabilities. The nature of campaign planning-particularly defensive campaign planning-focuses most intensely on the requirements of the initial phase rather than the subsequent phases necessary for ultimate victory. Should amphibious forces become available after campaign planning has been done, their mobility and combat power give the unified commander strategically mobile reserves for handling contingencies and exploiting opportunities beyond his visualization of the campaign at the time the plan was drafted. They also furnish the wherewithal for grand tactical maneuver, as demonstrated at Inchon and, to a lesser degree, in Vietnam. By virtue of specifically designed command, control, and liaison systems, the MAGTF can be employed alongside allied or other U.S. forces with the capability of mutual support.

Amphibious operations have strengths and weaknesses. On the plus side, amphibious forces are strategical> mobile on the world's scalanes. They are, therefore, comparatively free from foreign basing and overflight constraints. They can be assembled out of view and out of range of a prospective objective area and withheld until a decision is made to commit forces. If the situation changes, they can be withdrawn without entanglement.

Landing force combat power is tailored for the three dimensions of the battlefield and the fourth dimension of time. It has significant tactical mobility in its organic fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, and trucks. Moreover, it is designed to be self-sustaining until the logistics pipeline is established. Finally, it is projected from a mobile seabase that can maneuver to avoid enemy landward defenses and can close on the objective to furnish supporting gunfire and bring air and support forces closer to the operations they support to maximize their effectiveness.

There are balancing disadvantages and limitations. First, ships are comparatively slow; however, comparisons should measure the transit time of a seaborne force against the last planeload of an airlifted force of like size. Another problem is the amount and global distribution of amphibious lift. To conduct a large amphibious operation, considerable time is required to assemble amphibious ships for embarking the landing force. Delays in assembling MSC and commercial vessels at the outset of an operational requirement can affect timely shipment of follow-on equipment and support required for large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, those limited commercial assets must be apportioned to meet the deployment requirements of the other Services and the need to initiate pipeline shipments at the earliest possible time. For surface-bornc landings, amphibious operations require landing sites with usable beach gradients and exits. While air-cushion vehicles can negotiate a broader range of beach approaches, general unloading for large-scale operations still requires ports and/or beaches suitable for conventional amphibious operations. Success of amphibious operations against landward defenses depends on the availability of adequate air and naval gunfire support. Defense during transit to the objective area and mine countermeasures are problems that the amphibious force shares with the fleet as a whole, though defensive anti-invasion mining of suitable amphibious approaches can present an intense threat unique to amphibious assault operations.

Forcible entry capabilities offer significant strategic advantages and have certain tactical limitations. Forcible entry gives the National Command Authorities and/or a theater commander the means for seizing the strategic initiative. However, forcible entry requires rapid followup and exploitation for success in major efforts. The

length of time to deploy an amphibious force to an objective area can be offset only by forward-deploying that force either in peacetime or during the buildup of political tensions potentially leading to a requirement to commit forces.

Amphibious operations arc not an end in themselves; they are a means to an end. Whether as a phase of a major naval or continental campaign or as prelude to political reinforcement operations, amphibious operations lay the groundwork for subsequent military and/or political action, and the ultimate goal will shape the tasks and constraints imposed on the executing amphibious task force.

The complexities of amphibious assaults demand detailed planning and rehearsals or training exercises. Therefore, the two main players involved, the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) (a Naval officer) and the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF) (a Marine officer), must work hand in glove during all phases of the operation to ensure exact execution.

The CLF, under ideal conditions, reaches the objective area with most of the force embarked aboard amphibious shipping. Landing forces' fixed-wing tactical aviation deploys into convenient bases within striking distance of the landing area. This ideal situation is unlikely to exist except for relatively small-scale operations. In most amphibious assaults, the forces that must be projected onto a hostile shore and sustained in battle for an extended duration require significant strategic and tactical airlift and sealift. Further. the ATF is, in many cases. competing for limited transportation resources with other forces during the deployment. During deployment planning, decisions arc reached to arrange a time-phased echeloning of personnel, equipment. and supplies into the objective area. Echelonment is required not only because of the limited availability of airlift and sealift, but also for control purposes to ensure the orderly buildup of forces and supplies. Normally, three separate transportation echelons are required for the amphibious assault—assault echelon (AE), assault follow-on echelon (AFOE), and follow-up.

Subject to the overall authority of the CATF, responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore and for the security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations ashore is vestcd in the Commander, Landing Force. He must handle many concerns.

Establishing a lodgment by amphibious assault requires the projection of significant forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Factors such as the need for a favorable ratio of combat power, gaining air superiority and naval supremacy, and attaining strategic or tactical surprise are foremost concerns in developing the plan for tactical operations. In addition, however, the CLF must also be concerned with the deployment of his entire force into the area of operations and with its logistic support. The CLF, in addition to developing plans to employ forces tactically, is responsible for considering such matters as the following:

- Availability of forces assigned: troop list, readiness conditions. equipment shortages, activation schedules of subordinate headquarters. and replacements.

- Plans for absorbing or being absorbed by other forces (compositing).

- Embarkation and debarkation; movement echelons required to phase forces into the AOA.

- Airfield support requirements outside the AOA: en route staging and support requirements for self-depIoying aviation elements.

● Joint and combined operations: support requirements of other assigned or attached forces (logistics, intelligence, communications) and command and control arrangements.

● Political consideration: host-nation support, rules of engagement, treaties, status of forces, operational restraints (overflight restrictions, etc.).

DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT POWER ASHORE

In the amphibious attack. combat power is progressively but rapidly developed ashore during the assault. The LF is able to exert only a small fraction of its total potential power in the initial assault. The attack is initiated by small units supported by naval gunfire and tactical aircraft. A gradual buildup occurs until the entire LF is ashore and functioning as a cohesive organization exerting its maximum combat power. The echelonment reflected in the organization for landing arranges for the orderly progression and development of combat power.

MEF ASSAULT *Figure I-2-10*



AIR		SURFACE	
Distance 50 NM Time 90 minutes to complete		Distance: 25 NM Time 90 minutes to complete	
Package	Personnel, equipment	Package	Personnel, equipment
4 INF BN 2 ARTY BN 1 LAV CO (REIN) 2 AT SECT 1 PLAT LAAD	4944 MEN 250 HMMWV 48 M-198 48 ST TRUCKS 24 LAV	2 INF BN 1 ARTY BN 1 TK BN (-) 1 LAV BN (-) 1 ARTY BN	9302 MEN 28 TANKS 80 AAV 66 LAV 24 M-198 24 ST TRUCKS 173 HMMWV

AIR CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES

In an amphibious operation a centralized integrated air control system is developed through which all air operations within an assigned area of responsibility can be controlled and coordinated, Control of air operations is exercised by various commanders as the operation progresses. Plans must be made to give each such commander the proper facilities for control of air operations.

● When an advance force is employed, the advance force commander is responsible for pre-D-day air operations in the assigned area. Control is exercised through the Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) established in the flagship of the advance force commander.

● The CATF assumes responsibility for control of all air operations on arriving in the objective area. Control is exercised through the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), which is established in his flagship. Subordinate TADCs, as designated in advance, monitor air control circuits in readiness to assume all or part of the duties of the TACC if required.

● As soon as conditions permit, air control agencies arc established ashore that parallel the Navy control agencies afloat.

— Ashore agencies are furnished by the U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Air Force, depending on the composition of the participating forces. The control agencies ashore are initially in a standby status, monitoring all air control circuits. On recommendation of the CLF (or the appropriate agencies ashore), the CATF may pass control of air operations to the CLF or the joint task force commander concerned. The passage of control may be incremental; e.g., control of direct air support may be passed ashore before control of other aspects of air operations. After passage of any or all control to the CLF, the Navy control centers afloat continue to monitor appropriate circuits, ready to resume control if necessary.

— When the CATF passes control of air operations to the CLF, the latter exercises control of air operations through his TACC. If the Air Force furnishes most tactical aviation and a commander other than the CLF assumes control of air operations for the CLF, the designated commander will establish and operate a comprehensive airspace control system responsive to the authority of the CLF, subject to the overall authority of the CATF. The LF tactical control elements will be integrated by assigning, insofar as practicable, block airspace and/or sectors of responsibility within which authority for control of aerial vehicles organic to each Service and/or belonging to other Services can be delegated. The commander ashore to whom this authority is passed assumes the related responsibilities for the daily planning and execution of those air operations.

MARINE CORPS FORCES EMPLOYED IN JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS

Command and Control

When Marine forces are employed in joint or combined operations, operational command by the unified or joint commander is exercised through the Service component commander and commanders of other subordinate commands. MAGTFs can be employed in the following ways: as a Service component of the Naval component of a unified command, as an element of a joint task force under a unified command, as a joint task force under a specified command, or as a Service component of the Naval component of a specified command. The relationship of the MAGTF to the joint or combined command deals with the MAGTF's primary function in amphibious operations. The MAGTF will be employed as a uni-Service force under the unified command. When Marine forces are operating as an element of a combined force, those Marine forces will be employed per the agreed doctrine of the military alliances participating in the operation.

When the MAGTF is employed, it generally functions as a separate component of a naval task force, joint task force, or combined force, with operational control passing to an operational commander as directed. The MAGTF operates as an integral component under the command authority of the designated operational

commander, and the MAGTF commander retains operations control of all organic assets, including Marine aviation, with priority to assigning tasks to aircraft in support of his ground forces.

OVER-THE-HORIZON AND MANEUVER WARFARE

For the future, especially in light of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Marine Corps will be refining its warfighting doctrine. Expeditionary amphibious operations are central to the nation's deterrence posture. Increased threats, along with avoidance of attrition-style warfare, however, necessitate that the Marine Corps modify its doctrine.

FMFM-1 articulates Marine Corps philosophy on maneuver-boldness and decentralization—a philosophy equally adaptable to amphibious assaults and subsequent operations ashore. Marines' ability to conduct maneuver warfare will continue to improve with institutionalized doctrine and training, modified force structure, and acquisition of advanced equipment, all of which must contribute to enhanced tactical mobility and increased operational tempo. This effort is vital, given the lethality and proliferation of modem weapons.

Over-the-horizon (OTH) warfare is not a new goal for the Marine Corps. Since World War 11. with the advent of the helicopter, the Marine Corps has had limited OTH capability, but technology greatly limited taking full advantage of it. Now, however, technology exists to make it a reality.

The OTH concept builds on current amphibious doctrine and advances in technology. It offers a foundation for future development of amphibious doctrine. tactics. techniques, and procedures as well as future training. force structure, and equipment.

The OTH amphibious operation is a seaward extension of the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Not merely a traditional amphibious operation conducted from greater distances, it is an evolutionary way of executing the amphibious operation. OTH emphasizes the principles of tactical mobility. operational speed, and operational flexibility. It counters the enemy's antilanding defense and high-technology weaponry and gives a tactical advantage to the commander. There are two primary reasons to conduct OTH amphibious operations: to achieve a tactical advantage and/or to launch an assault from farther out to sea when the threat to the amphibious task force (ATF) necessitates.

The over-the-horizon assault is a further refinement and expansion of amphibious doctrine. It combines the concepts of maneuver warfare with modem technology and equipment to enhance combat power and reduce the frictions that hampered previous amphibious operations.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. JFACC: Key to Organizing Your Air Assets for Victory

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Examining the plans for America's aviation forces, Senator Sam Nunn, Capitol Hill's recognized defense expert, ignited a firestorm by asking if the United States needed and could afford its "four air forces. " While few military professionals will have much of a say on the larger issues of roles and missions that underlie Senator Nunn's questions, those who aspire to command forces in battle must consider a parallel issue, The services are locked in a debate over the purpose and functions of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). While the debate addresses roles and missions, its significance lies in the fact that its outcome will influence the effective use of airpower in combat. Prospective joint force commanders must therefore understand the JFACC debate and know how to organize air operations before the drums of war begin to beat. This article looks at the background of the JFACC concept and then addresses a major point of disagreement: whether the JFACC commands or coordinates the CINC's air component. Finally, it will outline a role for the JFACC in a joint operation, equal in contribution and importance to ground and naval commanders.

JFACC Background

The JFACC concept is a simple one. First, it involves a joint force. one composed of forces from more than one service. Second, the JFACC, in the person of the officer in charge. is an "air component commander. " Essentially, the JFACC runs the entire air operation for the joint force commander. Since it was codified into joint doctrine only with the publication of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 26 in 1986, the position and responsibilities of the JFACC are relatively new. [1]

The nature of warfare, the airpower assets of the different services, and airpower doctrine all drive the need for a JFACC. Joint operations are the norm rather than the exception for the foreseeable future.[2] Air warfare is probably our most joint current medium. Here's what the Department of the Navy recently said about airpower: "Joint operations between naval and Air Force strike assets—including carrier-based aircraft. land-based naval expeditionary aircraft, land-based Air Force aircraft from both local and distant bases. and Tomahawk missiles from surface and attack submarines-have become standard."[3] It should also be clear that the ability of US forces to operate successfully in combined operations is directly related to our skill in conducting joint operations.

From a sheer numerical perspective, the Navy and Marine Corps bring a lot of airpower to the joint force. In Desert Storm Navy and Marine Corps aircraft constituted about 33 percent of the US air armada and dropped about 28 pereent of the total US weapons' tonnage during the war. [4] Therefore. a failure to successfully integrate the airpower of all services represents a serious loss to the joint force.

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[1] Dwight R. Motz, "JFACC: Ths Joint Air Control 'Cold War' Continues," *Marine Corps Gazette,* January 1993, p. 67.
[2] JCS, Joint Pub, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces,* November 1991, p. 4.
[3] Department of the Navy, ... *From the Sea,* 1992, p. 10.
[4] Title V Gulf War Report, p. 164, and Richard P. Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992) p. 188.

From "JFACC: Key to Organizing Your Air Assets for Victory," by Jeffrey E. Stambaugh, Parameters, Summer 1994, pp 98 through 110.

According to USAF doctrine, a tenet of aerospace power is that airpower assets are theater assets and should be centrally controlled by an airman.[5] While not everyone accepts it, this tenet is firmly based on historical experience. It is also at the heart of the JFACC concept. The Allied campaign in North Africa during World War 11 began with airpower parceled out to various commanders, including ground commanders. The limitations of this arrangement quickly became apparent, particularly during the battle at Kasserine Pass. During the 1943 Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill approved a new command structure that centralized control under an airman.[6] This new concept quickly found its way into Army doctrine: "Control of available airpower must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow arc to be fully exploited."[7] As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Eisenhower invoked this new doctrine by insisting upon a single air commander reporting directly to him.[8]

As aviation forces shrink, common sense says we need centralized control. For example, the vast majority of fuel offload capability resides in USAF tanker aircraft. The same applies for aerial surveillance capability. Clearly, we need an integrated air plan if the Navy and Marine Corps are to receive adequate support from USAF tankers and surveillance aircraft. Moreover, the Navy and Marine Corps maintain superb electronic warfare aircraft that the Air Force would like to integrate into the theater plan for such assets.

This mixing and matching of assets points out a key characteristic of airpower—its seamless nature. Battle lines can be easily drawn for ground forces, but that's not so with air forces. Air assets can launch from bases hundreds of miles apart and simultaneously converge on a target. Those same forces can repeat that performance only a few hours later on another target located hundreds of miles from the previous target. Obviously, optimum use of such assets demands a theater view.

Furthermore, centralized JFACC control of these theater assets allows their integration in the joint force commander's campaign plan. The JFACC develops the air portion of the campaign and applies the available assets to achieve the desired effects. Centralized control enables a level of asset integration not otherwise possible.

Because the logic seems so compelling, it maybe incredible to an outsider that the three services did not cooperate on this point in the past: not in Korea and most certainly not in Vietnam. As the United States entered the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, the JFACC concept flew into an uncharted, and possibly hostile, environment.

In accordance with joint doctrine, General Schwarzkopf, the joint force commander in the Gulf War. appointed Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, the CENTAF commander, as the JFACC. And whatever the assessment of the air campaign prior to land combat, and the support of the ground forces during the 100 hours. one aspect of air operations is clear: the JFACC process had its difficulties. Of the many problems the JFACC would encounter, none was more troublesome than the attitudes of the services.

The Navy and Marine Corps entered the JFACC process reluctantly. Senior Navy commanders vigorously opposed working in a joint operation, especially with an Air Force general in charge. Three months into Desert Shield, with war a mere two months away, the Navy was still searching for a way to sink the JFACC.[9] If the Navy

[5] Department of the Air Force, AFM 1-1, Vol. 1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,* March 1992, p. 8.
[6] William W. Monyer and James C. Gaston, eds., *Airpower in Three Wars* (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1978), pp. 40-41.
[7] James L. Cates and Wesley F. Craven, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947), II,206.
[8] DeWitt S. Copp, *Forged In Fire* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1982), p. 461.
[9] Steven U. Ramsdell, unpublished trip report. Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 14 May 1991, pp. 3, 5; and Brian E. Wages, unpublished end of tour report, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, Bergstrom AFB, Tex., 5 March 1991, pp. 2-3.

fought the idea, the Marine Corps was downright defiant. Marine headquarters addressed messages to the "Joint Force Air *Coordinator:"* [10] *The* USMC air component commander during Desert Storm made it clear in a postwar interview that he viewed General Homer as only a coordinator and that Marine air worked primarily Marine targets.[11] The Air Force bears partial responsibility for the air of discontent because it dealt high-handedly with the other services on occasion. Had it not been for General Schwarzkopfs firm support for the JFACC, the integrated air plan that severely damaged the Iraqi forces might have been the first casualty of the conflict.

Though handicapped by interservice disagreements, Homer held two aces at the operational level that overcame these problems and kept the disagreements out of the public's eye. First, General Homer had an abundance of assets available to conduct his air war. Second, the Coalition initiated hostilities at its choosing, then pounded the enemy for 38 days before beginning the ground war, which it again began at the time of its choosing.

In reality, Homer had a surplus of aircraft under his direction. In October 1990, when asked by President Bush what additional forces he would need to conduct offensive operations to oust Iraq from Kuwait, Schwarzkopf requested two armored divisions. When President Bush authorized the reinforcement he gave Schwarzkopf almost double the ground forces Schwarzkopf had requested *plus* 300 additional USAF aircraft and two more aircraft carriers.[12] The initial plan for the air campaign assumed 700 attack sorties each day for the first six days, subsequently dropping to 100 per day. Homer's air forces actually flew 1200 attack sorties per day at the outset of the campaign. The lowest daily sortie rate, the result primarily of poor weather, was still over 200. During the ground phase, the Coalition flew over 1700 attack sorties daily. This overwhelming force allowed all phases of the air campaign, which had been planned for sequential execution, to run concurrently. [13]

The other significant advantage for the prosecution of the air campaign—the total control held by the Coalition over the timing of the war's phases—provided several advantages. The commanders knew the air campaign would run for more than a month before ground action would begin. This knowledge allowed time to conduct strategic attacks in Iraq and begin to shape the battlefield. And although some ground commanders may have been uncomfortable with some of Homer's actions, Schwarzkopf felt that his instructions were being followed.[14]

The abundance of assets and the complete retention of initiative meant that the hard choices a JFACC could expect—that the JFACC was designed to deal with-simply did not arise, The ability to address everyone's needs overcame philosophical arguments about the best use of airpower. There was no bloodletting when the Marine Corps initially dedicated 50 percent and eventually almost all of its sorties to preparing the battlefield in front of Marine forces because the JFACC still had sufficient theater assets to meet other requirements.[15] Similarly, after the ground war had begun, the ground commanders could not complain about inadequate air support, because they received virtually all the Coalition had.

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[10]Wages, p. 3.

[11]Royal M. Moore. Jr., "Marine Air There w When Needed," *US Naval Institute Proceedings,* November 1991, pp. 63-64. Lieutenant General Moore commanded Marine aviation during the Gulf War.

[12]H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero (New* York: Bantam Books, 1992). p. 376

[13]Hallion pp. 189-90.

[14]Department of Defense, *Copnduct of the Persian Gulf War,* April 1992, p. 248.

[15]Colonel Howard Barnard, USAF; also, Rick Atkinson, Crusade: *The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New* York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p.219.

Desert Storm clearly represented a JFACC concept in its infancy. The Iraqis were foolish to allow the Coalition to dictate the war's timing and pace. The United States cannot count on foolish enemies and an abundance of airpower in the next war, however. The future can only be tougher for the JFACC, and the concept must move forward from its Gulf War experience.

The JFACC: Commander or Coordinator?

The most important issue, underlying all the other controversies, is the proper role of a JFACC: does the incumbent coordinate the use of separately commanded air assets, or does the JFACC command the joint air effort?

The idea of losing control of its assets is anathema to any service. During Desert Storm the Navy's real fear was that USAF officers would misuse their assets, not necessarily out of maliciousness, but out of ignorance.[16] in the same way, the Marines were concerned that air support would not be available when and where needed if they were to lose control of their aviation assets.[17] Even the Air Force is not above this concern. Going back to World War II, significant resistance to General Eisenhower's desire to establish a single air commander controlling all allied aircraft came from senior officers of the US Army Air Forces. They feared that the British officer likely to be named the air commander would misuse the rapidly maturing B-17 strategic bombing force.[18] No one is immune to the fears of losing control. To its credit, the Air Force strongly supports the doctrinal consensus that the JFACC should come from the component providing the greatest share of the air assets, and acknowledges that the JFACC need not always be an Air Force officer.[19]

While each of the services struggles with the idea of being controlled by an officer from another branch, the Marines are the strongest and most vocal opponents of the JFACC as a commander. This concern is not new; the Marine Corps addressed the issue when JFACC doctrine was under development.

In 1986, the JCS released an agreement entitled the" 1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of USMC TACAIR [tactical aircraft] in Sustained Operations Ashore" simultaneously with its release of the new JFACC doctrine. The Omnibus Agreement sought to calm Marine fears over loss of control of Marine air. The Omnibus Agreement reads in part:

> The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions. redirect efforts. . . [20]

It is important to understand that the second sentence of the Omnibus Agreement summarizes Marine Corps doctrine concerning their air assets. Marines make no bones about the purpose of Marine air—to support the Marine ground combat element.[21] Interestingly, Marines do subscribe to the theory of centralized control, but

[16]Wages, p, 4.
[17]Motz, p. 65.
[18]Momyer, p. 46.
[19]John E. Valliere. "Stop Quibbling Win the War, "*US Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1990, p. 42.g
[20]P.X. Kelly, unpublished white latter 4-86. "1986 Omnibus Agreement for the Command and Control of Marine Tacair in Sustained Operations Ashore," Headquarters USMC, Washington, D. C., 18 March 1986.
[21]Duane A. Willis, "Break Some Rice Bowls," *US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, p. 82.*

that centralized air commander always reports to the MAGTF commander.[22] The real difference is that Marines believe Marine air should work for the Marines rather than supporting the joint force as a whole.

Marines have logical reasons for their retention of firm control over Marine air. First, Marine ground forces are relatively light on organic firepower (tanks and artillery). Thus, their aviation clement provides needed additional firepower. Second, the aviation and ground elements train together; consequently Marines assert that their pilots can provide the best support for Marine ground forces.

Having discussed the Omnibus Agreement from the Marine perspective, we must also look at it through the joint force commander's eyes. First, and most important, the Omnibus Agreement firmly acknowledges the joint force commander's right and responsibility to organize the joint force however he deems best. Thus, should the joint force commander choose to give the JFACC operational control of Marine air, a concept that will be more precisely defined below, he would *not* violate the Omnibus Agreement. Second, it does not necessarily follow that such a choice would ignore the valid Marine concerns underlying the Omnibus Agreement. Under current joint procedures and assuming reasonable commanders, Marine air would still support Marine ground troops to *exactly* the level the joint force commander and land component commander deem appropriate. Finally, deciding how best to handle Marine air is "situation dependent," and it may be one of the joint force commander's toughest calls. Here are a few of the factors and issues that will influence the joint force commander's actions.

- When Marine Corps forces operate as a part of a large joint force operation, are they really acting as a MAGTF or are they simply another maneuver unit? For example, Marine forces ashore in Desert Storm were not an independent task force. Major ground combat units of other Coalition members flanked them on both sides. Furthermore, the Army's Tiger Brigade of the 2d Armored Division augmented the Marines.[23] When Marines are not truly operating as a MAGTF, do the terms of the Omnibus Ageement apply?

- The joint force commander has more thorny problems. Why do the Marines get their own air support when every other ground force commander has to compete for theater assets? After all, what ground commander would not want dedicated air assets whose sole mission was to support only his forces? Furthermore, are Marine units the lightest in terms of firepower, or could US Army light infantry forces claim that dubious distinction?

- The Omnibus Agreement discusses the release of "excess" Marine sorties, but the joint force commander has to be realistic. To a ground commander staring an enemy in the face, there is no such thing as an excess sortie. While it looks a bit ridiculous in hindsight, some ground commanders bitterly complained that they werc not receiving adequate air support to prepare the battlefield during Desert Storm.[24] Therefore, if the exceptions contained in the Omnibus Agreement do apply to Marine units operating m a coalition or joint operation, joint force commanders should not expect Marine commanders to volunteer much of their air clement for use at the theater level.

- Joint Force commanders must prepare themselves to make hard choices using the Omnibus Agreement. What if, assessing the ground situation, the joint force commander decides that the Marine commander needs little, if any, air support to achieve the joint force commander's objective? Worse still, what if the Marine ground

[22] Valliere, p. 38.
[23] Schwarzkopf, p. 386.
[24] Hallion, pp. 206-08.

commander has a genuine need for all the support Marine air could provide, but another ground commander needs the airpower more? In peacetime, the answers maybe easy and obvious. In wartime, not only will these be tough judgments, they will be controversial and emotionally charged.

Under current joint doctrine the authority and command level of the JFACC is strictly up to the joint force commander. In fact, current doctrine does not *require* that a JFACC even be established. However, as was noted earlier, joint force commanders who want to use their airpower properly will probably want to establish a JFACC. The JFACC provides unity of command over the air effort. The JFACC keeps the assets focused to achieve the campaign objectives specified by the joint force commander. Moreover, the JFACC brings the knowledge and experience required to coordinate and integrate all air assets in a campaign plan. While the turmoil surrounding application of the JFACC concept to the hard realities of combat might be dismissed as "joint growing pains," consider this analogy. Would soldiers be comfortable executing a scheme of land warfare designed and controlled by an airman acting as the land component commander? Of course not, and that's why airmen look to another airman, the JFACC, to plan and control the air operations.

Before examining the relationship between a joint force commander and his JFACC, a few definitions are important. The idea of command under joint doctrine is a multi-layered affair, but two aspects of it are sufficient here to get to the heart of the JFACC challenge. Operational control (OPCON) of an organization entails virtually total control of it. Joint force commanders and service component commanders normally exercise operational control over assigned assets. Tactical control (TACON), on the other hand, allows detailed direction of operations to accomplish missions without assigning full control of any organization so designated.[25] The difference, however slight to those not accustomed to interservice operations, is a crucial one in combat.

Joint force commanders can be expected to give their JFACCs tactical control of service air elements. The initial draft of Joint Pub 3-56. *Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations,* states that the joint force commander may give the JFACC operational control, but notes that usually tactical control is sufficient to manage the air campaign. [26] The Air Force also believes that tactical control is the appropriate level of JFACC authority.[27] From the perspective of those who fly the aircraft, tactical control tells the various air assets where to fly, when to fly, and what to do while aloft. The JFACC should generally not need authority beyond this on a daily basis. Certain issues would require either that the JFACC negotiate directly with other commanders or that the joint force commander become involved. For example, when the JFACC has only tactical control authority, he cannot tell a unit how many sorties to fly. Should the JFACC want a unit to fly more sorties than proposed by the commanders of the air assets, the JFACC would have to negotiate with the commander who has operational control of the units to obtain the additional sorties.

Given that the JFACC has tactical control of air assets, the JFACC should normally control all fixed-wing assets operating in the joint force operating area with these exceptions (note—for this and all following discussions the focus is on scenarios with significant land operations):

- Sorties required by the naval component commander to perform maritime missions, to include defense of afloat forces.

[25]JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 1 December 1989, pp. 73, 262, 361; US Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, JFACC Primer, August 1992, p.9.

[26]JCS, Joint Pub 3-56 (Initial Draft), *Command and Control forJoint Operations,* September 1992, p. IV-4.

[27]JFACC Primer, p. 10.

- USMC air when Marine ground/amphibious forces are operating independently from the rest of the joint force.

- Special operations aircraft when performing special operations missions.

The JFACC should normally control only limited numbers of helicopters. There are two reasons for this exception. First, because helicopters do not possess the speed and range of the other air assets, they are not truly theater assets in terms of reach and effect. Second, attack, observation, and most utility helicopters directly support the ground scheme of maneuver and are best left under the control of the ground commanders. This is not to say that the JFACC could not use these helicopters in certain situations. With regard to the helicopters, however, the JFACC will usually need to control only search and rescue helicopters.

Ah-power is more than aircraft, of course, and the JFACC has a legitimate interest in those other assets too. Although employment of the Navy's Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) probably should fall under the JFACC, control of Army tactical missiles (ATACMS) requires more thought. The JFACC can build a strong case for controlling at least some of the joint force's ATACMS, but on a case-by-case basis rather than as a doctrinal matter. Nevertheless, assets with theater reach (range and effects) that do not by doctrine fall under JFACC direct control should coordinate with the JFACC to the maximum practical extent.

JFACC's Role as a Commander

Having appointed a JFACC to command the air effort, the next issue is to establish the JFACC's role within the joint campaign. Again, the focus is on a theater campaign where land operations predominate over maritime operations. Nonetheless, certain features of the following discussion are relevant to campaigns in which maritime forces predominate.

The joint force commander should first make the JFACC responsible for control of the air. This obvious beginning point is readily accepted. This requires coordinating the activities of Army surface-to-air missile units with those of US and allied aircraft in the theater. The mission of tactical ballistic missile defense is still evolving, but the JFACC will likely emerge as the overall commander of that effort.

A second job for the JFACC is air support of engaged forces. The JFACC and staff can aid the engaged commanders by advising them on how best to apply the airpower apportioned for direct support missions. To preclude any semantic quarrels, "direct support" simply means sorties flown either to aid forces engaged in close combat or to strike targets that, while not currently engaged in combat. will have a near-term effect on the battle. The JFACC also complies with the joint force commander's apportionment direction and assigns the prescribed percentage of sorties to provide direct support. Furthermore, the JFACC maintains the command and control means that arc used to provide air support to engaged forces.

Here we need to consider an aspect of emerging joint doctrine that overshadows the previous two issues in its potential effects on the concept of a "supported commander" in a theater. A statement published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992 provides guidance for joint doctrine under refinement or development. The statement uses the term "supported commander" to suggest that battlespace allocation can include assigning responsibility for certain parts of the theater to commanders subordinate to the joint force commander.[28]

[28] JCS, unpublished document, "A Doctrinal Statement of Seledted Joint Operational Concepts," 23 November 1992, pp. 10, 11, 16.

The term "supported commander" carries considerable weight under joint doctrine. Normally this term applies to the commander-in-chief of unified and specified commands-now termed combatant commanders-or occasionally to joint force commanders.[29] However, General Powell's 1992 statement used the term supported commander in reference to the subordinate land, naval, and air component commanders operating under a joint force commander. From context, it appears that "supported commander" now includes the functional or component commander within a joint force assigned primary responsibility within a specified zone or task.[30]

The 1992 statement then couples the idea of supported commander with partitioning the theater. According to the doctrinal statement, "The Joint Force Commander may define lateral, rear, and forward boundaries that are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval forces to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces. " Such areas would then become the responsibility of the supported commander.[31] Existing joint and service doctrine both support and condemn this partitioning.[32] Whether it is a good idea remains untested and hence unproven.

In view of all this, the JFACC could assume a new, vital role as the JFACC should be the supported commander for any areas not otherwise assigned to another component commander. Perhaps the strongest argument for this is common sense; the JFACC alone can conduct significant combat operations in areas that lie beyond the limits of Army or USMC commanders. While the idea of an airman as a supported commander may seem revolutionary, in reality there is increasing support for this idea from a number of sources. Two publications from the Joint Staff, as well as the Chairman's 1992 doctrinal statement, identify the JFACC as either the individual normally responsible for interdiction or as the supported commander for that task. [33] General Powell's statement also labels the JFACC the supported commander for strategic attacks.[34] Moreover, this idea is already at work in Korea. US Forces Korea developed a concept called the "Deep Battle Synchronization Line (DBSL)." The concept has two main features: first, the deep battle addresses all operations beyond the immediate vicinity of friendly ground forces, and second, the JFACC is responsible for the deep battle.[35] The Army's latest FM 100-5 adds veiled support to this concept by somewhat loosening the tie between the deep and close battle.[36] Major General L. D. Holder, in a recent *Military Review* article, called this "radical stuff" and noted with concern the possible doctrinal implications for joint operations. [37] Thus, the idea of the JFACC as a supported commander, responsible for the areas outside the proximity of friendly forces, appears obvious and sound. There is. however, a hitch.

The problem of whereto draw the dividing line between the various commanders immediately arises. The Army believes the deep battle to be extremely important and plans to fight the deep battle.[38] Appropriately, no strict mileage definitions exist for how "deep" the deep battle goes. Rather, the deep area extends to at least where events may affect the close battle within the 72 hours following the assessment. [39]

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[29] JCS, Joint Pub 5-0, (Test), *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 26* July 1991, p. GL-13.

[30] JSC, "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts" p. 16,17.

[31] Ibid., p. 16.

[32] Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations, 14* June 1993, p. 6-12; Department of the Army, FM 6-20-30, *Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations,* 18 October 1989, p. F-4; JCS Joint Pub 3-03 (Test), *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations,* 11 December 1990, p. II-1.

[33] JCS, "A Doctrinal Statement . . ., "p. 15; Joint Pub 3-03, p. IV-3; JCS, Joint Pub 3-03.1 (Proposed Final), *Doctrine for Joint Precision Interdiction,* 31 July 1991, p. III-8.

[34] JCS, "A Doctrinal Statement . . .," p. 12.

[35] Roger Carter, USFK Briefing on Deep Battle, Headquarters Seventh Air Force, Osan Air Base, Korea, August 1992.

[36] FM 100-5, p. 7-12.

[37] L. D. Holder, "Offensive Tactical Operations," *Military Review,* 73 (December 1993), p. 51-52.

[38] FM 100-5, p. 6-14.

[39] Department of the Army, FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* September 1989, p. 3-7.

No matter the exact definition, the Army needs airpower to fight much beyond its own position. Cannon and rocket artillery can fire only about 12 and 20 miles, respectively. Although the ATACMS is truly a deep weapon, the total buy of ATACMS is only programmed to be 2000 missiles.[40] Thus, the JFACC could match the firepower of the entire ATACMS force with only 500 F-16 sorties. The ATACMS is a welcome addition to the arsenal with its responsiveness, range, and lethality. However, you cannot plan to fight much of a deep battle with ATACMS alone.

The Army also talks of using its aviation forces, both to insert ground forces or as stand-alone attackers, to tight the deep battle. However, Army doctrine also uses terms like "very complex" and "significant risk" to describe the use of its aviation assets in the deep battle.[41] Thus, the vast majority of firepower capable of going deeper than 20 miles will most likely be fixed wing. Considering firepower and the Army's desire to plan 72 hours in advance, a line drawn beyond the ground forces' present position to where they will be conducting significant combat operations in 48 to 72 hours seems a logical place for the boundary. Rather than a set mileage, the line must consider factors like the enemy, friendly objectives, terrain, projected versus actual rate of advance, and weather. According to General Powell's statement, variables like the operational environment and actual versus projected rates of maneuver drive the revision of the boundaries.[42] At a minimum. the joint force commander should review the boundaries daily.

This idea of naming fictional or component commanders as supported commanders does not change the joint force commander's role. First, the joint force commander and his staff develop the campaign plan. From that plan, the joint force commander establishes objectives for each subordinate commander. Second. only the joint force commander can ensure the synchronization of the air, land, and maritime operations plans.[43] The apportionment decision represents a tremendous synchronization opportunity and is a clear communication of the joint force commander's priorities. Finally, the joint force commander must personally intervene in campaign planning when necessary. For example, the Air Force's initial draft for the Desert Storm air operations plan did not include daily attacks against the Iraqi Republican Guard; that changed immediately after the Air Force briefed General Schwarzkopf.[44]

One of the joint force commander's staff elements, the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), should be examined carefully. This board provides a forum within which each service can nominate targets for inclusion in air operations,[45] a process that is of great importance when there are fewer aircraft available than target opportunities. If the JTCB works directly for the joint force commander. the latter must limit it to broad guidance lest it usurp the prerogative and responsibility of the JFACC. If the JTCB issues detailed guidance, essentially telling the JFACC exactly which targets to strike, the JFACC truly would become a mere coordinator. In those commands in which the JTCB works directly for the JFACC there is slight chance of conflict.

The joint force commander and subordinate component commanders must understand how best to integrate their allocated direct support sorties into their operations. When direct support sorties are aiding ground troops engaged in close combat, the ground forces should continue to select the specific targets for aerial attack.

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[40]Christopher F. Foss, *James Armour and Artillery* 1991-92 (12th ed.; Surrey, England: Janes Information Group. 1991), pp. 590-91,676-91, 709 10.

[41]FM 100-15, p.3-7.

[42]JCS, "A Doctrinal Statement. . .," p. 17.

[43]Ibid., p. 15; Price T. Bingham, *Ground Manuever and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1992), p. 2.

[44]Schwarkopf, p. 320.

[45]Joint Pub 3-56, p. II-18.

However, as the distance from friendly forces increases, commanders should shift to mission-type orders. Using this idea, the supported commanders and joint force commander describe the desired effect, and the specific targeting is left to the JFACC staff. Army and joint doctrine both prefer mission-type orders in the latter case.[46]

Of course, this means the JFACC staff must be capable of effectively targeting the air assets to achieve the desired effects. To facilitate this, the JFACC staff should be truly joint, melding in experts on ground and maritime warfare.[47] A key contributor to this "jointness" already exists—the Army's Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE). The BCE acts as the Army Component Commander's liaison with the JFACC and staff and, interestingly, performs many of the functions mentioned for the JTCB. Ideally, the BCE would represent all land forces rather than having multiple service/nation coordination cells. The BCE, particularly because of the expertise it offers, will grow even more important under this proposal. Moreover, airmen themselves will need to learn more about the other operating environments to fully exploit airpower in joint warfare.

Conclusion

One of the first challenges a joint force commander will face is how to organize his air assets: a joint force needs one airman in charge—the JFACC. Making such a decision will likely create controversy, particularly if Marine air is involved. But organizing to win is more important than the absence of interservice controversy. Opting for a strong, empowered Joint Force Air Component *Commander* under current and emerging doctrine regarding supported commanders in a joint operation is a first, and essential, step toward victory.

[46]Ibid.; FM 100-15, p. 3-11.

[47]The US Atlantic Command and US Pacific Command JFACC concept of operations requires the JFACC staff to be a joint staff organized when the JTF is formed. USAF does not agree with this concept. C. R Larson and P. D. Miller, unpublished document. "Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Concept of Operations,"US Atlantic Command and US Pacific Command, 15 January 1993, p. 2.

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CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Planning Considerations for Airborne and Air Assault Operations

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AIRBORNE PLANNING

General

Airborne operations can involve both parachute assault and air-land missions and are characterized by their complexity and joint nature. A successful airborne operation requires the following:

- Use of the tactical decision-making process.
- Centralized, detailed planning and decentralized execution of mission-type orders.
- Adherence to the principle of simplicity.
- Use of the reverse planning process.

Planning Responsibilities

The JFLCC commander initiates airborne operations with a planning directive to participating units. The directive is assimilated through normal command channels at corps and division levels, and pertinent information is issued to brigades. The directive must accomplish the following:

- Specify missions.
- Outline the command structure.
- Identify participating ground and air forces.
- Provide a schedule of events.
- State conditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, or be terminated.
- List forces in support.

Key Personnel Responsibilities

The JFLCC Commander—

- Provides a specific mission to the airborne commander

- Specifies the AO for the airborne force and may also include within the AO specific objectives for the airborne commander.

- Provides to the airborne commander airlift allocated by the joint task force (JTF) to support the airborne operation.

The information in this appendix is from C320, *Corps and Division Combat Operations,* August 1993, appendix 1 to lesson 17, pp 17 through 17-7.

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The Airborne Commander—

- Plans the ground tactical plan and accomplishes the ground mission.
- Plans aircraft loads of equipment and personnel.
- Assigns personnel and equipment to aircraft and prepares flight forms.

The Airlift Commander—

- Allocates sufficient aircraft to support the ground tactical plan.
- Delivers assault elements to the correct drop zones (DZs).
- Conducts resupply and evacuation missions.

Joint Responsibilities

Airborne and airlift commanders—

- Establish control parties at departure airfields.
- Supervise the loading of equipment and soldiers.
- Conduct rehearsals.
- Coordinate and standardize signal operation instructions (S0I) and prearranged signals.
- Select DZs, landing zones (LZs), and extraction zones (EZs).
- Establish control parities at DZs, LZs, and EZs.
- Unload aircraft at LZs.
- Prepare the aerial resupply and evacuation plan.
- Secure the departure airfield.
- Prepare the air movement table.
- Supervise the joint airborne advance party (JAAP) procedures.
- Coordinate the movement of soldiers and aircraft.

AIR ASSAULT PLANNING

General

Air assault operations are based on a careful analysis of mission, enemy. troops, terrain and weather, and time available (METT-T) and detailed, precise reverse planning. The air assault task force (AATF) staff develops five basic plans, using the reverse planning sequence, for each air assault (AASLT) operation. These five plans are the ground tactical plan, the landing plan, the air movement plan, the loading plan, and the staging plan.

These plans should not be developed independently. The AATF staff coordinates and develops the plans staff to make best use of available time. The staff normally develops the ground tactical plan first and uses it as the basis for the other plans.

Planning Responsibilities

The JFLCC commander initiates AASLT operations with an order to participating units. The order is assimilated through normal command channels at corps and division levels. The order must—

- Specify missions.
- Outline the command structure.
- ldentify participating ground and aviation forces.
- Provide a schedule of events.
- State conditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, or be terminated.

Key Personnel Responsibilities

The JFLCC Commander—

- Provides a specific mission to the AASLT commander.

- Specifies the AO for the AASLT force and may also include within the AO specific objectives for the AASLT commander.

- May augment the AASLT force assault aviation with additional aviation units.

The AASLT Commander—

- Plans the ground tactical plan and accomplishes the ground mission.
- Plans assault helicopter loads of personnel and equipment.
- Assigns personnel and equipment to specific chalks and aircraft as part of the loading plan.
- Secures pickup zones (PZs) and establishes control parties.
- Plans and coordinates the loading plan.

The Air Mission Commander—

- Allocates sufficient aircraft to support the ground tactical plan
- Controls all aviation assets for the AASLT commander,
- Delivers assault elements to the correct LZs.
- Conducts resupply and evacuation missions as required.

Shared Responsibilities

The AASLT and air mission commanders—

- Conduct rehearsals.
- Select PZs and LZs.
- Coordinate and standardize SOI and prearranged signals.
- Prepare landing, air movement, and staging plans.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Extract From JCS Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*

APPENDIX B

US NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix provides information on major aspects of NSW operations. Although all Navy forces have the potential for supporting SO, specific units designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared and task-organized to conduct SO: active and reserve component SEAL teams, SDV teams, SBU and selected special mission units (see Figure B-1). In addition, othcr surface, subsurface, and aviation units receive enhanced training and equipment to support NSW operations.

2. SEAL Teams. SEAL teams arc a maritime multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments and levels of conflict.

a. Organization. The SEAL teams are organized into a headquarters clement and operational platoons. Each team is composed of 10 operational platoons, each of which can be broken down into either 2 squads or 4 elements. All personnel arc dive, parachute, and demolitions qualified.

b. Mission. SEAL teams arc organized, trained, and equipped to conduct DA, UW, FID, SR, and CT operations primarily in maritime and riverine environments. These operations include sabotage, demolition, intelligence collection, hydrographic reconnaissance, and training and advising friendly military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of naval and joint SO. Further. SEAL teams may be employed in direct support of conventional naval and maritime operations.

c. Capabilitics. SEAL teams can:

(1) Destroy or sabotage enemy shipping, port and harbor facilities. bridges, railway lines, communications centers, and other LOC in and around maritime areas and riverine environments to undermine the morale or degrade the military, political, or economic strength of the enemy.

(2) Infiltrate or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas, evaders, and escapees. Infiltration and exfiltration of SEALS may be by submarine, surface vessel, aircraft, or land vehicle.

(3) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence-gathering tasks, including capture of key personnel.

From JCS Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,* 28 October 1992, Appendixes B through D.

(4) Accomplish limited civic action tasks that are normally incidental to FID and HA operations, such as medical aid, elementary civil engineering activities, and boat operations and maintenance for the indigenous population.

(5) Organize, train, assist, and advise US, allied, and other friendly military or paramilitary forces in the conduct of any of the above tasks.

(6) Integrate NSW task organizations into fleet task forces or groups to plan, coordinate, and conduct maritime SO to meet fleet-specific requirements.

(7) Can operate in desert, arctic, jungle, urban, riverine, or maritime environments

d. Limitations. SEAL elements:

(1) Require specialized support for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply.

(2) Are restricted in their ability to conduct sustained firepower, mobility, organic combat support, and combat service support assets.

(3) Are dependent on the theater Navy component commander for logistic support.

(4) SEAL units are not equipped for sustained, direct engagements against enemy forces.

(5) Carry minimum amounts of equipment, munitions. and light armament consisting primarily of individual weapons.

3. SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams. SDV teams area maritime combat force organized, trained, and equipped to operate and maintain combat submersible systems in maritime or riverine environments.

a. Organization. Each SDV team is organized into a logistic support element, four SDV platoons, and two DDS platoons.

b. Missions. The mission of an SDV Team is to employ, operate, and maintain combat submersible systems in the conduct of naval and joint SO. SDV teams may be employed to conduct SO in a maritime or riverine environment. Typical mission profiles will vary because of differences in delivery of the SDV from forward basing to the objective area. Options available to a commander to meet different tactical situations include launch and recovery via submarine, surface combatant, or noncombatant craft. The most clandestine option is submarine launch and recovery.

c. Capabilities. SDV teams:

(1) Conduct limited DA missions such as port and harbor antishipping attacks and raids

(2) Conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and other intelligence-gathering missions.

(3) Infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF.

(4) SDV personnel maintain limited capabilities to operate in riverine and maritime environments, in either desert, arctic, or jungle climates.

d. Limitations. SDV teams:

(1) Are limited in speed and distance by propulsion system, sea state, and weather.

(2) Can carry a limited amount of equipment.

(3) Require transportation to the operating area. Mobility is best achieved by submarines equipped with DDS. Other means of transportation are air and surface sea lift.

(4) Require a support base for extended employment. (Sustainment in operating area is limited.)

4. Special Boat Units. SBUs consist of active NSW, fleet, and Reserve component personnel organized, trained, and equipped to operate a variety of surface combatant craft in both maritime and riverine environments. (See Joint Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations.")

a. Organization. SBUs are organized into a headquarters element and several combatant craft detachments, depending on number and type of vessels assigned.

b. Mission. The mission of the SBU is to employ, operate. and maintain a variety of surface combatant craft to conduct and support naval and joint SO, riverine warfare. and coastal patrol and interdiction. The craft most frequently employed are offshore, open-water fast patrol boats and shallow-draft riverine patrol craft.

c. Capabilities. SBU elements:

(1) Infiltrate and exfiltrate SOF

(2) Provide small-caliber gunfire support and limited shore bombardment.

(3) Conduct coastal patrol, surveillance, harassment, and interdiction of maritime LOC.

(4) Conduct operations to assist in the training of fleet units in countering fast patrol boat tactics.

(5) Advise, train, and assist allied and friendly forces in the operation, maintenance, and employment of various patrol and penetration craft.

(6) Participate in other FID activities, in addition to those in subparagraph (5) above.

d. Limitations. SBU elements:

(1) Are limited in range based on fuel, sea state, and current.

(2) Are limited in size and amount of equipment and weapons that can be carried.

(3) Require a support base or platform for extended employment.

(4) Require extensive transportation assets and dedicated air or sea lift from theater apportioned resources.

5. NSWTG or NSWTU. These are task organizations tailored from resources of a NSWG and its subordinate commands that will be composed of various NSW and supporting elements. They may operate unilaterally, jointly, or in combined operations. Their mission is to provide C2, administration, and logistic support for assigned units. OPCON of designated NSW forces maybe assigned to a JFC or remain with the fleet commander to support fleet amphibious and strike operations. The NSWTG and NSWTU are flexible in size and composition. Several NSWTUs could be operationally subordinate to a NSWTG, or an NSWTU could report directly to a JSOTF, for example, if the scope of operations and size of the deployed force were limited.

6. Special Mission Units. The NCA have directed the establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions throughout the operation continuum and arc routinely under the direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units are prepared and trained to execute a variety of SO missions under covert or clandestine circumstances \vhile maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.



Figure B-1. NAVSOF Command Relationships

APPENDIX C

US AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix provides information on major aspects of USAF SO. Although all aerospace forces have the potential for employment in SO depending on the operational environment and the capabilities required to accomplish the mission, specific units are structured principally to conduct or support SO as their primary mission. AFSOF is an umbrella term for those active and reserve component Air Force forces that are assigned by the Secretary of Defense primary responsibility to conduct and support SO. They include (a) specially equipped fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft, (b) specially trained aircrews for infiltration or exfiltration, resupply, aerial fire support and aerial refueling, and (c) special tactics, weather, communications, and other combat support units.

2. Organization. AFSOF may be organized into an AFSOC for joint operations.

a. The commander of an AFSOC assigned to a unified or subordinate unified command normally directs, coordinates, and integrates the USAF SOF air effort through control of assigned and attached Air Force forces. The AFSOC may be further structured into wings, groups, and squadrons, or be tailored into detachments (AFSODs) or elements (AFSOEs) (see Figure C-l). The size and composition of the organization will depend on the nature and length of the mission, the type of aircraft and personnel involved, the type of sustainment required, and the characteristics of the facilities from which operations will be conducted. Regardless of size. an AFSOF organization will typically contain operational and C2 elements, as well as maintenance, logistics, security, C4, intelligence, and selected facilities support.

b. The JFSOCC routinely has assigned to his command core AFSOF aircraft and supporting organizations to satisfy unique and continuing requirements. Further, for specific missions, the JFC may provide the JFSOCC certain other Navy, Marine, Army or Air Force sorties. The JFACC or, if a JFACC is not designated, appropriate theater conventional component commander will task sorties to support the JFSOCC. Those forces would be provided on a mission-by-mission and priority availability basis or for a specified and usually short period of time. Additionally. the forces (e.g., fighter escort, close air support, bomber, electronic warfare, aerial tanker, airlift) may be provided in support of the JFSOCC rather than assigned to it.

3. AFSOF Mission Capabilities. Aircraft must be capable of operating in hostile airspace, at low altitudes, under conditions of minimum visibility (darkness or adverse weather) while navigating precisely within narrow time parameters. to arrive at specifically defined drop or landing zones, infiltration or exfiltration points, or targets. Deceptive ECM, including LPI/D radios, and passive warning systems are used to avoid engagement by enemy defenses. Additionally, some AFSOF aircraft are capable of performing autonomous DA and SR missions. The AFSOF are organized and trained to permit tailoring the size and composition of the force to meet the particular SO requirement. The AFSOF may include fixed- and rotary-wing transport, aerial tanker, fixed-wing gunship, PSYOP support aircraft, and specially trained ground personnel as either .JFSOCC-assigned or JFSOCC-attached resources. Further, other joint force assets may be provided in support, on a mission-by-mission basis.

a. SO airlift aircraft, composed of transport or cargo and vertical-lift resources, provide low-visibility, clandestine, or covert penetration of hostile, sensitive, or denied airspace to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate ground and maritime forces in support of UW, DA, SR, and CT operations. Fixed-wing aircraft require the capability of using minimum-length, unimproved landing strips. Vertical-lift aircraft can land in confined areas

or hover over selected targets and use rope ladders, hoist, or rappelling or fast-rope procedures to infiltrate or exfiltrate personnel.

(1) Vertical-lift aircraft can be equipped for adverse-weather, all-terrain, long-range infiltration and exfiltration, suppressive fire support, personnel recovery, medical evacuation, and PSYOP.

(2) Highly specialized fixed-wing aircraft are equipped for deep penetration of hostile areas through use of electronics defense systems, terrain following or terrain avoidance tactics, and are capable of airlanding or airdropping personnel, equipment, and psychological warfare materials, or extracting personnel by airborne pickup devices or airlanding.

b. Certain AFSOF units may train, assist, and advise the Air Forces of other nations in support of FID. These activities may require selective AFSOF language skills and detailed area orientation. Unlike support to UW, DA, SR and CT missions, AFSOF participation in FID often does not focus on high technology equipment. Rather, AFSOF must be prepared to lend expertise on a level of technology compatible with host-nation resources and capabilities. Involvement in such FID activities may include operations, maintenance, and logistic support to host-nation counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and other related security assistance operations.

c. Certain fixed-wing, long-range AFSOF assets are equipped to refuel rotary-wing aircraft in flight, thereby significantly extending the range of the rotary-wing aircraft. Certain SOF aerial tankers, when equipped, may also be refueled from strategic fixed-wing tankers.

d. Fixed-wing gunships are equipped with a variety of sensors and weapons to acquire and engage static and moving surface targets in both an interdiction and CAS role or to provide armed escort. Aircrew training and avionics capabilities allow these aircraft to function at night and in adverse weather.

e. Certain Reserve component AFSOF aircraft are designed to provide employment platforms for PSYOP personnel to conduct operations in support of theater operational objectives or specific contingencies. Other SOF aircraft may be employed in PSYOP or PSYWAR roles supporting special or conventional missions.

f. STTs consist primarily of SO Combat Control and Pararescue personnel. The STTs are organized, trained, and equipped to establish and operate air assault zones and Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP) in austere and nonpermissive environments. STTs direct and position aircraft by verbal control, beacon operations, or other visual or electronic acquisition aids. They designate targets: assist in offensive attack, demolition operations and extraction of forces; provide HUMINT, airfield reconnaissance. and limited weather observations. STTs conduct personnel recovery and advanced trauma care, coordinate evacuation operations, and are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct selected aircrew duties.

g. The SOWT/TE of the Air Force Air Weather Semite is capable of operating in remote and austere locations under most climatic conditions. It can operate independently in permissive and semipermissive environments or as augmentation to other SOF in nonpermissive environments. These elements obtain forward weather observations from either friendly, hostile, or denied areas and maintain a limited air and surface forecast capability in the absence of normal weather data sources.

h. AFSOF base station and deployed C4 requirements are met by the tactical SOCCE. The SOCCE is a deployable tactical communications unit capable of providing secure and clear voice and data communications

among AFSOF units and between them and JFSOCC (SOC and JSOTF) headquarters and other Service SOF elements.

4. AFSOF Limitations. AFSOF assets are designed to operate most effectively in particular environments and under specific methods of employment. As a general rule, AFSOF assets become less effective when employed outside their intended operational environments. For instance, infiltration or exfiltration platforms and gunships may be less effective in conditions other than darkness and adverse weather. Planners must be familiar with the specific capabilities and limitations of each AFSOF platform as spelled out in appropriate technical manuals and orders. Broad-based limitations that apply generically to all AFSOF, because of their nature. include:

a. Limited self-deployment or sustainment capability and dependence on established support or logistic packages that must accompany employment aircraft. Operations may be sustained from a bare base. However, the technological sophistication of most AFSOF resources limits their beddown flexibility.

b. Degraded mission effectiveness resulting from increased sophistication of enemy defenses

c. Extensive maintenance support required by high-technology avionics equipment,

d. Possible restrictions on the duration or frequency of employment because of aircrew endurance. aircraft systems limitations, and maintenance and flying regulations.

e. Aerial tanker support required by long-range deployment and employment,

f. Extremely limited defensive air-to-air capabilities

g. Dependence on conventional air support for defensive counter air, air defense suppression. and other capabilities, as dictated by the threat.

5. Special Mission Units. In addition to the SOF discussed above, the NCA have directed the establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained. and equipped to conduct range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions. They may be conducted in peacetime competition, conflict, or war and are routinely under the direct supervision of the highest command levels. often the NCA. These units. generically referred to as special mission units, are prepared and trained to execute a variety of SO missions under covert or clandestine circumstances while maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.

6. Augmenting USAF Forces. Although not designated by the Secretary of Defense as core AFSOF, certain conventional forces may receive enhanced training and may be equipped and organized to conduct missions in support of SO. These improvements are principally designed to enhance the primary combat capabilities of the conventional force or to support SO on a nondedicated, mission-specific basis. But, they do not provide these forces with the capability to conduct unrestricted unilateral activities across the full range of SO missions. These forces include:

a. SO Low-Level. These are basic fixed-wing strategic and theater (tactical) airlift forces which, by virtue of special aircrew training or aircraft modification, could augment AFSOF for the conduct and support of selected so.

b. Strategic Tankers. Air Mobility Command maintains a limited number of strategic tanker crews trained to support the often unique refueling requirements of AFSOF fixed-wing aircraft.

c. Other. Depending on the mission any DOD aerospace assets maybe allocated by appropriate authority to support SO, depending on the capabilities required. This support is usually mission-specific and of short duration. Such capabilities may include strategic or tactical bombing or airlift, airborne warning or control, EW, reconnaissance, deception, or space-based support.



Figure C-1. AFSOF Command Relationships

APPENDIX D

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING GUIDANCE

Commanders and planners employing joint and single-Service SOF should adhere the following guidance, (Specific employment guidelines and coordination or deconfliction procedures will be included in supporting JTTP.)

a. SOF offer combinations of unique military capabilities routinely not resident in conventional forces, SOF maybe applicable WHEN nonmilitary options are insufficient, conventional options are inappropriate or infeasible, and WHERE results arc required beyond the influence of conventional forces. Further, HOW the NCA

or a combatant commander requires the operation to be conducted (e.g., minimal collateral damage, covert, clandestine) may dictate SOF employment.

b. SOF capabilities may be applicable to missions throughout the operational continuum. The threat environment, itself, does not characterize SO. For example, LIC defines abroad environment for politico-military confrontation, while SOF offer unique capabilities within that environment. LIC does not equate to SO, even though SOF maybe applicable to a given LIC environment. In this regard, SO could best be considered a form of warfare, regardless of where they are executed along the operational continuum.

c. Frequently, political ramifications of SO may be viewed as more critical than strict military considerations. The role of SOF is frequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive nonmilitary activities to occur. Commanders should view each SO in broad and long-term political, military, and psychological dimensions, which may impose legal and political constraints on operations.

d. The decision to employ SOF may turn on the need for a rapid, low-visibility response of limited size. Therefore, OPSEC, COMSEC, cover stories, deception, and compartmentation must be integrated at the first stage of operational planning.

e. SOF arc not structured in size, depth, or equipage to meet every contingency. Therefore, commanders should clearly assess the risk by comparing the value of the target to the possible loss of the force and the attendant embarrassment to the nation or negative impact on the theater campaign.

f. SO are inclusive. Before any employment decision, the mission must be comprehensively planned beginning with "action at the objective" and must concurrently include development of the profiles for infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of the forces. Emphasis on preplanning for extraction is critical since, by the time extraction is required, the element of surprise is often lost, particularly in short-duration operations.

g. Under most circumstances, SOF cannot sustain themselves for extended periods.

h. SOF are not designed to engage opposing forces directly with standard tactics. If forced into such action, SOF must rapidly disengage and reevaluate their effectiveness for continued operations. Reinforcement is not a routine option for SOF.

i. SOF are frequently joint. Likewise, many operations require close interdepartmental or interagency coordination. These circumstances mandate care in maintaining unity of effort.

j. SOF depend on interoperable, secure, lightweight, redundant, and short- and long-haul C4 systems.

k. Missions may require the employment of special weapons and equipment, often of a nonstandard configuration. Frequently, unique development and acquisition actions may need to be pursued urgently.

l. Logistic support still remains a basic Service responsibility. However, commanders should take great care to avoid either overlaps or deficiencies in the Service support to a force that is frequently joint. Routine supporting procedures must be established and maintained to avoid highlighting SOF operational activity by unusual or nonroutine methods of support; and logistic planners must be incorporated at the beginning of the SO planning effort.

m. Often, missions require SOF to employ state-of-the-art technology. However, certain operations, particularly in FID or UW, may require use of equipment of lower (or even obsolete) technology that is compatible with the people and environment of the operational area.

n. SOF are most effective when used in proactive vice reactive operations. Initiative, speed, surprise, audacity, intuition, and mobility are critical SOF planning elements. When employing SOF in FID or UW operations, commanders should consider the indirect role of advising, training, and assisting foreign indigenous military and paramilitary forces. This indirect approach may best further US interests while minimizing US visibility and risk. Such operations exemplify the often protracted politico-military nature of SO and require patience and policy consistency.

o. SOF are most effectively employed when centralized decisionmaking gives way to decentralized planning and execution. Joint operational planning should be accomplished on a face-to-face basis. The SOF hallmark: those who will execute the mission must plan it.

p. Commanders must maintain maximum flexibility by developing a broad range of options. But, although SO often require extensive, complex planning and rehearsal, the goal always must be to develop the simplest execution options possible.

q. Real-time, real-distance rehearsals, conducted under terrain and climatic conditions similar to the operational environment, which include all players and in which nothing is simulated, greatly enhance the probability of mission accomplishment.

r. Layered levels of either command or support have historically proven detrimental to the conduct of effective SO. Rather, a principal benefit of SOF is their capability to be organized flexibly and provided directly to the appropriate employing commander in a properly-sized task organization.

s. Senior commanders should provide for rapid and smooth conventional force support planning and coordination for SO.

t. Planning may necessarily be compartmented, but care must be taken to involve all required personnel from the outset. Commanders should ensure that misperceptions or misunderstandings within and outside the SOF community are avoided.

u. Detailed and current target-specific intelligence, often of more detail than that required by conventional forces, is necessary in SO mission planning. Further, data must be available to the lowest execution levels.

v. Although forces have the capability to conduct quick reaction missions under certain circumstances, normal mission planning and preparation may require 72 hours or longer from mission tasking, with an additional 24 to 48 hours needed to conduct insertion and movement to the target. Political sensitivities may preclude putting force into a country or into a position from which to conduct their mission effectively. If so, additional time may be required to conduct that operation.

w. SO may require conventional support for suppression of enemy defenses, escort, reconnaissance, deception, close air support, naval surface fire support, and other similar capabilities. To exploit these capabilities fully, planners should coordinate such support as early as possible in the planning process.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment

SCOPE

This lesson addresses the Latin American environment from a strategic perspective. In this lesson, you will study the Latin American by applying the strategic analysis methodology (SAM) to the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility. You have applied SAM in your studies of the other unified commands. You will also review the methodology for regional force planning (MFRFP) for use in subsequent lessons and will study the roles and organization of USSOUTHCOM. This lesson establishes the strategic setting for lesson *3* which covers deliberate and crisis action planning and for lesson 4 which covers the development of an Army operation order for the 21st Airborne Corps.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

B.00 TASK: Explain the strategic and operational environments in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include political, geographic, economic, social, and historical factors affecting US security interests in the region IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 1a, lb, ld, 1e, 3a, and 3c.

B.10 TASK: Explain regional situations affecting security in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include. as a minimum, regional threats: the relevant actors operating in the AOR; and the political economic, military, geographic, social and historical facts or trends having US security implications IAW student materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 1a, lb, ld, le, 3a, and 3c.

B.20 TASK: Explain US interests and objectives in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must identify US interests, objectives, and policies in the theater and how US diplomatic positions complement or conflict with the viewpoints of other regional countries. The explanation must also include the trends or changes in the political and foreign policy realms that may influence future US security decisions IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, lb, 1d, le, 3a, and 3c.

B.30 TASK: Explain the roles and responsibilities of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references

STANDARD: The explanation must include the USSOUTHCOM's roles and responsibilities in protecting US strategic interests in a changing theater. The explanation must also demonstrate how the changing regional situation affects the operational (unified) command's missions, organization. and functions IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: lb and le.

ISSUE MATERIALS

None

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives. As you read the assigned readings, apply SAM and the MFRFP to the information you are provided. You may want to review the methodologies prior to doing the readings. You originally learned the strategic analytical methodologies in S530, *Regional and Operational Studies.* Reviewing SAM will help you to focus on the significant aspects of the region. You should also review the MFRFP. This model was also presented in S530. A review of the model will benefit you in your preparation for Lesson 4, Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise. Key to the learning process is the active thinking you must do for each reading. These readings provide you with the background information which is essential for the successful completion of the remainder of the course.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Clinton and Latin America: Facing an Unfinished Agenda

Clinton and Latin America: Facing an Unfinished Agenda

BY PETER HAKIM

Since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched the Good Neighbor Policy, Latin Americans have felt that they have gotten a better deaf from Democrats in the White House than from Republicans. The noteworthy innovations in United States—Latin American relations are mostly associated with Democratic presidents. John F. Kennedy is linked with the Alliance for Progress. And Jimmy Carter gets credit for agreeing to turn over control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, and for making human rights the centerpiece of United States policy at a time when military dictators reigned in most of Latin America. Somehow Kennedy's responsibility for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Lyndon Johnson's decision to send the marines into the Dominican Republic are conveniently overlooked, as Latin American observer Mark Falcoff has pointed out.

In contrast, Republican presidents tend to evoke bitter memories. Richard Nixon's and Gerald Ford's administrations are associated with a policy of benign neglect. Ronald Reagan is remembered for his early efforts to curry favor with the military regimes in Brazil and the southern cone countries, and for his relentless interventions in the Caribbean Basin.

Yet Bill Clinton's victory last November left many Latin Americans uneasy. They had grown comfortable with the Bush administration and its approach to the region. George Bush had established personal relations with many Latin American leaders, including Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico, Carlos Menem of Argentina, and Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela. During the Bush years most of the outstanding conflicts between the United States and Latin America were muted, and a few were even resolved. The wars in Central America came to art end. The foreign debt crisis receded into the background. Tensions over drug trafficking lessened.

Moreover, the Bush administration proposed a new United States economic partnership with Latin America—at a moment when the region's governments were worried about being ignored in a post-cold war world, as they watched international attention and resources focus on the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and the fast-growing countries of Asia. Bush not only undertook free trade negotiations with Mexico but also called for the development of a hemisphere-tide free trade system that would incorporate all the nations of Latin America. On the political front, the United States and Latin American countries increasingly worked together at the Organization of American States (OAS) to find ways to protect and promote democracy in the region. The 1989 American invasion of Panama proved only a brief setback in the steady warming of United States-Latin American relations.

FEAR OF NEW FACES

It is thus no surprise that most Latin American governments seemed to prefer the continuity of the Bush administration to the "change" promised by the Clinton candidacy. Their main concern was that a Clinton White House would retreat from the hemispheric trade initiatives launched by Bush just as Latin American countries were increasingly counting on

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expanded trade and foreign investment to fuel economic recovery and growth. One source of anxiety was Clinton's pledge that America's own economic and social problems would be the central priority of his presidency. Another was the presumption that Democrats would be more protectionist, which raised doubts about whether the United States would sustain interest in regional free trade.

Latin Americans are not solely preoccupied with economic matters. Some are worried about Clinton's promises to take a more assertive stance on democracy and human rights; a few governments fear that they may be the targets. Others are concerned that an openly aggressive United States posture may upset the fragile consensus that has developed at the OAS and end up weakening rather than bolstering the organization's ability to undertake unified action to protect democratic rule.

Yet there was cause for uncertainty about the direction of United States policy more than a year ago-long before Clinton was nominated and Bush began to slide in the opinion polls. The Bush administration's policies toward Latin America visibly faltered on several fronts:

- In El Salvador, United States-supported mediation efforts by the UN finally produced a New Year's Day 1992 peace accord between the government and leftist insurgents-an accord that is being carried out, although by no means smoothly or without frustrating delays. Yet the United States seems increasingly bent on disengaging itself from Central America. Aid levels have declined sharply while approved assistance has been disbursed slowly and, according to the government's own reports, has not been used effectively. A few virulently anti-Sandinista members of Congress, led by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), last year interrupted aid to Nicaragua for nearly six months. For most of 1992, both Nicaragua and El Salvador were without United States ambassadors as administration appointments languished in the Senate.

- The United States has been actively involved in OAS initiatives in Haiti and Peru, but neither of these efforts has made much progress in restoring democratic government. In Haiti—where the army ousted the nation's first freely elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in September 1991—there is still no solution after 15 months, and the political and economic situation continua to deteriorate. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori—after suspending the constitution and dissolving Congress and the courts last April—bowed to international pressure, including a suspension of United States aid, and called for the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and serve as an interim legislature. But that election, held November 22, was only a small step forward, and the United States and other OAS members appear ambivalent about keeping the pressure on.

- After putting up resistance to the Cuban-American community in Miami for more than a year, the Bush administration decided to support the so-called Cuban Democracy Act, designed to tighten the United States embargo against Cuba—in part because Clinton had endorsed the measure to better his electoral chances in Florida. This was something of a turnabout for the White House, which had taken some modest steps to reduce United States—Cuban hostility, and it was greeted with dismay by most countries in Latin America—even as they increasingly pressed Fidel Castro for political change. One consequence has been diminished prospects for United States—Latin American cooperation on Cuba.

- The Bush administration succeeded in wrapping up negotiations with Mexico and Canada on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was formally signed by the three counties in mid-December and is now ready to be presented for congressional approval. This is a historic accomplishment in United States—Latin American relations, the fruit of active and persistent presidential leadership in the face of substantial domestic opposition. If ratified, it has the potential to reshape United States ties with Mexico and open the way for broader hemispheric trade links. The agreement, however, took considerably longer to complete than had initially been expected-and ratification is now the province of the new administration and Congress, which leaves the outcome still uncertain. Two tough issues, environmental protection and workers' rights, did not get sufficient attention from the Bush team and must be worked out with Mexico.

- The administration's greatest failing was not devising a strategy for extending NAFTA to other countries in Latin America and creating the hemisphere-wide free trade pact the president had proposed in his June 1990 announcement of the Enterprise for the Americas initiative. "Other elements of the initiative have languished as well. It was not until last October that limited financing was approved for a special investment promotion facility, and Congress has authorized only a fraction of the funds necessary for the reduction of debts

• For more on the initiative, see Peter Hakim, 'The United States and Latin America: Good Neighbors Again?" *Current History*, February 1992.

owed by Latin American countries to the United States treasury. The White House and Congress share responsibility for the initiative's excruciatingly slow implementation.

These developments in United States policy fast year disappointed Latin Americans. But so far they have not led to any significant deterioration in relations, which remain fundarnentally sound. Opportunities have clearly been missed, but irreversible losses have not occurred.

CLINTON'S CHOICES

President Clinton inherits a well-defined set of issues and challenges for Latin America. His administration has important decisions to make, but in the post-cold war eta the policy alternatives will not be grounded in distinct and clear-cut ideologies. Nor will the choices be derived from grand visions of America's place in the world; none of Clinton's statements on foreign policy, either during the campaign or since the election, have offered any such vision.

Ideology will play a role, however. The new administration's policies and priorities in Latin America will in part emerge from political competition among groups associated with a diverse Democratic party neoconservative supporters of the contras in Nicaragua and liberal human rights activists; proponents of free trade and individuals tied to labor and the environmental movement; advocates of special commercial relations within the hemisphere and globalists who reject regional trade preferences; and fervent champions of an active pro-democracy agenda and those calling for restraint in the use of United States power. The policies resulting from the conflicts and compromises among these different perspectives may not always be fully coherent or easy to implement.

Beyond this political tug-of-war, two factors will decisively shape and constrain the new administration's policy course in Latin America. The first is the performance of the domestic economy Clinton is well aware that the credibility and success of his presidency ultimately depend on his ability to spark growth, reduce unemployment, bring the deficit under control, and increase international competitiveness. A sluggish economy will inevitably absorb the administration's energy and political resources and limit its capacity for international initiative. A dynamic United States economy, in contrast, would provide the foundation for an active and imaginative foreign policy. It would give the administration added confidence and clout to operate internationally. It would also expand the funds available for initiatives abroad and mute the cries for protectionist trade measures—both of which are of crucial importance for Latin America.

Political and economic developments in Latin America will be another powerful determinant of United States policy. In the past few years the region has become a more compatible partner for the United States. Latin America's impressive democratic renewal, its dramatic shift toward market-oriented economic strategies, and its newfound willingness to cooperate with the United States on a range of issues have increasingly turned the region into an area of opportunity rather than a well of problems and conflicts. It was, for example, Latin America's enthusiastic response to the Enterprise for the Americas initiative that gave the initiative its importance back in Washington.

The region's future, however, remains plagued by uncertainty. Democratic politics are robust in only a few counties and human rights abuses are still widespread. Haiti and Peru have reverted to authoritarian rule. Mexico has made little progress in opening its political system. Venezuela suffered two coup attempts last year that left its democratic institutions badly wounded. Democracy in Brazil is under increasing stress.

Economic reforms have remedied long-term structural weaknesses in many countries but are producing sustained growth in only a few. Overvalued exchange rates, widening trade deficits, inflationary pressures, and high unemployment and underemployment are common throughout the region. Brazil remains the sick giant of Latin America, with persistent hyperinflation, three years of negative growth, and deep indecision about the direction its economy and politics should take.

The type and quality of Latin America's relations with the United States will depend on the region's capacity to deal with its own problems-its ability to sustain and deepen democratic practice, stick with its market openings, and achieve healthy economic growth. Failure on one or more of these fronts will reduce United States interest in the region and diminish the prospects for productive ties.

Since his electoral victory on November 4, Clinton has been upbeat about Latin America. He has suggested that Latin America is fertile ground for advancing the cause of democracy, stating that, "together, we can construct a genuine hemispheric community of democracies." He has emphasized the contribution a prosperous Latin America could make to economic revival in the United States, pointing out that if the region's growth had not been interrupted in the 1980s the United States trade deficit would have been 20 percent lower. To be sure, these expressions of optimism are partly diplomatic rhetoric. Nonetheless, the linking of United States economic interests to Latin America's economic performance, by an American leader whose agenda is dominated by the domestic economy, is good news for the region.

NAFTA THE CORNERSTONE

NAFTA will be the first crucial test for the new administration. The fate of the free trade agreement will

affect the course of United States—Latin American relations more than any other single issue.

It would be a devastating blow to United States–Mexican ties if the United States were to reject or signficantly delay NAFTA-after two years of negotiation, and with a signed agreement in hand. This could well provoke a resurgence of anti-Americanism in a country that clearly wants and expects NAFTA to be a reality soon. And aside from Canada and perhaps Japan, no other bilateral relationship is more important for the United States.

Once the accord is in place the stage will be set for free trade negotiations with other Latin American counties and for the possible development of a hemisphere-wale trading system. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine the United States pursuing free trade with any other Latin American country if it cannot achieve an agreement with Mexico first.

Clinton has consistently backed NAFTA. Time and again during the presidential campaign he expressed his conviction that free trade with Mexico would contribute to job creation and economic growth in the United States. In the final weeks before the balloting he endorsed the 2,000-page NAFTA agreement signed by the Bush administration and said he would not call for its renegotiation. He has made plain his dissatisfaction with the pact's labor and environmental provisions, and announced his intention to seek parallel accords with Mexico that deal with these issues. This, however, does not appear to present any significant roadblock and should in fact facilitate congressional ratification and broaden public support, Mexican President Carlos Salinas has not objected to negotiating the additional provisions.

Given his strong public endorsement of the agreement, Clinton is unlikely to backtrack on NAFTA, despite the continued opposition of many of his political allies. The agreement will most likely be ratified this year, although the huge turnover in Congress makes the final vote unpredictable. Clinton artfully kept NAFTA from becoming a campaign issue. AS president, he will likely move to conclude the agreement, after having argued that it is good policy—toward Mexico, toward Latin America, and for the United States economy.

Clinton is also on record as favoring the extension of NAFTA to order Latin American countries, leading to the eventual development of a hemispheric free trade system as proposed by Bush. But so far he, like the Bush administration, has presented no specifics on procedures, conditions, or timetables, aside from mentioning Chile and Argentina as potential early candidates for negotiations.

It is difficult to predict how much energy and political capital the Clinton administration will be prepared to spend pursuing free trade arrangements for the hemisphere. Nor is it clear how intense the resistance from labor and other groups or how strong the support from American business would be. Much will depend on the performance of the United States and Latin American economies. Vibrant growth in the United States. would diminish protectionist opposition, while economic advances in several major Latin American countries would help mobilize the backing of United States investors and exporters; sluggish economies would have the opposite impact.

Brazil may be the key. only in Brazil are United States economic interests potentially as intensively engaged as they are in Mexico. If and when Brazil recovers economic dynamism it would quickly become a major market for United States products, attract large flows of United States investment, and appear an appealing free trade partner. If the Brazilian economy remains crisis-ridden, the United States may still negotiate free trade pacts with a few other Latin American countries (or try to bring them into an expanded NAFTA). But without Brazil—which has 40 percent of Latin America's population and economic output—there is unlikely to be a strong United States push for a hemispheric free trade system.

SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY

While Clinton has pledged to work aggressively in support of democratic change and human rights, he has given no hint of how his administration might carry out that commitment in Latin America. One major issue his administration will have to address involves the mechanisms through which it would pursue its democracy and human rights goals. After years of political irrelevance, the OAS has recently emerged as a potentially significant actor in hemispheric affairs, particularly in organizing collective inter-American responses to safeguard democracy. Clinton and his advisers will have to decide whether they want to fortify the OAS role or whether they want greater capacity for independent United States action.

The broader issue concerns the kind of multilateral governance the United States would like to see emerge in the hemisphere. What mandate, authority, procedures, and instruments of enforcement should the OAS and/or other inter-American institutions have? Should Washington encourage the OAS to take on the kind of activist role the UN has begun to play globally? Is the United States prepared to shoulder the added costs?

Above all, strengthening collective action in the hemisphere will require the Clinton administration—unlike virtually all its predecessors—to resist the temptation to intervene on its own, even when the slow pace of multilateral diplomacy proves frustrating.

The first tests will come in Haiti and Peru. Alarmed by the prospect of a renewed flow of Haitian refugees, the administration may be tempted to displace the OAS efforts with more aggressive, unilateral action in

order to resolve a politically stalemated and badly deteriorating situation in Haiti. In Peru, on the other hand, where the antidrug war has continued to have priority for the United States, Clinton and his people may find the easiest course is to avoid further confrontation with the autocratic Fujimori government by moving to reestablish normal relations. That is the road the Bush White House appeared to be taking, and it would probably be endorsed by Latin American governments, most of which do not relish keeping the pressure on Peru.

If Clinton took these actions, OAS credibility would be damaged and its ability to respond to democratic breakdowns diminished. The alternative for the new administration —which carries no guarantees of success—is to sack with the 0AS in both countries and try to provide the leadership and resolve necessary to make the organization's efforts more effective.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND BEYOND

Democratic rule and respect for human rights are weak in every nation of Central America except Costa Rica. Abject poverty remains pervasive, and most of the countries are economically distressed. The United States still exercises considerable influence, and could contribute to political reconciliation, economic reconstruction, and the resettlement of large numbers of refugees and displaced people. But that will cost money, which is in short supply in Washington. And the president has announced no plans to reverse the sharp decline in United States economic assistance over the past few years. The Clinton administration could partially compensate for the reduced aid flows by providing additional trade preferences and encouraging increased lending by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. But to play a truly constructive role in Central America today, the United States w-ill have to come up with more hard cash.

President Clinton will also not be able to avoid dealing with Fidel Castro's Cuba. Nothing Clinton has said so far suggests his administration would be disposed to change current policy, directed at squeezing Cuba economically and isolating it diplomatically.

Yet when the new administration begins to view Cuba as a policy issue, and not merely as a political matter, it may conclude that the approach of the past 30 years is unimaginative and unproductive-and want to set its own course rather than be guided by inertia. One potentially attractive alternative, put forth by a special task force of the Inter-American Dialogue last September, proposes combining continued economic pressure with new incentives for political opening, aims for a marked expansion of the flow of information and ideas to the island, and-most important-urges greater cooperation between the United States and Latin America to encourage peaceful change.

The choice for Clinton is whether to pursue a fresh and more activist approach, involving an effort to mobilize an international coalition and to begin bargaining with Cuba, or to continue waiting for the Cuban authorities to take he first steps or for Fidel Castro to pass from the scene. The former might well be more consistent with Clinton's approach to promoting democracy elsewhere, but it would be fiercely resisted by many Cuban-American leaders who are the driving force behind current policy.

The war against illegal drugs, especially its international component, has receded as an issue in United States politics; indeed, the issue was hardly tied in the presidential campaign. Clinton felt no need to communicate a strong position and he made no mention at all of the drug war in Latin America. All this suggests there may now be room for some significant policy changes-which appear to be justified on both substantive and financial grounds.

The evidence is overwhelming that United States antidrug efforts overseas have had virtually no impact on its problems with drugs at home, and probably never will. Given the scarcity of foreign aid resources, funding for drug initiatives in Latin America could be sharply curtailed, or directed to those initiatives that Latin American governments—not Washington—consider most important. Given its domestic focus, the new administration will almost certainly want to emphasize domestic measures to reduce demand rather than international anti-narcotic programs.

Clinton inherits a well-defined policy agenda for Latin America He and his advisers will have important choices to make, but the issues will be familar. One should not expect dramatic turns or reversals such as President Carter's emphasis on human rights, President Reagan's anti-Communist crusade in Central America, or President Bush's proposals for hemisphere-wide free trade arrangements. With the end of the cold war, a significant bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington on the issues that should be given immediate attention in United States-Latin American relations, and that consensus is largely shared by most governments in Latin America.

But the fact that the agenda is set and the issues are familiar does not make the challenges confronting the new administration in Latin America arty less difficult or important. The battle for democracy could still be lost; economic progress in the region is by no means assured; cooperation between Latin America and the United States, whether on economic matters or on other issues, remains incipient. The task of the Clinton administration is not to break new ground but to consolidate and build on what has been accomplished, establishing an enduring relationship that best serves the interests and values of both the United States and Latin America. No previous United States government has come close to accomplishing that task. ■

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Alexander F. Watson's Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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I am honored to be nominated by president Clinton to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss Latin American and Caribbean affairs with members of the committee and to respond to your questions.

I am particularly fortunate to be nominated for this post at this historical juncture when, as Secretary Christopher has said, there is an unprecedented "convergence of goals and values among all the people of the Americas." We have today an opportunity to work together with our neighbors in this hemisphere, inspired by common values. to strengthen relations and achieve a wide range of benefits for all our peoples.

Fortunately, representative democracy is now the norm in this region. But elections alone do not guarantee that all citizens are fully enfranchised, have recourse to fair and effective systems of justice, or have a government capable of meeting needs and guaranteeing basic rights.

By the same token, the countries of the region are recognizing the enormous potential of liberal. market economics to generate economic growth, investment, and employment. But sound macroeconomic policies alone do not guarantee that a society will work effectively to lift people out of poverty, or to create equal opportunity for all citizens. I believe the United States should cooperate in efforts to extend the benefits of democracy and sustainable economic growth as broadly and as deeply as possible in this hemisphere, as President Clinton intends to do at home.

President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have made a clear decision to engage actively on the full range of issues confronting the Americas.

I would like to discuss these issues briefly, making reference to the three pillars of President Clinton's foreign policy: building American prosperity, promoting democracy, and defending American security.

Building American Prosperity

First, economics. This is the area where a strong relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean offers the clearest, most tangible mutual benefits.

Latin and Caribbean reformers are adopting market-oriented economic policies, and their economies arc growing as a result. In 1991 and 1992, for the first time in a decade, the region's economic growth outpaced population growth.

"Statement at Confirmation Hearing," by Alexander F. Watson Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Department of State Dispatch, 24 May, 1993, Vol 4, No 21, pp 384 through 385.

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These governments' unilateral moves to drop trade barriers and cut tariffs have led to a boom in regional trade. This hemisphere has become our fastest-growing export market. Last year, our exports grew 19%, from $63 billion to $76 billion, creating an estimated 240,000 new jobs in this country. As our neighbors' incomes continue to grow, so will their demand for our exports.

Our challenge is to build upon this shared prosperity so that economies of the hemisphere will enjoy strong economic growth which is environmentally sound and treats labor fairly. As you know, President Clinton is working aggressively to open markets to our goods worldwide. He is committed to working with the Congress to achieve approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and to seeing it enter into force on January 1, 1994. If confirmed, I would look forward to contributing to this accomplishment.

The President has also made special mention of this hemisphere as a region where we will work, after the North American Free Trade Agreement is completed, to reach further agreements with democratic countries which are succeeding at economic reform.

The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, launched in 1990 with bipartisan support, provides a solid policy foundation to expand trade and investment, and to alleviate debt burdens in the hemisphere. This initiative was very well received in the region. Its essential elements are continuing in this Administration, and if confirmed, I would work to build on them.

Promoting Democracy

President Clinton's second foreign policy pillar— strengthening democracy—is of vital importance in Latin America and the Caribbean, which has made dramatic progress is in this regard.

Citizens and political leaders throughout the region have understood that only open and democratic societies have the resiliency and capacity to draw on the talents and energies of their people to confront the challenges of this age. For them as for us, democracy and human rights are more than moral imperatives which fulfill our vision of a free and just society—they are practical necessities.

Strengthening democracy means first and foremost bolstering the public and private institutions which defend human rights, engage citizens in the political process. and promote justice and social equity. If confirmed, I would use our foreign assistance, working with public and private organizations throughout this hemisphere, to strengthen these vital institutions.

I know first-hand from my experience in the Andean region that one of the most dangerous threats to democracy and free societies is narcotics trafficking. I have seen the courage and the sacrifice with which many of our neighbors are confronting this threat, despite resources that are even scarcer than ours. Their losses have been great. Their victories have benefited us as well as themselves. I look forward to examining with our partners in the hemisphere the ways we can cooperate which will most likely lead to further success in this terrible struggle.

I would also work with our neighbors to promote good governance. For democracy to work well, governments must be able to respond to citizens' needs effectively, regularly, and fairly. Misapplication of funds or simple corruption is corrosive to public trust, undermines democratic institutions, subverts governments' efforts to serve their citizens. and is a cruel tax paid most often by society's weakest members. Good governance is an important challenge, a permanent challenge for all democracies, even our own.

Central America remains an important focus of U.S. foreign policy. The people of El Salvador and Nicaragua have ended their civil wars and are making extraordinary efforts to heal their societies, rebuild their economies, and strengthen their democratic systems. In Guatemala, good progress is being made in negotiations to end the last military conflict in Central America. I believe we have a strong interest in exercising leadership and providing assistance to help Central Americans consolidate a democratic peace and pursue a brighter future.

Defending American Security

Modernizing our armed forces and enhancing American security is a third pillar of President Clinton's foreign policy. In this hemisphere, with the Cold War ended, with the spread of democracy and waning of guerrilla movements once sponsored by Cuba, the issue of regional security has been transformed. Still, we cannot neglect security concerns in our own region. I believe we must take advantage of this period of peace to search for opportunities to enhance security and prevent future crises.

One of the most hopeful developments of recent years has been the action taken by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I would set as a key goal of our diplomacy the search for a regional consensus to continue progress in this critical area.

I would also search for opportunities to contribute to the solution of lingering border disputes, and to foster understandings to restrain the buildup of conventional weapons. Success in such efforts would build confidence among neighbors and permit them to devote more resources to urgent social needs.

I am confident that my personal experience in the Foreign Service affords me a good opportunity to be successful as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. In my 31 years in the Foreign Service, I have served 16 years in Latin America and 5 more working on Latin American affairs in the State Department.

Yet I have also had opportunities to step back from Latin America and the Caribbean-in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, at our mission to the United Nations—where I could view inter-American affairs in a broader policy perspective.

I value my economic experience, given the high priority economic issues in the affairs of this region. If confirmed, I would make economic and business affairs a key priority of our personnel in Washington and in the field. 1 want the American business community to see the State Department and each of our embassies as working partners in the search for new export opportunities.

In my service as the United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations the last 3 years, I gained an appreciation of the opportunities offered by strong multilateral organizations. In our hemisphere, the Organization of American States is today working constructively in a wide range of areas beneficial to our interests. I would welcome the chance to work closely with Ambassador Babbitt to strengthen the OAS for the benefit of all its members.

I would also place a high priority on consulting frequently with the Congress and on achieving the highest possible degree of bipartisan support for our policies. When our foreign policy is built on a solid domestic consensus, it sends the clearest possible signal that our policy is sustainable and that we are serious in our purpose. To a diplomat, that is an invaluable asset.

Finally, I would work to maintain a tone of partnership and mutual respect in our relations with the nations of the Americas. I believe President Clinton has set forth a policy for this hemisphere which is worthy of American values and will serve our economic and security interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and with the nations of this region to make that vision a reality.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. The Roles of USSOUTHCOM in the Latin American Region

GENERAL

The rapid changes in the world are not restricted to Europe, Asia, and Africa. The causes of instability and insurgency in Latin America are not going to go away merely because of the fall of the Soviet Union and the reduction in Communist support for Marxist surrogates and insurgent movements around the world. Until the root economic, social, and political causes of insurgences are addressed, their potential to incite violence will remain.

Since 1989, Latin America has seen many changes. In May 1989. elections were held in Panama. After General Noriega's candidate was defeated by a 3 to 1 margin, he nullified the election. In August, a Colombian presidential candidate was assassinated by narcotics traffickers and the government of Colombia declared war on the drug cartels. President Bush responded with a $65 million emergency drawdown of stocks to aid in the Colombian counterdrug effort. During September, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney tasked the Unified Command CINCs to develop a counterdrug mission in their priorities. In October, a coup attempt against General Noriega failed, In November, the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (FMLN) launched an offensive against the Salvadoran Government. In December 1989, the United States invadcd Panama, arrested General Noriega, and installed a civilian government. In March 1990, Chile peacefully transitioned from a military dictatorship to an elected government. In April 1990, the people of Nicaragua rejected the Sandinista-led government for the United Opposition led by Violets Chamorro. In January 1992, the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed a peace accord ending that country's long and bloody civil war.

These are but a few events from recent Latin American history in which the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) played a role: from armed intervention in Panama to the support of democratic processes in Chile, Nicaragua and El Salvador to combating narcotics trafficking and production. These events highlight the importance of the region, showing the shift of US foreign policy from its past East-West orientation to one of regional focus, nation assistance, and support of democratic institutions. It brings the role of USSOUTHCOM into focus.

THEATER AND MISSION OF USSOUTHCOM

United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO), has the responsibility for the landmass nearest to the continental United States that encompasses all of Central and South America. Note that the USSOUTHCOM AOR does not include the Caribbean islands or any seas or oceans. For the purposes of security assistance only, the area of responsibility includes Mexico.

The information in this appendix is based on C320, *Corps and Division Combat Operations,* Strategy Committee, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1993.

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Do not make the mistake, as has been done in our past, of generalizing about the 19 countries that constitute USCINCSO's AOR. Each is distinct: the climate, the geography, the history, the culture, the blending of the colonial immigrants and native Indians, and even the language differ to some degree. Each country pursues its own national interests which, when dealing with that country must be considered.

Additionally, Latin America is a region of emerging democracies. Almost all countries there had military governments in 1976. Today, all the countries of the region, except for Haiti and Cuba, have some form of democracy, Of course, none has a democracy identical to our own. The differences between our systems are due to 500 years of differing history—Latin America's Iberian-based culture contrasting with ours based primarily on Great Britain and Catholic rather than Protestant religious influences.

Simply stated, the mission of USSOUTHCOM is to promote United States policy and to contribute to the defense of the North American continent. The actual mission statement is—

ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES IN PEACETIME, CONFLICT, AND WAR WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, AND WHICH PROTECT AND PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

One should note the implications of this mission statement. It does not call for the actual defense of the United States as, in the traditional sense, there is no real military threat. It discusses requirements across the entire spectrum omissions, and the final outcome is to protect and promote US national interests in the region. You can quickly see that objectives in this AOR are more likely to be political or economic than military.

In accomplishing his stated mission, USCINCSO does not rely on the forward basing of troops or, as seen in other areas of the world, the development of multinational forces. Cultivating democratic, secure. self-reliant regional governments is the means of ensuring mission accomplishment.

US NATIONAL INTERESTS

General

Geographic proximity and economic interdependence mean that the United States cannot afford to be complacent about the problems of Latin America. The effects of the problems that threaten stability and democratic institutions in the region—illegal immigration. loss of jobs in the United States due to decrease in market access as the ability of countries in the region to import declines, trafficking in narcotics and the associated higher incidence of violent crime, and the threat to the solvency of US commercial banking institutions posed by the inability of debtor nations to meet their external debt obligations—spill over to the United States These factors affect the daily lives of the North American people.

The stated national interests of the United States are—

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

- A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

- Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

Threats to US national interests in USSOUTHCOM are related to drugs (growing, processing, and shipping), debt (massive debt in most Latin American countries), destabilization (insurgences in Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia), and democracy (new democracies still trying to stabilize themselves in countries that do not have a history of democracy). With all the US national interests at stake, the USCINCSO must pursue those interests with very limited assigned military forces to employ the military element of power. The following indicates the priorities, established by USCINCSO and listed in order of precedence, that are in support of US national interests.

Counterdrugs

Drug money has helped to undermine the economic and political stability of Latin America nations and the legitimacy of their political institutions. Because of the fragile nature of new democracies with which we have historic, cultural, geographic, economic, and political bonds, and because of the fact that the United States is the principal consumer of these drugs, the drug problem is a threat to US national security interests. Drug money is used to corrupt government officials, both civilian and military, and to finance antidemocratic insurgents. USSOUTHCOM, in supporting the President's Andean Initiative, plays a major role in counterdrug operations in Latin America. USCINCSO uses a combination of security assistance (to include mobile training teams (MTTs) and deployment for training (DFTs)), combined exercises, and selected types of military capabilities (tactical analysis teams (TATs), command management system (CMS), operation planning groups (OPGs), intelligence sharing, and detect ion and monitoring) to assist Latin American nations fighting the power of drug traffickers.

Counterinsurgency

A peaceful end to the ongoing insurgences in Latin America would allow the governments in the region to concentrate on their other issues (debt, inflation, development, democratic institutions, etc). Headway has been made in several countries, such as Colombia and Ecuador, where former insurgent groups have given up the armed fight to become legal political parties (M-19 in Colombia; Alfaro Vive Carajo! (AVC) in Ecuador).

Nation Assistance and Treaty Implementation in Panama

The image of the United States is at stake in how we comply with the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, which call for the withdrawal of US forces from Panama and the turnover of the Panama Canal by the year 2000. In keeping with the provisions of the treaties, the position of administrator of the Panama Canal Commission reverted to a Panamanian with a US deputy for the first time in 1990. Additionally, the ongoing nation-assistance mission m Panama (Operation Promote Liberty), aimed at giving democracy a chance to succeed, is also key to the CINC's strategy. Signs within the government of Panama suggest that it may realize that the very nationalistic issue of Panamanian control of the canal and all of Panama by the year 2000 maybe an issue that it is not yet ready to face. Finally, also as part of the treaty, USSOUTHCOM must leave Panama by the year 2000. Its future location is still being debated. The Accelerated Treaty Implementation/Consolidation Plan (ATICP) is being executed and USSOUTHCOM is in the process of efficiently withdrawing personnel and equipment and turning over the facilities that are being vacated to the government of Panama.

Professional Militaries

Although Latin America has moved in the direction of democratic, participative government in the past two decades, military leaders there sometimes feel the urge to intervene when they are dissatisfied with the performance of elected officials. For example, in February 1992, the Venezuelan Government defeated an attempted military coup d'etat. USCINCSO seeks to promote the ideal of the professional military, which is responsible to and responds to the people and its constitution and not to a political party or person. Another key factor in this portion of the CINC'S regional strategy is the reduction in human rights violations and abuses of military power. These concerns are tied to security assistance programs and receive close scrutiny by both the executive and legislative branches of our Government.

THEATER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

USCINCSO has developed a regional strategy that encompasses US foreign and strategic policy and supports US national interests and objectives. His region not only is lacking in combat forces in comparison to other regional CINCs, but also has to face a threat different from the conventional military threat normally faced by military commanders.

The threat in USSOUTHCOM is one that requires an innovative application of the elements of power, especially the military element. The nations of the region are members of the Rio Pact of 1947, creating the Organization of the American States (OAS). Therefore, they are all allies to each other and to the United States. The United States must seriously consider the political and international repercussions before it deploys combat forces to the area. Even "peacetime engagement" deployments (e.g., DFTs and MTTs) must be closely coordinated between the United States and the host nation to ensure proper integration into both US and host nation national objectives.

USCINCSO, in pursuit of US interests and objectives in Latin America, has identified these theater strategic objectives (taken from the National Security Strategy relating US national interests and objectives to USCINCSO's theater strategic objectives):

Strengthen Democratic Institutions

USSOUTHCOM objectives are to strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights; to promote the rule of law in the conduct of nations; and to promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress.

Eliminate Threats to Regional Security

To achieve this objective, USSOUTHCOM must be prepared to deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat a military attack and end conflict on terms that are favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies; aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression coercion insurgences, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking; and maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

Support Continued Economic and Social Progress

In achieving the US interest in this area, USSOUTHCOM objectives are to promote an open and expanding international econornic system based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment and stable currencies and with broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes and to support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.

Assist Host Nations to Defeat Drug Trafficking

To ensure the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values intact and its people secure, USSOUTHCOM works at achieving this objective by supporting initiatives aimed at reducing the flow of illegal dregs into the United States by combating traffickers abroad and choking off demands at home.

Ensure Open and Neutral Panama Canal

Until the year 2000, when HQ USSOUTHCOM is scheduled to move from Panama. USSOUTHCOM theater strategy here is to ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, and the oceans and space.

Enhance Military Professionalism

To achieve healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. the objective of USSOUTHCOM is to strengthen and enlarge the cornrnonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and human rights. Further, to achieve the interests of the United States in a stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish, USSOUTHCOM objectives are to promote the rule of law in the conduct of nations; to promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes: and to promote the growth of free. democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress.

SOUTHERN COMMAND REGIONS

To organize Latin America into regions with similar problems or needs or both, the area of operations is divided into four subregions: Central America, Panama, the Southern Cone. and the Andean Ridge. Again, reflecting the changing threats, the region is viewed more in functional rather than geographic slices: coca cultivation areas (Andean Ridge); drug processing areas (Colombia and, to a lesser degree. Brazil): and areas in which cultivation, processing, or transiting might occur (Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Argentina, and others). The counterdrug function is obviously the primary focus. However, the regional view is most helpful in understanding an area of operations encompassing 19 countries and 400+ million people.

Central America

Current concerns in Central America include insurgences, emerging democracies, economic difficulties, and drug trafficking and/or transiting. The basic objectives for the Central American region are the institutionalization of the peace process in El Salvador, the containment or defeat of other insurgent movements, and the support of the democratically elected government in Nicaragua. Brief assessments, by country, follow:

- El Salvador. Since 1980, US aid has been restored, but is still tied to human rights. In the 10 March 1990 elections, the FMLN, for the first time, did not try to disturb the elections, and, in fact, directed that their

forces not interfere. The 7-year peace treaty negotiations process between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN culminated with the signing of the January 1992 peace accords. The peace accords provided for a 9-month cease fire effective 1 February 1992; the establishment of a 1,000-man UN peacekeeping force to monitor and enforce the accords; the demobilization of the FMLN within 9 months; the reduction in end strength of the El Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF); the disbanding of the ESAF Public Security Forces (police) and the subsequent creation of a new civilian police force under civilian control; and the establishment of a National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (Comision National para la Consolidation de la Paz (COPAZ)). COPAZ will consist of representatives from the Government of El Salvador, the FMLN, and the United Nations; they will work out the implementation details of agreed on social, economic, and land reforms with the government legislative and judicial bodies.

● Nicaragua. Since the 1990 elections, the Chamorro government has struggled to build a democratic system in Nicaragua. The power of the Sandinista Party and its forces, the Sandinista Popular Army (abbreviated EPS in Spanish) is the major stumbling block. Additionally, elements of the former Contras, dissatisfied with the lack of economic progress and with harassment by the EPS, have rearmed and are again the cause of internal incidents.

● Honduras. The reduced threat from Nicaragua brought about the reduction of both the need for and the continued level of aid to Honduras. Incidents of narcotics passing through Honduras mean potential involvement by the Honduran Armed Forces in curtailing this transit, if possible. With the reduced military threat and the reduction in support for other Central American insurgent groups by the new nicaragual Government, the future of Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) is being reviewed.

● Guatemala. Although Guatemala has a new government in place and talks between the main insurgent groups and the new government look promising, the Bush administration suspended most military aid in December 1990 due to human rights abuses. The Guatemala Government is, however, taking steps to improve the human rights situation. Additionally. as in other Latin American countries, narcotics trafficking is on the rise.

Panama

Panama counts as a “region” in USSOUTHCOM planning because of the uniqueness of its problems, its special relationship with the United States, and the importance of the Panama Canal.

A brief assessment of the situation in Panama following Just Cause shows that the high expectations following US intervention have not been fully realized. Economic growth has only amounted to 3 to 4 percent and reports suggest that the amount of cocaine passing through the country has increased. The government is democratic, but fragmented. Panama has yet to turn around the economic malaise begun during the Noriega years and worsened by the US embargo prior to Just Cause. Problems continue with the new police force (Panama Public Force) due to the lack of trust by the population, poor morale, and continued links to former Noriega officers. Further, on 4 and 5 December 1990, COL Herrera, the second chief of police of the new police force (who had been removed from office by President Endara) led a short-lived revolt that had to be put down with the help of USSOUTHCOM forces.

The Andean Ridge

The common feature of this group of countries is the involvement in coca cultivation and processing of most of the cocaine that is shipped into the United States. The growth of the drug trade has further threatened US

interests and the stability of Latin American countries. USSOUTHCOM objectives concerning the Andean Ridge are to reduce the drug supply and trafficking and to bring stability to the region through legal, economic, and democratic means. Brief assessments of the Andean Ridge countries follow:

- Colombia. Although Colombia has seen an escalation in insurgent war and drug traffickers remain a threat in democratic institutions, the fight against the drug traffickers continues with increased military-police cooperation and the training of 3,800 host nation rnilitary and law enforcement personnel. Army and police strike companies are being formed and drug seizures are up.

- Bolivia. Bolivia is home to a model counterdrug program, and the counternarcotics police (UMOPAR) is a success. The country has implemented crop substitution and crop eradication programs. With the formation of five additional strike forces, the country is showing its commitment to counterdrug operations.

- Peru. Inflation and debt, creators of fertile ground for revolutionaries, are also at work in Peru. Inflation has exceeded 1,000 percent per year for several years and in 1990 exceeded 7,000 percent. These problems create the conditions that the insurgent groups, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), have tried to take advantage of. Links are found between these insurgent movements and drug traffickers. President Fujimori's completed counterdrug plan calls for an air sovereignty campaign in the Upper Huallaga Valley, which is the main producing area for coca. Fujimori's plan calls for better police-military cooperation and stresses the removal of any officers suspected of dealing with drug traffickers. The initiatives in Peru are evidence of the government's desire to enforce counterdrug operations.

The Southern Cone

This term generally refers to all the countries not in the other three regions and does not necessarily refer to the countries in the southern cone of the continent of South America. The spread of drugs is a problem throughout this region because of the pressures put on the cartels in the Andean Ridge. Examples include drug processing (Brazil) or transiting (Argentina) and looking for access to markets in the United States and Europe. Major debts for many countries have hindered their progress, but some indicators appear favorable for the future due to the exploitation of natural and human resources. US national objectives in the Southern Cone are to develop mature partnerships and alliances, to hasten both economic and political development, and to aid in the resolution of disputes,

SUMMARY

As you have seen in this reading, USSOUTHCOM plays an important role in protecting the national interests of the United States. All our national interests in the national security strategy are at play in this region nearest the continental United States. The USCINCSO has the challenge of meeting his nontraditional military missions in an innovative way with the use of those military capabilities that are appropriate. However, he must do so with a minimum of forces in theater, with limited security assistance funds, and in a supporting role to the ambassadors and host nation efforts.

The USCINCSO is making progress in addressing his four priorities-democracy, peace, freedom, and human dignity-but the struggle continues. The priorities are possible with the employment of a regional strategy in support of the national security strategy.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 2. The Latin American Environment

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee

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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command. Three weeks ago I appeared before this Committee as part of the confirmation process for the position I now hold. In the interim, I've had the opportunity to meet the members of the Southern Command Staff and participate in a Symposium on hemispheric security hosted by the North-South Center of the University of Miami. What I say today reflects the views of one who has just stepped into the theater.

I have had an extremely warm and professional welcome to Panama and paid a brief command visit to our SOUTHCOM forces in Soto Cano, Honduras. During the symposium in Miami, Florida, I spent three days in a series of intense off-the-record discussions with over 100 U. S. and Latin American civilian and military officials. I look forward to assessing the region and the Southern Command's programs in the near future. beginning with a trip to Brazil. I intend to deal with each of our Latin American neighbors in a manner which takes into account their unique circumstances. This initial visit to Brazil has great symbolic importance to me personally. Our giant neighbor of Brazil holds particular importance to the U.S. as a key ally, bordering all but two nations of South America and with a history of close military cooperation dating back to World War II and beyond.

Once I have visited the forces that arc assigned to or augment the Command. consulted our U.S. ambassadors, our Latin American partners, and U.S. government agency representatives, and completed my assessment of the region, I will be pleased to return and discuss my views. In the meantime, I will share my initial observations and the judgments of the superb SOUTHCOM Staff.

Today I will outline my initial impressions of the theater, describe the forces assigned to the Southern Command, and address the theater strategy, priorities. and programs. SOUTHCOM has developed a first-rate conceptual framework to use the resources allocated from those that you the Congress have provided to accomplish the national security strategy in the region. It is my purpose to underscore the increasing importance of Central and South America to the United States in these early Post-Cold War years. But first, I wish to recognize the accomplishments of General George Joulwan, my predecessor, who is well known to this committee. General Joulwan left SOUTHCOM in excellent shape, He deepened attitudes of mutual respect, furthered the cause of hemispheric cooperation, and set a standard for inter-agency cooperation upon which I intend to build. The Southern Command continues to do the right things well. I am not yet ready to propose any significant changes to the strategy, plans, or programs he established.

From "Statement of General Barry R McCaffrey, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," 2 March 1994.

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INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE THEATER

SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility stretches from the Guatemalan-Mexican border in the north to Cape Horn in the south and includes the nineteen sovereign nations in Central and South America. The dimensions and diversity of this theater are often not well understood by our citizens. From north to south the distance is approximately 7,000 miles, and from east to west more than 3,000 miles. Latin America comprises 20% of the world's land mass. Brazil is larger than the continental United States. Mr. Chairman, Ecuador is almost twice the size of your home state of Georgia. Guatemala is one and a half times the size of South Carolina. As a final comparison, Peru is three times the size of California. There are over 330 million people within the Southern theater. While Spanish is the predominant language, over forty percent of these people speak Portuguese, and there are a total of seven official languages among all the OAS nations as well as innumerable dialects and native tongues.



Within the theater, SOUTHCOM routinely supports operations in many remote and outlying areas. A typical example is in the Beni area of Bolivia. To operate in Beni, northwest of Sucre, Bolivia, we travel a distance from our bases in Panama that is greater than that between Madrid and Moscow. I use this example not because size equates to importance, but to underscore that we as a nation don't have an intuitive sense for Latin America. Many North Americans simply don't understand the opportunities. challenges. and obligations the Untied States has in the region.

In the post-Cold War world, Latin America is a region of increasing U.S. strategic interest resulting from expanding economic opportunities and a growing harmony of political interests. Within the last decade, ballots have become the primary mechanism for change in most of Latin America. To quote the words of the Liberator,

Simon Bolivar, in 1825, these countries have “embraced a same liberty, with different laws and even different types of governments; for each nation wishes to be free in its won way and to enjoy its sovereignty according to the desires of its own conscience. ” These nations share other salient characteristics.

The first is the growing prevalence of peace. All nations in the hemisphere share a propensity for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This is a region in which insurgences have been increasingly marginalized. Many insurgents now appear to be largely motivated by profit from the drug trade. Some have formed alliances with narcotraffickers. It is also a region in which the United States is not likely to be involved in a Major Regional Contingency. We should not expect a U.S. regional conflict on the scale of the Gulf War or the Korean War in the Hemisphere.

There are, nevertheless, real threats in the region to our national security and to some of our democratic partners. The threats are primarily the scourge of drugs, terrorism, civil strife caused by poverty, injustice, and the potential for large population dislocations. We currently make significant contributions to maintain and deepen the political and social security of the region. We must continue to contribute constructively to reducing domestic and international tensions, and to solidifying regional and hemispheric agreements and organizations which will support and enhance the prevalence of peace.

A second feature of the region is the positive economic news that has begun to emerge from the growth of free market economics. Economic reform, including reduced tariffs, fiscal responsibility, and the privatization of state subsidized enterprises, has prompted growth in many countries. Since 1991, growth rates of the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere have been higher than those of the U.S. or the European Community. Spiraling debt and inflation have been curtailed in most cases. For example, in Argentina, inflation plummeted from 4,923% in 1989 to 17.5% in 1992. While we cannot discount the socio-economic costs of the region’s debt burden, there no longer is widespread talk of a Latin American debt crisis. What is good economic news for Latin America generates positive economic news for the United States. Economic growth in Latin America generates U.S. exports and creates jobs for our citizens.



U.S. worldwide exports grew by 6% in 1992. In Latin America they grew by 17%. The U.S. sells five times more than Japan in the Latin American market. Over 800,000 U.S. jobs have been created in the past five years at better than average wages because of increasing Latin American prosperity. Each percentage point of growth in Latin America not only benefits the people in the region, but generates another $5 billion in U. S. exports and adds 100,000 American jobs. Clearly, it's in our interest to assist our Latin neighbors improve their economic performance. NAFTA will accelerate this positive trend as will additional complementary trade pacts.

However, this economic good news is tempered by the sobering statistics of poverty. Some estimates indicate that as many as 45% of the region's population still live in poverty. Compounding the problem of widespread poverty is the inequitable distribution of wealth in some of the region's countries. In some countries, income disparities have widened in the last 20 years as the condition of the have-nets has deteriorated. It is evident then that, in spite of the increasingly good economic news, not everyone yet shares in the benefits of this economic growth. The ability of the region's governments to satisfy the aspirations of citizens to fully participate in the growth of Latin American economies will remain a major challenge.

Widespread poverty and inequality can precipitate political instability and civil unrest. These tragic economic situations can result in localized insurrections and civil conflicts, We all understand that democracy must respond to the needs of the people. Political systems that cannot address the needs of the electorate will inevitably be challenged by their citizens. By continuing to work with our partners we can help individuals, communities, democratic systems, and nations. But we will also indirectly help ourselves by reducing some of the incentives for migration.

A third feature of the region I wish to mention is the criminal drug trade. Illegal drugs represent a serious threat to democracies. Many of the core institutions of a democratic society-the legislative branch, the judiciary

system, the military, the police, the press, political parties, and civil society—are under direct assault in some Latin American countries by criminal narcotraffickers who will stop at nothing to enrich themselves. Drug trafficking also causes grave ecological harm. The demand to grow more coca leaves or poppies encourages unsound slash-and-burn farming techniques. Watersheds are polluted by the runoff of precursor chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine.



Drug trafficking also hinders coherent economic development. Local and national economies are distorted by laundered money (some estimates suggest that $300 billion dollars are laundered in Latin America each year). Traditional crops are displaced by coca and labor patterns are disrupted by the coca industry. The campesino coca grower is not the one who benefits. The coca leaf farmer sells the leaves he harvests to cartel buyers for $500, which after processing and smuggling, sell for $200,000 on the streets of our cities. This 40,000% mark-up is not shared with the poor by the cartel leaders.

The afflicted nations of Latin America cannot fight this scourge alone. They need cur help to develop their capabilities and to support their political will. They are engaged in a deadly struggle with enormously wealthy narco-criminal syndicates that are sophisticated in their operations and adept at using propaganda, bribery, and the threat of violence to attain their ends. Furthermore, experience shows that when we and our allies are successful in our operations against the cartels in one region (be it Tranquilandia in Colombia or the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru), the criminals possess the flexibility to shift their manufacturing operations or smuggling patterns to another region or country, Our challenge is to limit their flexibility, find their vulnerabilities, and then assist host nations in attacking them where it will hurt the most. This is how, together, we crippled the Medellin Cartel.

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1 agree with the assessment that the scourge of drugs is presently the greatest threat to democracy in several Latin American countries. Seeking to address both the domestic problem of demand and the international problems of drug manufacturing and smuggling, the President's new National Drug Control Strategy is precisely on target. I will be paying particular attention to SOUTHCOM's counterdrug programs to assess their effectiveness.

SOUTHERN COMMAND FORCES

The Headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command is at Quarry Heights, in the Republic of Panama, Our mission is to support U. S. national policies in the Southern Theater by: being prepared to command U.S. joint operations in support of U.S. policy; implementing the Panama Canal Treaties and keeping the Panama Canal open and neutral; and assisting nations in the region to promote democracy, stimulate economic and social progress, ensure regional security, and foster hemispheric cooperation.



In addition to having the standard Semite component headquarters common to all unified commands, SOUTHCOM also controls a Special Operations Sub-unified Command. In addition, SOUTHCOM employs two standing Joint Task Forces (JTF-Panama and JTF-Bravo in Honduras) and 16 Security Assistance Organizations, including one in Mexico. We also have representatives from six national agencies working with us to accomplish our mission.

Our Air Force component, USSOUTHAF, is based at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona and is led by the Commander of the 12th Air Force. He is represented in Panama by the 24th Wing. based at Howard Air Force Base. The major Air Force assets within the theater include ten C-27 tactical airlift aircraft and an Air Operations Center that coordinates and monitors air operations throughout the theater. Augmenting these air assets are fighters, transports, and airborne collection, detection, and tracking platforms, from the Air Force,

the Army, and other U.S. government agencies. At any given time there are typically more than 80 U. S. aircraft operating out of Howard Air Force Base.

Our army component, U.S. Army South, has its headquarters at Fort Clayton, Panama. Its principal units include: alight infantry brigade with two infantry battalions and combat support units, an Army aviation brigade, a signal brigade, an engineer brigade, a military intelligence brigade, the Jungle Operations Training Center, a military police battalion, and an Area Support Group. Many of the Army units in Panama will continue to be withdrawn in anticipation of our total departure from Panama by 31 December 1999. [NOTE: US Army, South, inactivated its 193d Infantry Brigade in the summer of 1994 as a part of the Treaty Implementation Plan. One infantry battalion remains.]

Our naval component is led by the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. He too has forward elements in Panama. SOUTHCOM's major naval assets include: a Special Warfare unit, a Special Boat unit, a Marine Corps Security Force Company, and the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School.

Joint Task Force Panama (JTF-PM) was created in the late 1980s, prior to Operation JUST CAUSE. It is commanded by the Army Component Commander. Since that military operation, JTF-PM has been responsible for SOUTHCOM's postconflict programs designed to support democracy within the Republic of Panama and to assist in the recovery of the country's infrastructure. In consonance with Embassy objectives. this task force continues working with the Government of Panama to identiyi and carry out humanitarian and civic action projects that benefit local communities. Today JTF-PM is conducting a medical readiness training exercise (MEDRETE) in Chiriqui Province, refurbishing four schools in Darien Province, and digging five water wells in Los S antes Province.

Joint Task Force Bravo is located at Honduras' Soto Cano Air Base. While the circumstances in Central America have changed dramatically for the better in recent years, with the ending of civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, this organization and its facilities continue to be useful. There are also approximately 1100 Army and Air Force troops with 35 helicopters operating with JTF-Bravo in Honduras at Soto Cano Airfield. We fly supplies into this C-5 capable airfield from the United States. We distribute the supplies throughout the region using helicopters and short-range transport aircraft, such as the C-27 and C-130, as well as trucks and even barges. Soto Cano also supports counterdrug operations and aircraft of the U. S. Customs Service in Central America. Finally, our presence in Honduras allows us operational flexibility as we draw down in Panama. Maintaining access to this facility during the Panama drawdown continues to be cost effective and in our best interest. However, I intend to do a zero-based assessment of the rationale for all the forces operating out of Soto Cano and recommend to the Secretary of Defense its appropriate future roles.

Finally, the Security Assistance Organizations we have in sixteen different countries are essential elements of SOUTHCOM. The Service men and women we have working with our Country Teams promote close military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and host nations. They also coordinate our humanitarian and civic action programs, exercises, and operations throughout the region. Security Assistance Organizations provide the U.S. both access to and influence with host nation militaries. As associated members of the Ambassadors' Country Teams, they are also vital participants in the interagency process within the region.

U.S. Military Population in Panama

	Active PCS & DTY Military (24 Feb 94)
HQ SOUTHCOM	456
ARFOR	6,953
AFFOR	2,362
NAVFOR	913
SOCSO	285
Total	10,969

	DOD Civilian	Family Members
ARFOR	598	9,711
AFFOR	371	2,637
NAVFOR	115	804
Total	1,084	13,152

DOD Non U.S. EMPLOYEES

5,011

There are not many people permanently assigned to SOUTHCOM, as you can see from this graphic, Their numbers will dwindle over the next five years, as I will show you later when I discuss our implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties. However, we do maintain a vigorous presence, accomplishing most of our missions by deploying units from the United States. Let me illustrate this point. In the last fiscal year SOUTHCOM orchestrated over 1,000 separate Training Support deployments such as engineering and medical exercises, joint/combined exercises, and deployments for training (DFT). SOUTHCOM also deployed approximately 2900 Operational Support missions such as joint planning assistance teams (JPAT), airborne platform sorties, and ground-based radars. More than 60,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines took part in these activities. Managing this effort is a significant challenge to our modest SOUTHCOM joint headquarters staff, SOUTHCOM works enormously hard across a broad spectrum of activity in support of democracy, improved civil-military relations, and the counterdrug war.

More than 22,000 of these deployed SOUTHCOM troops came from the Reserve Components, both the National Guard and the Reserve. Hailing from 38 different states and Puerto Rico, these highly motivated and well trained individuals and units bring unique capabilities we depend on. Furthermore, these citizen-soldiers are tremendous role models in societies where the reserve concept is unfamiliar. SOUTHCOM is offering this reserve concept as a possible approach where the Latin American political and military leadership are exploring ways to shrink the gap between civilians and the military.

THEATER STRATEGY

SOUTHCOM's strategy is one of continuous peacetime engagement with the countries in the AOR. We have derived it from existing guidance and the evolving National Security Strategy, which is based on *defending the U. S.,* stimulating *economic growth, promoting democracy,* and ensuring *regional security and stability.* The means used by the Southern Command in peacetime to help the United States attain its strategic goals are different from those that usually come to mind when we think of classic military campaign plans. The following chart illustrates this point:



A Combatant CINC in a theater with traditional military threats focuses on potential combat operations and develops plans for the employment of “above the line” forces: wings, divisions, and battle groups. On the other hand, a CINC in a theater with a smaller risk of regional contingency operations but a high requirement for peacetime engagement must also plan and execute operations other than war using “below the line” forces such as: military police, psychological operations, civil affairs, medical and veterinary teams, and conventional and special operations training and planning teams



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As SOUTHCOM executes this strategy, it operates with and in support of other U.S. government agencies throughout the theater. U.S. objectives are not accomplished unilaterally by any Government entity. They are accomplished by the cooperative efforts of all departments and agencies. These agencies work together to support the Ambassadors' and their Country Teams; efforts to assist host nation governments. Identifying shared U.S. objectives and developing mutually supportive strategies and programs are necessary for us to attain national objectives, As CINCSO I wil1 continue to ensure that military forces operating under my command throughout the A OR fully support the objectives of the U.S. Country Teams. While CINCSO has responsibility for the command of operational forces and for their security, the missions and the ROE of these military elements must be fully coordinated with the involved U.S. Ambassadors.

SOUTHCOM PRIORITIES

To execute this peacetime engagement strategy, the Command has focused on the following priorities:

- Support appropriate military roles in host nation democracies.
- Promote peace and stability in order to enhance democratic development and equitable economic growth.
- Support counterdrug efforts.
- Implement the Panama Canal Treaties.
- Maintain a high quality of life for U.S. forces and their families throughout the theater.

I will now amplify on the Command's efforts in each of these priority areas:

Support Appropriate Military Roles in Host Nation Democracies

SOUTHCOM conducts many complementary programs to foster appropriate military roles in host nation democracies. We work through our Military Groups in support of the Country Teams to assist countries to develop sustainable. properly structured and trained armed forces for the security needs of each nation. We also seek, in appropriate ways, to further military subordination to democratically constituted civilian governments.

The ways in which we do this include humanitarian and civic action projects. professional exchanges, and combined military training. Additionally, we assist with selected International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. During humanitarian and civic action projects. conducted in conjunction with military exercises, we work with host nation communities to improve medical care, public sanitation. and transportation services, as well as construction of rudimentary public facilities. The Service men and women who participate in these exercises not only benefit by practicing crucial deployment skills, but also seine as role models for the host nation units they work with.

SOUTHCOM also has an extensive exercise and deployment for training program throughout the theater. Combined exercises such as FUERZAS UNIDAS enable us to conduct professional training with our counterparts on security issues of mutual concern. Recently we have brought Latin American military units from Ecuador. El Salvador, and Venezuela to participate in low intensity scenario exercises at our Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. These exercises are mostly low cost, low key evcnts that can provide the catalyst for greater regional military cooperation. Participating as allies in high quality military training on

neutral (U. S.) soil offers these neighboring military forces an excellent vehicle for building mutual trust and confidence.

SOUTHCOM also sponsored a training exercise in Quito, Ecuador last fall in which civilian and military organizations with counterdrug responsibilities from both Ecuador and Colombia participated. They sought solutions to common problems including: illegal immigration; insurgent intimidation of their citizens; smuggling of illegal arms, munitions, and explosives across common borders; and narcotrafficking in border regions. Participants agreed that the conference strengthened relationships between the two countries and improved cooperation between the militaries and police forces in both countries. As a result of this success, Ecuador will host a FUERZAS UNIDAS command post exercise in June in which the police and military forces of Ecuador and Colombia will participate.

These exercises and deployments provide participating units valuable training opportunities consistent with their missions while supporting SOUTHCOM regional objectives. They represent a "win-win" situation. U.S. forces get unique training opportunities in environments that would be difficult to replicate in the U. S., while the host nation also derives a benefit. An example of this is the recently concluded FUERTES CAMINOS exercise in El Salvador. During this three and a half month engineer exercise (which was approved unanimously by the Salvadorian Legislature) our troops, working side by side with the El Salvadoran engineer units and the people in the region, built twelve schools, two community centers, and dug six wells. The exercise also was a vehicle for improving the skills of Salvadoran Army engineer units which had been decimated during the civil war. This effort marked another small step in the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction following a decade of civil war.

We have also conducted FUERTES CAMINOS exercises in Belize. Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama. and Uruguay. In every case, these exercises provided valuable training for U. S. forces, while assisting local populations in improving basic public facilities and services. Perhaps more importantly, these exercises allowed participating U.S. forces to demonstrate appropriate military roles and functions for host nation militaries,

SOUTHCOM's objectives in this area are also furthered by the IMET programs that allow selected foreign military leaders the opportunity to interact with their U. S. counterparts at military courses in the United States. Some of these schools, conducted in Spanish by our Services, (the Inter-American Defense College; the School of the Americas: the Inter-American Air Force Academy; and the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School) are cost effective, influential institutions that have been all too often misunderstood. Their international faculties and student bodies create a unique learning environment that encourages a regional perspective and the building of mutual trust and confidence between neighbors.

Promote Peace and Stability

The success of the peace process in El Salvador is a credit to the determination of the Salvadorian people to end a decade of violence and an excellent example of our efforts to promote peace and stability. We are optimistic that they will see this process through. A return to arms did not occur in 1992 despite some slippage in the implementation of the Peace Accord. Even the discovery of illegal arms caches last year was handled by all parties with restraint. The United Nations and the international community continue to be important guarantors of the peace process.

The political process in El Salvador appears healthy and we expect free and open elections later this month. However, violent crime remains a terrible problem in the country. The National Civilian Police are still not fully deployed, which hinders the government's ability to combat this threat. The El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) have demonstrate their support of the country's democratic institutions, and have complied with the Truth and Ad Hoc Commission reductions. The new ESAF leadership appears supportive of civilian control of the military, intolerant of corruption and non-professional conduct, and is positively changing both the composition and the roles of their Armed Forces.

Support Counterdrugs Efforts

Supporting the counterdrug efforts of the host nations and U. S. Law Enforcement Agencies continues to be SOUTHCOM's most demanding and rewarding mission because of the serious threat illegal drugs pose to democracies. Drugs kill 10,000 U.S. citizens each year and cost our economy $75 billion. The economic and political influence of narcotraffickers in the Latin American region is unprecedented. In the United States, the effect of the trade and consumption of illegal drugs on health care, economic productivity, crime, education, and our nation's moral fiber is staggering.



Over the past three years, SOUTHCOM has worked to strengthen host nation counterdrug capabilities through regional, inter-agency and international operations. Operation SUPPORT JUSTICE I, a bilateral operation between Colombia and the U. S., preceded Operation SUPPORT JUSTICE II, a multilateral operation during which the U.S. supported the individual counterdrug actions of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. *Operation SUPPORT JUSTICE III* was the first effort in the theater to employ a regional concept of U.S. support to the coordinated, cooperative counterdrug operations of Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. As a result of this operation, host nations realized the benefit of mutual cooperation and began to address the problem frorn a

regional perspective. This has had a large effect on coordinated, regional actions in Operation SUPPORT JUSTICE IV, and today in Operation STEADY STATE. The progress made in cooperation between host nation militaries and their own civilian law enforcement agencies has also been impressive.

Fighting the menace of drugs is less like prosecuting a war than fighting a life-threatening chronic illness. We have extensively invested in developing our own capabilities and those of our allies for the long haul. There will be no dramatic victories, but if we were to give up the struggle, thousands more of our young people would be lost. Some of our allies would fall under the control of criminal gangs and not gain their freedom for decades, if ever, Progress is hard to quantify, given the continuing flow of drugs from the region to the United States, Europe, and Asia. However, I believe that we are just beginning to see dividends from the investments the Congress wisely allowed us to make. We have now transitioned to steady state counterdrug operations and fund our programs annually instead of on a by-event basis.

We need a comprehensive assistance effort based on a long term vision that will allow those countries demonstrating the will to cooperate with us to have the requisite equipment and training. We must maintain our security assistance programs. In some cases, we should be prepared to increase them to achieve exponential increases in the payoff. The potential of these cooperative operations was recognized by the President in the new National Drug Control Strategy in which he directed a gradual shift in priority of efforts towards the source countries.



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SOUTHCOM's support to the Ambassadors' Country Teams and to host nations' counterdrug efforts is extensive and multifaceted. We have deployed ground based U.S. Air Force radars (operated by both active duty and Air National Guard airmen) to detect drug smuggling flights. Our airborne systems enable us to conduct detection and monitoring throughout the theater. Some of these systems carry host nation riders who pass information for immediate action to host nation interdiction forces. We have joint planning and assistance teams (JPAT) in seven countries (Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia). These teams work directly with the U.S. Country Teams and coordinate with host nations to advise and assist them as they develop and execute their own counterdrug campaign plans.

We also provide target packages to U.S. and host nation regional users. Our ability to process all-source information and to provide around-the-clock actionable intelligence is essential in this struggle. Our support capability has been enhanced significantly by the SOUTHCOM Command Management System. This regional command and control system allows the near-instantaneous transfer of data and images to any node in the region. We have installed it in SOUTHCOM Headquarters, U. S. embassies, at operational military sites, and also here in the Washington, D.C. SOUTHCOM liaison office, where we provide this information to other counterdrug agencies.

Implement the Panama Canal Treaties

The successful implementation of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties will continue to be a high priority for SOUTHCOM as we march steadily toward 31 December 1999. SOUTHCOM established the framework for success in this important area by developing the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan (PC TIP) which was signed by Secretary Cheney in February of 1992. PC TIP provides the blueprint for all the Service components and other DOD agencies to follow in drawing down our military presence in Panama in a controlled, coherent manner over the next five-and-one-half years.

PC TIP is based on our belief that a consistent, steady drawdown will optimally benefit both the U.S. government and the government of Panama. S1owly drawing down our forces is a much more manageable process for us than pulling out everyone during the last year, 1999. The plan also gives SOUTHCOM the operational flexibility needed to make modifications to match available forces against our assigned missions. I have asked for a detailed bottom-up validation review of this plan to take into account the changing environment since its inception two years ago.

Our first important increment of force structure drawdown and base closures will occur this year and next. The total number of assigned forces will decrease through the inactivation of some combat and support forces of the 193d Infantry Brigade. We will also close several DOD installations by 1995, including most of the Atlantic side bases. These steps remain consistent with the PC TIP base closure concept of shrinking geographically around the Howard Air Force Base, Fort Kobbe, and Rodman Naval Station complex, known as HOROKO, near the Pacific entrance to the Canal.

A key milestone we must soon confront is the relocation of the SOUTHCOM Headquarters out of Panama. The three previous SOUTHCOM CINCs all laid out their criteria for a new headquarters in the United States based on their operational and geographical requirements. The Headquarters must be in a location that provides efficient transportation and communication access to Latin America. It should be a facility capable of supporting a military staff of 500-700 personnel and have a military airfield. It should be near a city with a sufficiently good quality of life to attract a first-rate staff with Latin American area expertise. A Hispanic language and cultural influence in the community would be a strong plus. SOUTHCOM will work closely with the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to get a site selected and required funds appropriated. We are convinced that the U.S. Southern Command is a national asset which will become even more important as we move into the 21st century. We must establish a first rate headquarters complex at a strategic gateway to Latin America as a step toward reinforcing our regional commitment. America's national security interests in Latin America are permanent and should match the growing economic and political vitality of the region.

This Treaty drawdown plan will present the young democracy of Panama the best opportunity to develop its own plans for the most effective use of the DOD properties that we revert to them. Simply handing over the keys and walking away will not achieve our U.S. Government's objectives in Panama. SOUTHCOM assumes that the best defense of the Panama Canal is a stable, democratic Panamanian government, which is free from internal threat. In my judgment, SOUTHCOM can positively influence the growth of democracy by working closely with the Government of Panama in consonance with Embassy country objectives to help them best assimilate the property we revert. Effective commercial development of these reverted properties should stimulate the economy by providing jobs and increasing the tax base.

In the last three years. SOUTHCOM has worked creatively with the Panamanian Government, as well as with the U.S. Embassy and the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) to bring this Treaty Implementation Plan into fruition. We will continue to meet regularly with key Panamanian, Embassy. and PCC officials involved in the reversion process.

Implementing the 1977 Treaties will not be problem free. We will have hard work with our Panamanian partners in the six year to come. The road ahead for Panama is full of obstacles. They have not made as much progress as they would have hoped in preparing to accept the properties we leave. However, when put in the context of Panama's recovery from over 20 years of military dictatorship, their accomplishments take on a new perspective. Treaty implementation planning by the Panamanian Government prior to Operation JUST CAUSE was almost non-existent. The Panama Defense Force (PDF) was ill-organized and simply waited to inherit the U.S. bases for its own use. With the demise of the PDF and the installment of a democratic government, the planning effort had to start from ground zero in 1990. They have responded superbly. The Government of Panama took a very important step forward last year when they established the Inter-Oceanic Region Authority (ARI is the Spanish acronym) for the planning, accepting, and marketing of reverted Panama Canal Area properties. SOUTHCOM meets regularly with ARI representatives. As the new bureaucracy in Panama continues to grow in effective government, the planning and reutilization of DOD properties will inevitably continue to improve. SOUTHCOM is committed to the successful implementation of the Treaty and the effective transfer of this property to the betterment of the Panamanian people,

We have a comprehensive plan in place for a controlled drawdown of U. S. forces from Panama. We have established excellent lines-of-communication with the Government of Panama as well as with other U. S. agencies in Panama to ensure all our treaty plans remain on track. We will keep our military planning effort in consonance with overall U.S. government objectives in Panama. Latin America and indeed the whole world is watching to see how we live up to our treaty commitments. Our legacy of success in implementing this treaty will do much toward furthering our interests throughout the region and the world.

Maintain Quality of Life for U.S. Forces and their Families

The care of Service members and their families is my baseline responsibility. SOUTHCOM is committed to ensuring that our top-notch volunteer military people, our dedicated civilian DOD and other agency employees, and their family members maintain a first rate quality of life for as long as the U.S. government has military

forces based in Panama. We must ensure that our Service personnel and their families maintain a wholesome and secure environment as we draw down the U.S. presence. This commitment applies not only to the Service members and their families within the Republic of Panama but to all those serving in the other eighteen countries in the theater on either a permanent or temporary basis. I solicit your continuing support and oversight to fulfill this command responsibility.

With the support of Congress we must be committed to a continuing investment in the maintenance and upkeep of all our facilities. Whether we have five years or five weeks left in Panama, we must provide adequate barracks, housing, medical care, and essential quality of life support to these men and women and their families. SOUTHCOM will remain focused on taking care of all our forces and supporting our military families as the Treaty Implementation Plan is executed. The Service components will play a vital role in funding and supporting this continuing responsibility to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

Funding for construction and maintenance will need your continued support and commitment. We must maintain our infrastructure and revert facilities in good condition. Thus, our quality of life investments will pay double dividends: improved troop care and morale and the efficient consolidation and maintenance of facilities to allow the effective implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties.

PROGRAM AND RESOURCES

Mr. Chairman, although the programs and resources necessary for SOUTHCOM to execute its strategy are small in relation to our overall defense budget, let me say that SOUTHCOM appreciates the consistent way the Congress—in particular, this committee-has supported our requirements. The programs necessary for supporting our theater strategy can be grouped into six categories. These groups of programs form the pillars of the resource requirements for SOUTHCOM. Let me comment briefly on each of them.

As I've already mentioned, *quality of life* for our Semite men and women and their families will be a continuing priority. SOUTHCOM must continue to ensure a first-rate quality of life for the Service members in Panama and those who serve throughout the theater. The Services have supported this priority well and thankfully the President's budget provides for the appropriate level of support necessary to maintain this quality of life.

Our ability to support flexible operations throughout the AOR mandates emphasis on *logistics and mobility* capabilities. The tremendous distances and the poor communications and transportation infrastructure require unique and tailored capabilities. Airlift, both strategic and tactical, is absolutely essential to what we do in Latin America. Our organic airlifter, the C-27, and our forward deployed Army helicopter force have been vital to supporting the thousands of troops deployed to the theater.

SOUTHCOM also requires a robust communications infrastructure so that we are able to *command and control* U.S. military forces throughout this vast AOR as well as implement our regional approach to the counterdrug effort. Command and control must ensure the ability to get the right military forces to the place and time they are needed. In this regard, the Command Management System remains a top priority program for us. This system will provide the backbone structure for critical secure voice, data, and imagery telecommunication to connect all field and headquarters elements in the Southern Theater.

Operational support describes assistance provided under the broad functions of a unified command within its assigned geographic responsibility. Counterdrug Operational Support includes activities such as individual

detection and monitoring sorties, JPAT deployments, GBR deployments of both active and reserve personnel, and theater airlift sorties. Non-counterdrug Operational Support includes infrastructure studies consisting of the deployment of small teams of engineers. These teams determine if engineering projects suggested by the host nation will provide the best training for U.S. engineers and also be useful to the local population. Providing this type of support is a cornerstone of the theater strategy,

Training support describes those activities designed to improve the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct the activities for which they are organized and equipped. Training in SOUTHCOM involves conventional and special operations forces from our active and reserve components. Special operations forces are authorized to conduct training support activities designed to improve the readiness of host nation militaryy forces. SOUTHCOM accomplishes this training through the joint/combined exercise program and JCS sponsored exercises, and includes the deployment of mobile training teams (MTT), deployments for training, and subject matter expert exchanges. This training plays a critical role in maintaining combat readiness. It also enhances the professionalism of host nation forces by providing examples of a professional military ethic, committed to civilian control, and imbued with the fundamental respect for human rights.

Finally, the *intelligence support we* provide is vital to nations with the will to fight drug trafficking and production. Our intelligence systems enable SOUTHCOM to know what the narcotraffickers are doing and permit our allies supported by U.S. agencies to conduct effective interdiction and seizure operations as well as to develop long-range strategies. Our counterdmg programs could not function without comprehensive intelligence support.

The President's counterdrug strategy directs a gradual shift in resources to the source countries and SOUTHCOM's intelligence capabilities are proportionate to the task. This is the result of increasing competition for scarce intelligence resources as we apply worldwide management to high value platforms, The drop in the intelligence platform sortie rate also reflects decreasing funding available to keep these expensive platforms engaged on a continuing basis. While there is a decrease in sortie rates. this represents our attempt to fine tune the process to reinforce successful efforts and cull away those which are less productive. However, let me be candid. SOUTHCOM is concerned that if the availability of our intelligence collection assets continues to dwindle, full prosecution of the war against the narcotrafficker terrorist organizations would be hampered. These narcotraffickers have brought enormous destruction to American youth and our cities.

I will watch the availability of counterdrug intelligence assets closely in the coming months and seek the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as SOUTHCOM's understanding of our reconnaissance priorities improves.

A11ow me to stress that continued interaction with our Latin American military partners is crucial for SOUTHCOM. These professional interactions further the development of democracy in the nations of Latin America. Toward this end, SOUTHCOM strongly endorses the President's request for $46.3 M of funds earmarked for DOD military-to-military contact efforts. We strongly believe these funds have an enormous multiplier effect on the stability and growth of democracy with an attendant increased likelihood for economic prosperity. We need to emphasize through training contacts and professional influence a role for Latin American militaries which is subordinate to civil authority and proudly based upon respect for law and human rights.

In SOUTHCOM, and throughout our Armed Forces, our most important resource is our people. Never in our history have we had a more professional and disciplined force. They are prepared to tight and put their lives at risk for the American people. The Armed Forces count on your continued support of our Service personnel

during this period of change. Armed Forces personnel fully understand why our military is changing. They understand new institutional realities and the need to downsize. However, the day-to-day continuing uncertainty for young Service men and women is causing serious concern. Let me strongly recommend that we stabilize our planning for the 1.4 million Service member force outlined in the Bottom Up Review. This military force will be the smallest since 1939. It will be adequate for our defense, provided we preserve our talented people.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, the resources committed to supporting SOUTHCOM are small in relation to the total defense budget. However these funds allow us exceptional leverage in achieving our national objectives in Latin America. SOUTHCOM strongly urges that the key programs and efforts addressed in this Senate hearing be fully funded at the requested level. Reduction in this very modest budget can have enormous detrimental effect on our efforts.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chaiman, allow me to conclude by stating my conviction that Central and South America are areas vital to the economic well-being and to the security of the United States. The nineteen nations in the SOUTHCOM AOR comprise a region of enorrnous new opportunity and a common destiny. Latin America increasingly shares our commitment to democracy, our respect for human rights, and our aspiration for liberty. All Americans share Bolivar's opinion of governments: "the most perfect governmental system is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness, the most social security, and the greatest degree of political stability. " We sense that the leaders and people of the sovereign nations in the Southern Theater are committed to the development of social and political systems appropriate to their individual cultures and circumstances.

It is vital that we continue to work with the committed democratic governments throughout SOUTHCOM to develop strategies which promote regional security, combat the drug menace, and support democratic good governance. Our programs in Latin America must support the President's foreign policy goals of expanding democracy and econornic development. SOUTHCOM's continued focus on a broad and supportive regional partnership with Latin American military counterparts can only strengthen the rule of law, enhance the rights of the people of the Americas. and preserve the security of their democratic institutions. Our SOUTHCOM effort is committed to achieving these important national objectives.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 3. Joint Planning Practical Exercise

SCOPE

This lesson is designed to apply the information and knowledge that you have gained in earlier lessons on joint operations. In this lesson, you will be introduced to a fictitious yet realistic planning scenario. In four practical exercises, you will demonstrate your ability to function as a staff officer at the theater and corps joint task force (JTF) level by using the deliberate and crisis action planning procedures in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). You will develop—

- A mission analysis using a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking.
- Courses of action.
- The commander in chief's (CINC'S) strategic concept.
- A commander's estimate.

This lesson completes your JOPES instruction and will give you a solid foundation with which to conduct peacetime and crisis action planning and to execute joint or single service operations at any level.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

C.10 TASK: Explain the relationship between the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), campaign plan; the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES); and the joint task force (JTF) campaign plan.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include the concepts, elements, and application of campaign planning in contrast to the principles, functions, and application of JOPES. The explanation must also include how to apply these systems at the theater and subordinate levels and must provide insight into how and by whom JOPES operation plans and theater-level campaign plans are developed IAW AFSC Pub 2, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, lb, le, 2a, 3a, 4b, 4d, and 4e.

C.20 TASK: Develop a CINC's strategic concept using deliberate planning procedures of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

CONDITION: Acting as a staff officer at USSOUTHCOM level and given a general situation, Joint Planning Document, USSOUTHCOM Strategic Estimate, maps, overlays, and written requirements.

STANDARD: The courses of action and elements of the CINC'S strategic concept must be consistent with procedures outlined in Joint Pub 5-01.1, JOPES, Vol 1 (Extract), and be feasible, suitable, and acceptable with respect to the mission, enemy, and strategic situation as presented.

LEVEL: Application.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: la, lb, ld, 2a, 2c, 3a, 3c, 4a, 4d, and 5c.

C.30 TASK: Develop a commander's estimate using the crisis action procedures of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

CONDITION: Acting as a staff officer at the JTF (corps) level and given a special situation, Joint Planning Document, USSOUTHCOM Strategic Estimate, CINC's Strategic Concept, maps, overlays, and written requirements.

STANDARD: The courses of action and commander's estimate must be consistent with procedures outlined in Joint Pub 5-01.1, JOPES, Vol 1 (Extract), and be feasible, suitable, and acceptable with respect to the mission, enemy, and strategic situation as presented.

LEVEL: Analysis.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: le, 2a, 2c, 3c, 4b, and 5c.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives. Follow the instructions and read the materials listed below at the suggested time. Key to the learning process is the analysis and application of knowledge within the practical exercises that are included in the lesson.

READINGS:

a. Appendix 2 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, USSOUTHCOM Strategic Estimate (7 pages).

b. Appendix 3 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Joint Planning Document, Part A and Part B, Section 2 (21 pages) (reference only).

c. Appendix 4 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, General Situation (5 pages).

d. Appendix 5 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, OPREP-3 PINNACLE Situation Report (2 pages).

e. Appendix 6 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC Assessment (1 page).

f. Appendix 7 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, CJCS Warning Order (7 pages).

g. Appendix 8 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, JTFSo Activation Order (1 page).

h. Appendix 9 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Commander's Estimate of the Situation (3 pages) (reference only).

i. Appendix 10 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, CJCS Alert Order (4 pages).

j. Appendix 11 to M/S320C Staff Planning Book, CJCS Execute Order (3 pages).

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

> In a force-projection army, planning and conducting operations at both the tactical and operational levels have become more complex since the end of the Cold War. In Cold War Europe, many strategic, operational, and even tactical choices had long ago been made. A strategic theater in a force-projection environment with few or no US forces creates operational circumstances where planners have many more strategic. operational, and tactical options than they were used to having in the Cold War.
>
> Such a diversity of available options should, in the end, give US commanders the means to confuse, confound, and rapidly defeat armed enemies of the United States in full-dimensional operations.

This quote from FM 100-5, *Operations,* is appropriate as you, a member of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) planning staff, begin to develop a plan to defend Honduras, a friend of the United States, from Atlantica, an increasingly aggressive and provocative nation to the south. In most respects, this quote describes the situation in USSOUTHCOM to perfection. You, as the planner, must choose those options available so as to tip the scales in favor of the United States and Honduras and. as much as possible, guarantee the rapid defeat of the opposition's armed forces.

In this lesson, you will apply the knowledge and skills you have gained over the past several months as an operational planner using JOPES procedures. Your first task will be to develop a strategic concept for a defense of Honduras using the JOPES deliberate planning procedures. To do this, you will conduct a mission analysis and develop courses of action using the staff planning techniques you have learned. You will do this as a member of a theater planning staff using a fictitious scenario in a practical exercise. Your second task will be to analyze courses of action and develop portions of a commander's estimate using crisis action planning procedures. You will do this as a member of a planning staff at the corps joint task force (JTF) headquarters level. The scenario that was used in S530, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Space,* evolves into a crisis in this course.

Since you have not thought about this subject for awhile, you need a short review. You will first review the Department of Defense (DOD) systems and how to formulate our national military strategies and communicate the requirements to the warfighting comrnanders in chief (CINCs). You will then look at the theater planning and campaign planning processes used by the CINCS to accomplish the stated national goals in their areas of responsibility. Finally, you will review the JOPES procedures that are used to write war plans. Also included in this review is a discussion on how JOPES relates to the other DOD systems and how campaign planning relates to JOPES.

After the review, you will look at the general situation so that you are prepared for the practical exercises. You will also preview the types of documents a planning staff would use to reach its goals. In this and the subsequent lesson, you will focus on how to apply the concepts and principles you have learned over the past 2 years as a Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) student.

JOINT SYSTEMS REVIEW

Before you start the first practical exercise, you need to understand how the various levels of planning relate to one another and how the staffs collectively plan for the security of the United States. The levels of planning that you are concerned with now are the DOD or national-level planning process, the theater or CINC planning process, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. At the DOD level, wc develop an overall military strategy for defending US interests. At this level, we plan the military structure and indicate the resources needed for it. This strategy is then communicated to the warfighting CINCs, who then put together effective organizations and develop plans to carry out their portions of the strategy. The CINCs are the ones who provide the security for the United States and its allies, They usc a theater planning process to develop campaign plans. As a part of this process, the CINCs usc the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System to write the specific contingency plans that make possible the actual deployment of the various wafighting forces.

DOD Systems

In S511, *The Nation and Military Power,* you were introduced to the Defense Planning Systems, which consist of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS); the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). You were given more detail about these systems during S530, *.Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Space.* In this review, you will see the relationships of these systems.

In the upper left-hand comer of the graphic is a box titled JSR. A Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is conducted to assess the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS). In this review, current, emerging, and future issues, threats, technologies, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions are examined. Representatives from the joint staff, the services, and the combatant commands make up the working groups that provide input to the JSR. An annual report is developed, which summarizes the strategic environrnent and recommends changes to the National Military Strategy. Here is an example of a change to the NMS: Because the end of the Cold War caused huge changes in the strategic environment, the JSR recommended significant changes to our National Military Strategy. No longer was it necessary to have large contingents of forward-deployed forces in Europe. Instead. we began to move toward a system whereby our forces were stationed closer to home but trained to react to unforeseen events wherever they might occur in the world.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), assesses the JSR and then writes his guidance. This Chairman's Guidance (CG) conveys the framework for the National Military Strategy document.

The National Military Strategy document expresses to the President and the Secretary of Defense what our National Military Strategy should be and the recommended force structure necessary to carry out the recommended strategy. Here is an example: An outcome of this process is the CINCs and the Chairman testifying before Congress as to why we need a certain number of divisions, certain amounts of strategic lift, or any other number of resources. They are simply trying to explain what is needed to defend the interests of the United States through our National Military Strategy.

To understand the DOD planning systems relationships, refer to this graphic.



The Joint Planning Document (JPD) is a concise listing by functional area of the programs we need to carry out the National Military Strategy. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would identify resources needed for intelligence gathering, and the J6 would identify communications requirements.

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is essentially a decision directive from the Secretary of Defense. Notice that the graphic shows arrows going in two directions. The DPG is a directive to the services to develop their specific requirements in support of the National Military Strategy. For example, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps would specify what they need out of the defense budget to carry out their portion of the national defense strategy. If the Army decides it needs a new highly transportable personnel carrier, this is where you would see the request. Note that this is where the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) begins. PPBS is the system that develops our resource lists and establishes our funding. It also puts together the budget that ultimately furnishes the combatant commanders with the forces, equipment. and support needed to defend the interests of the United States.

The other arrow extending from the DPG goes to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). In this case, the Secretary of Defense provides major policy decisions and guidance to the CJCS on the actual strategy to be

carried out by the CINCs. The Chairman takes this guidance and develops the JSCP, which is where the CINCs get their marching orders on what plans to develop and what forces they will have to work with.

The JSCP restates our National Military Strategy in terms of how we are to use our nation's military resources to defend our national interests. This document directs the CINCs to develop specific operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs) and apportions major combat forces and strategic lift to each of the CINCs. Here is an example: Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the JSCP had tasked the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to develop an OPLAN to defend our friends and allies as well as such vital interests as US access to oil.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the system used to develop and, if need be, execute the OPLANs and CONPLANs that the JSCP directs the CINCs to write. JOPES is also the system that would be used to develop original plans if no prior planning had been accomplished.

The bottom line is that the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the joint staff, and a host of support agencies use the DOD systems to fashion a National Military Strategy that is approved by the President. On approval, that strategy is then distributed to the CINCs for execution.

Theater Planning Process and Campaign Planning

The second level of planning is at the theater level. At this level, the strategy developed at the DOD or national level is put into practice. The defense of the United States takes place under the direction of the regional CINCs.

In S511 and S530, you were introduced to theater-strategic planning and campaign planning. In this process, a CINC conducts his security responsibilities. As you review this process, you should be able to recognize the relationships between this process, the DOD planning process you just covered, and JOPES planning.

As mentioned previously, combatant commanders receive their portion of the military strategy responsibilities from the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commanders translate national strategy into operational concepts by following the *theater-strategic planning process*. This theater-strategic planning process is used to attain end states or to achieve CINC's goals. The process includes the commander's estimate of what is needed in the theater to ensure success, a theater strategy or strategic concept to achieve that success, and the establishment of a theater design or organization that can carry out the strategy. This theater-strategic planning process is nothing more than a collection of decisions, organizational moves, and planning thoughts used by the CINC to achieve his missions. You studied this in S530 when you looked at the strategic analysis methodology (SAM) and the methodology for regional force planning. To formalize this theater-strategic planning process, the CINC would—

Refer to this graphic as You study theater planning.



● *Develop a strategic estimate.* The strategic estimate is similar to a commander's estimate and is the CINC's statement of the broad strategic factors that influence the mission and the courses of action necessary to achieve desired goals. In other words, the strategic estimate tells what the CINC wants to do to accomplish his goals and achieve suet.ess in his theater. Included in this estimate is the strategic direction given by the National Command Authority (NCA). An example for USSOUTHCOM would be the decision to support counterdrug efforts within the theater. An example for USCENTCOM might be to promote regional stability and ensure access to critical resources. Once a goal is adopted, some decisions have to be made as to how to accomplish it. In the first example, intelligence-gathering services might be performed. In the other example, the military means necessary to deter hostile aggression would be needed. An example of a strategic estimate is at appendix 2 in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book. You will have more on this a little later.

● *Design the theater.* A theater-strategic design has to do with how the theater is organized and the types of forces and resources it would require. The CINC will need to organize his theater so he can reasonably expect to meet his strategic goals. In this way, each theater would be unique. USSOUTHCOM has missions and goals that are very much different from those of USCENTCOM. In USSOUTHCOM, the emphasis might be on nation building and counterdrug activities. USCENTCOM would emphasize conventional military deterrence activities. Clearly, the differences in missions would lead to differences in theater design. In the Mideast, USCENTCOM would have available armor units, aicraft wings, and naval forces to ensure that it could adequately respond to a threat by hostile forces. USCENTCOM would then probably have an organization that would include representatives from all the services strategically located and prepared to react if problems threatened the region's stability and US interests. In this case, it might be appropriate to create a decentralized system of command and control. The theater design for USSOUTHCOM would require a different focus, emphasizing psychological operations, engineer support, and surveillance units. In addition, the political element of power might greatly outweigh the military. With that in mind, USSOUTHCOM might establish a more centralized arrangement, with its headquarters in charge.

● *Organize and establish command relationships and develop campaign plans.* Once the CINC has written his strategic estimate and organized his theater in a way that he can expect success, he will formalize the

command relationships that are necessary for his strategy or goals to be met. This includes the command relationships of US and coalition military organizations and also the relationships between nonmilitary agencies and host nation organizations. Once the CINC has written the estimate, designed his theater, and established the command relationships, he will ideally produce a campaign plan. The campaign plan, which is also referred to as a theater outline plan, is the CINC's sequence of operations needed to attain the strategic objectives. It orients on the enemy's centers of gravity; achieves unity of effort with land, sea, and air forces; clearly defines what constitutes success; and serves as the basis for planning by subordinates. The campaign plan is a framework or outline of the overall strategy to be used, but it does not have the authority to put units and resources on the ground. Remember, it is a vision or a strategy. JOPES is the system that gives the campaign plan form.

Desert Storm can be used as an example. When General H. Norman Schwarzkopf took the reins of USCENTCOM, he looked at the entire region and developed a concept of what he thought the region should look like. Not only was he concerned about Iraq as an aggressor, but he was also interested in Iran, the situation in Somalia, the relations with Syria, and our friends in Saudi Arabia. He then began developing a plan to achieve his various goals. One of the goals, but not the only one, was to protect the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. His staff then began to develop plans for that kind of contingency. The staff also began to prepare plans for dealing with problems in Somalia, strengthening ties with friends in the region, and upgrading military facilities within the region. The point is that a campaign plan includes a complete package of initiatives. Notice also that the campaign plan is written during peacetime and is not restricted to wartime. However, the campaign plan includes any plans that would be necessary if contingencies should erupt. They are part of the larger campaign plan and would only be used in the event of an emergency. The actual war plan for Desert Storm got all the press, but it was only one part of the campaign plan. When Iraq attacked Kuwait, the United States was forced to initiate that specific contingency plan.

The activity in Somalia is another example. This contingency was dealt with under the umbrella of the larger campaign plan. Once the situation in Kuwait was resolved and once US forces left Somalia, we returned to the campaign plan and the many initiatives it included. Another important point to remember about campaign planning is its utility for subordinate commands. CINCs do not actually have forces assigned to them and usually would have to form a joint task force (JTF) to carry out the operations if a contingency were to erupt. The subordinate commands would use the CINC's campaign plan as a guide or as a means to ensure that they understood the commander's intent. The JTF would then fashion its own campaign plan to actually define the phases of the operation. But again, the JTF depends on JOPES plans to initiate the deployment. Campaign planning does not include deployment.

JOPES

The third level of planning is JOPES, which is the official DOD planning system. JOPES is the only system we have to deploy forces and materiel to a regional hotspot. JOPES feeds into the CINC's campaign plan or the theater planning process with specific operation plans that are targeted against actual contingencies, and it completes the CINC's overall strategy. It may take several formal JOPES plans before the CINC completes his strategy for the theater. The events in the Persian Gulf that began in 1990 can be used as an example of a phased strategy using JOPES planning. The initial phase of the Gulf War, Desert Shield, began in August 1990 as a defensive or deterrent operation designed to prevent Iraq from making further conquests. A JOPES operation order (OPORD) was used to initiate the transport of forces and equipment into the theater. While executing Desert Shield, USCENTCOM began making plans to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait-Desert Storm. When Iraq failed to respond to diplomatic and economic measures, the President ordered Desert Storm to begin. An actual JOPES OPLAN was used for the Desert Storm offensive. During this offensive, the USCENTCOM staff

planned the final phase, which involved the eventual redeployment of US forces and the civic action activities needed to rebuild and defend occupied Kuwait. This required the use of further JOPES planning to transport units back home, provide for a lasting defense, and offer assistance to refugees. So, the Persian Gulf campaign required that several different JOPES plans be used to provide for the units that conducted the operation. Notice that it takes actual JOPES plans to move, deploy, and redeploy forces. Campaign plans do not accomplish this. Only through JOPES does the joint community have the procedures, communications facilities, hardware, and software to cause units to deploy and to get to the theater where they can influence the action.

If you are interested in additional information on these systems, you should refer to S530. The lesson guide to S530 provides a fairly detailed outline of how all of this fits together.

In the practical exercises (PE) for this course, you will assume the role of a planner on the USSOUTHCOM staff. In the first PE, you will develop a planning concept during peacetime to defend Honduras from a possible hostile attack. You will use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System to accomplish this. Because you have not been involved with S530 for several months, an abbreviated review of the JOPES procedures and processes follows. You do not need to memorize this material because you have the references needed to conduct the practical exercises.

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

JOPES has two planning processes: deliberate planning and crisis action planning. The deliberate planning process is used during peacetime to develop OPLANs or CONPLANs in case contingencies occur. The crisis action planning process is used during emergencies to convert existing plans to OPORDs or to develop OPORDs from scratch. During the first PE, you will be in a peacetime situation and will use the deliberate process. A brief review of those planning procedures follows.



According to this chart, there are five phases to the deliberate planning process.

● *Initiation phase. The Chairman,* Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), normally by means of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), tasks CINCs to develop contingency plans-either OPLANs or CONPLANs. The JSCP also apportions major combat forces, strategic lift, critical communications assets such as satellite channels, and other major resources. The PE that you will work will be a JSCP tasking.

● *Concept development phase. The CINC* develops a concept of operations using the military decision-making process, which is similar to the tactical decision-making process,

● *Plan development phase.* Once the concept is approved, the CINC and his staff develop the plan in detail. The goal is to determine the feasibility of deploying, via strategic lift, all the forces, resupply, and other resources to the theater of operations in time to accomplish the tasking. The result is a documented OPLAN.

● *Plan review phase. The* CJCS reviews the plan for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.

● *Supporting plans phase.* Supporting plans are completed as required by subordinate or supporting agencies and commands.

DELIBERATE PLANNING PRACTICAL EXERCISE

Read Appendix 4, to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book General Situation, and then return here.

General Situation

Appendix 4 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, General Situation, provides a chronology of events and summary of the situation in Atlantica, a fictitious nation. The second paragraph describes the problem and tells who the players are. Atlantica which is located just south of Honduras (see the map in appendix 1), is currently controlled by Alfredo Marti, a Marxist-style leader who heads the Atlantican People's Party (APP) and is backed by the People's Popular Army (PPA). The APP is supported by Cuba, North Korea, and Libya. The opposition is composed of the Party for Democratic Atlantica (PDA), better known as the Contras. The PDA was in power prior to the coup and as a result of UN-supervised elections. Once the APP seized power, the PDA moved into the area along both sides of the Honduran-Atlantican border to the east of Choluteca. The PDA rebuilt its insurgency infrastructure, organized and equipped guerrilla units, and directed a recruiting effort in the rural and urban areas. The PDA's goal is to overthrow the Marxist APP and return democracy to Atlantica. In that regard, there is currently an active insurgency between the two factions.

But how does all of this involve the United States? First, the United States is sympathetic toward the Contras because of their adherence to the democratic principles of government and freedom of choice. Clearly, the United States would prefer to see the PDA in power in Atlantica because of the benefits of having democratic and friendly governments as neighbors. At the same time, the United States does not outwardly support the Contras with arms or money. Second, Atlantica feels increasingly isolated in the region, and to relieve pressure, it continually threatens to expand with force. The most likely expansion seems to be toward Honduras, where a number of Contra base camps are located. This, therefore, gives the APP a convenient excuse. The United States is involved because it is committed to protecting Honduras, an ally.

References and Documents

You will need to refer to some key documents as you begin the PE. Here is a brief description of each one:

- Appendix 4 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book describes the general situation. This document sets the stage for the situation, describes the various factions, and provides a listing of the forces available in Honduras.

- The USSOUTHCOM strategic estimate is at appendix 2 in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book. **Go to that document now, and scan the content. You do not need to read it word for word, but you should get a feel for the layout and the type of information it contains. You should also refer to it as you follow this short explanation.**

The USSOUTHCOM strategic estimate states what actions or priorities the CINC wants to accomplish to assure success in his theater. It is the initiation of the theater-strategic planning process that you read about earlier. This estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the NCA or the authoritative body of the alliance or coalition within which the CINC works. Notice that this document contains the strategic concepts that are the basis for the CINC's strategy. These concepts were derived from higher authority or, in many cases, from the CINC himself. One of the principal ways in which this estimate is derived

is from applying the strategic analysis methodology (SAM) and the methodology for regional force planning (MFRFP) that you have learned about in previous courses and reviewed in lesson 2 of this course.

The USSOUTHCOM staff would then outline specific courses of action to be used with the strategic concepts. An example of a strategic concept for USSOUTHCOM is to *support counterdrug efforts.* A course of action for this concept would be that USSOUTHCOM will perform theaterwide intelligence collection services. As you can tell, the collective result of these courses of action is essentially the basis of the theater strategy. To you as a planner, this means that the CINC's strategic estimate must be used as the basis for all plans and actions that USSOUTHCOM would take in response to a crisis either in its theater or in a supported theater. As you work on the PE, look at what the CINC wants to accomplish and then fashion the plan accordingly.

● The Joint Planning Document (JPD) is at appendix 3 in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book. **Go to that document now, and scan the content. Refer to this document as you read the following explanation.**

The JPD is intended to show you what a JSCP would look like. As you know, the JSCP gives the CINC his planning taskings and apportions forces and strategic lift. Essentially, it states the National Military Strategy and provides guidance on how the CINCs will carry out that strategy. This JPD is not in the exact format of a JSCP, but much of it is written in a similar form. Remember that this document is only for USSOUTHCOM. A real JSCP would cover all theaters and combatant commands. Here are some areas within the document that you should be aware of:

— Part A, Section 2, Strategic Setting, contains much of the planning guidance from the JCS that the CINC needs to carry out his strategy. Note that the national military objectives and the national strategic concepts are explained. Notice also that the strategic concepts here are similar to the ones that the CINC developed for his strategic estimate. The difference is in the level. The JPD deals with the national level while the CINC's strategic estimate addresses regional specific concepts.

— Part A, Section 4, Tasks, contains the taskings for the CINCs to write OPLANs and CONPLANs. Paragraph 3a tasks USSOUTHCOM to "prepare an operation plan for the bilateral defense of Honduras along its southeastern border." And this is the tasking for your PE. In a real JSCP, you may have several taskings, but for the purposes here, you have only one. Notice the assumptions that the CJCS attached to the tasking (paragraph 3b). Also included in this section are the rules of engagement that must be followed. These are important and must be used as the plans are written.

— Part B contains information on force apportionment and planning annexes. Here, you would find the listing of forces that the CINC and his staff will use as they develop the plan. You will also find useful data on such things as nuclear weapons, intelligence support, special operations, logistics, and civil affairs.

● ST 100-7 contains all sorts of information about the Atlantican military forces and the People's Popular Army. You may find this resource helpful as you work on the PE. Of particular importance to a planner when developing courses of action is the information on the enemy's capabilities and limitations. Courses of action should target enemy weaknesses and limit enemy strengths.

Deliberate Planning Requirements

There are three requirements for the deliberate planning portion of the practical exercise. For the first requirement, you will conduct a mission analysis of the JSCP tasking that directs you to "prepare an operation

plan for the bilateral defense of Honduras along its southeastern border." Next, you will develop two courses of action that are based on the mission analysis you did as part of the frost requirement. Last, you will complete selected portions of the CINC's strategic concept. This should take you 1 to 1 ½ hours to complete. Once you are satisfied with the results of this potion of the PE, you will then be required to use the crisis action planning process to complete the PE. You are now ready for the first requirement, mission analysis.

Requirement 1: Mission Analysis

The actual procedures for conducting a mission analysis were covered in S530, lesson 2, and this visual may jog your memory.



Complete requirement 1 to the PE.

Special Situation for Mission Analysis

You are a member of the USSOUTHCOM staff. The following portion of a memorandum from the USSOUTHCOM chief of staff to the J5 begins the concept development phase of JOPES. A key first step of this phase is the mission analysis. Use the mission analysis worksheet on the following page to document your analysis. (Refer to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 3, Joint Planning Document, for the strategic guidance for this planning task.)

TO: J5

Your action in coordination with the staff planners.

1. Conduct a mission analysis of the JSCP tasking: ". . . . produce an OPLAN for the bilateral defense of HONDURAS along its southeastern border."

2. Formulate the USSOUTHCOM mission statement for this OPLAN.

3. Brief me on the following:

a. Essential tasks-things we must do to win.

b. Implied tasks.

c. The mission.

MISSION ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

1. ESSENTIAL TASKS

a. Defend Honduras.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

2. IMPLIED TASKS

a. Deploy rapidly.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g. Defeat At.lantican forces.

h.

i.

j.

k.

3. MISSION STATEMENT RECOMMENDED FOR CINC APPROVAL

Do not continue until you have completed requirement 1.

Solution to Requirement 1

When you are satisfied with your answers, you can refer to the solution that follows. Your solution may vary from this one. As long as your answers meet the commonsense test, you should not consider them to be wrong. This solution is presented only to give you a means of comparison.

1. ESSENTIAL TASKS

a. Defend Honduras.

b. Deter aggression,

c. If deterrence fails, restore the territorial integrity of Honduras.

d. Conduct bilateral operations.

e. Restore regional stability.

2. IMPLIED TASKS

a. Deploy rapidly.

b. Control seas and airspace.

c. Protect US citizens.

d. Conclude conflict rapidly.

e. Increase security assistance.

f. Establish lodgments and staging areas

g. Defeat Atlantican forces.

h. Restore Honduran border security.

i. Contain conflict to smallest region possible.

j. Repatriate captured enemy.

k. Establish bilateral command and control.

3. MISSION STATEMENT RECOMMENDED FOR CINC APPROVAL

When directed, USSOUTHCOM, in coordination with the Honduran Armed Forces will deter Atlantican aggression and, if deterrence fails, restore the territorial integrity and regional stability of the Honduran-Atlantican border region.

Once you have compared your work to this solution and are satisfied with what you have done, begin the next requirement.

Requirement 2: Course of Action Development

Refer to the Concept Development Phase chart again. Step 2 of concept development is planning guidance. During this step, the CINC provides preliminary guidance so the staff can begin working on courses of action. Tentative courses of action will be developed at the end of step 2, and then during step 3, the staff will conduct staff estimates to check the supportability of these courses of action. Once that is complete, the staff will produce a commander's estimate during step 4. You do not have to accomplish these steps. Instead, you will concentrate on developing the courses of action. As a staff officer, you may have to expand the CINC's guidance or even draft his comments based on verbal guidance. For the purposes here, the chief of staff has provided you with notes from a conference with the CINC. The notes and assumptions necessary for you to continue your planning are as follows:

1. ASSUMPTIONS

a. Commitment of US forces to combat will be preceded by a Honduran Government request for assistance.

b. NCA will authorize a selective callup (200,000 personnel).

c. The governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Panama will permit preconflict deployment of forces into their territorial waters and land areas.

2. CINC'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

a. Prepare a flexible range of deterrent options for the NCA. Include options that would be requested in the areas of diplomacy, domestic policy, and the economy to enhance the success of our operations.

b. Make the deterrent force joint and overt, and back it with over-the-horizon forces for protection and reinforcement.

c. Prepare for postdeterrence (successful) and postcombat.

d. Make "rapid" the word of the day rapid deterrence, rapid deployment, and rapid conflict resolution and restoration.

e. Create options for withdrawal following the successful operation.

Complete requirement 2 to the PE.

Special Situation for Course of Action Development

As a member of the staff planning team, you are to assist the J5 in developing broad courses of action (COAs) for analysis. Remember, you are dealing with JSCP-apportioned major combat forces (yet to be specifically identified), sometimes referred to as "above-line forces. " Therefore, your COAs should be flexible and broad. The courses of action should accomplish the mission that you developed during mission analysis and incorporate the guidance and assumptions you received from the chief of staff. You may also use the data from

the mission analysis solution that was provided from requirement 1. Note that one course of action is provided as an example. It is important that you provide the CINC with something he can analyze. If the COA is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable or if it does not really provide an alternative to existing COAs, then you are not providing options.

The J5 should direct the staff to analyze the COAs in terms of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, command and control, political implications, coalition operations, and interagency issues. Staff officers would normally consult supporting command and component staffs, to include national intelligence agencies (through representatives in the CINC's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)) to enhance analysis efforts. Parallel planning is a technique that can be used to produce quality plans or orders.

Study the following memorandum from the chief of staff

FROM: Chief of Staff

TO: J5

1. Chair a working meeting with our staff planners.

2. Purpose:

a. Develop two broad COAs. Use the worksheet on the next page as an outline. Note that one COA has been provided for purposes of comparison.

b. Address supportability implications for each COA

c. Recommend a feasible COA with supporting rationale for CINC approval.

Chief

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT WORKSHEET

COA 1: Rapid deployment of available US Commander in Chief, Pacific, naval force to Pacific side of Honduran territorial waters to provide a show of force. Follow-on forces prepare for deployment to Honduras.

COA 2:

COA 3:

NOTES:

Do not continue until you have completed requirement 2.

Solution to Requirement 2

When you are satisfied with your answers, you can refer to the solution that follows. Again, your solution may vary from this one. As long as your answers meet the commonsense test, you should not consider them to be wrong. This solution is presented only to give you a means of comparison.

COA 1: Rapid deployment of one task-organized division-ready brigade; one tactical fighter squadron; elements of joint special operations task force; and commander, joint task force (COMJTF) headquarters, to Honduras (4-day closure). Rapid deployment of available US Commander in Chief, Pacific, naval forces and Marine expeditionary force to Pacific side of Honduran territorial waters. Intratheater airlift package to support division-ready brigade (3-day closure). Second division-ready brigade and one fighter squadron to Howard AFB, Panama (5-day closure). Deployment accomplished under guise of emergency deployment readiness exercise.

Follow-on forces deploy to Honduras and prepare for combat operations.

Forces employed under OPCON of COMJTF.

Continental United States (CONUS)-based security forces and forces for civil-military operations deploy on order of COMJTF to relieve attack forces and conduct stability operations.

COA 2: Rapid deployment of one tactical fighter squadron; strategic intelligence assets to include Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); and forward element of Commander. Joint Task Force South (COMJTFSO) headquarters to Honduras to provide direct support to the Honduran military forces.

Once you have compared your work to this solution and are satisfied with what you have done, begin the next requirement.

Requirement 3: CINC's Strategic Concept

You are now going to move quickly through the remainder of steps 3 and 4. As mentioned earlier, you will not be required to complete a staff estimate or a commander's estimate. Instead, you are provided with a CINC-approved COA that would have come out of the commander's estimate. Once that happens, the staff begins working on the CINC's strategic concept, which explains the concept of the operation to the CJCS and, pending approval, states the CINC's concept to component and supporting commands. The content of the strategic concept is much more broad than the eventual basic concept for the OPLAN, but remember that it is still early in the planning process and much more detail is yet to be determined.

Complete requirement 3 to the PE.

Special Situation for CINC's Strategic Concept

As a result of the commander's estimate in concept development, the CINC selected the following course of action to be used as a basis for continued planning:

Rapid deployment of one task-organized, division-ready brigade; one tactical fighter squadron; elements of joint special operations task force; and commander, joint task force (COMJTF), headquarters to Honduras (4-day closure). Rapid deployment of available US Commander in Chief, Pacific, naval forces and Marine expeditionary force to Pacific side of Honduran territorial waters. Intratheater airlift package to support division-ready brigade. Second division-ready brigade and one fighter squadron to Howard AFB, Panama (5-day closure). Deployment accomplished under guise of emergency deployment readiness exercise.

Follow-on forces deploy to Honduras and prepare for combat operations.

Forces employed under OPCON of COMJTF.

CONUS-based security forces and forces for civil-military operations deploy on order of COMJTF to relieve attack forces and conduct stability operations.

On the following pages is a partially completed CINC's strategic concept for this planning exercise. Using the results of your planning efforts to this point and the CINC selected COA, you are to fill in the blank spaces of the CINC's strategic concept. The paragraphs that require your attention are in bold print and are—

- Paragraph 1c, Deterrent Options.
- Paragraph 1f, Assumptions.
- Paragraph 1g, Legal Considerations.
- Paragraph 2, Mission.
- Paragraph 4a Concept of Support.
- Paragraph 5a, Command Relationships.

Partially Completed CINC's Strategic Concept

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO MIAMI 34003-0201_
23 OCTOBER 199_

USCINCSO STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE BILATERAL DEFENSE OF HONDURAS (U)

( ) REFERENCES: Joint Planning Document

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION. See apportioned forces in the M/S32oC JPD.

l. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. As outlined in the M/320C JPD, this strategic concept is designed to proactively respond to military aggression against HONDURAS by ATLANTICA. Provided are a range of options to deter Atlantican aggression against the sovereign territory of HONDURAS. US and regional friendly nation political support of the Contra movement emanating from the frontier along the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border has politically isolated the nation of ATLANTICA. ATLANTICA continues to harbor an oppressive regime that is counterproductive to the healthy democratic environment that is emerging in the region. Continued isolation of ATLANTICA could produce such desperate conditions that the Atlantican Government will exercise its only credible strength—military intervention. If US deterrence fails or Atlantican forces are committed without sufficient warning to the United States (less than 7 days), the plan outlines actions to swiftly contain and terminate the conflict to restore the region to a stable condition with the application of all instruments of national power. This plan does not provide for the dismemberment of the Atlantican Government.

b. ( ) Area of Concern

(1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), continues to maintain responsibility of the geographic region outlined in the Unified Command Plan.

(2) ( ) Area of Interest. The area of interest includes the Central American landmass and all adjoining territorial waters. Of particular interest are the sea and air lanes of communication leading into the region. Control of the sea and air lanes by Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), will contribute to the success of this strategic concept.

(3) ( ) Area of Operations. The theater of operations for this strategic concept includes the landmass and airspace of the countries of HONDURAS and ATLANTICA. CINCUSACOM establishes an intercept and interdiction zone over the territorial waters and applicable seas and airspace leading to ATLANTICA.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. The purpose of deterrence in this instance will be to convince the Atlantican Government not to choose military means to reach its political ends. USCINCSO intends to demonstrate US resolve to support the Honduran Government through the rapid deployment of US forces and materiel to HONDURAS and littoral areas. These rapid deployments will also allow the command to posture for follow-on operations through materiel buildup, reconnaissance, combined coordination and training, infrastructure enhancement, and rehearsals. The following menu of military deterrent options should be closely orchestrated with diplomatic, political, and economic options established by the National Command Authority (NCA):

(1) ( ) Employ inplace assets.

(2) ( ) Upgrade alert status.

(3) ( ) Increase strategic reconnaissance.

(4) ( )

(5) ( )

(6) ( )

(7) ( )

(8) ( )

(9) ( )

(l0) ( )

(11) ( )

(12) ( )

(13) ( )

(14) ( )

(15) ( )

(16) ( ) Order contingency forces to initiate actions to deploy.

(17) ( )

(18) ( ) Move maritime pre-positioning ships (MPSs) to region.

(19) ( )

(20) ( )

(21) ( )

(22) ( )

(23) ( )

(24) ( ) Prestage or deploy contingency ready brigades.

(25) ( )

(26) ( )

(27) ( )

(28) ( ) Prestage sealift and airlift reception assets.

(29) ( )

(30) ( )

(31) ( )

d. ( ) Enemy Forces. (See ST 100-7 for the order of battle.) The Atlantican military forces operate under strict centralized control the Ministry of Defense. Protracted operations against Contra militia along the border frontier with HONDURAS have created an atmosphere of urgency resulting in increased readiness at the company level. Ground, maritime. and air elements are not routinely exercised together. Each service closely protects its assets while consistently pressing to impress the government with successes. Military districts are closely managed as power bases rather than functional coordinated defense areas. Lateral coordination between districts is rare. Coastal naval forces aid and profit from drug trafficking more than they provide coherent defense. Boat squadrons lack command and control assets. Air combat and transport assets are closely managed due to a scarce maintenance infrastructure. Training in close air support is weak. Attack aircraft routinely operate in small autonomous detachments. Detachments are competent in raid operations against preplanned targets. Air reconnaissance is routinely flown but lacks coordinated counterair for protection. Transport assets are well utilized. but crews are not skilled in delivering airborne forces or parachute-rigged cargo. Ground forces are generally barracks bound with the exception of short-duration (7- to 14-day), company-sized deployments along the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border. Cross-border night raids are conducted at the platoon level. Ground command and control for battalion and above operates from fixed stations. The national militia, while large, is a forurn for political activity rather than a mission-oriented defense asset (zeal is strong, but marksmanship is weak). The Atlantican military enjoys the respect and support of the people because the military has maintained

a link with the historical Revolutionary Army of Independence. Approximately 600 left-wing rebels operate within HONDURAS, and the Honduran Government publicly claims that many of these are mercenaries paid and trained by ATLANTICA.

e. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Honduran Armed Forces (HAF)

(a) ( ) General. The HAF (17,000 personnel) consist of an army, an air force, a coastal navy, and a national police force. The HAF enjoy the benefits of an ongoing security assistance program from the UNITED STATES and a continued working relationship with Joint Task Force BRAVO (JTFB). Having no domestic arms industry, HONDURAS imports all equipment, mostly from the United States and the UNITED KINGDOM. Army forces (14,500 personnel) are organized into four brigades, each with an assigned military district, The air force (1,500 personnel) has 76 aircraft. The coastal navy fields 11 swift ships and 15 small patrol boats, The national police force is deployed throughout the country in detachments composed of 8 to 30 men each,

(b) ( ) Honduran Army

1. ( ) 3 infantry brigades (each with 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion).

2. ( ) 1 armored cavalry regiment.

3. ( ) 5 independent infantry battalions.

4. ( ) 1 independent artillery regiment.

5. ( ) 1 engineer battalion.

6. ( ) 1 special forces battalion.

7. ( ) 1 presidential guard company.

Ground forces are generally deployed a distance from the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border to maintain the legal stand that the Honduran Government provides no military or materiel support to Contra operations and to preclude clashes with Atlantican forces that routinely conduct cross-border, hot-pursuit operations.

(c) ( ) Honduran Air Force

1. ( ) 34 fighters (F-5s, A-37s, and Mirages).

2. ( ) 12 cargo aircraft (C-130s, and C-47s).

3. ( ) 30 helicopters (UH-ls).

Headquartered in TEGUCIGALPA, the air force has elements stationed at SAN PEDRO SULA and LA CEIBA with training bases at LA MERCID, TONCONTIN, and UTILA. Seven combat missions have been flown in support of Contra forces over the past year.

(d) ( ) Honduran Navy

1. ( ) 2 *Tegucigalpa* class (US 106-foot *Lantana)*

2. ( ) 3 *Guaymuras* class (US 105-foot swift ships).

3. ( ) 1 85-foot cruiser (captured from ATLANTICA).

4. ( ) 5 *Nacome* class (US 65-foot swift ships).

5. ( ) 15 small harbor patrol craft.

Bases are located at PUERTO CORTES and AMAPALA. The navy has had no role in Contra support.

(2) ( ) The Contras. US aid to the Contras was discontinued in 1989, and the Contra forces were formally demobilized in June 1990. However, the demobilization process did not remove the animosity for the Atlantican Government. In 199-, five loosely united factions renewed the Contra cause. While not formally benefiting from outside support, the Contra militia numbers 5,000 (one-fourth the 1985 strength). Support is garnered mainly from Atlantic an expatriate organizations in the United States and throughout the region. This militia could inhibit envisioned US operations due to its fragmented leadership, an agenda that could choose escalation of conflict rather than containment, and Contra occupation of key areas along the border frontier.

(3) ( ) US Government Agencies. The following requested actions will enhance success of this strategic concept in support of US national interests.

(a) ( ) Department of State

1. ( ) Obtains third-country basing, staging, and overflight rights.

2. ( ) Provides support for USSOUTHCOM psychological operations (PSYOP) under the auspices of the US Information Agency (USIA).

3. ( ) Provides adviser team to the designated Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO).

4. ( ) Facilitates country team assistance.

5. ( ) Advises the production and execution of USSOUTHCOM public affairs plan.

6. ( ) Orchestrates humanitarian support.

7. ( ) Garners support for UN peacekeeping force following conflict termination and cease-fire agreement.

8. ( ) Develops draft cease-fire agreement early during the crisis and advises USCINCSO of contents.

9. ( ) Identifies military assistance requirements for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

10. ( ) Assists in the arrangement of host nation support (HNS).

(b) ( ) Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

1. ( ) Coordinates and provides national intelligence support team (NIST) to designated COMJTFSO.

2. ( ) Enhances current support to the USSOUTHCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), as requested by USCINCSO.

(c) ( ) Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy

1. ( ) Provide logistics and administrative support to the service forces.

2. ( ) Provide intelligence support as requested.

3. ( ) Provide personnel replacements as required.

4. ( ) Coordinate and provide for interface with joint, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and other service command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems as required.

(4) ( ) Supporting Commands and Agencies (as outlined in the M/S320C JPD)

(a) ( ) US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

1. ( ) Coordinates and executes strategic deployment.

2. ( ) Provides movement control assistance as required.

(b) ( ) US Atlantic Command (USACOM)

1. ( ) Protects sea and airlines of communication, within US Atlantic Command (USACOM) area of responsibility (AOR), leading to the USCINCSO theater of operations during deployment, employment, and redeployment.

2. ( ) Provides supporting forces necessary to interdict and intercept outside support to Atlantican military efforts.

3. ( ) Provides sea and air rescue in support of COMJTFSO.

4. ( ) Provides supporting forces necessary for Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to conduct NEO.

5. ( ) Provides commander, amphibious task force (dual-hatted as naval component commander to COMJTFSO), for Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) destined for sustained operations ashore in HONDURAS.

(c) ( ) US Space Command (USSPACECOM). Assures access to space-based resources as required.

(d) ( ) US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Provides forces as directed to meet USCINCSO deployment and employment requirements and reassigns forces under combatant command (COCOM) of USCINCSO.

(e) ( ) US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Provides forces as directed to meet USCINCSO deployment and employment requirements and reassigns forces under COCOM of USCINCSO.

(f) ( ) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Provides communications support as required.

(g) ( ) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Provides logistics support as required,

(h) ( ) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Provides intelligence support as required.

(i) ( ) Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Provides charting and mapping and geodesy support, including multispectral imagery as required.

(j) ( ) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

1. ( ) Formulate an establishing directive based on this strategic concept for supporting commands and, in particular, for the supporting forces from USACOM.

2. ( ) Provide joint communications support element (JCSE) assets as requested by USCINCSO.

f. ( ) Assumptions

(1) ( )

(2) ( ) The National Command Authority (NCA) will authorize selective callup (200,000 personnel).

(3) ( )

(4) ( ) CUBA will not interfere with US operations.

(5) ( )

(6) ( )

(7) ( )

(8) ( )

g. ( ) Legal Considerations

(1) ( ) In the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires a detailed report to Congress within 48 hours following the introduction of combat forces into a foreign territory. Should this report be triggered by the commitment of unconventional warfare or other advance forces during preconfiict operations, operational security could be compromised prior to deployment of the main body.

(2) ( )

(3) ( )

2. ( ) Mission

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operations

(1) ( ) General, USCINCSO intends to proactively deter and contain this conflict should deterrent efforts fail. Deterrence, with rapidly deployed forces from the continental UNITED STATES (CONUS) to HONDURAS, will be orchestrated with other instruments of national power. Naval forces, under COCOM of CINCUSACOM, demonstrate power-projection capabilities to the Atlantican national leadership with an effective intercept zone that can be quickly ramped up as a blockade zone and air interdiction zone. Ground forces and Air Force tactical fighter assets establish lodgments in a swift tactical deployment intended to demonstrate US resolve to support HONDURAS and create fear in the hearts of the Atlantican military leadership. Simultaneous operations, while deterring, will include creation of intermediate staging bases (ISBs) for ground forces in HONDURAS, strategic reconnaissance to target Atlantican military command and control facilities for follow-on strike operations, logistical buildup for ground and air offensive operations, security assistance surge to assist the HAF, bilateral coordination and command and control enhancement, foreign internal defense operations, and NEO to protect the lives of US citizens in ATLANTICA and HONDURAS if required. The designated COMJTFSO will conduct operations to contain the conflict in a me-oriented approach along the border frontier. Concentrating overwhelming force, zone by zone, will maximize limited combat power and help convince the Atlantican forces to cease operations. Atlantican forces, not accustomed to protracted deployments of more than 2 weeks, will be violently isolated from any logistical support along the border frontier. As each zone is cleared, with its adjacent border reestablished postconflict operations to assist the Honduran Government to stabilize the citizens and infrastructure can commence. Recommended diplomatic focus will be to press ATLANTICA to a cease-fire agreement as each zone is progressively isolated and violently cleared of Atlantican forces. Cease-fire agreements will be enforced by either UN contingent (three ground battalions, one fighter aircraft squadron) or regional nations. US forces will prepare to support peacekeeping forces with logistical and naval support. CONUS-based mobilization could inhibit operations security (OPSEC), thereby degrading the element of surprise. Recommend, therefore, that strategic disinformation efforts portray a larger than actual initial ground deployment force to aid in deterrence. Recommend that the US and Honduran Governments portray hesitancy to agree on rules of engagement to create confusion and uncertainty in the Atlantican leadership. Recommend that despite possible adverse diplomatic conditions, the US and Honduran Governments continually press, and press early, for cease-fire agreements to maintain the moral high ground. For example, humanitarian aid offered to ATLANTICA in border frontier areas could enhance peacemaking efforts and create a public feeling in ATLANTICA that the conflict is useless in regard to Atlantican national interests. Contra efforts to escalate the conflict by exploiting Atlantican divergence of focus must be squelched early and continue throughout the conflict through end state. US forces will, therefore, prepare to screen the Contra base camp areas from Atlantican forces.

(a) ( ) This strategic concept, which will result in a fully developed operation plan (OPLAN), is intended to be the basis for a campaign plan in an actual crisis. The following simultaneous, continuous operations will occur from preconflict to end state:

1. ( ) Flexible Deterrence. The intent is to visibly portray a US capability to rapidly deploy and employ forces in support of the Honduran Government. Deterrence will continue even if ATLANTICA chooses to violate Honduran territorial integrity with air, sea, or ground forces. Through violent action, US forces

will convince ATLANTICA that its military actions will be dealt within a manner that far outweighs any political gains. Once victory is achieved, deterrent forces must remain (whether US or United Nations (UN)) to enforce any peace plans to display continued US resolve and will for a lasting peace.

2. ( ) Security Assistance and Nation Assistance. Peacetime security assistance is expected to surge before and during the crisis. Strategic lift, logistical support, and foreign internal defense (FID) efforts will constrain US ability to project force from CONUS. This constraint must be balanced with political realities to enhance the capabilities of the HAF for self-defense. US forces executing this OPLAN must prepare for humanitarian relief efforts to reestablish stability in HONDURAS as areas are secured and for postconflict as border frontiers are secured. They must also prepare for limited humanitarian relief in support of Atlantica's citizenry along the border to gain support and embarrass the military leadership of ATLANTICA.

3. ( ) Psychological Operations. The purpose is to create fear in the minds of Atlantican soldiers by convincing them that their government is using them as pawns. The target is Atlantica's citizens, with information highlighting the corrupt and incompetent political and military leadership of ATLANTICA. The target is also the political and military leadership of ATLANTICA, with information that emphasizes the overwhelming force of the US military, international isolation, and the futility of Atlantica's strategic objectives. Psychological operations (PSYOP) will convince Contra forces to cease military operations and terrorism and form a credible shadow government.

4. ( ) Interdiction and Interception of Outside Military Aid to ATLANTICA. CINCUSACOM forces will interdict and intercept all outside military aid to ATLANTICA before, during, and after the conflict to convince ATLANTICA political leadership of the utter futility of unwarranted military buildup. Countries aiding the regional offensive campaign of ATLANTICA will be internationally identified with recommended diplomatic and economic repercussions. Strong early efforts to intercept aid could help deter ATLANTICA.

(b) ( ) In addition to the continuous operations that are outlined above. this strategic concept envisions four phases in its operational design:

1. ( ) Phase I (Credible Deterrence/Force Buildup) (Beginning C-day)

a. ( ) Purpose

(1) ( ) Demonstrate US ability to rapidly project force in support of a request by HONDURAS.

(2) ( ) Establish in-country command presence (commander, joint task force (COMJTF)) with effective control assets for bilateral coordination with HONDURAS.

(3) ( ) Posture for NEO if directed.

(4) ( ) Establish logistical infrastructure necessary to receive and stage US forces.

(5) ( ) Conduct reconnaissance and targeting.

(6) ( ) Rehearse future operations

(7) ( ) Develop campaign plan.

(8) ( ) Posture to isolate and contain Atlantican aggression should deterrent efforts appear to be failing or if ATLANTICA violates Honduran territorial integrity.

b. ( ) End State. ATLANTICA withdraws military forces from Honduran territory.

c. ( ) Forces Required

(1) ( ) COMJTF established in country with a CINC'S required date (CRD) of C+3 at TEGUCIGALPA.

(2) ( ) Army division headquarters plus one infantry brigade, CRD C+5 at TEGUCIGALPA.

(3) ( ) Army brigade (on order airborne), CRD C+2 at CHOLUTECA.

(4) ( ) US Air Force (two fighter squadrons), CRD C+8 at TEGUCIGALPA

(5) ( ) Aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and MEU (on order NEO), under COCOM of CINCUSACOM, requested in place not later than (NLT) C+4, until committed in USCINCSO theater of operations.

(6) ( ) Special operations forces (SOF) (Army special forces group (airborne) (SFG(A)), US Air Force special operations wing (SOW)) CRD C+10 at TEGUCIGALPA.

(7) ( ) Theater reserve (one Army infantry brigade on-call at the port of embarkation (POE) (to be determined (TBD)) until C+21).

2. ( ) Phase II (Offensive Operations) (Beginning D-day, Not Earlier Than (NET) C+12, to D+42)

a. ( ) Purpose

(1) ( ) Isolate ATLANTICA politically, economically, and militarily. Activate interdiction and interception zone to deny outside assistance to ATLANTICA. Activate no-fly zone over .Atlantican airspace.

(2) ( ) Contain Atlantican ground operations to the smallest region possible.

(3) ( ) Selective (single-zone) violent destruction of Atlantican ground forces operating in Honduran territory.

b. ( ) End State. Atlantican Government agrees to cease-fire or withdraws forces from Honduran territory,

c. ( ) Forces Required

(1) ( ) Army division plus division (minus) (from C+l2 to C+27). Two divisions employed beginning C+28.

(2) ( ) Navy surface action group (SAG), CVBG, MEU (on order NEO) under COCOM of CINCUSACOM.

(3) ( ) US Marine Corps MEF (Fwd) (sustained operations ashore) beginning C+l8 in vicinity CHOLUTECA.

(4) ( ) US Air Force (three fighter squadrons with wing equivalent headquarters).

(5) ( ) SOF (one SFG(A), SOW, and one sea-air-land team (SEAL).

(6) ( ) Theater reserve. (Army CONUS infantry brigade on call at POE (TBD) until C+21. One battalion from Panama arrives beginning C+20.)

3. ( ) Phase III (Conflict Termination) (Beginning as soon as the frost border zone is secured and ending when the entire border is secured; approximately D+60)

a. ( ) Purpose

(1) ( ) Secure, consolidate, and stabilize the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border frontier.

(2) ( ) Restore regional stability by disestablishing intercept, interdiction, and no-fly zones based on Atlantican Government compliance with terms of peace agreement.

(3) ( ) Relinquish border frontier security operational responsibility to HAF, UN contingent, or designated peacekeeping force.

b. ( ) End States

(1) ( ) ATLANTICA complies with peace agreements.

(2) ( ) Contra forces either disarm or agree to cease military operations into ATLANTICA.

(3) ( ) Border security and peace terms are enforced by military forces not under COCOM of USCINCSO.

c. ( ) Forces Required. Same as for Phase II.

4. ( ) Phase IV (National Assistance, Redeployment)

a. ( ) Purpose

(1) ( ) Help the Honduran Government heal the ravages of this envisioned conflict to conditions favorable to the Honduran Government, based on the commitment and means available to the NCA.

(2) ( ) Promote democratic ideals.

(3) ( ) Enhance peace enforcement operations.

b. ( ) End States

(1) ( ) United States lifts economic sanctions against and reestablishes diplomatic relations with ATLANTICA.

(2) ( ) Contra forces cease to threaten the Atlantican Government with military means.

(3) ( ) HONDURAS reestablishes autonomous control of its border security.

c. ( ) Redeployment Priority

(1) ( ) MEF (Fwd).

(2) ( ) Army division.

(3) ( ) US Air Force (USAF) (one fighter squadron).

(4) ( ) Army division (on order, one infantry brigade remains in country as security force).

(5) ( ) USAF (one fighter squadron).

(6) ( ) SOW, SEAL, SFG(A) (on order, one battalion SFG(A) remains in country for foreign internal defense (FID)).

(7) ( ) JTF disestablished.

(8) ( ) MEU (afloat).

(9) ( ) Naval forces.

d. ( ) Forces Required if Security Enhancement Is Required

(1) ( ) Army infantry brigade.

(2) ( ) USAF fighter squadron.

(3) ( ) One battalion SFG(A).

(4) ( ) One MEU.

(5) ( ) Reserve (one US Army battalion from bases in PANAMA).

(2) ( ) Operation Plan (OPLAN) Structure (omitted).

(3) ( ) Employment (omitted).

(4) ( ) Deployrnent (omitted).

b. ( ) Tasks

(1) ( ) COMJTFSO

(a) ( ) Phase I

1. ( ) Deter Atlantican aggression.

2. ( ) Receive, stage, and employ deployed forces.

3. ( ) Coordinate with HAF.

4. ( ) Receive staff augmentation from USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM, USACOM, and NIST.

5. ( ) When established in HONDURAS, exercise operational control (OPCON) of all US forces in joint operations area (HONDURAS).

6. ( ) Exercise OPCON of amphibious task force (MEF (Fwd)).

7. ( ) Exercise OPCON of HAF committed to counter Atlantican aggression. All other Honduran forces remain under national control.

8. ( ) Coordinate with US country team.

9. ( ) Establish applicable joint boards, offices, or centers as required.

10. ( ) Exercise OPCON of USSOCOM-formed joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

(b) ( ) Phase II

1. ( ) Isolate, contain, and destroy Atlantican military forces violating Honduran territory.
2. ( ) Secure zones sequentially based on Atlantican main effort.

3. ( ) Coordinate with Contra factions and convince them to remain neutral.

4. ( ) As zones are sequentially restored. rapidly transition to phase III.

(c) ( ) Phase III

1. ( ) Notify USCINCSO when zones are stabilized and security can be relinquished to either UN forces or the HAF.

2. ( ) Coordinate transition of security responsibility.

3. ( ) Continue to secure zones as required.

(d) ( ) Phase IV

1. ( ) Assist HAF to enhance their security capabilities.

2. ( ) Control redeployment and provide USCINCSO with recommended flow. USSOUTHCOM responds to COMJTFSO requirements and produces Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) for the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

3. ( ) Be prepared to provide security enhancement force.

4. ( ) Disestablish on order, based on envisioned redeployment priority in coordination with JTFB.

(2) ( ) Commander, Joint Task Force BRAVO (COMJTFB)

(a) ( ) Phase I

1. ( ) Direct liaison authorized with designated COMJTFSO.

2. ( ) Exercise OPCON of all deployed forces prior to establishment of COMJTFSO.

3. ( ) Deter Atlantican aggression.

(b) ( ) Phase II

1. ( ) Following disestablishment of COMJTFSO, exercise OPCON of all US forces in HONDURAS.

2. ( ) Assist HAF with efforts to enhance security and area stabilization.

3. ( ) Be prepared to support or participate in UN peacekeeping operations if enacted.

(3) ( ) Commander, US Army South (COMUSARSO), and Commander, US Air Force South (COMUSAFSO). Provide forces to COMJTFSO and administration and support of those forces in theater.

(4) ( ) Commander, US Navy South (COMUSNAVSO). Coordinate in-support operation with USACOM.

(5) ( ) Commander, US Special Operations Command South (COMUSSOCSO). Designated Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force SOUTH (COMJSOTFSO), OPCON to COMJTFSO, phases I through IV.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) When resourced, the commander of the Army corps will be the designated COMJTFSO.

(2) ( ) OPSEC (preconflict and during phase I) is key to victory. All supporting and subordinate commands will include OPSEC measures into their plans.

(3) ( ) USSOUTHCOM coordinates plan development for COMJTFSO when designated. USSOUTHCOM provides Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) support for development of COMJTFSO-desired TPFDD.

(4) ( ) Deployment flow for apportioned forces is based on envisioned strategic guidance of—

(a) ( ) Rapid deterrence.

(b) ( ) Prevention of escalation.

(c) ( ) Rapid conflict termination.

(5) ( ) COMJTFSO develops command relationships for forces OPCON to COMJTFSO.

(6) ( ) USCINCSO publishes plan development letter of instruction (LOI) pending CJCS approval of this strategic concept.

(7) ( ) This strategic concept is provided to the CJCS for approval and to subordinate and supporting commands to enhance parallel planning. JPEC is encouraged to conduct preliminary plan development efforts.

4. ( ) Administrateion and Logistics

a. ( ) Concept of Suppport.

b. ( ) Logistics (omitted).

c. ( ) Personnel (omitted).

d. ( ) Public Affairs (omitted).

e. ( ) Civil Affairs (omitted).

f. ( ) Environmental Services (omitted).

g. ( ) Mapping, Charting. and Geodesy (omitted).

h. ( ) Medical Services (omitted).

5. ( ) Command and Control

a. ( ) Command Relationships

b. ( ) Command Posts. USSOUTHCOM headquarters remains in PANAMA. COMJTFSO headquarters is located at TEGUCIGALPA

c. ( ) Succession to Command

(1) ( ) Deputy, USCINCSO.

(2) ( ) COMUSARSO.

(3) ( ) COMJTFSO.

d. ( ) Command, Control, and Communication Systems. JCSE support is requested on behalf of COMJTFSO. JCSE provides Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS) connectivity for COMJTFSO-deployed hardware and Defense Communications System (DCS) entry for COMJTFSO.

USCINCSO

Do not continue until you have completed requirement 3.

Solution to Requirement 3

Once you have given this requirement an honest effort, you can refer to the solution that follows. As before, your solution may vary from this one. As long as your answers meet the commonsense test, you should not consider them to be wrong. This solution is presented only to give you a means of comparison.

Here is the solution to paragraph 1 c:

1. ( ) Situation.

* * * * * * *

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. The purpose of deterrence in this instance will be to convince the Atlantican Government not to choose military means to reach its political ends. USCINCSO intends to demonstrate US resolve to support the Honduran Government through the rapid deployment of US forces and materiel to HONDURAS and littoral areas. These rapid deployments will also allow the command to posture for follow-on operations through materiel buildup, reconnaissance, combined coordination and training, infrastructure enhancement, and rehearsals. The following menu of military deterrent options should be closely orchestrated with diplomatic, political, and economic options established by the National Command Authority (NCA):

(1) ( ) Employ inplace assets.

(2) ( ) Upgrade alert status

(3) ( ) Increase strategic reconnaissance

(4) ( ) Increase collection efforts.

(5) ( ) Initiate or increase show-of-force actions.

(6) ( ) Employ electronic measures.

(7) ( ) Conduct aircraft flyovers,

(8) ( ) Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope.

(9) ( ) Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area.

(10) ( ) Increase naval port calls or squadron visits to the area.

(11) ( ) Increase mobile training teams.

(12) ( ) Institute provisions of existing host nation agreements.

(13) ( ) Open pre-positioned stock facilities

(14) ( ) Use naval and/or air capability to enforce sanctions.

(15) ( ) Deploy tighter squadrons.

(16) ( ) Order contingency forces to initiate actions to deploy.

(17) ( ) Deploy Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to region.

(18) ( ) Move maritime pre-positioning ships (MPSs) to region.

(19) ( ) Deploy surface action group (SAG) to the region.

(20) ( ) Deploy aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) to the region.

(21) ( ) Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation (POEs).

(22) ( ) Move Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) to the region.

(23) ( ) Activate procedures to begin Reserve callup.

(24) ( ) Prestage or deploy contingency ready brigades.

(25) ( ) Deploy special operations forces (SOF) to the region.

(26) ( ) Prestage airlift.

(27) ( ) Prestage airlift support assets.

(28) ( ) Prestage sealift and airlift reception assets.

(29) ( ) Emplace logistic infrastructure where possible.

(30) ( ) Open and secure air lines of communication (ALOCs) and sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

(31) ( ) Initiate psychological operations.

* * * * * * *

Here is the solution to paragraphs 1 f and 1 g:

l. ( ) Situation

* * * * * * *

f. ( ) <u>Assumptions</u>

(1) ( ) Commitment of US forces will be preceded by a Honduran Government request to the United States for assistance.

(2) ( ) The National Command Authority (NCA) will authorize selective callup (200,000 personnel).

(3) ( ) The governments of HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, and PANAMA will permit entry of US forces into their sovereign territorial waters, land areas, and airspace.

(4) ( ) CUBA will not interfere with US operations.

(5) ( ) The Honduran Armed Forces (HAF) in the area of operations will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the designated COMJTFSO.

(6) ( ) The Honduran Government will request a surge of security assistance from the United States.

(7) ( ) The Honduran and US Governments will not provide military or humanitarian aid to the Contras.

(8) ( ) The United Nations (UN) (or an objective third party) will provide peacekeeping forces to enforce the envisioned cease-fire agreement following the conflict.

g. ( ) Legal Considerations

(1) ( ) In the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires a detailed report to Congress within 48 hours following the introduction of combat forces into a foreign territory. Should this report be triggered by the commitment of unconventional warfare or other advance forces during preconflict operations, operational security could be compromised prior to deployment of the main body.

(2) ( ) The War Powers Resolution requires that unless Congress declares war or enacts specific legislation authorizing continued use of US forces, the President must remove all US forces within 60 to 90 days of their introduction. The resolution also provides for termination of military operations in less than 60 days, if so directed by Congress. Deployment, completion of all military actions, accomplishment of all objectives, and redeployment may, therefore, be required in 90 days or less.

(3) ( ) Although military operations conducted according to this strategic concept may occur without a declaration of war, it is the declared policy of the United States that all captured enemy personnel, whether members of the regular or irregular forces, will be accorded the prisoner-of-war status, treatment, and protection as defined in the Geneva Convention of 1949. It is also the declared policy of the United States to demand that US military personnel captured by the enemy be accorded prisoner-of-war status as defined in the Geneva Convention.

* * * * * * *

Here is the solution to paragraph 2:

2. ( ) Mission. When directed, USSOUTHCOM, in coordination with the HAF, deters Atlantican aggression and, if deterrence fails, conducts combined operations to contain the conflict to the smallest possible region,

defeats Atlantican forces operating in or conducting operations against HONDURAS, restores the territorial integrity of HONDURAS, and assists the Honduran Government to promote stability.

* * * * * * *

Here is the solution to paragraph 4a:

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. ( ) Concept of Support. Logistic support is the responsibility of the service component commands. USCINCSO exercises directive authority for logistics through COMJTFSO. COMJTFSO establishes common servicing responsibility for support within his area of operations based on operational requirements. USSOUTHCOM component commands support COMJTFSO as required. The complexity and rapid power projection require development of tailored force modules to overcome austerity of facilities and HNS. Force module development will also enhance rapid deployment. COMJTFB maintains development of HNS agreements and responds to additional requirements desired by COMJTFSO.

* * * * * * *

Here is the solution to paragraph 5a:

5. ( ) Command and Control

a. ( ) Command Relationships. The intent in developing the command relationships for this strategic concept and the subsequent OPLAN is to simplify command and control on behalf of COMJTFSO. For phases I through IV, COMJTFSO will be the designated US Army corps commander. COMJTFSO exercises OPCON of all US forces deployed into the theater of operations. Based on coordination with CINCUSACOM, COMJTFSO exercises OPCON of the amphibious task force (MEF (Fwd)) intended for sustained operations ashore in the vicinity of CHOLUTECA. Command relationships will be refined following detailed coordination with CTNCUSACOM and will culminate in a draft “establishing directive” for CJCS approval.

* * * * * * *

Once you have compared your work to this solution and are satisfied with what you have done, continue reading the lesson guide.

Interim Summary

This completes the deliberate planning portion of the lesson. You first took a JSCP tasking, which directed you to develop an OPLAN for the defense of Honduras, and then conducted a mission analysis. This resulted in a listing of essential and implied tasks and a mission statement. Next, you received guidance from the CINC, and you prepared two courses of action that were to be used as the basis for the concept of the OPLAN. You then took the results of the commander’s estimate and completed the CINC’s strategic concept. This concept would then be forwarded to the CJCS for approval and continued planning. On approval, the staff would commence with the plan development phase of deliberate planning until such time as the OPLAN was completed.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES

During the remainder of this lesson, you will be a staff plainer for the Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) headquarters. The JTF has been activated in response to a crisis situation that is taking place in Central America. You will use the JOPES crisis action planning process that you studied in S530 to deal with the crisis.

Here is a short review of the crisis action planning process you studied in S530. Refer to this chart as you read the following material.

SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

	EVENT	OUTCOME
PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	• Event occurs with possible national security implications.	• Assess that event may have national implications. • Report the event to NCA/CJCS.
PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	• CINC's report or assessment received.	• NCA and CJCS decide to develop military COA.
PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	• CJCS publishes warning order.	• CINC publishes commander's estimate with recommended COA.
PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	• CJCS presents refined and prioritized COAs to NCA.	• NCA selects COA. • CJCS publishes COA selection by NCA in alert order.
PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	• CINC receives alert order or planning order.	• CINC publishes OPORD.
PHASE VI EXECUTION	• NCA decides to execute OPORD.	• Crisis resolved.

● *Situation development.* In phase I, an event occurs that has possible national security implications. This event is reported to the NCA and JCS via the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The report itself is from the CINC in whose region the event takes place and includes an assessment of the event, forces available to react, major constraints to possible force employment, and actions being taken. There is an example of this report for this particular exercise at appendix 5 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

● *Crisis assessment.* Phase II begins when the NCA and JCS receive the CINC's assessment. Using that assessment, they gather other information and eventually decide either to return to a precrisis situation where the situation will be monitored or to have military options developed for possible consideration and use. Appendix 6 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book is an example of the CINC's assessment and will be used in the practical exercise (PE).

● *Course of action development.* Phase III begins with the issuance of a warning order, which essentially tells the CINC to develop courses of action (COAs) to deal with the crisis. The CINC and his staff will develop COAs and use the commander's estimate as the vehicle to communicate the recommendation to the JCS. The warning order for our PE is located at appendix 7 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and you will be using it as the basis for the COA analysis and to complete the commander's estimate for the scenario crisis.

● *Course of action selection.* In phase IV, the CJCS reviews the CINC's proposed COA. The Chairman then makes a recommendation to the NCA for decision. Authority to proceed with planning will come either by an alert order or a planning order. The JCS publishes an alert order to announce the COA selection to the CINC and to allow the CINC to proceed with execution planning, which is phase V. If the NCA does not select a COA immediately, the Chairman may publish a planning order in lieu of an alert order, which allows the CINC and the planning community to proceed into phase V and to plan in detail. In the PE for this portion of lesson 3, an alert order is issued, which is at appendix 10 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

● *Execution planning.* In phase V, the CINC is primarily concerned with getting forces, sustainment, and transportation lined up and ready to go. The final product of this phase is an operation order (OPORD), which is essentially a plan converted into an order with forces, missions, and times specified. If the President gives the go-ahead, the CINC proceeds to phase VI.

● *Execution. The* document that authorizes the commitment of forces into battle is the execute order. An example of an execute order is at appendix 11 in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PRACTICAL EXERCISE

You are now going to transition to a crisis situation, Instead of using the deliberate planning process, you will use the crisis action planning process of JOPES. It is important, however, that you take advantage of and usc the results of the work you did in the initial stages of this lesson. Just as in the real world, the results of previous planning done in peacetime are used to manage a crisis. Some specific guidance and direction is provided to get you started on the PE.

Read Appendix 5, OPREP-3 PINNACLE Situation report, in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and then return here.

General Situation

The operational report at appendix 5 of the M/S320C Staff Planning Book provides details of the incident that precipitates the crisis. Recall that under the crisis action planning process, reporting of an incident such as this would go from the CINC to the National Military Command Center and, from there, to all interested parties, including the CJCS and the NCA. Even though the ultimate intentions of the Atlantican forces are unknown, the incidents that have taken place leave no doubt that a serious situation exists. Paragraphs 3 and 4 explain dispositions and strengths of enemy forces and where attacks are likely to take place. Added to the car bombing that occurred in Managua, along with other information that has been received, it is no surprise that JTFB has elevated its alert status. These activities take place in Phase I, Situation Development.

Read Appendix 6, OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC Assessment, to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and return here.

CINC Assessment

The information in appendix 6 is significant for its restatement of the situation but mostly for the CINC recommendation in paragraph 5. He recommends that OPLAN 5500-9_ be put into effect. This is the plan that you worked on earlier in the lesson.

Read Appendix 7, CJCS Warning Order, to the MLS320C Staff Planning Book, and return here.

CJCS Warning Order

Appendix 7 is a facsimile of a warning order (WO) that would be issued when the NCA is considering the use of military action. The information from the situation report and the CINC's assessment has been analyzed and a decision was made to consider this situation a crisis and to continue with appropriate planning measures. The warning order does several things, and it is important that you read it thoroughly. Here area few of the highlights:

- USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9_ is to be used as the basis for planning.

- El Salvador may be expected to deny basing and overflight rights, which would significantly alter our alternatives.

- Major forces are allocated and listed in the WO.

- Command relationships are designated, to include the activation of Joint Task Force South (JTFSO). JTFSO would plan for and execute the possible contingency operation in this situation. There will be more *on* this later.

- Tentative C-day is listed.

- Rules of engagement (ROE) are defined.

- Transportation support is addressed.

Read Appendix 8, JTFSO Activation Order, to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and return here.

JTFSO Activation Order

Appendix 8 activates the 21st Airborne Corps to be JTFSO. Recall that USCINCSO or any unified commander has no actual combat units that are permanently assigned. When a scenario like this erupts, units will be assigned to carry out the planning and execution of the operation. In Desert Storm, the XXVIII Airborne Corps was activated. Also note that the Commander, 21st Airborne Corps, is designated COMJTFSO.

You are now part of the 21st Abn Corps staff and have moved to a lower echelon. You were initially on the staff the theater commander, and now you are on the staff of the corps that has been designated to plan for and actually execute the contingency operation. This is an important point. Remember this as you work on the PE.

Requirement 4: Commander's Estimate

At this point in the scenario, an incident with national security implications has been reported. After reviewing the CINC's assessment, the NCA has decided to contemplate military action, which resulted in a warning order being issued. The WO tasks the CINC to provide a commander's estimate with alternative courses of action.

Complete requirement 4 to the PE.

Continued Special Situation for the Commander's Estimate

The time is now 1800 (local), 4 December 199-. You are a member of the JTFSO staff. You are in your headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The chief of staff provided all staff planners with the following notes from the JTF Commander:

Chief:

1. I've just talked with the CINC. He wants us to come up with ideas on how to execute in Honduras. We need to send him a recommended commander's estimate in OPREP-1 format as soon as possible. He needs it NLT late today so he can be ready for the planning Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network (WIN) teleconference on the 6th.

2. Consider the deliberate planning work that we accomplished by writing our portion of OPLAN 5500-9___

3. Keep the courses of action clear and simple.

4. The JTF will deter and, if necessary, fight this war.

5. Consider actions to contain the conflict. While it appears that Atlantica intends to cross into Honduras, it is not too late to keep this crisis from escalating.

6. The obvious big change from OPLAN 5500-9_ is our inability to base out of El Salvador.

7. Let the staff members do their jobs!

COMJTF

The following two courses of action are based on the mission in the CJCS warning order (appendix 4) and are provided here:

COA 1

Rapid deployment of one task-organized, division-ready brigade (DRB); one fighter squadron (FS); elements of joint special operations task force (JSOTF); and commander, joint task force (COMJTF) headquarters, to Honduras (4-day closure). Rapid deployment of available US Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), naval forces and MEF (Fwd) to Pacific side of Honduran territorial waters (closure TBD). Intratheater airlift package to support division-ready brigade (3-day closure). Second DRB and one FS to Howard AFB, Panama (5-day closure). Deployment accomplished under guise of emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE).

Follow-on forces deploy to Honduras and prepare for combat operations.

Forces employed under OPCON of COMJTF.

CONUS-based security forces and forces for civil-military operations deploy on order of COMJTF to relieve attack forces and conduct stability operations.

COA 2

Rapid deployment of one task-organized DRB, one tactical fighter squadron (TFS), elements of JSOTF, and COMJTF headquarters to Honduras (4-day closure). Rapid deployment of available USCINCPAC naval forces and MEF (Fwd) to Pacific side of Honduran territorial waters (closure TBD). Intratheater airlift package to support division-ready brigade (3-day closure).

Follow-on forces deploy to Honduras and prepare for combat operations.

Forces employed under OPCON of COMJTF.

Security forces and forces for civil-military operations deployed for operations concurrent with combat operations.

Analyze these courses of action, and draft paragraphs 1,2,3,4, and 5 of the commander's estimate using the following outline. You are not required to come up with any additional COAs. Key to this exercise is that you use the results of your work from the deliberate planning process. Use the CINC'S strategic concept that you developed earlier to assist you.

Commander's Estimate

FLASH

FROM: COMJTF SOUTH FT BRAGG NC/
TO: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN

INFO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRA CALIENTE//

031630ZDEC9_/OPREP-l/USCINCO//
REF/A/020600ZDEC9_/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCSO//
//B/031800ZDEC9_/ORDER/CJCS//

1. MISSION.

A. THE PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO

B. TASKS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

(1) CONCLUDE CONFLICT RAPIDLY.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7) DEFEAT ATLANTICAN FORCES WHO VIOLATE OR DIRECTLY SUPPORT VIOLATIONS OF HONDURAN TERRITORY.

(8)

(9)

2. SITUATION AND OWN COURSES OF ACTION

A. SITUATION. SEE REFS

B. ALLOCATED FORCES. SEE REF

C. COURSES OF ACTION. THE FOLLOWING COAS WERE DEVELOPED.

(1) COA 1

(A) RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ONE TASK-ORGANIZED DIVISION-READY BRIGADE (DRB), ONE FIGHTER SQUADRON (FS), ELEMENTS OF JSOTF, AND COMJTF HQ TO HONDURAS (4-DAY CLOSURE). RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE USCINCPAC NAVAL FORCES AND MEF (Fwd) TO PACIFIC SIDE OF HONDURAN TERRITORIAL WATERS (CLOSURE TBD). INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT PACKAGE TO SUPPORT DRB (3-DAY CLOSURE). SECOND DRB AND ONE FS TO HOWARD AFB, PANAMA (5-DAY CLOSURE). DEPLOYMENT ACCOMPLISHED UNDER GUISE OF EDRE.

(B) FOLLOW-ON FORCES DEPLOY TO HONDURAS AND PREPARE FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(C) FORCES EMPLOYED UNDER OPCON OF COMJTF.

(D) CONUS-BASED SECURITY FORCES AND FORCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPLOY ON ORDER OF COMJTF TO RELIEVE ATTACK FORCES AND CONDUCT STABILITY OPERATIONS.

(2) COA 2

(A) RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ONE TASK-ORGANIZED DIVISION-READY BRIGADE (DRB), ONE TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON (TFS), ELEMENTS OF JSOTF, AND COMJTF HQ TO HONDURAS (4-DAY CLOSURE). RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE USCINCPAC NAVAL FORCES AND MEF TO PACIFIC SIDE OF HONDURAN TERRITORIAL WATERS (CLOSURE TBD). INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT PACKAGE TO SUPPORT DRB (3-DAY CLOSURE).

(B) FOLLOW-ON FORCES DEPLOY TO HONDURAS AND PREPARE FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(C) FORCES EMPLOYED UNDER OPCON OF COMJTF.

(D) SECURITY FORCES AND FORCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPLOYED FOR OPERATIONS CONCURRENT WITH COMBAT OPERATIONS.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COAS.

A. COA 1

B. COA 2

5. DECISION. RECOMMEND COA_____

6. REMARKS.

AKNLDG/Y
DECL/OADR

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Do not continue until you have completed requirement 4.

When you are finished with the practical exercise, refer to the following solution.

Solution to Requirement 4.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

FLASH

FROM: COMJTF SOUTH FT BRAGG NC/
TO: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN

INFO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRA CALIENTE//

031630ZDEC9_/OPREP-l/USCINCO//
REF/A/020600ZDEC9_/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCSO//
//B/031800ZDEC9_/ORDER/CJCS//

1. MISSION. ON ORDER JTF SOUTH, IN COORDINATION WITH THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES (HAF), RESTORES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY OF THE HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN BORDER REGION.

A. THE PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO EJECT THE ATLANTICAN ARMED FORCES (AAF) FROM HONDURAN SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND RESTORE THE REGIONAL STABILITY OF THE

HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN BORDER REGION. IF DETERRENCE FAILS AND ATLANTICA ATTACKS HONDURAS IN FORCE, WE WILL DESIGN OPERATIONS TO CONTAIN THE CONFLICT TO THE SMALLEST REGION POSSIBLE. POSTCOMBAT OPERATIONS WILL, IN COORDINATION WITH THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT, RESTORE THE SECURITY OF THE BORDER AND ASSIST WITH THE RESTORATION OF SERVICES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO ENSURE A LASTING PEACE. WE WILL POSTURE FORCES TO REMAIN IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE SHOULD THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT DESIRE OUR PRESENCE.

B. TASKS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

(1) CONCLUDE CONFLICT RAPIDLY.

(2) EVACUATE ENDANGERED US CITIZENS IN HONDURAS AND ATLANTICA.

(3) SUPPORT SURGE IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR HAF

(4) CONTAIN CONFLICT TO THE SMALLEST REGION POSSIBLE.

(5) DEPLOY FORCES RAPIDLY TO ESTABLISH LODGMENTS AND INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES TO BUILD COMBAT POWER AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE.

(6) CONDUCT BILATERAL OPERATIONS.
(7) DEFEAT ATLANTICAN FORCES WHO VIOLATE OR DIRECTLY SUPPORT VIOLATIONS OF HONDURAN TERRITORY.

(8) CONTROL SEAS AND AIRSPACE TO THE LODGMENTS.

(9) RESTORE HONDURAN BORDER SECURITY CAPABILITIES.

2. SITUATION AND OWN COURSES OF ACTION

A. SITUATION. SEE REFS A AND B.

B ALLOCATED FORCES. SEE REF A. PARA 6A.

C. COURSES OF ACTION. THE FOLLOWING COAS WERE DEVELOPED.

(1) COA 1

(A) RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ONE TASK-ORGANIZED DIVISION-READY BRIGADE (DRB), ONE FIGHTER SQUADRON (FS), ELEMENTS OF JSOTF, AND COMJTF HQ TO HONDURAS (4-DAY CLOSURE). RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE USCINCPAC NAVAL FORCES AND MEF (Fwd) TO PACIFIC SIDE OF HONDURAN TERRITORIAL WATERS (CLOSURE TBD). INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT PACKAGE TO SUPPORT DRB (3-DAY CLOSURE). SECOND DRB AND ONE FS TO HOWARD AFB, PANAMA (5-DAY CLOSURE). DEPLOYMENT ACCOMPLISHED UNDER GUISE OF EDRE.

(B) FOLLOW-ON FORCES DEPLOY TO HONDURAS AND PREPARE FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(C) FORCES EMPLOYED UNDER OPCON OF COMJTF.

(D) CONUS-BASED SECURITY FORCES AND FORCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPLOY ON ORDER OF COMJTF TO RELIEVE ATTACK FORCES AND CONDUCT STABILITY OPERATIONS.

(2) COA 2

(A) RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ONE TASK-ORGANIZED DIVISION-READY BRIGADE (DRB), ONE TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON (TFS), ELEMENTS OF JSOTF, AND COMJTF HQ TO HONDURAS (4-DAY CLOSURE). RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE USCINCPAC NAVAL FORCES AND MEF TO PACIFIC SIDE OF HONDURAN TERRITORIAL WATERS (CLOSURE TBD). INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT PACKAGE TO SUPPORT DRB (3-DAY CLOSURE).

(B) FOLLOW-ON FORCES DEPLOY TO HONDURAS AND PREPARE FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(C) FORCES EMPLOYED UNDER OPCON OF COMJTF.

(D) SECURITY FORCES AND FORCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPLOYED FOR OPERATIONS CONCURRENT WITH COMBAT OPERATIONS.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. ATLANTICAN FORCES CAPABILITIES ARE LIMITED TO A TWO-AXIS ATTACK TO CHOLUTECA BY TWO MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENTS AND FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS SUPPORTED BY ARTILLERY, ARMED HELICOPTERS, AND FIGHTERS. THE AAF IS NOT CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A PENETRATION BEYOND CHOLUTECA WITHOUT PAUSING FOR 30 DAYS. SEIZING THE SOUTHERN BORDER AREA OF HONDURAS WOULD PROVIDE THE ATLANTICAN GOVERNMENT A BARGAINING CHIP FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT IN THE ATLANTICAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORT TO END THE HONDURAN-SUPPORTED INSURGENCY DIRECTED AGAINST THE ATLANTICAN GOVERNMENT. COAS 1 AND 2 PROVIDE AN OVERT CREDIBLE DETERRENT FORCE CAPABLE OF IMMEDIATE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT. BOTH COAS POSTURE FOR NEO. COA 2 PROVIDES FOR A RAPID FORCE BUILDUP IN HONDURAS CAPABLE OF FORESTALLING AN AAF FOOTHOLD AND TRANSITIONING TO POSTCOMBAT OPERATIONS.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COAS.

A. COA 1 DEPLOYS TASK-ORGANIZED INITIAL FORCE PACKAGES TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE AND POSTURES FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT. A SECOND FORCE PACKAGE DEPLOYED TO PANAMA TO PREPARE FOR RAPID EMPLOYMENT WILL TAX INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT AND MAY EXPAND THE CONFLICT TO UNWANTED REGIONS OR POLITICAL SPHERES. SECURITY AND FORCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ASSEMBLED IN CONUS WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCLIMATE AND RUN THE RISK OF NOT PROVIDING TIMELY SUPPORT TO COMJTF.

B. COA 2 PROVIDES COMJTF WITH FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS, POSES LESS STRAIN ON INTRATHEATER LIFT, AND PROVIDES FOR A RAPID AND MORE RESPONSIVE TRANSITION TO POSTCOMBAT OPERATIONS.

S320C-3

5. DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 2.

6. REMARKS. FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO JOPES DATABASE AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS 5500-1_ (COA 1) AND 5500-2_ (COA 2). COMJTF IS CDR 21 ABN CORPS. DETAILS OF PLAN WILL BE FORWARDED AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE. USCINCTRANS CONCURS WITH PARA 5.

AKNLDG/Y
DECL/OADR

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

97MAR/S320CL3/eh

Once you have compared your work to this solution and are satisfied with what **you have done, begin Requirement 5, CJCS Alert Order.**

Requirement 5: CJCS Alert Order

Read Appendix 10, CJCS Alert Order, to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, and return here.

The alert order is what allows for execution planning, which is phase V of the crisis action planning process.

Requirement 6: OPORD

Turn to Appendix 12, JTFSo OPORD 9_-5, located in your M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

This JTFSO OPORD will execute the operation if the President issues the execute order. This OPORD is based on your previous work, including the commander's estimate you just completed. You will use this as YOU continue with the PE in lesson 4.

Before you move on, look at paragraph 2 of the OPORD. The mission statement is similar to the one you developed when you received the JSCP tasking during the deliberate planning process. Now look at paragraph 3, which is execution. This paragraph contains a description of the phases of the operation. This is a good example of what the commander intends to accomplish. Another area you should look at is the task organization. Find Annex A, Task Organization and notice that there is a list of forces by phase that will be used to accomplish the commander's intent, Finally, find the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). which is nothing more than a schedule of when units are to arrive in theater. Obviously, they are to arrive in such a way as to support the phases developed to accomplish the commander's intent. Notice that the units are listed by C-day in order of priority of arrival. Here's an example. Go back to Annex A, Task Organization, and notice that under phase I is a requirement for a light infantry brigade task force, This requirement is made a reality by positioning a light infantry brigade early (C+1) on the TPFDL which you just looked at. Under phases II and IV is the 1-57 FA. Because that unit is not required quite as soon in the operation, it is scheduled to arrive at C+l4.

Requirement 7: CJCS Execute Order

Read Appendix 11, CJCS Execute Order, to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

In appendix 11 is the execute order as authorized by the President. Notice the restriction to COA 2. Any type of change can have an impact down the line. In this instance, the most obvious impact would be to the TPFDL. If the order, unit designation, or priority of arrival of units are changed, then the schedule, notification of units, and so forth, must also be changed. You will get to play with just such a situation in lesson 4.

FINAL SUMMARY

During this lesson, you have applied your knowledge of JOPES planning procedures and developed a plan to help the Honduran Government deter Atlantican aggression and, if deterrence fails, conduct a joint and combined defense of Honduran territory. The specific requirements you have completed were to conduct a mission analysis of a JSCP tasking, develop courses of action as part of the commander's estimate, and complete the CINC'S strategic concept using the JOPES deliberate planning process. You were then provided with a scenario update, and you transitioned to crisis action planning. Here, you were required to analyze courses of

action, recommend which course of action to use, and complete portions of the commander's estimate. You were also provided with examples of the various orders used in a crisis and *were* given a completed OPORD to be used as you transition to lesson 4.

Up to this point in the course, you have been working at the joint level. You were initially a member of the USSOUTHCOM planning staff working directly under the CINC. Later, you moved to the JTFSO staff, which was the headquarters of the 21st Airborne Corps and assumed the warfighting responsibilities for the CINC. You should have realized that you were in a joint environment because you were planning for the deployment and eventual use of all elements of each service. Remember, the Desert Storm planning community that worked for General Schwarzkopf conducted planning for all the services, not just one or two.

In the next lesson, you are going to get a different perspective. You are going to concentrate more on the Army aspects of force projection by working at the corps level in a force-projection environment. While there will not be as much emphasis on the joint nature of operations in this final phase, you should remember that your planning and the ultimate use of your forces area part of a larger whole and include all of the joint forces that have been discussed before. Bear this in mind as you continue. It is also important that you realize the Army aspects of operations. The Army is an indispensable part of any combat operation, and it is important that you know the deployment and employment procedures and processes. The measure of success for future military operations is how well all DOD elements work together toward the common goal as defined by the ClNC's campaign plan and refined by his current guidance. In lessons 1 through 3 of S320C you studied the joint aspects of force projection. In lesson 4, you will focus on the Army activities in force-projection operations. Remember, Army tactics must conform to joint guidance.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

SCOPE

Lesson 4 builds on previous subcourse lessons set at the strategic and operational levels. This lesson places you at the corps level with many responsibilities in responding to the Honduran Government's request for military assistance. Lesson 4 is the capstone exercise in your U.S. Army Command and General Staff College curriculum, and the focus of the learning activities is on an increasingly important mission—preparing for joint force-projection operations. You are initially on the staff of Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) to work the first practical exercise (PE) and then shift roles to become Task Force (TF) Brown and develop an operation order (OPORD) for operations in area of operations (AO) Shield. You are given a joint task force (JTF) OPORD and will be issued staff planning data and an execution order that will require some changes to the OPORD. The final product of this lesson is an abbreviated corps OPORD briefing and a partially written order.

LEARNING OBJECTIVE

C.00 TASK: Plan corps force-projection operations.

CONDITION: Given the requirement for a written presentation; assignment as a corps staff planner; general and special situations with maps; and a theater or joint task force (JTF) campaign plan with a Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL), an intelligence estimate, the commander's planning guidance, and theater/corps intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products with references.

STANDARD: The plans or staff recommendations must be tactically feasible and logistically supportable, consistent with joint and service doctrine, and justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in staff estimates and decision-making processes IAW FM 34-130, FM 63-3, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, FM 101-5 (Final Draft), Student Text 22-2, student issue materials, and study requirements.

LEVEL: Synthesis.

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: 2c.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objective. The lesson guide lists directed readings, practical exercises, and other learning activities. Doing these requirements at the suggested time and actively thinking about the steps you are doing are key activities to achieving the maximum benefit from this lesson and achieving the lesson learning objective. When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions. If the lesson guide requests that you write a response to a question or complete a practical exercise, you must do so or you will not be prepared for the examination that follows.

REFERENCES:

a. M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

b. FM 100-5, *Operations.*

c. FM 100-15, *Corps Operations.*

d. FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols.*

e. ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes.*

f. FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Extract).

g. ST 100-7.

READINGS:

a. Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Component and Joint Command Structure (3 pages).

b. Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, J3 Tasking, Airflow Capacity (3 pages).

c. Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, JTFSO Deployment Planning Data (11 pages).

d. Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Example Solution to Practical Exercise: Available Air Sorties and Reception Capability (3 pages).

e. Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, J3 Tasking, TPFDL Adjustments (1 page).

f. Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Example Solution to Practical Exercise: Possible TPFDL Adjustments (2 pages).

g. Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Mission, Tasks Analysis, and Restated Mission (7 pages)

h. Appendix 8 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Logistics Data (6 pages).

i. Appendix 9 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, TF Brown OPORD Format (3 1 pages)

MAPS:

Series USACGSC 50-355, Honduras, sheet 1 (San Lorenzo), edition 1982, 1:50,000.
Series USACGSC 50-356, Honduras, sheet 1 (Choluteca—El Triunfo), 1:50,000.
Series USAGCSC 50-357, Honduras, sheet 1 (San Marcos de Colon), 1:50,000.
Series USACGSC 50-358, Honduras, sheet 1 (Soto Cano—Tegucigalpa), 1:50,000.
Series TPC, Belize—El Salvador—Guatemala—Honduras—Mexico, sheet K-25A, edition 3, 1:500,000.
Series TPC, El Salvador—Honduras—Nicaragua, sheet K-25B, edition 1:500,000.
Series TPC, Costa Rica—Nicaragua—Panama, sheet K-25C, edition 1:500,000.

With the following overlay and template:

Template 4- l—Enemy Situation Template.
Overlay 4-1 —JTFSO Operation Overlay (2 sheets).

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the final lesson for phase IV of the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). Once you complete this lesson and successfully complete the subcourse exam, you will have completed a very challenging program of instruction. This lesson gives you a chance to practice all the combat operations planning instruction you have received so far. It is a demanding lesson but one that will give you a sense of accomplishment upon completion. You have a tactical problem to solve. The readings and other course material will provide information to help you do it, but you must apply the tactical decision-making process described in Student Text (ST) 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes,* to accurately and correctly develop a tactically and logistically sound solution.



This is one of the few opportunities in your military career to practice and understand the staff planning skills necessary to succeed in the modem, joint, military environment. As you know, the art of warfare is changing. To succeed, the military professional must know as much about employing forces from other services as he or she does about employing members of other Army branches. Think about examples of recent Army employment. In Operation Desert Storm, the Army was deployed by a joint command, supported by sister services, and employed or, in the case of the amphibious deception force, planned to employ Marine forces, Chances of the Army ever again being employed in a single-service operation are remote.

This lesson contains a lot of information, but much of it is similar to what you have done in earlier subcourses. Here, you will plan combat operations in a different environment and with different forces. The pieces are different, but the process remains the same. You will use the deliberate decision-making procedure (DDMP) to develop a doctrinally sound corps plan that meets the mission assigned to you by your higher (joint) headquarters. Remember the linkage between your tactics courses. You learned about corps operations in S320B, *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations;* in S320C, you will apply these basics in a different environment-a force-projection operation in Latin America. The map on the next page shows where the operation takes place.

You will develop a partial corps operation order and associated overlays that will clearly communicate your commander's tactical decision to subordinate units. Remember that force-projection operations are generally described in eight stages. Your plans and sketches must clearly describe what is happening in each stage and why.

This is a big lesson; in the resident course, students spend several days working in staff groups to develop the solution. Although you will not have to develop all the products they do (lesson material provides some of the intermediate steps) and you only have to write the order not brief it, it is still a big lesson. So, before you get started. here is a brief overview of what you will do and in what sequence.



First, remember that in this lesson, you are transitioning from the joint process you worked in lesson 3 to an Army-oriented scenario. You will work toward solving a tactical problem using the DDMP as described in ST 101-5, part I.

Now is a good time to get out and put the maps together that you will need for this lesson. Refer to the list of maps on page 4-3 of this lesson guide to make sure you have them all. There are three different map sets. Sort them by scale, and find a flat spot to put them together. A wall is a good place to work, but some people prefer to work on sliding glass doors; others use the floor. Do what suits you best.

The first set is the three-sheet, 1:50,000-scale set that you will use with Template 4-1. Enemy Situation Template. It will require approximately 8 by 4 feet of flat area. If you can't get that large a space, you can, once you put the set together, fold the edges of the maps and get the set into a space of approximately 6 by 4 feet.

These maps go together like this:



The second set, the three-sheet, 1:500,000-scale set that you will use with Overlay 4-1, JTFSO Operation Overlay, will require approximately 8 by 6 feet of flat area. As with the other set, you could fold the edges of this set and get it into a space of approximately 6 by 4 feet. The maps go together as shown in the following illustration:



Course Materials

Now that the maps are up and you have an appreciation of what the terrain is like, you should spend a few moments to familiarize yourself with the documents you will use during this lesson. First is the lesson guide that you are now reading. It will tell you when to go to other documents for readings or practical exercise information. The doctrinal manuals listed in the reference section on page 4-2 provide an in-depth discussion of the underlying doctrine that guides this lesson. ST 101-5 will guide you in your efforts to reach a sound tactical decision. And, finally, the M/S320C Staff Planning Book contains much of the material you will need to work through the scenario. You should take a few moments to read through the table of contents, and then skim the content of the appendixes to familiarize yourself with what is available to you.

Course Builds on Previous Work

First of all, a reminder. You have done the deliberate decision-making process (DDMP) before in S310B, *Combat Operations;* S320A, *Reinforcing and Forward Deployed Operations;* and S320B. *Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations.* If there has been a significant amount of time since you completed those subcourses, you might want to begin this lesson with a review of the deliberate decision-making process. As a minimum, you need to review ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes,* which describes how to use the decision-making process. If you do not understand this procedure, you will not be able to master this block of instruction.

Deployment Practical Exercise

Initially, a deployment exercise will have you assess movement of the force to the objective area from the perspective of a joint planner on the staff of Joint Task Force South (JTFSO), the land component commander

(LCC). You will be asked to assess the airflow capability needed to support planned operations. Next, you will examine changes in the situation that will have you consider adjusting the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). The purpose of these requirements is to show the importance of the deployment phase to force-projection operations. Although work to refine the TPFDL is a continuous process, you will learn that you must understand basic deployment information before you can plan subsequent combat operations.

Mission Analysis

Once you begin the mission analysis, you shift roles and become a staff planner for TF Brown, a subordinate task force made up largely of 21st Airborne Corps units. You will remain at this level for the remainder of the lesson. Once you have considered the impact of the deployment phase on the operation, you must understand the situation and what your commander wants accomplished. This is done in a series of steps called mission analysis, which results in a restated mission for your unit. Once completed, if you were in an actual unit, your commander would approve the restated mission and issue his initial commander's guidance. You will find material relevant to the corps mission analysis in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 12, JTFSO OPORD 9_-5; and Overlay 4-1, JTFSO Operation Overlay.

Once you have developed your restated mission, it will be used to prepare the rest of the operation order. Be sure your mission statement contains all the elements contained in the example in ST 101-5.

It isn't necessary to specifically address all the mission analysis steps discussed in the manual, but you should have considered them all. Likewise, you are not required to publish a warning order (WO) to your subordinates after the mission analysis, but in an actual situation, you would send one to expedite planning at the lower levels. The commander would approve the warning order at the same time he approved the restated mission. Following mission analysis approval, the commander would provide initial planning guidance that would guide course of action (COA) development.

Ultimately, you will develop and write a portion of a corps-level OPORD in your role on the staff of TF Brown. As in previous tactics courses, if you don't start writing the OPORD as you develop its component parts, you will not be able to complete it in a reasonable amount of time. Because a corps order is such a huge undertaking, you will write only designated parts of it. In appendix 9 to this lesson guide, you will find a partially completed OPORD format. Fill in the appropriate blanks as you go through the DDMP. The approved mission statement fits into the OPORD format as paragraph 2, Mission. This is similar to what you did in S310B and S320A.

Course of Action Development

After you have the restated mission and the commander's initial planning guidance, you will start on the course of action development process. This development is based on troops and other resources made available by the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). Your COAs should be based on the friendly forces available according to the constraints and conditions contained in appendix 12 of the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, adjustments to the TPFDL, and updated information on the enemy forces array in the area of operations. You will need to use ST 100-7 to get the detailed data about the Atlantican Armed Forces required to analyze relative combat power. While it is important that you discard any COAs that are not possible given forces available, it is equally important that you consider all possibilities that could be workable given the resources.

Eventually, you must develop a minimum of two COAs for Stage 4, Entry Operations, and two for Stage 5, Operations. You should review what constitutes significantly different COAs if you have any doubts. Before starting this process, you should understand how COA development for force-projection operations differs from that in your previous studies. You must understand that mission analysis forms a vital foundation for good COAs. Relative combat power analysis and possible forms of maneuver are also crucial. Make sure you recognize the need for multiple stages, complete with a sketch and statement for each of the stages. Though the focus is on stages 4 and 5, you will also have to think about stages 3 and 6.

Your focus in prior courses has been toward maneuvering forces. You paid some attention to the concept of support, but it was done mostly as a necessary step to meet requirements. In this scenario. logistics may prove to be the most difficult part of the development process. You must be sure that adequate supplies and transportation assets are moved into the theater of operations in the proper sequence to let your maneuver forces accomplish the mission.

Course of Action Analysis

Once you have successfully developed the required number of COAs, you would, in an actual situation, brief the COAs to the corps commander. If he approved your efforts. he would approve the COAs for the next step. analysis. For this part of the DDMP, simply review the format for the briefing in ST 101-5. review the purpose and desired outcome of the briefing, and then sit back and think of how you would do the briefing. If you have the time and desire to do so, you could ask someone to listen to your briefing.

If you do not remember course of action analysis and comparison from S310B, S320A, or S320B, thoroughly review the course of action analysis and comparison process described in ST 101-5. It describes the steps required to analyze and compare multiple COAs. Without this understanding, you will not be able to complete this block of instruction successfully. Be sure to keep a complete and accurate record of your war-game results.

Of particular importance during this phase is the development of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). You should identify critical unknowns as you war game the COAs. Otherwise, when it comes time for you to list the CCIRs, you might make up some questions that seem reasonable but do not really focus on the *critical* information requirements. Intelligence-collection assets are too scarce not to focus them accurately. If you do not develop the CCIR in this step, you will learn bad habits.

Operational analysis and risk assessment arc tricky in this practical exercise. You must have a clear vision of what costs are acceptable to achieve the mission. Then, you must clearly formulate instructions in your initial commander's guidance and watch closely to make sure that the risks m your COAs do not exceed the costs. Depending on the course of action, a corps commander may not have sufficient authority to make some decisions (refer to the risk assessment matrix in ST 101-5 to see the risk level). If a COA is likely to exceed the preestablished risk, the corps commander would be obligated to forward the decision to a higher commander.

Course of Action Decision

The next step in the process you will follow is to make a decision as the TF Brown commander. In a real situation, when you have completed the analysis of the COAs, the staff would present a decision briefing to the commander. This briefing would provide the results of the analysis and clearly provide the rationale for why they recommended a particular COA as the best way to accomplish the restated mission. You should go through this

process to gain an appreciation for how it is done. Again, if you have a cooperative friend or family member, present the briefing to them.

To prepare for this briefing, you should produce decision tables, conduct a COA comparison, and determine the recommended COA. Again, examples of these products and steps are provided in ST 101-5. You will play the role of both the staff and the commander. Make a decision, and develop your intent and concept to set the stage for OPORD preparation.

This is a good time for you to devote some time to the preparation of the designated portions of the five-paragraph OPORD. Go back to the blank sections of Appendix 9, TF Brown OPORD Format. Since you have selected a course of action, you can move toward filling in paragraphs 3 and 4. You must develop an operation overlay, service support sketch. and task organization plan for stages 4 and 5. The lesson guide will cover this step in more detail.

At the end of this lesson, you should have a good feeling about your accomplishments. All that will remain between you and graduation from CGSOC is the S320C exam.

Products You Will Develop

As an aid for you to plan your activity, here is a list of the minimum products that you should produce during this lesson. You can do more if you have time, but this list is adequate to achieve the educational objectives of lesson 4:

- A restated mission.
- Two *significantly* different COAs with a sketch and statement for stage 4 and for stage 5.
- A record of the war game for two COAs.
- A decision matrix or decision table for two COAs.
- A partially written OPORD (fill in blank sections of the format at Appendix 9, TF Brown OPORD Format).

Interim Summary

So, what will you get from this lesson that you haven't mastered before? Well, to begin with, you will work with a corps deeply involved in joint operations. Second, you will work through a scenario that employs the force-projection doctrine described in FM 100-5, *Operations,* and FM 100-15, *Corps Operations.* This will provide a clear example of the differences in maneuver and logistic operations for a contingency force. Finally. you will see how a corps planning staff splits its focus when the corps is assigned multiple responsibilities.

Well, this is enough of an introduction; it is time for you to get to work. Reset your mental perspective. You are moving into the portion of the lesson where you *will initially solve problems as a planner on the staff of Joint Task Force South* preparing to participate in force-projection operations. To help you visualize the roles and responsibilities *given* to the 21st Airborne Corps, you may find it useful to use appendix 1 to lesson guide, lesson 4. to assist you in visualizing where you are in the command hierarchy.

The staff of the JTFSO will be heavily engaged in making sure that the deployment of forces is done well. Obviously, if this were a real unit there would be many more planners within the corps staff to help you with the task at hand. However, since you are working this lesson alone, you will do only limited portions of the deployment analysis and will be given some important products that are too time-consuming for you to produce. In short, all of the information you need to work through this lesson is either a requirement for you to develop or is provided as part of the supplementary material. You have been through similar courses before, so you should understand the process.

FIRST PRACTICAL EXERCISE: DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Airflow and Reception Capacity

While at home station the corps commander, who is dual hatted as the JTFSO commander, insisted that his planning staff review the airflow for the emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) force being sent to Honduras. He wanted to cause the staff to review the TPFDL for potential adjustments needed to support deterrence operations and possible combat operations if deterrence failed. This deployment PE has two parts for you to examine. In the first portion of the PE, you will look at the airflow into Honduras. In the second part, you will reconsider the TPFDL to make needed adjustments that will better support the planned operation. Think about how early deployment considerations affect the decision-making process and future operations.

Before you get started, the JTFSO commander offers some planning guidance:

> Before you get too far into the analysis process, let me give you a few points that require particular attention. The lifeline of this operation is air; I want to make sure that nothing has changed since the TPFDL was put together. As with most operations, the first few days were easy to plan, but as we moved furher into the future, things became a little difficult to project. I want you to first determine how many sorties are not being used each day to deploy the EDRE units and which aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) still have available reception each day. Some of the APODs may be completely “maxed out” on some days, and I need to know where the flexibility lies. After thinking about the EDRE deployment, you will need to continue this assessment for the remainder of the operation. This staff assessment is especially critical if we are forced to alter how and/or when some units arrive in theater based on the anticipated D+26 (C+33) requirement to commence decisive combat operations. In short, I want you to determine which APODs still have available reception—where is the slack?

Consider this guidance, the JTFSO OPORD, and the area maps as you think through the commander’s concerns. The chief of staff directs that the J3 take the lead in addressing these deployment issues.

The J3, after some individual homework, calls a meeting to provide the ad hoc staff group with some background information and specific requirements for individual staff members:

> The boss is very concerned with the deployment aspects of this operation to Honduras. His initial thoughts are on the EDRE package, so that’s where we’ll look initially-knowing that we’ll have to look at the whole deployment scheme a little later. We have been tasked to conduct a force-echelonment analysis. Our work will be used to make needed adjustments to the existing Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). We are anticipating the receipt of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warning order (WO) for an emergency deployment readiness exercise

(EDRE) to Honduras. This requires us to review our operation orders and plans for the region, to coordinate with higher headquarters, and to draft possible tasks and WOs for our subordinate units. A major task during this review will be to envision deployment to theater and to form several by-unit echelonment lists for different force packages. This list will identify corps units that will deploy to an APOD or a sea port of debarkation (SPOD) in the objective area by a C-day sequence. Later, on receipt of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), execute order, this echelonment will be refined to match the unified CINC's required delivery dates (RDDs). However, for the purpose of our immediate task, I want to do an early assessment of some of the deployment issues we'll have to refine later.

Here's what I want you to do first. Take the information that I have assembled for you and do a quick airflow assessment **(Read the situation in appendix 1 to lesson guide, lesson 4).** Use the JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 (appendix 12, S320C Staff Planning Book) and the EDRE-designated Army units to do your assessment. I have also assembled some information in a JTFSO deployment planning data summary to help you **(Read appendix 3 to lesson guide, lesson 4).**

When you have completed the airflow requirement, return to this point in the lesson guide.

Deployment planning is not a "clean" process. An assortment of different documents contains information that must become apart of the TPFDL analysis process. This task is as frustrating as it is complex, but it must be done and done very well.

You should have noticed in your airflow analysis that the primary reception airflelds are Soto Cano and La Mesa because of the location of the airfields. Goloson is on the coast near Puerto Cortes, and units arriving there would have a difficult time traveling to the Choluteca region. A day-by-day assessment of available C-141 and C-5 sorties and available reception capability, beginning with the EDRE deployment, then continuing to the start of planned offensive operations, gives you a picture of how many aircraft are available and where these aircraft could be received by day. You should have discovered that some of the APODs are completely maxed out on some days. You must have a thorough appreciation of how and/or when some units arrive in theater based on the D+26 (C+33) requirement to begin decisive combat operations to effectively develop your courses of action.

Your initial work has shown the importance of assessing how the number and types of aircraft match up with the numbers and capability of the airfields in the area of operation. Obviously, the same type of assessment would apply to the maritime operations, especially in a place such as Latin America, but time constraints cause us to focus primarily on the airflow. As you continue to plan, however, you should periodically consider some possible tradeoffs between shipments by air and shipments by sea.

The J3 reconvened the staff working on the EDRE airflow requirement to see how they were coming along. One of the staff members had compiled the group's general assessment. He discussed some of the initial findings that looked at the number and types of aircraft available to support the operation and the number of available airfields in Honduras. He also discussed the lift requirements and examined possible options when lift and requirements did not match. Turn to appendix 3 to this lesson guide to obtain a copy of his work. Having completed the requirement yourself, do you agree with his assessment'? Why or why not? When you have finished reviewing the example solution, return to this point in the lesson guide. The J3 has another deployment task for you to complete.

Deployment Considerations: TPFDL Adjustments

As the J3 was preparing to issue additional guidance, the chief of staff came in with some additional information from the JTFSO commander who was still concerned that the staff do a thorough job on analyzing the TPFDL. The chief handed the J3 a note from the commander with the following statement:

> Make sure the staff looks closely at any adjustments we may have to make to the existing TPFDL. I need you to analyze the flow of equipment and units into the theater. Another point I want assessed as you consider the deployment phase is possible revisions to the TPFDL flow as a result of the current intelligence summary (INTSUM). The identification of possible Atlantican surface-to-surface missiles is very troubling. What possible modifications to the existing TPFDL would let us move the Patriot missile units to the area more quickly? J3, I need you to give me some recommendations on adding or deleting units to the TPFDL and your rationale. Also, look to see if there are any units we need to move up or down in the TPFDL. Be sure to tie this to airflow availability.

Attached to this note from the commander was another note from the J2 which provided some additional information not previously known. The J3 read the note aloud:

> We have just learned of new information that will be important as we plan this operation to Honduras. The extracted portion of the JTF intelligence summary is provided for your information. 1 will brief you in more detail at a later date.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

JTF INTSUM (Extracted)

1. CURRENT SITUATION

a. US intelligence analysis indicates that NORTH KOREA has built and sold a new type of surface-to-surface weapon called the No-Dong 1 (ND-1) missile to the Atlanticans. The ND-1 is a SCUD variant with a high-explosive capability only and a range of 500 to 600 kilometers.

b. Based on available information, the ND-1 may have significant design and engineering flaws. Intelligence received from a recent North Korean test firing of the ND-1 supports this assessment.

c. The design and engineering flaws, coupled with North Korean quality control deficiencies and a lack of consistent logistic support, will minimize the impact this system has on military capabilities in the region.

d. US analysts believe a greater threat to stability is posed from other countries which could possibly be offering more sophisticated and reliable systems in the near future.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Based on this intelligence update, the JTFSO commander wrote a note to the J3 with his further guidance on this matter:

Although the ND- 1 missile presents no significant military threat to our ability to execute our mission, we need to take precautions to ensure we provide maximum protection to our APODs and the Honduran capital. Provide a recommendation on adjusting the flow of Army forces into country to allow the early introduction of the required units to provide defense against the threat posed by the ND-1 missile system.

This intelligence summary is typical of the updated information a unit would receive while planning. The point is that planning must remain sufficiently flexible to react to such late-breaking intelligence. Since you are working alone on this lesson, you will not actually modify TPFDL flow. The process is too time consuming for one person, and in reality, transportation experts with sophisticated computer software would ease this burden considerably. However, you must understand the concept of where changes might come from, why you must react to them. and how you would go about making those necessary changes.

Again, the J3 tries to focus on what the commander wants and directs the planning cell to assess possible TPFDL adjustments called for by the current situation. He provides you with the requirement and asks that you contact him as soon as you are done. **(Read appendix 5 to lesson guide, lesson 4)** When you have finished the requirement, return to this point in the lesson guide.

Adjusting deployment lists is tough business. Luckily, the J3 has you on his staff. You have come up with several important recommended modifications to the TPFDL that will help better sequence the right types of units into theater to support planned operations. As you observed, shifting units and loads causes a “snowball” effect that challenges the planner to continually assess if the right assets will be at the right place at the right time.

The list of possible TPFDL adjustments may vary greatly, but there is no substitute for having thought about the deployment flow. **Read appendix 5 to lesson guide, lesson 4,** to see what the staff recommended. Your suggestions may have been, and probably were, different from those shown. The differences are not as important as having thought through the process. Try to envision doing a course of action sketch and statement without a good understanding of the forces that you will have to work with-an impossible task? When you have reviewed appendix 5, return to this point in the lesson guide.

INTERIM SUMMARY

Many military planners support the Helmuth von Moltke theory that the outcome of the campaign may be decided by the initial positioning of the combatants-before the first shot is fired. His famous quote, “A mistake in the original assembly of the army can scarcely be rectified in the entire course of the campaign,” is an important cornerstone in current US Army doctrine. This theory is based on creating conditions for success from the very beginning of the operation. Force-projection operations demand a thorough analysis of the deployment plan to ensure that forces arrive in a manner conducive to achieving the military tactical objectives and the operational end states.

Recent trends have caused a shift in the national security strategy from a forward-deployed military capability to one based on force projection. Increasingly, joint and combined forces are being trained to operate at distant locations in austere environments. The full range of combat, combat support, and combat service support must be carefully considered as a hedge against frequent requirements to operate in underdeveloped areas or theaters. The time spent thinking about the deployment of our forces to Honduras has helped you become more aware of the critical need to be sure that you assemble the right assets, at the right time, and at the right location to sway the odds of a successful military operation in your favor.

MISSION ANALYSIS

You will now leave the JTFSO level and shift your role to **be a staff planner for TF Brown.** The remainder of this lesson will be done from the perspective of TF Brown, which is responsible for operations in AO Shield. Remember, append.. 1 to this lesson guide will help you maintain a clear picture of who works for whom in this "multihatted" corps.

Even though the geographic region in which the operation takes place has changed to Latin America, *the process of tactical decision making remains the same.* Because this scenario allows time for the staff to become intimately involved in developing the TF Brown order, the chief of staff has directed the planning staff to employ the steps of the deliberate decision-making procedure (DDMP) as opposed to other decision-making procedures found in ST 101-5. The JCS has not yet issued an execute order, but informal warning orders have indicated that the corps needs to put its planning effort into high gear.



What is the flrst step of the DDMP process? The first step is mission analysis.

It is difficult to develop a good solution to the problem without understanding what the mission is and what resources are available to accomplish the mission. You will gain this understanding from reading the supporting information available in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book and the appendixes to this lesson guide. Of particular importance is the JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 found at appendix 12 of the M/S320C Staff Planning Book. Remember that this is the OPORD you worked within lesson 3. If you have let some time elapse between lesson 3 and this lesson, you must reanalyze the JTFSO OPORD IAW the steps of ST 101-5. You must determine the actions

and results required to successfully accomplish your assigned mission. When you have digested the OPORD, return to this point in the lesson guide.

As you know, a thorough mission analysis is key to the remainder of the planning process. You need to apply your understanding of the process at this time. If you desire to revisit the steps of the process, turn to ST 101-5, for a quick review. It isn't necessary for you to specifically address all of the steps as you think about mission analysis, but you must consider them.

If mission analysis were being done in an actual unit (or if you were taking this course with other students), the mission analysis for all functional areas (for example, air defense, maneuver, intelligence, and logistics) would be conducted simultaneously. However, because you are taking this course by correspondence and you arc performing all of the staff functions yourself, you must do the fictional area mission analysis sequentially. You will start this portion of the DDMP by analyzing the mission as the G3 planner, then do the same as the G2, and then as the logistic planner, the G4. If you are comfortable with the process, keep these three categories in mind, and identify and categorize the tasks into the appropriate functional areas as you find them in the order. To keep this process clear, the lesson guide will discuss them sequentially.

Mission Analysis Steps to Consider

1. Commander reviews commanders' intent of one and two levels up.

2. Staff reviews area of operations (AO), higher headquarters' concept of operations, and task organization.

3. Staff identifies specified and implied tasks.

4. Staff develops list of essential tasks (it defines success and shapes the restated mission)

5. Staff reviews available assets, to include attachments and detachments from task organization.

6. Staff determines limitations (restrictions and constraints).

7. Staff determines broad command and control warfare (C2W) considerations to maximize lethal and nonlethal fires.

8. Staff *proposes* acceptable risk for commander's approval.

9. Staff determines critical facts and assumptions that can and will affect successful accomplishment of the mission.

10. Staff analyzes available time (balance planning detail versus speed and surprise).

11. Staff (G3 and chief of staff (CofS)) prepares restated mission for commander's approval

Remember, the restated mission contains the who, what, where, when, and why.

First the G3 Functions

Steps 1 and 2 have been accomplished. You did this when you did your readings for this lesson.

Steps 3 and 4 call for a review of the JTFSO OPORD to develop a task list of specified and implied tasks. You should do this by mission phase. You can also complete step 6 at this time. Enter the tasks in the following spaces; do the same for any limitations you find. (NOTE: The number of lines or spaces below do not necessarily correspond to the number of answers that are being sought.)

G3 Considerations in Mission Analysis

Specified Tasks

a. Phase I.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(l0)

b. Phases II and III.

(1)

(2)

(3)

c. Phase IV(A).

(1)

(2)

d. Phase IV(B) through Phase V.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Implied Tasks

a. Phases II and III.

(1)

(2)

b. Phase IV(A).

(1)

(2)

(3)

Essential Tasks

a.

b.

c.

d.

G3 Limitations

a.

b.

Now, shift your attention to an analysis of the G2 tasks.

G2 Considerations in Mission Analysis

Enemy Situation Template

a.

b.

c.

d.

Avenues of Approach

a. Avenue of Approach A.

b. Avenue of Approach B.

Key Terrain

Logistic Considerations in Mission Analysis

Now that you have gone through the JTFSO OPORD from a G3 and G2 perspective, take a few minutes and put on your logistic hat. Go back through the OPORD (appendix 12, M/S320C Staff Planning Book), and write in the spaces provided the specified, implied, and essential tasks. Also, write in your thoughts on any logistic limitations. Don't forget to go through the various annexes of the JTFSO OPORD as well as Appendix 8, Logistics Data, to this lesson guide. These will help you formulate your responses.

Logistic Specified Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Logistic Implied Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Logistic Essential Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Logistic Limitations

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

After you have determined the specified, implied, and essential tasks and the constraints and limitations are identified, use the essential tasks to write the restated mission. As you recall, when the commander approves it, this restated mission becomes paragraph 2 of the order and forms the basis for the remaining DDMP steps. Be sure that your restated mission contains all the elements IAW ST 101-5. Take a few moments and write a proposed restated mission for TF Brown in the space provided.

Poposed Restated Mission

OK, let's see how you did on your task and limitation analysis. Turn to Appendix 7, Mission, Tasks Analysis, and Restated Mission, of the lesson guide for some examples of what you may have come up with. Compare your lists with the content of the appendix. If there are significant differences, you should review the appropriate portions of ST 101-5.

Forces Available

Mission analysis requires that you determine the assets available for mission accomplishment. In this situation, you have a clearly defined force list that was adjusted to take the missile threat into account. You would tailor your force list and deployment data to meet the known requirements of the operation. Eventually, you will receive a CJCS execute order that will be specific about the troop list and will provide updated information needed for further planning. If you are confident that your corps will be used in the operation, you must start initial planning to get ahead of the power curve. As you know, work on the airflow and the TPFDL has already taken place. The G3 would brief the tailored force list when the status of friendly forces is covered during the mission analysis briefing. Write this force list on a clean sheet of paper; it will form the basis for your task organization. Make sure you include all units. You might want to put each unit on a small stick-on note—this will aid you in your war gaming later on.

This wraps up the discussion on the mission analysis portion of the DDMP. Why did you spend so much time on it'? The answer is clear. In force-projection operations, even more than forward-deployed operations, the commander must know what he must do to successfully accomplish the mission. Regardless of the mission, there never seems to be sufficient combat power to do a job. But, in force-projection operations, where the commander must bring everything with him, this shortage is more acute. An analogy between the two situations might be the difference between camping in your backyard as opposed to camping in the mountains. In the backyard, you can quite easily get something that you forgot to bring. In the mountains, you cannot. In a forward-deployed situation, you probably have an alternate source of supply (host nation, theater stockpiles, and so forth). In force-projection operations as part of a joint contingency mission. you have only what you deploy in the TPFDL.

COMMANDER'S INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

At this stage of the DDMP, the TF Brown commander would provide initial planning guidance to the staff. It would straddle the narrow line between too directive (which stifles the staffs initiative) and too broad (which results in wasted effort on courses the commander will not accept). Commanders generally have wider experience than their staffs and more access to the higher commander's intent which leads to a clearer understanding of exactly what it is the order calls for. ST 101-5 contains a good description of this step. To help you get on with this lesson, here is your commander's initial planning guidance:

> We must accomplish four essential tasks before we declare victory in this operation. I am confident that the restated mission will satisfy all of them. The four tasks are—
>
> 1. Conduct a coordinated, combined defense of AO SHIELD along PL PIKE in conjunction with Honduran forces. Deny Atlantican forces PL PIKE and crossing sites over the Choluteca River.

2. Plan and conduct joint and combined operations to cut off and destroy the armored capability of the Atlantic an Army in the Choluteca region, defeat Atlantican forces, restore the preconflict border between Atlantica and Honduras, and transition to peace.

3. Cut Atlantican LOCs to isolate Atlantican forces in Honduras and attack to destroy Atlantican armored, mechanized, and motorized units in zone.

4. Restore Honduran-Atlantican boundary and establish a border security zone until relieved by Honduran forces.

It will not be an easy mission, though. As you prepare to develop some courses of action, I want you to keep the following thoughts in mind.

GOLDEN EAGLE emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) forces must immediately secure the existing Pan-American Highway bridge that spans the Choluteca River. This will prevent the Honduran armored cavalry regiment (ACR) from being cut off on the south side of the river as it delays back from the border. The second brigade of the 17th Inf Div (Lt) will arrive on C+8 and be available for employment. Figure out a way to get them in position to defend at Choluteca as rapidly as possible. Leave a small security force in place at Soto Cane.

We have been told to expect the Honduran ACR to delay back across the Choluteca River by D+3 with about 75 percent of its force. The ACR will need some time to reorganize, so keep that in mind when assigning it missions.

Soto Cano must receive the initial priority for air defense. Until corps air defense units are in place, divisional air defense may have to be used. Let me know how soon corps can establish a viable air defense with corps units.

Focus our intelligence and deep operations efforts during entry operations stage (JTFSO phase II) on the approaching Atlantican forces. We expect the Atlanticans to establish defensive positions at Choluteca and to move their tactical sustainment capability forward. We need to damage the Atlantican sustainment capability; reduce the operational strength of Atlantican heavy forces; and, at the same time, reduce the Atlantican ability to cross the Choluteca River.

We will have 22 close air support (CAS) sorties per day during entry operations stage (JTFSO phase II), including four AC-130 sorties per night. 1st MEF (Fwd) will receive air support from its own air elements, so distribute the available CAS to Army units. We also may want to keep some CAS under corps control. Give me a recommendation.

Navy forces (NAVFOR) will establish 1st MEF (Fwd) ashore during this stage. We assume operational control (OPCON) of them at that time. 1st MEF (Fwd) units will be southeast of San Lorenzo and northwest of Choluteca when we assume OPCON of them. They must be rapidly incorporated into the defense. The final brigade of the 17th Inf Div (Lt) arrives

on C+l3 and will be available for employment. We may need to increase the size of the security force at Soto Cano at some point during this stage. Look at it and give me your recommendation.

Operations stage (JTFSO phase IV(A)) will start not later than (NLT) C+23. We have to somehow prevent Atlantican heavy forces from escaping across their border once we attack. Come up with some recommendations on how we can cut the Atlantican lines of communication (LOCs) to accomplish the mission. I don't think we can rely on doing that with air assets alone. Get the Honduran ACR involved in the attack, but give it a mission within its capabilities. End state should place our forces in a security zone along the Honduran-Atlantican border after completing the destruction of the committed Atlantican heavy forces. Phase IV(A) ends with our units in the security zone being replaced by Honduran forces.

Focus our deep operations during operations stage (JTFSO phase IV(A)) on destroying withdrawing Atlantican heavy forces and preventing reinforcement of the committed units,

We will have 76 CAS sorties per day during operations stage (JTFSO phase IV(A)), including four AC- 130 sorties per night. 1st MEF (Fwd) will receive air support from its own air elements, so distribute the available CAS to Army units. We still may want to keep some CAS under corps control. Again, I need a recommendation.

For phase V, make use of those aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) that are C-141 capable. Units can leave from airfields that arc different from the ones at which they arrived. Try to minimize unit movements as much as possible: however, we need to maximize available APOEs for redeployment.

Warning Order

If you were in a field situation, once your restated mission was approved by the TF Browm commander, and had the initial commander's planning guidance, you would draft a warning order for the commander's approval:

Because of time requirements, you will not do this step. If you did, it would be similar to the warning orders you drafted in previous tactics instruction.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

You have worked on courses of action development several times during your CGSOC career. This time the methodology is the same, but the employment considerations are different. During the remainder of this subcourse, you will follow the same process, but the emphasis will be on applying what you have learned, the quality of your tactical judgment, and the justifications that support your ideas. You will be challenged by questions such as—How well do you apply doctrine to the situations that confront you'? What tactical decisions do you make and does your rationale support your position? Do you understand command and control'? Do you know the important sustainment questions that must be considered to properly support force-projection operations? This practical exercise will have you explore multiple options for solving complex tactical problems and learn to translate your thoughts into action. Having just

clarified the mission, you must now begin the hard, but important, job of putting the operation order together. Let's begin by developing viable courses of action that will accomplish the mission.

For the remainder of the lesson you are to think about all of the force-projection stages, but you will concentrate mainly on stages 4 and 5. Your attention must turn to formulating options and determining relative force ratios and to other tasks associated with COA development for TF Brown.

As you do your work, remember that there is no one correct solution to the practical exercise—multiple COAs could prove successful if proper] y controlled and supported, Your rat ion ale and judgment to defend your position are the crucial aspects of this lesson.

When you wear your G1/G4 planner's "hat," refer to Appendix 8 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Logistics Data, to help with the logistics concerns. The summarized information is intended to help you understand the issues confronting the logistician.

If you feel uncomfortable with COA development of the DDMP process, turn to ST 101-5, to review the methods and techniques.

Use the procedures described in ST 101-5 to develop at least two feasible COAs for the corps mission. You should use all previously issued course material to help you accomplish this task.

SECOND PRACTICAL EXERCISE: COA DEVELOPMENT

With your thorough understanding of the mission requirements, you are ready to begin course of action (COA) development. The restated mission from appendix 7 to this lesson guide tells you what you want to do, and the commander's initial planning guidance provides a rough idea of how to do it.

Make sure you have a visual method for recording the analysis of relative combat power. Without this step, you cannot fully appreciate the full range of maneuver available to the corps. Also. without a visual method to keep track of your units. there is a good chance that you will fail to use some element of combat power.

Before you get too deep into your development process, there are a few points that need highlighting:

- Make sure you consider the enemy situation template. This template depicts an estimate of where the enemy will be on C+28.

- The first step of COA development is to determine relative combat power. This is important because it is a significant factor determining what options are available to you. The greater your combat power advantage, the more flexibility you enjoy. Conversely, if you are constrained in combat power, you are probably constrained in options. Use the M/S320C Staff

Planning Book, Appendix 14, Relative Combat Power Comparison Chart, to help with your assessment.

. As you proceed through the development process, recognize that the elements of power in this scenario are different from those in a more traditional combat situation. In Latin America—as compared to Central Europe, for example-psychological operations might provide a greater proportion of your means of influencing the enemy. Consider the forces available to you in the light of the mission and situation.

● Don't forget to think about developing a deception story before you start arraying your forces, developing the scheme of maneuver, and determining command and control means.

● Consider all the stages of this force-projection operation you learned in lesson 1, but in the interest of time and focus, you do COA sketches and statements for stages 4 and 5 only.

● You should determine conditions and objectives for stages 3 through 6 of this force-projection operation.

● Specific C-days need to be applied to the various stages:

— Stage 3, Deployment, starts at C+8. This corresponds to JTFSO's phase H.

— As units arrive, they transition to Stage 4, Entry Operations, even though it is still phase 11 of the JTFSO OPORD.

— Stage 5, Operations, corresponds to JTFSO's phase IV(A) and begins not later than D+26 (C+33).

— Stage 6, War Termination and Postconflict Operations, corresponds to JTFSO's phase V and begins as soon as the border is reestablished. Based on the JTFSO OPORD, this phase could last as late as D+105.

JTFSO Execute Order

While you were conducting liaison with the JTFSO J3, the CJCS execute order for the operation in Honduras arrived. You received approval to take a copy back to the TF Brown planning staff. This order is important and needs to be reviewed carefully. You will need to determine if there are new or different mission twists that will change the TF Brown mission statement. There is also updated information on enemy forces that must be considered at this point. Carefully think about this execute order and make adjustments where necessary. The execute order is provided here for your information and referral—

Based on Atlantican force buildup on the Honduran border, JTFSO was directed to execute JCS EDRE GOLDEN EAGLE (C-day) 11 Dec 9. to demonstrate support to the Honduran Government. The phase I force package listed in annex A of JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 (appendix 12, M/S320C Staff Planning Book) was deployed to Soto Cano, Goloson, and La Mesa airfields. USNAVSO also moved TF 45 to a location off the Pacific coast of Honduras

to facilitate a possible landing by the embarked MEB. Despite these deployments, the Atlanticans crossed the Honduran border in strength early on the morning of 18 Dec 9_, C+7. As a result of guidance received from the NCA, the CJCS, and USSOUTHCOM, JTFSO published the following execute order on 180900 Dec 9_:

(Asterisks indicate that material has been intentionally omitted.)

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

* * * * * * *

1. General. This is an execute order for deployment of JTFSO forces to HONDURAS. Immediately initiate deployment of additional forces IAW TPFDL to assist the government of HONDURAS in countering the invasion by the armed forces of ATLANTICA.

2. Situation

a. Enemy. 18 Dec 9_, armed forces from Atlantican 1st Corps crossed the HONDURAN border in strength northwest of SOMOTILLO (EK1041) along route 33, toward EL TRIUNFO (EK0151) in the CHOLUTECA Gap area with one type I motorized (mtz) infantry (inf) division (div). Two mtz inf regiments (regts), supported by one tank battalion (bn), have crossed the border and are attacking toward CHOLUTECA (DK8071). The third mtz inf regt of the division is positioned on the border as the division reserve and is available for employment. The field artillery (FA) brigade (bde) of 1st Corps is supporting this attack. An inf regt from the 1st Corps type I inf div, using a combination of air assaults and truck transports, attacked from EL ESPINO (EK3087) along the Pan-American Highway (route 1) toward SAN MARCOS DE COLON (EK2086). The remainder of the 1st Corps type I inf div is located at CHINANDEGA (DJ8698) and is in position to counter any amphibious threat in the vicinity of the port of CORINTO (DJ8180), The second mtz inf div of 1st Corps remains at EL SAUCE (EK5028) and appears to be the corps reserve. 1st Corps armored (armd) bde is still at LEON (EJI177) and appears to be the Atlantic an operational reserve, blocking the approach to MANAGUA (EJ8045). Atlantican Air Force has provided effective air support to its ground forces and has neutralized Honduran attempts to launch air strikes against invading Atlantican forces in the CHOLUTECA region. Honduran Air Force and inplace US Air Force and ADA assets successfully engaged Atlantican aircraft attacking the airfields at TONCONTIN (DL7949) and SOTO CANO (DL3389). The Atlantican airstrikes were ineffective.

The Atlantican type II inf div at OCOTAL (EL5609), which was mobilized to defend against Contra attacks, crossed the border near LAS MANOS (EL4725) with two infantry regiments and is conducting counterinsurgency operations against Contra camps in that region. The third infantry regiment and the division HQ are located at OCOTAL.

One type III infantry brigade crossed the border at LEIMUS (HM1330) and has begun counterinsurgency operations against the Miskito insurgents located in that region.

UNCLASSIED SAMPLE

b. Friendly

(1) USSOUTHCOM OPLAN 5500-9_ is now OPORD 5500-9_. Effective C+7, JTFSO plans and conducts military operations in support of HONDURAS.

(2) 21st Abn Corps is ARFOR.

(3) 9th AF is AFFOR.

(4) TF 45 is NAVFOR.

(5) USSOCSO is JSOTF.

(6) 7th POG (Abn)(-) is JPOTF

(7) 301st CA Bde is CMOTF.

(8) TF BLACK (Brigade 110 (Honduran) is defending in AO CASTLE along the approach to DANLI (EL4850).

(9) TF BROWN is delaying the Atlantican attack in the CHOLUTECA region with the Honduran ACR and is preparing to move additional forces into defenses along phase line (PL) PIKE.

(10) Amphibious objective area (AOA) SWORD is activated and NAVFOR is positioning offshore to land 1st MEB (Fwd).

c. The following conditions for execution of this order have been met.

(1) Government of HONDURAS has requested US assistance.

(2) Strategic lift is available.

(3) Presidential callup of selected Reserve Component units has occurred,

3. Mission. JTFSO destroys Atlantican armored, mechanized, and motorized forces in HONDURAS and restores the international border.

4. Tasks

a. Contain Atlantican ground forces in HONDURAS along PL PIKE.

b. Based on the strength of Atlantican invasion forces, tailor available friendly forces and adjust deployment means and times as necessary to allow commencement of Phase IV, Counteroffensive Operations, in AO SHIELD (phase IV(A)) NLT C+23 (D+16); in AO CASTLE (phase IV(B)) NLT C+33 (D+26); and in AO LANCE NLT C+58 (D+51).

c. Conduct offensive operations to destroy Atlantican armored, mechanized, and motorized forces in HONDURAS.

5. Coordinating Instructions

a. Estimated duration of the operation through phase V is 96 days.

b. Action addressees submit requirements.

c. Staging and overflight rights are not authorized for EL SALVADOR. APODs and SPODs located in EL SALVADOR are not availablc for use.

d. Acknowledge.

6. Command Relationships. As listed in paragraph 5a and annex J of OPORD 9_-5 (appendix 12, M/S324 Staff Planning Book) and the diagrams in appendix I to this lesson guide.

* * * * * * *

In your role as the G2, you must now develop known and suspected enemy situations based on an ongoing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. Recall that in an actual situation, the corps all-source production sect ion would provide the G2 with the information needed to develop different threat models, or enemy courses of action, for use during war gaming. The process of refining all this data into meaningful information for the commander and the rest of his staff is called situation and target development. During the course of analysis portion of this lesson, you will have to “think enemy” and apply his doctrine in completing the detail needed for planning purposes.

Logistical Considerations

As you work toward a fully developed COA, you will gain a great appreciation for the relationship between ground maneuver and logistic support. In this force-projection scenario, you will also gain an understanding for the points made earlier in this lesson about the critical effect good TPFDL planning plays in setting the framework for success. If the TPFDL list doesn’t provide the proper units, in the proper sequence, at the proper time and place, no plan will succeed. Remember that while performing G1 or G4 planner duties, you are planning logistics from both a corps (TF Brown) and an ARFOR perspective.

As work on your COA progresses, you should continually think about possible TPFDL revisions to ensure that units required for specific stated missions are, in fact, in country and available for use when you plan on

assigning these units tactical missions. This thought process is a continuation of the first practical exercise that had you look at deployment. You must also consider in-country travel time after the unit arrives in theater. Remember, a field artillery unit arriving by ship at Puerto Cortes on C+l5 would not be available for use at Choluteca on C+l6. Offload and travel time must be considered.

Before you start your COA development, here area few logistic considerations to keep in mind: Information in the JTF OPORD and M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 13, Combat Service Support Planning Data, and appendix 8 to this lesson guide, are your primary sources for combat service support (CSS) data to use in the tactical decision-making process.

OK, it is time for some creative thinking. Turn to ST 101-5 and proceed through the steps listed. You may want to refer to this document periodically to help stay on track.

As you develop your COA sketches and statements, use the sketch maps that follow to assist you. You may use either a broad approach to COA development (one that provides more flexibility for later development) or a more detailed approach (one that specifies units to a lower detail and refines other actions in greater detail). Whichever option you use, *some of the basic points you must check are:*

- Does the COA comply with the commander's planning guidance?

- Regardless of the technique used, does the COA adequately communicate the scheme of maneuver'?

- Did you identify specific ground maneuver units? You should *not* because the commander will determine these later in the DDMP. However, if you use one-of-a-kind units, they maybe specified if depicted.

- Are control measures kept to the minimum necessary, and do the graphics and symbols used comply with FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols?*

Consider all the steps, or you will inevitably produce an unsynchronized COA. Pay particular attention to the graphics of your COA sketch, and make sure the picture tells the complete story. Your commander should be able to pickup the sketch and quickly understand how you intend to accomplish the mission. Learning to communicate with operational graphics is no different from learning any language. A language is a means to communicate ideas, and if it doesn't communicate clearly and concisely, it fails the test as a language. If you encounter problems with your use of graphics, open FM 101-5-1 and find the example you need,

When you are ready, turn the page and draft two COA sketches and statements each for stages 4 and 5.



COA 1 (STAGE 4) STATEMENT



COA 1 (STAGE 5) STATEMENT

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

COA 2 (STAGE 4) STATEMENT



COA 2 (STAGE 5) STATEMENT

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Validity Check:
Is COA 1 Different From COA 2?

When you are finished with your two COAs, check the following to make sure COA 1 is truly different from COA 2:

- Did you use your reserves differently—by stage or by composition?

- Were there task organization differences?

- How about the main effort? Was it different from one COA to the other?

- What about your scheme of maneuver'? Did you vary how you disposed forces on the battlefield and how you intend to maneuver them to mission accomplishment'?

If you answered "yes" to some or all of the above-listed factors, then, more than likely, you have two different COAs.

If you simply made minor changes such as using different units to accomplish essentially similar schemes of maneuver, you need to go back and redo at least one of your two COAs before proceeding with the lesson.

Validity Check:
Are Your COA Sketches Complete?

Check the following to make sure that your two sketches are complete:

- Did you show the appropriate phase lines, axes, zones and sectors, and areas or positions?

- Are your objectives clear and properly labeled'? Do you have a separate sketch for both stages'?

- Could another planner identify the appropriate fire support coordination measures?

- How about the main effort'? Is it clearly designated for offensive operations?

- Did you add natural or manmade features to orient the COA to the ground?

If you answered "yes" to the above-listed factors, then your sketch is probably acceptable.

If your sketches failed the validity checks, you should correct the problems before proceeding with the lesson.

Did your work pass the validity check? If you are now confident that your two COAs meet all the guidelines found in ST 101-5, page I-7-2, move on to the next major step in the DDMP: analysis and comparison. Because there are so many different ways that you could structure this exercise, you will not get an example solution to the COA. You will learn more by developing your own COAs, analyzing them, and forming your own decision as to which of the two is the better.

COA Analysis and Comparison

At this point, it is critical to visualize how the operation might unfold. This process is called war gaming, or COA analysis. If you need to refresh your memory on this concept, take a few minutes and scan ST 101-5.

A few of the war-gaming and analysis factors change emphasis in force-projection operations, but the basic process remains the same as in your previous tactics courses. You will, however, perform the analysis by stages. In the entry phase, you are most concerned about safely getting your units into the theater. Therefore, much of your concern is with safeguarding your ports of entry. As you move into the operation phase and you start war gaming force-on-force engagements, your analysis will take on a more familiar feel.

Here are a few points to consider as you conduct your COA analysis:

- Analyze your schemes of maneuver against the anticipated enemy laydown depicted on Template 4-1, Enemy Situation Template. You may find it useful to array stickers on your map using stick-on notes for both enemy and friendly maneuver forces. You then can move the stickers as you visualize the attacker advancing along the avenues of approach.

- As you analyze each stage, think of the conditions that describe the beginning and ending states. Start with the beginning conditions, and move your units through a logical series of events until you reach the end condition for that stage.

- Capture any critical event that you might want to re-analyze later. These events should be a base for your commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

- Be alert for events that might violate the level of risk you are authorized to incur. Read the section on risk management in ST 101-5.

- Record the events as they occur. This narrative record forms the basis for your OPORD's paragraph 3. It forms the foundation for the concept of operations, fires, tasks to subordinate units, and coordinating instructions-the essential parts of the mitten OPORD. If you do a good job during this stage, you will find it much easier to write the OPORD.

One of the most crucial steps in a thorough war gaming and analysis is to do each COA independently. At this stage, do not attempt to compare them to one another. That is a later step. At this point (in a very gross oversimplification), you are interested in how well each COA accomplishes the mission, what losses you anticipate, and what condition will be after the mission is accomplished.

THIRD PRACTICAL EXERCISE: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

When you are ready, use ST 101-5 as a guide. Proceed through the steps of war gaming, recording the results and assessing the risks for your first COA. Make sure you record the results of your war gaming and analysis in a useful format. It does no good to collect mounds of data if you cannot use it in a timely manner.

Validity Check:
Complete War-Gaming Results

When you are finished war gaming your first COA, check the following to make sure that you have developed and recorded all necessary data:

- Did you list all friendly forces, assumptions, known critical events and decision points, and other significant factors?

- Did you select and use one of the three war-gaming methods?

- Did you select and use one of the three recording techniques?

- Did you war game the events logically, by stage? You would do this for stages 1 through 8 if you were actually serving as a planner on a corps staff. Time constraints in this lesson limit your assessment to stages 4 and 5.

If you answered "yes" to these factors, then, more than likely, you have successfully war gamed this COA.

If you skipped one or more of these steps, then you need to go back and accomplish it before proceeding with the lesson.

When you have satisfactorily completed the analysis of your first COA, repeat the process for COA number 2. (As you go through this process, do not forget that the number of COAs was arbitrarily limited to two-in real life. you would do as many as time and circumstance would allow). Modify your COA or develop a new one when you identify new requirements or critical events during war gaming. Identify advantages and disadvantages as they become apparent.

Comparison of War-Game Results

After you thoroughly understand the pros and cons of the competing COAs, you must develop a logical, defensible method of selection. There are many ways to make a choice between the COAs. Some of the most frequent are listed in ST 101-5.

One of the most crucial steps in doing a thorough COA comparison is to select the proper decision criteria against which to compare the competing COAs. A good place to find criteria is in the commander's initial planning guidance and orders or plans of higher headquarters. Other sources might be the principles of war or a critical event identified during war gaming. In any event, the criteria should be things that truly differentiate the COAs. For example, listing "mission accomplishment" as a criterion is generally not a good choice—if the COA doesn't accomplish the mission. then it is not a viable COA and shouldn't be considered.

Recall that ST 101-5 lists three primary methods for use when developing a decision tool:

- A decision matrix using numerical analysis.
- A decision matrix using subjective analysis.
- A decision matrix using broad categories.

As you compare your COAs, you can use any of the three methods you prefer. The following worksheet is set up for you to use the broad category method, but feel free to change to one of the others if you so desire.

FOURTH PRACTICAL EXERCISE: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

List your decision criteria in the following table and compare your two COAs. After you complete the table on the next page, write short rationales to support each evaluation. Select the best COA.

When you are ready, turn the page and begin.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON MATRIX

FACTORS	COA 1	COA 2
•		
•		
•		
•		
•		
•		
•		

Rationale for subjectively assessing each factor:

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Factor 6

Factor 7

List the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action relative to one another.

COA 1

Advantages

Disadvantages

COA 2

Advantages

Disadvantages

When you are sure you understand the relative merits of the competing COAs, put yourself in the place of the G3 and make a decision. Which of the two is better'? What was the basis of your decision?

RECOMMENDATION: COURSE OF ACTION_____

Once this decision is made, it will drive the rest of the lesson.

Commander's Decision and Concept

After comparing the feasible COAs, the staff will normally present its coordinated recommendation of a COA in a decision briefing to the commander. Advantages and disadvantages for each COA are highlighted. After receiving the staff recommendation for a COA, the TF Brown commander will make his decision and announce it. The staff and subordinate commanders should always take good notes at this point. Because you are doing this by correspondence, your recommendation and decision arc one and the same. ST 101-5, part I, section 8, pages 1-8-30 and I-8-31, provides formats for doing a briefing should the situation arise.

Another OPORD Requirement

Now is a good time to fill in paragraphs 3a(1), Maneuver, and 3a(2), Fires, for the OPORD in appendix 9 to this lesson guide.

FIFTH PRACTICAL EXERCISE: CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

At this stage in the tactical decision-making process (TDMP), the commander has approved your recommendation on a course of action. It is now time for the logistician to figure out how he or she plans to support that course of action. In other words, it is time to begin formulating the concept of support for the operation. This requires that the logistician understand the course of action, the units involved, the combat service support assets available, the area of operations, and so forth,

You should have noticed as you progressed through this practical exercise (PE) that M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 13, Combat Service Support Planning Data, contains a lot of the information that you needed to go through the DDMP and will need to develop your concept of support. That's the good news. The bad news is that *not all the data has been provided to you* in appendix 13 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book. Some information has been intentionally left blank for you to fill in. Some of this missing data you should have already filled in based on previous analysis. Some of the data is COA related and could not be determined until you had an approved COA. Therefore, in specific places within the appendix, where "to be determined" (TBD by student) appears, fill in the remaining information based on your analysis of the logistic requirements for the approved COA. This information, along with the information already provided, will be used to develop your concept of support later in the lesson.

In order to fill in the remaining blanks, there are certain steps you should take before you actually put pencil to paper. These are:

- Review JTFSO OPORD 9.5.

- Review the TPFDL. Look at the units available and their C-dates. This will help you determine which units can provide what support and when.

- Review the existing information in appendix 8 to the lesson guide and appendix 13 to the M/S324 Staff Planning Book. Information on airfields and ports will help you determine possible locations for the CSS units. It will also give you information on where to flow supplies into the area of operations (AO).

- Review the approved course of action you developed previously.

- Go to the map and look at the terrain especially in AO Shield and AO Dragon. Pay attention to locations of ports, airfields, major road networks, and so forth. Remember that you are providing CSS to all the Army forces (ARFOR), as well as providing some joint logistics.

Sister Service Joint Logistics

You must plan for joint as well as ARFOR logistics. The JTFSO OPORD specifies that the ARFOR will provide certain joint logistic support. The following may be used to analyze the joint logistics that is considered in the TF Brown concept of support.

AFFOR Requirements

- Mail, mortuary affairs, and class I requirements will be based on the final flow of US Air Force forces (AFFOR) into Honduras for each phase. Each phase's incremental Air Force population is computed based on the TPFDL. Daily sustainment figures should be used to arrive at the Air Force net requirements that the ARFOR would have to fulfill. Total Air Force personnel figures, according to the original TPFDL, should be around *4,556* personnel. For class I and water, this would equate to approximately 9.56 short tons of food per day (4,556 x 4.2 = 19,135.2 pounds) and 56,950 gallons of water (4,556 x 12.5 = 56,950 gallons). These figures are valid once the ARFOR is full up. The USAF element that the ARFOR coordinates with is the Prime Fare. You must show how the ARFOR will handle ARFOR supply requirements and brief the corps support command (COSCOM) units which provide support.

- Class III(b) requirements are listed as a single fuel (JP-8). Rough-cut estimates for daily bulk fuel requirements from the combat service support (CSS) planning data areas shown in appendix 13 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

- ARFOR maintenance units would assist in common equipment maintenance, and class IX requirements would include generators; high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); and commercial utility combat vehicles (CUCVs).

- Common class V requirements support the security police (40-mm, 5.56, 7.62, grenades, and 9mm). Only emergency resupply from the ARFOR is needed. Units deploy with their unit basic load (UBL) and are not

expected to be directly engaged in combat activities. For ARFOR aircraft, class V configuration, packaging, and assembly require special handling beyond ARFOR ordnance unit capabilities.

MARFOR Requirements

- ARFOR supports only on-shore Marine forces (MARFOR) ground units' JP-8 requirements. Equivalent Army unit consumption rates are used for MARFOR units.

- The MARFOR has a 600,000-gallon amphibious assault fuel dispensing system that will be located at San Lorenzo. MARFOR AV-8s and some helicopters will be located there. However, these systems use JP-4 and will be supported by offshore Navy forces (NAVFOR) replenishment systems. Therefore, the only ARFOR requirements will be to provide 59,286 gallons of JP-8 to ground elements of the MARFOR once they arrive onshore (after 10 days) (600,000 gallons divided by the daily consumption rate of 59,286 equals a 10-day supply). If you expect the ground fight to last more than 10 days, then you, as the ARFOR G4, must consider MARFOR requirements for JP-8. In addition, some medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support may be required.

Now, turn to M/S320C Staff Planning Beak, appendix 13, and till in the remaining blanks. When you have finished, return here.

Concept of Support Practical Exercise

Now that you are aware of the scenario-unique considerations that affect logistic planning, it is time for you to develop the concept of support. For this requirement, you are the TF Brown Gl/G4 responsible for planning logistics from a TF Brown and an ARFOR perspective. In this capacity,, it is your responsibility to develop the concept of support (paragraph 4a of the OPORD) for the operation. Your focus should be on the ARFOR logistics of phases I through IV of the JTF plan.

As the Gl/G4, you must determine how best to support the commander's concept of the operation you previously developed as the G3. This will require you to have a thorough knowledge of the information contained in the JTFSO OPORD, as well as the supporting data in the CSS planning data. One of your requirements is to be sure you adhere to joint and Army support doctrine in developing your concept of support. Some "number crunching" is required, but don't get bogged down in just doing calculations. More important is how you go about analyzing and applying the data to develop your concept of support.

Again, before you start, a quick review of the impact of OPORD 9_-5 on logistics maybe useful in helping you to develop your concept of support. Remember, it was written by the "joint side" of JTFSO (21st Airborne Corps) that will execute the ground portion of the USSOUTHCOM OPLAN. Pertinent logistic information for developing your concept of support can be found in:

- M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 12, JTFSO OPORD 9_-5:

  — Annex A (Task Organization).
  — Annex B (Intelligence).
  — Annex D (Logistics).
  — Annex Q (Medical Services).

- M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 13, Combat Service Support Planning Data.

- Appendix 8 to lesson guide, lesson 4.

There are numerous joint task forces specified that contain Army elements that are not assigned to the corps per se, These Army units still require combat service support from the corps under the ARFOR logistic doctrine. You will have to determine how this support will be provided. ARFOR customers can be determined by reviewing the troop list in the OPORD.

Remember, the JTFSO OPORD concept of support paragraph (4a) is different from what you have seen in previous courses. JOPES dictates its format and specifics. The concept of support you develop for TF Brown should be in accordance with ST 101-5. You should note that paragraph 4 of the TF Brown OPORD should also include ARFOR logistics.

You have already done most of the creative requirements for your support concept. You did it during the COA development process. Ordinarily, the G3 and logistic planners work together on COA development. This allows the logistic planners to work interactive y with the G3 planners and results in the support concept being done when the COA is approved. It is then a simple process to convert the support concept into Paragraph 4a, Concept of Support. Because you are doing all portions of this OPORD, you need to take time to focus on what you have probably already done. If you have already done it, then the next portion of the lesson will be quick. If you haven't already done the support concept, then this is a good time to remedy the situation.

OPORD Requirement

Turn to ST 101-5 and review the procedures for concept of support planning. Follow the procedures and develop your concept of support for your OPORD. Turn to Appendix 9, TF Brown OPORD Format, in this lesson guide, and fill in paragraph 4a. When you are finished, return to this lesson guide.

Validity Check:
Concept of Support

As you review the concept of support you just developed, ask yourself the following questions:

- Are there any C S S shortfalls: if so, what are they, and how can you overcome them?

- Are there any critical commodities (class III, V, water): if so, what needs to be done to ensure continuous resupply?

- Which units get priority of support during each phase or stage of the operation?

- Based on the ten-sin, road network, and enemy array, where do you want to position your CSS assets?

- Is an intermediate staging base (ISB) required; if so, where?

- What are the fixes for limited host nation support (HNS), congested terrain, and main supply routes (MSRs)?

- Where are the logical locations to locate various stockage points, transshipment points, and terminals?

- Does the COSCOM need to develop logistic support areas (LSAs); if so, where?

- Which corps units should be earmarked for postconflict and redeployment operations?

- What support do I need to provide to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Air Force forces, and Army special operations forces?

- How will mortuary affairs be handled?

- Is there a requirement for logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations?

- What support can be provided by host nation, allies, or other services and where?

- What are the maintenance priorities during each stage?

- How will personnel replacements be handled, and who gets priority?

- What are the transportation movement priorities on the MSRs?

- How will emergency resupply be handled?

- How are logistic units and materiel "tailored" in the TPFDL (or task organization)?

- Does the CSS overlay and concept of support reflect the impact of the mission and environment (for example, tropical weather, diseases, poor roads, infrastructure, lack of reliable HNS, joint logistic requirements, echelonrnent, and so forth)?

- Are replacement operations tailored for a force projection of this duration and scope?

- Are the medical units in the TPFDL sufficient? How does the theater evacuation policy affect medical TPFDL development? What items are addressed in the OPORD, medical annex, and the CSS planning data that are uniquely related to force projections (vaccinations, medical intelligence. more MEDEVAC versus hospitalization, water, subsistence from local economy, and so forth)? What is the possible patient evacuation flow from the forward areas to the mobile aeromedical staging facility?

- What critical MOS shortages would impede operations in a force-projection operation (terminal operators, forklift operators, linguists, and so forth)? What provisions are in place to handle catastrophic events involving CSS unit personnel? What about morale, welfare, and recreation programs?

- Do you need more field service units? How are general supplies planned for force projections (that is, pre-positioned war reserves and operational project stocks, tactical analysis teams, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supporting depots, reliance on HNS, and direct-support system ALOC)? Have you made requests for GS supply companies?

- How does the COSCOM fit into the Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC) (joint bases and base clusters defense plan, real estate management, civil affairs, and I-INS)? What is the protection priority for logistic bases protection priority, and who provides this protection?

If you addressed these factors, and resolved problems, then more than likely you have an acceptable support concept.

If you did not resolve one of these points, then you need to go back and develop a solution before proceeding with the conclusion of this lesson.

DEVELOPMENT OF OPORD

This brings you to the final portion of a long, but important, lesson. This step is why you were filling out the OPORD format in appendix 9. Without doing this as you went along, you would have a very difficult time completing this plan. In this step, you will move on to the final steps in OPORD development. Most of the creative steps are already done. What remains is to make sure you put the approved concept into the proper format. Remember, the best decision is ineffective if you are unable to produce and disseminate a clear, concise order within a relatively short time period. Converting your COA stage sketches into the operation overlay will probably be your most time-consuming job.

At the end of this lesson, you should have the following products:

- A partially completed five-paragraph OPORD (paragraphs 1,2,3 (excluding the tasks to combat support units portion), and 4a). There is no need to prepare an intelligence or service support annex. Emphasis should be on content but should follow the format found in ST 101-5.

- A corps task organization, operation overlay (depicting control measures and command posts), and a rudimentary service support overlay or sketch.

- The operation overlay must be correct and complete showing all control measures, division boundaries, and appropriate CP locations.

SUMMARY

During this lesson, you used the deliberate decision-making process to solve a tactical problem that featured a corps in a force-projection operation. In doing so, you should have gained an understanding and appreciation for the difficulty and complexity of conducting force-projection operations in an underdeveloped area of operations. Although this lesson centered around force projection, the skills you learned apply across the range of rnilitary operations. You should be highly confident in your ability to analyze a mission, estimate the situation, recommend a tactically feasible solution, and prepare an operation plan or order.

You should take pride in your accomplishment. You are only one step away from completing a very demanding course of instruction and becoming a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate.

As you take the examination, you will have the opportunity to apply the knowledge and skills you learned in this subcourse to the exam's force-projection scenario. Good luck.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Component and Joint Command Structure

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A simple, straightforward, easy to understand, unchanging command structure is *ideal* when planners begin to develop military operations. Unfortunately, however, the ideal is difficult to achieve in the real world where headquarters frequently have multiple responsibilities—they wear various "hats." The scenario in this lesson is one such situation.

The 21st Abn Corps has several major responsibilities specified in the JTFSO OPORD. The corps commander has been designated the JTFSO commander for the operation in Honduras and the land component commander (LCC). The corps also functions as TF Brown, a subordinate organization under JTFSO, the LCC. Additionally, the corps as the primary Army force in theater was also designated the Army force (ARFOR) headquarters.

This mix of roles and responsibilities challenges staff planners to continually think about their perspective when discussing the operations in Honduras. The following organization charts will help you visualize both the component roles and the joint warfighting roles.

JTFSO JOINT (WARFIGHTING) COMMANDERS



NOTES:
1. JTFSO retains JFLCC.
2. 21st Abn Corps (-) serves as TF Brown, subordinate to JFLCC.
3. JRAC designated as the coordinating authority for logistics — probably designate 21st Abn COSCOM commander.

JTFSO SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS



NOTES:
1. Service component commanders are responsible for administration and logistics of service units in theater.
2. Service component commanders may serve as joint commanders.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. J3 Tasking, Airflow Capacity

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BACKGROUND

The objective of this tasking is to get you more familiar with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) process. As you know, one of the differences between contingency operations (force projection) and mature operations (forward deployed) is the availability of forces. There will not be as many inplace forces in a force-projection operation to Honduras as you would find in a developed theater like Europe. The commander will be just as concemed with when and how forces arrive in theater as he is with how ready and how capable they are. As you prepare to work this requirement, you need to keep a couple of things in mind—a planner developing or modifying a TPFDL must know three main factors:

- The units to be deployed (the requirements).
- The transportation assets available to deploy the units.
- The ports available to off-load the deployed units when they arrive in theater.

These three factors can be manipulated to some degree-sometimes a lot. other times only slightly. The degree to which they can be manipulated depends on the situation.

From the data given you, the first factor—units to deploy—is a given. You can find the information in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, Appendix 12, JTFSO OPORD 9_-5, and in the joint deployment planning data found in the latter part of appendix 3 to this lesson guide. The second factor—transportation assets—is normally beyond your capability to modify. The US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides these resources based upon their availability and your priority. Air deployment assets for this operation arc listed in appendix 3 to this lesson guide.

The third factor—reception capability-forms the focus for what you are to do. What you arc to figure out is how many sorties remain and how much unused reception capability remains at each aerial port. Given the concerns of Commander, Joint Task Force South (COMJTFSO), you know that you will probably have to modify the operation order (OPORD) TPFDL flow or the courses of action that can be executed (or both). For now, concentrate on the emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) flow, but it won't be long until you'll have to do a detailed analysis of the TPFDL for the entire operation.

TPFDLs are based on the unified commander in chiefs (CINC'S) required delivery dates {RDDs) in conjunction with the COMJTFSO. Refinement maybe necessary based on later war-gaming analysis using actual situational events. You should echelon your combat service support (C S S) forces in this process. There is no set solution to the TPFDL refinement. You must, however, use the parameters given for the operation to flow in the necessary units.

Use the sealift information only if you plan to move an entire unit by sea. While split shipments area viable option, it is not feasible to figure out split shipments in the time allotted. If a ship is used, fill it as close as

possible to 100 percent for planning purposes. Assume units and ships are available when required. Identify the forces required for each stage or phase of the operation and their corresponding closure rates from your tactical decision making. You must establish closure rates to determine when combat operations can commence.

REQUIREMENT

You are to develop a matrix showing, by C-date and designated aerial port of debarkation (APOD), the EDRE units (C+l—C+8) that will flow into the joint operations area (JOA)—who arrives when and where. The matrix also needs to show the airlift capabilities for each APOD. Compare the requirements for each APOD on each day with the capabilities for each APOD shown by C-date. When you have finished, you will have abetter understanding of the constraints that will affect subsequent planning. Use the information provided below in conjunction with the JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 to do your analysis. Appendix 3 of this lesson guide also provides a summary of JTFSO deployment planning data for your use.

Airfield Reception Capabilities

Airfield reception capabilities (in C-141 equivalents) per 24 hours of upgraded operation.

- La Mesa: C+l:100, C+2:100, C+3:99, C+4:100, C+5:97, C+6:100, C+7:95.
- Soto Cane: C+1:100, C+2:0, C+3:77, C+4:117, C+5:118, C+6:116, C+7:7.

Available Airframes

- C-l4ls: C+1:129, C+2:27, C+3:110, C+4:148, C+5:146, C+6:149, C+7:35.
- C-5s: C+1:48, C+2:48, C+3:47, C+4:47, C+5:46, C+6:46, C+7:46.

EDRE Units

21st Abn Corps
- Corps Aslt CP

17th Inf Div (Lt)
- 1st Bde
- 121st Aslt Hel Bn
- 17th Atk Hel Bn
- 2-45 FA (105,T)
- A/2-439 ADA (A/S)
- 1st FSB

21st Avn Bde (Corps)
- 116th Aslt Hel Bn

Corps Troops
- 771st Cmd Sig Ops Bn (Abn)

21st COSCOM
- HHC, 21st COSCOM
- 2001st MMC (Fwd)
- 4104th MCC
  - 797th MCT (Air Tml)
  - 798th MCT (Air Tml)
- Contract Spt Tm
- Procurement Law Tm
- 753d Trans Cgo Trf Co
- HHC, 719th Trans Bn
- 701st Trans Co (Lt)
- 702d Trans Co (Lt)
- HHC, 82d Med Bde
- HHC, 800th Med Bn
- 803d Med Bn (Evac)
- 890th Area Spt Med Co
- 8121st Med Det (Air Amb)
- 8002d Med Det (Vet)
- 801lth Med Det (Prev Med)
- HHC, 21st CSG
- HHC, 90th CSB
- 901lth Maint Co (DS)
- 201st QM Sup Co (DS)
- 257th Petrl Sup Co
- QM CEB Tm 1

13th SF GP
- HHC, 13th SFG (Abn)
- 1-13 SF
- 2-13 SF
- 3-13 SF
- 7th PSYOP Co (Abn) (DS)
- Spt Co, 13th SFG (Abn)

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. JTFSO Deployment Planning Data

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ORGANIZATION

Use this appendix and the deployment data in the JTFSO OPORD to complete the practical exercises. This appendix is organized as follows. The next section lists CONUS-based US Army units that are or could be made available to the Commander, 21st Abn Corps. Then, a section identifies other CONUS-based US Army units that will fall under the Army force (ARFOR) commander's list of units that must be supported. Following that is a list of US Army units that are currently in the USCINCSO AOR. The last section contains additional deployment information necessary to analyze strategic lift requirements and constraints.

You will use this appendix to plan the daily echelonment of forces and supplies. Based on the unit selected, lift requirements. port of debarkation (POD) constraints, and factors of METT-T, you will eventually develop a TPFDL that meets the demands of the lesson scenario and execute order. Appendix 1 to annex A to the JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 (M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12) contains only the original estimate TPFDL of JTFSO. You, acting as a corps staff planner, must originate a flow of US Army units *and* theater sustainment buildup. You are also acting as the Army service component planner who provides necessary Army units to support the JTFSO commander. The units you select will be interwoven into a JTFSO TPFDL based on the US Transportation Commands (USTRANSCOM's) analysis.

The sections headed "Army Units Available for Planning" and "Other Army Units Supported by ARFOR Commander" identify units *available* for deployment from which corps planners must select and then echelon into the theater. Not all units listed will deploy in every contingency operation. Some units might not be required. The M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12, has additional information necessary for strategic mobility analysis and planning.

To help you complete the tactical decision-making process, some information is provided to expedite the procedure. The objective of the PE is to understand the concepts of echelonment and strategic flow force-projection operations. Inmost instances, the OPLAN will seldom be executed as it was originally written.

Some information is intentionally altered due to classification

Explanatory Notes for Deployment Tables

The figures in the pax column represent the number of personnel that will deploy to the theater *if* the unit is selected. Using quantities of personnel other than the figures provided will require an extrapolated change of lift requirements. The number of personnel deployed (for each time period) will be the cumulative strength figures that are to be used for this PE.

The aircraft sortie columns reflect the number of aircraft needed to deploy the entire unit, all its equipment, and its accompanying supplies. A number in the C-5 column indicates that the unit has outsized cargo. For *planning* purposes, a C-5 sortie equals two C-141 equivalent sorties (that is, two C-5s = four C-141 equivalents).

The miscellaneous column primarily reflects the unit's sealift requirements. This column is necessary if the ARFOR planner decides to deploy all the unit's equipment by sea. Personnel move by air (commercial) to arrive at least 1 day before the ship (some personnel move by sea as supercargo). Percentages given show how much of the ship's capacity the unit would take up *if* it were moved by sea. Aviation unit percentages are given only for breakbulk (BB) ship so that offloading and reassembly times arc shortened.

Ports of embarkation (POEs) are found in the TPFDL of JTFSO OPORD 9_-5. Disregard intheater PODS originally stated in the JTFSO OPORD to determine new PODS within the theater based on the execute order and the final flow analysis.

Information for airborne insertion of the airborne division and its initial sustainment using C-130 aircraft is under the heading "Additional Deployment Information. "

How to Use the Deployment Tables

In this example, you want the Ml battalion of the airborne division in country by C+3. Look down the TPFDL in the OPORD (M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12) and see that it was planned for C+27 (under the LAD column). Next, find the same unit under "Army Units Available for Planning" in this appendix and see that it takes 30 C-141s and 1 C-5 to move this unit. Then look at the available aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) in country and choose one that is operationally sound and can accommodate the required sorties for the unit. Since this is a rough-cut lift flow, combine the sorties into C-141 equivalents. Therefore, the unit will require 32 C-141 equivalent sorties. (Remember for planning purposes, one C-5 sortie equals two C-141 equivalent sorties.)

Go through all of the units necessary for C+3 in the same manner until you have either exhausted the available sorties and the reception capabilities of the APODs or have moved the forces required for that day. However, you must also take into account the sustainment sorties required for each day based on the resupply requirements found in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book appendix 13. Since you are figuring the flow for C+3, note in the last section of this appendix that you must account for 175 short tons (S TONS) of nonunit sustainment. Nonunit sustainment will be moved by the available C-5s sorties remaining after unit requirements are fulfilled. The sustainment flow for C+3 would take up 2.4 C-5s (using conventional rounding to 3) or 6 C-141 equivalents.

If, for some reason, you decide to move the unit to the theater out of its original sequence and by ship, note that it would take up 14 percent of a roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ship. You could maximize the economy of the ship by putting other units on it as well. Go to the TPFDL and find the sea port of embarkation (SPOE) for this unit (Charleston SC). From the section titled "Additional Deployment Information" of this appendix, note that it will

take 1 day to load and 1 day to offload a RO/RO as well as 2.2 days to sail from the CONUS SPOE to Honduras. Since the unit is needed thereat C+3 and it will take approximately 4.5 days to get it to the theater by ship, you would have to accept a different day for the unit in country or specify that it must move by air. (The planner must complete ship loading, sailing, and offloading times (cycle time) for all units he or she expects to move by sea. The planner must also take into account the limited number of available ships for this contingency.)

The closure rates of forces and sustainment to the theater provide planners with the conditions of when a contingency phase may begin or end. For example, the amount of required forces and supplies for conducting decisive combat operations may be expressed as a percentage of certain types of units and/or a specified number of days of supply (DofS). You will use the closure rates you have established to determine when certain phases or other critical events are estimated (by C-date) to occur.

ARMY UNITS AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Mist
21st Abn Corps				
HHC, 21st Abn Corps	198	10	0	0.05 RO/RO
Aslt CP	40	1	0	EDRE unit
Tac CP	48	2	0	
17th Inf Div (Lt)				
HHC, 17th Inf Div (Lt)	233	15	0	0.06 RO/RO
1st Bde	1,791	47	0	EDRE unit
2d Bde	1,791	47	0	0.12 RO/RO
3d Bde	1,791	47	0	0.12 RO/RO
17th Avn Bde				
HHC, 17th Avn Bde	176	25	0	0.45 BB
121st Aslt Hel Bn	363	46	1	EDRE Unit
175th Air Cav Sqdn	265	56	1	0.56 BB
21st Atk Hel Bn	236	14	4	EDRE Units
17th Inf DIVARTY				
HHB, 21st DIVARTY	117	8	0	0.04 RO/RO
A/2-48 FA (155, T)	140	11	0	0.06 RO/RO
2-45 FA (105, T)	412	23	1	EDRE unit
2-46 FA (105, T)	412	23	1	0.11 RO/RO
2-47 FA (105, T)	412	23	1	0.11 RO/RO
2-439 ADA				
HHB, 2-439 ADA (A/S)	77	6	1	0.04 RO/RO
A/2-439 ADA (A/S)	119	14	0	EDRE unit
B/2-439 ADA (AM)	119	14	0	0.06 RO/RO
C/2-439 ADA (A/S)	119	14	0	0.06 RO/RO
17th Engr Bn	294	17	1	0.09 RO/RO
17th MI Bn	338	18	0	0.08 RO/RO
17th Sig Bn	498	59	1	0.26 RO/RO
17th MP Co	81	6	0	0.03 RO/RO
17th Inf Div Band	41	0.5	0	
17th DISCOM				

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
HHC/MMC, 21st DISCOM	89	9	0	0.04 RO/RO
MSB	481	50	4	0.34 RO/RO
FSB	649	21	1	EDRE unit
FSB (X2)	1,298	44	2	0.22 RO/RO
AMC	151	20	1	0.11 RO/RO
102d Abn Div				
HHC, 102d Abn Div	258	14	0	0.06 RO/RO
1st Bde	2,123	64	0	0.22 RO/RO
2d Bde	2,123	64	0	0.22 RO/RO
3d Bde	2,123	64	0	0.22 RO/RO
3-73 Armor (Abn) (M551)	476	51	0	0.24 RO/RO
102d Avn Bde (Abn)				
HHC, 102d Avn Bde (Abn)	180	25	0	0.46 BB
196th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)	146	14	0	0.19 BB
197th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)	146	14	0	0.19 BB
1-28 Cav (Abn)	385	33	3	0.76 BB
102d Atk Hel Bn (Abn)	254	28	0	0.56 BB
102d DIVARTY (Abn)				
HHB, 102d DIVARTY (Abn)	126	7	1	0.04 RO/RO
1-57 FA (105 T) (Abn)	441	30	1	0.14 RO/RO
1-58 FA (105 T) (Abn)	441	30	1	0.14 RO/RO
1-59 FA (105 T) (Abn)	441	30	1	0.14 RO/RO
1-442 ADA (G/S)(Abn)				
HHB, 1-442 ADA (Abn)	72	13	1	0.03 RO/RO
A/l-442 ADA (G/S) (Abn)	180	11	0	0.07 RO/RO
B/1-442 ADA (G/S) (Abn)	180	11	0	0.07 RO/RO
C/1-442 ADA (G/S) (Abn)	180	11	0	0.07 RO/RO
102d Engr Bn (Abn)	419	36	1	0.18 RO/RO
102d MI Bn (Abn)	426	30	1	0.14 RO/RO
102d Sig Bn (Abn)	496	50	1	0.22 RO/RO
102d MP Co	119	15	1	0.09 RO/RO
102d Div Band	42	0.5	0	
102d Cml Co (Abn)	128	19	1	0.09 RO/RO
102d DISCOM (Abn)				
AMC (Abn)	221	22	1	0.15 RO/RO
Med Bn (Abn)	347	44	0	0.20 RO/RO
S&T Bn (Abn)	741	128	2	0.50 RO/RO
Maint Bn (Abn)	533	75	2	0.37 RO/RO
HHC/MMC (Abn)	216	15	1	0.08 RO/RO
21st Avn Bde (Corps)				
HHC, 21st Avn Bde	151	12	1	0.46 BB
104th Avn Gp	72	7	1	0.11 BB
116th Aslt Hel Bn	240	54	1	EDRE unit
117th Aslt Hel Bn	240	54	1	0.76 BB
121st Mdm Lift Hel Bn	505	51	25	0.98 BB

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
725th Cmd Avn Bn	325	46	1	0.66 BB
103d Atk Hel Gp	76	7	1	0.23 BB
120th Atk Hel Bn	226	39	1	0.56 BB
121st Atk Hel Bn	226	39	1	0.56 BB
160th ATC Bn	130	6	0	
21 St corps Arty				
HHB, 21st Corps Arty	200	15	1	0.10 RO/RO
1-651 FA(155, T)	485	58	1	0.31 RO/RO
2-651 FA (155, T)	485	58	1	0.31 RO/RO
3-651 FA (155, T) (Abn)	521	57	1	0.31 RO/RO
2-661 FA (MLRS)	508	118	4	0.51 RO/RO
Corps Troops				
21st ADA Bde				
HHB, 21st ADA Bde	82	2	1	0.06 RO/RO
1-430 ADA (Chap)	448	3	15	0.32 RO/RO
1-461 ADA (Hawk)	553	6	21	0.26 RO/RO
21st MI Bde (Abn)				
HHC, 21st MI Bde	91	8	0	0.07 RO/RO
210th MI Bn (TE)	l90	9	0	0.18 RO/RO
220th MI Bn (AE)	288	15	0	0.25 RO/RO
221st MI Bn (Ops) (Abn)	271	16	()	0.15 RO/RO
250th LRSC	62	4	0	
21st Sig Bde				
HHC, 21st Sig Bde	78	5	0	0,14 RO/RO
712th Sig Rdo Bn	254	16	0	0.25 RO/RO
770th Sig Bn Area Spt MSE	216	15	0	0.26 RO/RO
771st Cmd Sig Ops Bn (Abn)	144	8	0	EDRE unit
705th Sig Spt Bn (Abn)	137	8	0	0.19 RO/RO
21st MP Bde				
HHC, 21st MP Bde	98	3	0	0.07 RO/RO
230th MP Bn (Abn)	464	11	0	0.05 RO/RO
272d MP Bn (w/EPW Aug)	464	11	0	0.05 RO/RO
51st Engr Bde				
HHC, 51st Engr Bde	170	5	0	0.08 RO/RO
538th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Abn)	377	39	1	0.18 RO/RO
Engr Det, Well Drilling	25	1	0	
500th Cbt Bn	792	35	30	0.56 RO/RO
502d Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)	792	35	30	0.56 RO/RO
5045th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	10	12	0.24 RO/RO 0.80 BB

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Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
5046th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	10	12	0.24 RO/RO 0.80 BB
5047th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	10	12	0.24 RO/RO 0.80 BB
5048th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	10	12	0.24 RO/RO 0.80 BB
4019th Engr Port Const Co	188	17	10	0.06 RO/RO 0.20 BB
4505th Engr Det (Diving)	16	0.5	0	
4815th Engr Pipeline Const Co	213	3	5	0.06 RO/RO 0.20 BB
21st COSCOM				
HHC, 21st COSCOM	311	23	2	EDRE unit
2199th RAOC	78	3	0	0.02 RO/RO
2001st MMC (Fwd)	116	3	0	EDRE unit
523d EOD Det	19	1	0	
4104th MCC	124	2	0	EDRE unit
797th MCT (Air Tml) (LF)	48	0.5	0	EDRE unit
798th MCT (Air Tml) (LF)	48	0.5	0	EDRE unit
7058th MCT (LB)	7	0.25	0	
7071st MCT (Hwy Reg) (LH)	4	0.25	0	
7072d MCT (Hwy Reg) (LH)	4	0.25	0	
7073d MCT (Hwy Reg) (LH)	4	0.25	0	
155th Postal Co (DS)	115	1	0	
131st Fin Spt	89	1	0	
Contract Spt Tm	12	0.25	0	EDRE unit
Procurement Law Tm (JA)	14	0,25	0	EDRE unit
21lth PSC Pers Spt Bn	237	10	0	
209th Press Camp HQ	19	0.5	0	
70th Trans Gp				
HHC, 70th Trans Bde	135	2	0	0.05 RO/RO
771st TMT Bn				
HHC, 771st Trans Bn	77	2	0	0.05 RO/RO
7010th Trans Mdm Trk Co (cc)	178	3	15	0.32 RO/RO
723d Trans Mdm Trk Co (POL)	178	2	15	0.32 RO/RO
753d Trans Cgo Trf Co	86	2	4	EDRE unit
714th Trans Tml Bn				
HHC, 714th Trans Tml Bn	68	2	0	0.05 RO/RO
7099th Trans Tml Svc Co (BB)	298	5	5	0.04 RO/RO

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
703d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm)	180	4	4	0.20 RO/RO
719th Trans Bn				
HHC, 719th Trans Bn	76	2	0	EDRE unit
701st Trans Co (Lt Trk 5-T)	178	8	3	EDRE Unit
702d Trans Co (Lt Trk 5-T)	178	8	3	EDRE Unit
82d Med Bde				
HHC, 82d Med Bde	103	2	0	EDRE Unit
84th MASH	146	1	3	0.80 BB
809th CSH	609	17	14	0.70 RO/RO 1.50 BB
888th Med Det (Surg) (Abn)	18	1	0	
800th Med Bn				
HHC, 800th Med Bn	135	1	1	EDRE unit
880th Med Det, Dental Svc	70	3	0	
803d Med Bn (Evac)	39	1	0	EDRE unit
855th Med Amb Co	119	7	0	
890th ASMC	93	2	0	EDRE unit
8121st Med Det (Air Amb) (RG)	147	7	2	EDRE unit
8120th Med Det (Air Amb) (RG)	147	7	2	0.56 BB
8002d Med Det, Vet Svc (JA)	17	1	0	EDRE unit
886th Med Det (Log Spt)	68	2	0	
8011th Prev Med Det (Entomy)	40	1	0	EDRE unit
21st CSG				
HHC, 21st CSG	119	3	0	EDRE unit
90th CSB				
HHC, 90th CSB	67	2	0	EDRE unit
500th Ord Co (Convl Ammo) (DS)	230	5	10	0.50 RO/RO 0.80 BB
901lth Maint Co (DS)	287	3	2	EDRE unit
950th Msl Maint Tm (TOW/Dragon)	11	1	0	
201st QM Sup Co (DS)	244	4	6	EDRE unit
91st CSB				
HHC, 91st CSB	67	2	0	
26th Airdrop Sup & Equip Rep Co	189	2	1	
9012th Maint Co (DS)	287	3	2	0.30 RO/RO
203d QM Sup Co (DS)	244	4	6	
257th Petri Sup Co	183	3	8	EDRE unit
QM CEB Augmentation Tm	15	1	0	EDRE unit
92d CSB (Prov)*				

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
HHC, 92d CSB	69	3	0	
400th Rep Parts Sup Co	277	5	6	
POL Wharf Plt	25	0.5	0	
615th POL Pipeline Tml Ops Co	110	3	4	
8012th Coll Co (MA)	64	1	1	
5099th Water Purif Tm (12K GPH)	19	1	0	
701st Aircraft Maint Co	257	18	5	

*Provisional unit on request from FORSCOM.

OTHER ARMY UNITS SUPPORTED BY ARFOR COMMANDER

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
SOCCE	14	0.5	0	
301st CA Bde				
HHC, 301st CA Bde	49	1	0	
96th CA Bn				
HHC, 96th CA Bn	40	1	0	
CA Det (GS)	55	0.5	0	
CA Det (DS)	48	0.75	0	
99th CA Bn (FID/UW)				
HHC, 99th CA Bn	40	1	0	
CA Det (GS)	34	0.5	0	
CA Det (DS)	40	0.75	0	
CINC Op Spt Tm (A)	150	0.5	0	
8th PSYOP Gp (Abn)(-)	46	1	0	
17th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Tac)	312	3	0	0.03 RO/RO
28th PSYOP Bn (Strat Dissem)	113	2	0	0.02 RO/RO
409th PSYOP Bn (EPW)	112	3	0	0.02 RO/RO
617th Sp Op Avn Det (MH-60)	175	7	1	0.80 BB

OTHER ARMY UNITS CURRENTLY IN USCINCSO AOR

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
13th SF GP				
HHC, 13th SF Gp	88	1	0	EDRE unit
1-13 SF	261	3	0	EDRE unit
2-13 SF	261	3	0	EDRE unit
3-13 SF	261	3	0	EDRE unit

Unit	Pax	C-141	C-5	Misc
7th PSYOP Co (Abn)(DS)	130	1	0	EDRE unit
Spt Co, 13th SF Gp	226	2	1	EDRE unit
USARSO				
JTFB				
ARNG Engr Bn (Rotation)	360			Honduras
A/12th Engr Bn (Const)	188			Honduras
32d MI Bn (AE(Lt))	277			Honduras
19th Sig Bn (-)	388			Honduras
63d MP Co	212			Honduras
JTFB Log Spt Elm	414			Honduras
JTFB Hosp	87			Honduras
ll0lst Sig Bde				Panama
156th Sig Bn	216	Intratheater	Panama	
160th Sig Bn	235	Intratheater	Panama	

NOTE: Strategic lift computations *do not* need to be done for Air Force units. The number of USAF personnel to be supported will be taken from the personnel figures listed in the USAF TPFDL.

ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION

Distance Factors (Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)

CONUS SPOE	Transit Hrs (BB[1])	Transit Hrs (RO/RO[1])	OCONUS SPOD	Nautical Miles
Galveston, TX	75.4	65.6	Panama	1,508
	85.8	74.6	San Juan	1,715
	52.8	45.9	P Cortes[2]	1,055
New York, NY	98.7	85.8	Panama	1,974
	70	60.8	San Juan	1,399
	91.2	79.3	P Cortes	1,823
Norfolk. VA	89	77.3	Panama	1,779
	62.6	54.4	San Juan	1,252
	81.2	70.6	P Cortes	1,623
Charleston, SC	76	67	Panama	1,516
	56	48.7	San Juan	1,121
	59.4	52.7	P Cortes	1,167
Jacksonville, FL	65.8	57.8	Panama	1,329
	40	34.9	San Juan	802
	58.2	50.1	P Cortes	073
Seattle, WA	144	130	S Lorenzo[3]	3,000
	188	157	P Cortes	3,880

[1] FSS BB at 20 knots and FSS RO/RO at 23 knots.
[2] Puerto Cortes, Honduras.
[3] San Lorenzo, Honduras

Ship Loading

Based on a 20-hour workday, fast sealift ship (FSS) BB takes 3 days to load and 3 days to offload. FSS RO/RO takes 1 day to load and 1 day to offload: 5 RO/ROs available and 5 FSSs BB (self-sustaining) available. Maximum FSS (full) draft is 36 feet, 8 inches.

Sea Lines of Communication

Ships may sail anytime after C+9. This will simulate loading requirements. Pacific parts are reserved for MARFOR use. Class V BB carrier will sail from Charleston, SC. SLOCs open on or about C+14.

Intertheater Lift Allocations to ARFOR from JTFSO

- Number of daily C-5 sorties: 50.

- Number of daily C-141 sorties: 150.

Daily Sustainment and Buildup Requirements (in STONs) Moved by Air

	C+0	C+1	C+2	C+3	C+4	C+5	C+6	C+7	C+8	C+9	C+10
STONs:	82	102	133	175	186	219	252	279	390	430	600

	C+ll	C+12	C+13	C+14	C+15	C+16	C+17	C+18 . . . . . .n.
STONs:	650	780	780	800	800	800	800	600 . . . . . .n.

- Supplies are to be moved by the daily unused C-5 sorties (after unit requirements have been met). Average C-5 planning payload weight is 73 STONs.

- All sorties computed must be rounded to the next higher whole number: this will take average cube as well as weight into account.

- Sustainment air sorties for each day must be allocated against that day's total sortie rate. Unit sorties plus sustainment sorties must be equal to or less than the maximum allowable sorties for all APODs in theater. The above STONs represent daily resupply and buildup levels for classes of supplies established by JTFSO. The ARFOR planner would normally have to compute the levels for both air and ocean movement. However, due to classroom time constraints, these figures are provided. The STONs given do not reflect SLOC sustainment tons, which you *do not need to calculate* for this lesson. The objective is to understand that some of the strategic air flow available to a CINC must be specifically allocated for supplies and equipment.

Nonunit Equipment

Nonunit equipment from the JTFSO OPLAN 9_-5 TPFDL is selected and moved as needed.

Airborne Division

If the airborne division is transported by strategic air and airlanded, the required sorties per unit areas stated above in this appendix. If you desire to insert the airborne division by a combination of parachute assault and airland, use the following gross planning factors. This move assumes early deployment of the airborne division aviation brigade and the helicopter and air cavalry assets by either strategic airlift or sealift.

The following movement of the remainder of the airborne division allows closure of the division in a 4-day period. *It assumes the early seizure of an airstrip capable of supporting C-130s to allow the airlanding of the follow-on elements, equipment, and sustainment. If airfields are not secured, these planning factors are invalid and cannot be used. The* movement depicted does not realistically relate how the airborne division would task organize to move the division brigades into the theater. It is intended only as a gross planning factor for use by the ARFOR staff The decision to insert the airborne division using parachute assault will result in a loss of 30 percent of the 150 C- 141 B sorties allocated per day to the ARFOR. You must make sure this number of C- 14lB sorties is available on the days designated for the insertion of the airborne division. For this problem, the

C-130 requirement for airdropping and airlanding follow-on elements will not be calculated. The requisite number of C-130s is assumed to be available for use.

102d Airborne Div

Unit	Pax	Location	Day	APOE/SPOE
CASAB HHC, 102d Abn Div	258	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
17BAB 1st Bde	2,123	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
CAFAB HHB, 102d DIVARTY (Abn)	126	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
FW6AB 1-57 FA (105,T) (Abn)	441	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
FCAAB HHB, 1-442 ADA (Abn)	72	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
FGTAB A/1-442 ADA (G/S)(Abn)	180	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
ERZAB 102d MI Bn (Abn)	426	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
EU3AB 102d Sig Bn (Abn)	496	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
TAWAB AMC (Abn)	221	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
CMAAB Med Bn (Abn)	347	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
CTYAB S&T Bn (Abn)	741	Bragg	1	Pope/Chas
CSTAB Maint Bn (Abn)	533	Bragg	2	Pope/Chas
CAMAB HHC/MMC (Abn)	216	Bragg	2	Pope/Chas
17BAB 2d Bde	2,123	Bragg	2	Pope/Chas
FW6AB 1-58 FA (105, T) (Abn)	441	Bragg	2	Pope/Chas
FGTAB B/1-442 ADA (G/S) (Abn)	180	Bragg	2	Pope/Chas
TYBAB 3-73 Armor (Abn)(M551)	476	Bragg	3	Pope/Chas
EV3AB 102d Engr Bn (Abn)	419	Bragg	3	Pope/Chas
EPMAB 102d MP Co (Abn)	119	Bragg	3	Pope/Chas
17BAB 3d Bde	2,123	Bragg	4	Pope/Chas
FW6AB 1-59 FA (105, T) (Abn)	441	Bragg	4	Pope/Chas
FGTAB C/1-442 ADA (G/S) (Abn)	180	Bragg	4	Pope/Chas
OP6AB 102d Div Band	42	Bragg	4	Pope/Chas
EREAB 102d Cml Co (Abn)	128	Bragg	4	Pope/Chas

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Example Solution to Practical Exercise: Available Air Sorties and Reception Capability

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GENERAL

This practical exercise (PE) was designed to cause you to think about many of the important issues associated with deploying a force to Honduras. While the "number crunching" has been replaced by computer programs, the planner must appreciate the thought process behind the system. The commander has clearly stated the importance of air operations to rapidly position the force for subsequent employment. He wants flexibility, and he wants the staff to analyze the numbers to aid his decision-making requirements.

Thinking about the introduction of forces into the theater should have caused you to realize several points that will prove useful in future planning requirements. You clearly noted that on some days, an APOD lacked the capacity for the airlift that was scheduled. This identified constraint, for example, required you to modify the flow of EDRE units. Because the EDRE package had to share airframes and airfield reception with other service components, you experienced restrictions in the number of aircraft apportioned to the corps. as well as aircraft reception in the specified APODs.

METHODOLOGY

Your task was to develop a matrix to list EDRE units by C-date and by designated APOD to determine constraints and scenario-specfic difficulties. While there may be various ways to derive the required information, the following methodology will help you understand how the numbers in the example were determined.

Step 1. List the EDRE units with airlift requirements by designated APOD for each C-date. Begin with C+l; end with date of closure of last EDRE unit (C+8).

- EDRE units are listed in appendix 2 to the lesson guide, lesson 4.

- Airlift requirements for EDRE units are in appendix 3 to the lesson guide, lesson 4.

- C-dates and APOD for each unit arc listed in the TPFDL, Appendix 1. Annex A. JTFSO OPORD 9_-5, located in appendix 12 of the M/S320C Staff Planning Book.

For each day, add the C-141 and C-5 requirements at each APOD.

Step 2. Compute the numbers and analyze what it means to the planning process—the following information shows an example of a solution.

NOTE: It takes until C+8 for the last EDRE unit to arrive in country. On several of the early days, airfield capability and airlift availability require modifications to the TPFDL.

C+l SC = Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

1st Bde	(47/0)
2-45 FA (105,T)	(23/1)
A/2-439 ADA (Gun/Avenger)	(14/0)
Corps Aslt CP	(1/0)
771st Cmd Sig Ops Bn (Abn)	(8/0)
797th MCT (Air Tml)	(.5)
798th MCT (Air Tml)	(.5)
Contract Spt Tm	(.25)
Procurement Law Tm	(,25)
701st Trans Co (LT)	(8/3)
201st QM Sup Co (DS)	(4/6)

TOTAL (106.5/10)
APOD capability: 100 C-141 equivalents.
Airlift availability: 129 C-141 and 48 C-5.

NOTE: You require 127 C-141 equivalents, but the airfield can handle only 100. Do you divert to another airfield?

C+2 SC= Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

17th Atk Hel Bn	(14/4)
121st Aslt Hel Bn	(46/1)
1st FSB	(21/1)
116th Aslt Hel Bn	(54/1)

TOTAL (135/7)
APOD capability>: 0 C-141 equivalents.
Airlift availability: 27 C-141 and 48 C-5s.

NOTE: You require 149 C-141 equivalents but the airfield can handle none and you have only 123 C-141 equivalents. What do you divert? Where? What do you try to bring in earlier or later?

C+3 SC = Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

4104th MCC	(2/0)	
753d Trans Cgo Trf Co	(2/4)	
702d Trans Co (Lt)	(8/3)	
HHC, 719th Trans Bn	(2/0)	
HHC, 82d Med Bde	(2/0)	
8002d Med Det (Vet)	(1/0)	
801lth Med Det (Prev Med)	(1/0)	
HHC, 21st COSCOM		(23/2)
HHC, 21st CSG		(3/0)

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HHC, 90th CSB	(2/0)
257th Petri Sup Co	(3/8)
901lth Maint Co (DS)	(3/2)

TOTAL (52/19)
APOD capability: 77 C-141 equivalents.
Airlift availability: 110 C- 141 and 47 C-5s.

NOTE: You have 90C-141 equivalents, but the airfield can handle only 77. What do you divert, and where?

C+4 SC= Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

HHC, 800th Med Bn	(1/1)
890th Area Spt Med Co	(2/0)
8121st Med Det (Air Amb)	(7/2)
QM CEB Tm 1	(1/0)

TOTAL (1 1/3)
APOD capability: 117 C-141 equivalents.
Airlift availability: 148 C-141 and 47 C-5s.

NOTE: The airfield capability and airlift availability support planned lift.

C+6 SC **=** Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

HHC, 13th SFG (Abn)	(1/0)
1-13 SFG (Abn)	(3/0)
2-13 SFG (Abn)	(3/0)
3-13 SFG (Abn)	(3/0)
7th PSYOP Co (Abn) (DS)	(1/0)
Spt Co, 13th SFG (Abn)	(2/1)

TOTAL (13/1)
APOD capability: 116 C-141 equivalents.
Airlift availability: 149 C-141 and 46 C-5s.

NOTE: The airfield capability and airlift availability support the planned lift. Also note that units are deploying from Panama not CONUS.

C+8 SC= Soto Cano (C-141/C-5)

2001st MCC (Fwd) (3/0)

NOTES: 1. Not listed on the TPFDL but listed as an EDRE unit is the 803d Med Bn (Evac) (1/0)
2. Requirements, capabilities, and availability provide much flexibility to usc other airfields, as appropriate-not essential that all units come through Soto Cane.

97MAR/S320C4X4/eh

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. J3 Tasking, TPFDL Adjustments

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BACKGROUND

The J3 had several action officers gather some initial data that will be helpful in considering possible TPFDL adjustments. The officers identified the 1-500 ADA (Patriot) as a unit to possibly deploy. You need to look at the information below, the JTFSO OPORD, and the joint deployment data from appendix 3 as you consider what you will recommend.

FRN/UTC/Force	Description	Pax	Origin	LAD/APOE/SPOE/POD
1LP65	1-500 ADA (Patriot) Btrys A-D	765	Hood	RGAAF/Galv/SC
XE666	8099th Hv Crane Plt	12	Belvoir	Richm/Norf/SC
HAAA	Missile Maint (Patriot) Augmentation Tm	27	Hood	RGAAF/Galv/SC

Deployment data for those units identified is as follows:

FRN/UTC/Force	Description	Pax	C-141	C-5
1LP65	1-500 ADA (Patriot) Btrys A-D	765	4	16
XE666	8099th Hv Crane Plt	12	0	2
HAAA	Missile Maint (Patriot) Augmentation Tm	27	0.5	0

REQUIREMENT

Your specific requirement is to decide on the recommendations that you will offer to the commander about revising some parts of the existing TPFDL. Be as specific as possible. but also realize that you will make additional deployment adjustments as you go. What you want to do here is to identify some of the more important adjustments that can be done now to simplify course of action development.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Example Solution to Practical Exercise: Possible TPFDL Adjustments

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Specific adjustments to the troop list would vary from staff analysis to staff analysis. The following comments provide an example of what might be done. The suggestions are not binding on future course of action development, but if your solution differed significantly, you should review your proposal to ensure you have not exceeded the transportation resources allocated to this mission.

Few changes are necessary to the flow of 21st COSCOM units. The support package flow is what is needed with possibly one exception. The late arriving 809th Combat Support Hospital may not be needed due to the adjusted theater evacuation policy. This hospital could be eliminated from the flow.

Eliminating the 2-661 FA (MLRS) and the 1-430 ADA (Chap) frees one of the RO/RO ships, which would allow a reduced corps engineer brigade to move a day earlier and to close by C+14. The corps MP battalion, the 272d MP Bn, would also arrive 2 days earlier on C+l3. The MLRS unit may not be needed in this contingency and a Hawk missile battalion is already in theater. Given the enemy air capability and the allied air available by C+l0, the Chaparral battalion may not be required.

The following engineer units could be eliminated from the flow: 502d Cbt Engr Bn, 5045th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon), 5046th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon), and the 5048th Engr Ash Fltbrg Co (Ribbon). This would leave one battalion in the corps engineer brigade and one combat engineer battalion. The disembarked 1st MEF (Fwd) also has a bridge company, but this is not a ribbon bridge unit.

You may want to switch three units from the corps aviation brigade from movement by sea to movement by air the 121st Mdm Lift Hel Bn (CH47D), 120th Atk Hel Bn (AH-64), and 117th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60). These units originally arrived on C+22-25 on ships that had to be round tripped to the states.

These units may be needed to assist in either the sustainment or mobility of corps units. You will have to examine available airflow and reception to determine if these units could be moved forward in the flow. The adjusted flow of some of the above-mentioned units is as follows:

21st Corps Troops

FRN/UTC	Force Description	PAX	Origin	LAD	APOE/SPOE/POD
CPDFC	272d MP Bn (W/EPW Aug)	464	Bragg	C+13	Pope/Chas/PC
C4YAC	HHC, 51st Engr Bde	170	Bragg	C+14	Pope/Chas/PC
CRY2C	538th Engr Cbt Bn (Abn)	377	Bragg	C+14	Pope/Chas/PC
CTY3C	500th Cbt Engr Bn	792	Bragg	C+14	Pope/Chas/PC
CNF9C	5047th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	Bragg	C+14	Pope/Chas/PC

V7N90	4505th Engr Det (Diving)	16	Belvo	C+13	Langl/Norf/PC
V7L20	4815th Engr Pipeline Const Co	213	Belvo	C+14	Langl/Norf/PC

As stated in M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12 (app 1 to annex A to JTFSO OPORD 9_-5), the parachute assault of the airborne division will require 30 percent of the 150 C-141 sorties allocated per 24-hour period to the ARFOR. The airborne data assumes early deployment of the airborne division aviation brigade and the helicopter and air cavalry assets. The remainder of the airborne division could be closed in a 4-day period using a combination of parachute assault and air landing. This assumes the early seizure of a C-130-capable airstrip to allow air landing of the follow-on elements, equipment, and sustainment. If airfields are not secured, these planning factors are invalid and cannot be used. If you insert the airborne division by a combination of parachute assault and air landing, two brigades plus the M-551 battalion can be on the ground in 3 days. The last brigade would arrive the fourth day. The airborne division elements arrive early enough by strategic air to participate in all planned operations. However, you may want to consider employing the airborne elements assigned to 21st Abn Corps in an airborne operation directly from the CONUS base.

If you flow the airborne division elements by strategic air, the units arrive as contained in the existing TPFDL. This method of flowing the airborne division would also require available reception capability at the various APODs in theater. If you insert the airborne division units assigned to corps directly from their CONUS APOE to objectives behind enemy lines to cut off the retreat routes of the Atlantican heavy forces, available reception capability at the various APODs in Honduras is not a factor.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Mission, Tasks Analysis, and Restated Mission

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GENERAL

The 21st Abn Corps has many roles in this scenario. The corps has been designated the Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) headquarters and the commanding general has assumed the duties of the land component commander. The corps is also the Army force (ARFOR) headquarters with its awesome responsibilities. Additionally, the corps is a subordinate of JTFSO as TF Brown with major responsibilities in area of operations (AO) Shield.

The following tasks were extracted from the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12, the JTFSO OPORD. To identify all of tasks listed below, you should have read the basic document as well as the accompanying annexes and appendixes. There are three parts to this section to consider: operations. intelligence. and logistics. The list includes responsibilities for various roles that the corps must perform in this operation—as you review this listing, see if YOU can determine the "hat" that is being worn.

OPERATIONS

G3 Specified Tasks

Phase I

- Command TF Brown.

- Conduct predeployment planning and pre-positioning of selected elements at APOEs as required to support JTFSO operations.

- Establish HQ Army Forces (ARFOR) at Soto Cano AB to coordinate and synchronize combat operations of service forces supporting JTFSO.

- Nominate and provide joint rear area commander (JRAC) to conduct joint logistic, security, and support operations in AO Dragon.

- Establish communications and liaison with COMJTFSO and other components.

- Plan for and conduct precombat operations in accordance with the concept of operation.

- Establish plans for a coordinated combined defense with Honduran forces operating in AO Shield NLT C+7. IAW direction from the government of Honduras, initial border security in the Choluteca region is the responsibility of those Honduran forces OPCON to TF Brown.

- Do not forward deploy US ground forces into AO Shield until after Atlantican forces have crossed the Honluran border.

- Conduct liaison and coordination with TF White NLT C+3.

- Deploy and establish TF HQ elements.

Phases II and III

- Conduct coordinated combined defense of AO Shield along PL Pike in conjunction with Honduran forces. Deny Atlantican forces PL Pike and crossing sites over the Choluteca River.

- Receive OPCON of TF White when established ashore.

- Integrate arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

Phase IV(A)

- Plan and conduct joint and combined operations to cut off and destroy the armored capability of the Atlantican Army in the Choluteca region, defeat Atlantican forces, restore the preconflict border between Atlantica and Honduras, and transition to peace.

- On completion of phase IV(A), provide required forces to JTFSO for future operations.

Phase IV(B) through Phase V

- Plan and conduct joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO Shield to peaceful conditions.

- Rapidly transition from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

- Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from JTFSO operations in AOs Castle and Lance.

- Be prepared to return Marine forces to TF 45 control for embarkation.

G3 Implied Tasks

Phases II and III

- Conduct deep operations in the vicinity of the Atlantican border to prevent reinforcement of Atlantican forces in Honduras.

- Conduct deep operations along exposed Atlantican lines of communication to reduce their ability to resupply and sustain deployed heavy forces operating in Honduras.

Phase IV(A)

- Conduct river crossing operations to destroy Atlantican forces in zone.

- Block available retreat routes from Choluteca region to Atlantica to prevent the escape of Atlantican heavy forces and complete the destruction of these units in Honduran territory.

- Conduct deep operations in the vicinity of the Atlantican border to prevent reinforcement of Atlantican forces in Honduras.

Essential Tasks

Designating a task as essential always creates considerable discussion. This is just one solution.

- Conduct coordinated combined defense of AO Shield along PL Pike in conjunction with Honduran forces. Deny Atlantican forces PL Pike and crossing sites over the Choluteca River.

- Plan and conduct joint and combined operations to cut off and destroy the armored capability of the Atlantic an Army in the Choluteca region, defeat Atlantican forces, restore the preconflict border between Atlantica and Honduras, and transition to peace.

- Cut Atlantican LOCs to isolate Atlantican forces in Honduras and attack to destroy Atlantican armored, mechanized, and motorized units in zone.

- Restore Honduran-Atlantican boundary and establish border security zone until relieved by Honduran forces.

G3 Limitations

The following limitations were extracted from the JTFSO OPORD, appendix 8 to Annex C, Rules of Engagement. These were included as limitations because these restrictions could affect development of desired courses of action.

FASCAM

Authority to emplace FASCAM or other scatterable munitions is held by division-level commanders for their areas of operations. It maybe further delegated to brigade-level commanders for those of long duration (more than 24 hours) or to battalion- or task force-level commanders for those of short duration (less than 24 hours).

Cross Boundary Operations

- Nominated targets in the territorial waters, airspace, or land area of Atlantica will be reviewed by the appropriate component commander, or designated representative, to assess the impact of engagement of the targets on the civilian population, structures, and economy. The striking of these targets by any means will occur only after approval by JTFSO.

- US land forces will not cross the Atlantican border unless ordered by USCINCSO.

● Counterbattery and air defense fires by US ground forces that are conducted within 1 kilometer of the Atlantican border, or across the border, are permitted for the defense of US or Honduran forces in contact with the enemy or receiving the effects of the enemy fire. Such fires will be reported immediately to JTFSO. Fires that may cross neutral borders, airspace, or territorial waters are prohibited until authorized by USCINCSO.

● Direct and indirect fires by ground weapon systems, other than counterbattery and air defense, to include naval gunfire in support of ground operations, that will engage targets in the 1-km border zone or across the Atlantican border, will be reported to JTFSO. At no time will US ground forces enter into Atlantica or into neutral territory without USCINCSO permission.

● Division-level commanders may employ organic ground reconnaissance and surveillance assets necessary for unit self-defense in the region of the Atlantican border if they will not conflict with JTFSO elements and if they have approval from JTFSO.

● Hot pursuit for ground forces will not permit cross-boundary operations unless specifically granted by JTFSO in cases involving the Atlantican border, or the USCINCSO for neutral borders.

INTELLIGENCE

General

Each "G' staff officer conducts a mission analysis from the view of his or her functional area. Selected G2 mission analysis-related topics are described below. There are other areas that the G2 would examine, but for this time-constrained exercise, these are the most important.

Enemy Situation Template

The threat array is portrayed on template 4-1 (to be used during the concept development portion of the lesson). This is a projection of where the threat forces will be on D+26 (C+33) when phase IV(A) begins. More information on various unit organizations and capabilities is contained in ST 100-7. The G2 will focus on the analysis of the template in an attempt to identify the enemy main effort. The main effort in this scenario seems to be in the zone of the eastern motorized infantry regiment. This analysis is based on the positions of the division artillery group, the tank battalion, the engineer battalion minus, and the second-echelon motorized infantry regiment. The analysis should also attempt to identify which level of command provided certain units to support the enemy attack.

The two D-30 artillery battalions came from the 1st Corps artillery brigade. The type I motorized infantry division's field artillery regiment has no D-30 units assigned. These D-30 units have been pushed forward in support of the attacking regiments. The D-30 is a much better close support weapon than the D-20.

The SA-9 and S-60 batteries protecting the Mi-24 helicopter battalion at El Triunfo and the S-60 battery protecting the Mi-8 company at San Marcos de Colon came from the People's Army air defense brigade. There are no SA-9s in the ADA battalion of a type I motorized infantry division, and all the S-60 batteries of the division's ADA battalion are located forward protecting division assets.

The Mi-24 battalion and the Mi-8 company came from the People's Aviation Command. There are no helicopters in either the division or the corps structures of the Atlantican Army.

The infantry company at San Marcos de Colon came from an uncommitted regiment of the type I infantry division and not from the infantry regiment at Choluteca. The motorized infantry company at El Triunfo came from the type I motorized infantry division's second-echelon motorized infantry regiment, which is shown as a regiment minus on the template.

The tank company, D-44 battery, D-20 battalion, BM-21 battalion. and the S-60 battery east of Choluteca are all type I infantry division assets provided in support of the infantry regiment attack.

Avenues Of Approach

Avenues of approach are contained in appendix 11 to annex B of the JTFSO OPORD 9-5 (M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12). As the G2, you should extract that data from appendix 11 and post the identified avenues of approach on the map. The information on avenues of approach will be needed to formulate friendly courses of action. Appendix 11 also contains information on how the different seasons affect trafficability throughout the region. The primary avenues identified in appendix 11 are avenues A and B. Avenues C and D are also listed in appendix 11, but these avenues are well north of the Choluteca region and AO Shield,

Avenue Of Approach A

Avenue A is the Choluteca approach from Somotillo, Atlantica, northwest to Choluteca and then San Lorenzo. This avenue then turns north to Tegucigalpa. This is identified as a division-sized avenue of approach. Major obstacles on the avenue are the chokepoint near San Bernardo (DK8547) and several rivers (Choluteca, Aqua, Callente, and Grande). Cross-country movement in the dry season is 20-30 km/hr. Wet season reduces cross country movement to 5-10 km/hr and occasionally restricts movement to the road network. Dry season runs from November to April.

Avenue Of Approach B

Avenue B is the Pan-American Highway from Somoto, Atlantica, to Choluteca, where it joins avenue A. This is identified as a regimental to division-sized avenue of approach. Seven kilometers of the avenue is choked and restricted to the road. Light infantry can support the main avenue by controlling high ground, bridges, and chokepoints. On-road movement varies from 10-20 km/hr in the mountains to 30-40 km/hr in the valleys. Off-road movement is subject to the same restrictions. Wet season effects are the same as avenue A.

Key Terrain

Possible key terrain in the region includes chokepoints identified along the avenues of approach and bridges spanning the Choluteca River. The C-130-capable airfields at San Marcos de Colon and El Triunfo are also key if a course of action intends to place blocking forces behind the Atlanticans along the two avenues of approach. These airfields would be needed by an airborne force for air landing of follow-on forces and for sustainment of any type force placed deep behind the Atlanticans until friendly forces conducted a Iinkup.

LOGISTICS

General

Each "G' staff officer and special staff officers conduct a mission analysis from the perspective of his or her functional area. Logistical analysis is particularly important in joint and force-projection operations. Selected logistic tasks (to include medical) have been extracted from the JTFSO OPORD and are listed below.

Specified Tasks

- Provide common servicing for classes I, 111 (bulk), common V, and X; mortuary affairs; and all potable water support to all land forces in the JOA.

- Prepare to expand logistics to support future operations.

- Act as the JTFSO executive agent for bulk fuels, terminal services, ground transportation, DS ground support equipment, maintenance, postal operations, and common user logistical management.

- Be prepared to support independently deployed units.

- Provide for resupply of isolated units in coordination with US Air Force South.

- Provide class 111 (bulk) to ground clement of MARFOR after accompanying supplies are exhausted.

- Provide essential logistics support to CIs, displaced persons (DPs), and EPWs.

- Coordinate joint base defense plans for all JTFSO logistical bases in AO Dragon up to and including level III threats.

- Designate JRAC.

- Provide primary hospital support for land forces.

- Provide intratheater aerial evacuation assets for all land components,

- Establish HQ, Joint Rear Area at Soto Cano AB.

- Establish a JMC.

- Establish and manage a temporary morgue in AO Dragon.

- Provide single item manager class VIII support to all ARFOR.

- Establish an offshore POL discharge facility.

Implied Tasks

- Establish staging bases for incoming units.

- Provide airfield and logistical support for MAGTF air-based in Honduras.

- Provide personnel to joint boards.

- Coordinate with the JRAC for management and allocation of resources and terrain in AO Dragon.

- Be prepared to expand logistics to support future operations.

- Provide support for redeployment of units during phase VI.

Essential Tasks

- Provide common servicing for classes I, III (bulk), common V, and X; mortuary affairs; and all potable water support to all land forces in the JOA.

- Provide class III (bulk) to ground element of MARFOR after accompanying supplies are exhausted.

- Act as the JTFSO executive agent for bulk fuels, terminal services, ground transportation, DS ground support equipment, postal operations, and common user logistical management.

- Provide hospital support for land forces.

- Provide single item manager class VIII support to all ARFOR.

Limitations

- Lack of host nation support.

- Poor infrastructure, limited all weather road network. limited helicopter landing and drop zones.

- Limited theater POD throughput capability.

PROPOSED RESTATED MISSION

On order, TF Brown defends in sector to prevent Atlantican forces from crossing the Choluteca River, NLT D+26 (C+33) attacks in zone to destroy Atlantican armored, mechanized, and motorized units in Honduras to destroy Atlantican armored offensive capability, and restores Honduran-Atlantican boundary.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 8 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Logistics Data

This appendix is to be used with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) and mission analysis practical exercises and the operation order (OPORD) development and briefing. Information in this appendix is to help you in the development of the combat service support (CSS) concept of operation.

JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH OPORD 9_- 5

A quick review about the impact of JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 on logistics is appropriate here. It was written by the "joint side" of the corps for the defense of Honduras against an Atlantican invasion. The Army side of JTFSO (TF Brown) will execute the ground portion of the Honduran operation. Pertinent logistics information for you to use during the tactical decision-making process is found in:

- JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 (M/S320Ctaff Planning Book, appendix 12).
  - Annex A (Task Organization).
  - Appendix 1 to Annex A (TPFDL).
  - Annex B (Intelligence).
  - Annex D (Logistics).
  - Annex E (Personnel).
  - Annex Q (Medical).
- Combat Semite Support Planning Data (M/S320Ctaff Planning Book, appendix 13).

There are numerous joint task forces specified that contain Army elements that are not assigned to the corps per se. These Army units still require combat service support from the corps that has been designated the Army force (ARFOR) headquarters. The G1/G4 must determine how this support will be provided. ARFOR customers can be determined by looking at the corps troop list, JTF task organization, and the JTF TPFDL.

The JTFSO OPORD concept of support paragraph (4a) is different from what the you have been exposed to thus far in the course. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) dictates the format and the specifics. The TF Brown concept of support for the OPORD should still be in accordance with ST 101-5. Paragraph 4 of the corps OPORD should include discussions about ARFOR logistics.

TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (TPFDL)

TPFDLs show what ARFOR units are scheduled to support the contingency. These TPFDLs are based on stage I planning, which uses expected activities to drive the flow of forces into the area of operations (AO). You will be given additional guidance that modifies the scenario so that you may have to adjust the TPFDL to meet mission requirements. Therefore, you need to analyze the TPFDL so that the right mix of forces arrives at the right time and at the right place. TPFDLs also contain contingency support packages that the you must identify

and schedule for strategic lift. Acting as the G1/G4, you should identify any shortfalls, as well as where the materiel should go and which organization should manage it.

During the first practical exercise, you should cover any CSS shortfalls identified in the TPFDL. If necessary, the following units may be made available for inclusion into the relined TPFDL:

- POL Sup Co (GS)
- Ord Co Ammo (GS)
- QM Sup Co (GS)
- Mdm Truck Co (POL)
- Area Spt Med Bn (-)
- Maint Co (Msl Spt) (Corps)

The capabilities of the airfields listed are fixed. This will influence the flow of units into the AO. Use the strategic lift information found in the M/S320C Staff Planning Bock, appendix 3, Part D, Planning Data, sections 1 and 2, to make any refinements to the TPFDL.

ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TPFDL FLOW

During your mission analysis, you will analyze the units that flow into the theater to determine if there are required units that arc not listed in the TPFDL. TPFDLs are based on the unified CINC's required delivery dates (RDDs) in conjunction with the Commander, Joint Task Force South (COMJTFSO). Refinements maybe necessary based on later war gaming. You should consider echeloning CSS forces in this process.

There is no set solution to the TPFDL refinement. You will develop your own requirements to develop a viable TPFDL. You must, however, use the parameters of the practical exercise (PE) to flow in the necessary units. If you determine that more units are needed than have been identified, you must make adjustments. However, that portion identified as the emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) TPFDL is not to be adjusted during the PE.

Use the sealift information only if you plan to move an entire unit by sea. While split shipments area viable option. it is not feasible for you to figure out split shipments during this course. If a ship is used, fill it as close as possible to 100 percent for planning purposes, Assume units and ships are available when required.

The forces required and their corresponding closure rates will result from the tactical decision-making process. Identify forces required for each stage and phase of the operation. You must establish closure rates to determine when combat operations can commence.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING DATA

Information in the JTFSO OPORD (M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 12) and CSS Planning Data (M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 13) are the primary sources for CSS data for the ARFOR and corps to use in the tactical decision-making process.

During your mission analysis, use the CSS planning data to do the logistical analysis. The PE is designed so that you must determine some of the information on your own (TBD by student). Some of the blanks you fill in may drive TPFDL decisions.

The TPFDLs drive the personnel numbers to use for the scenario. Cumulative figures are based on the buildup of troops in the AO. Keep in mind that the units' personnel strength percentages, as listed on the TPFDL, may not reflect full modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) numbers. This was done intentionally to reflect a tailored deployment. Pax columns in the TPFDL show the number of personnel.

You must determine which aerial and seaports are realistically available for use. You should specify which ports of debarkation (PODS) are usable for which type of operation or commodity. Don't get into a lot of calculations; only a broad-based analysis is required. The proposed emplacement of the 21st COSCOM units at and around each POD used should be identified. Be sure you analyze the necessity and requirements for any logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations.

As the battle staff G1/G4, you must plan for the entire joint area of operations bulk petroleum system. A tactical petroleum terminal (TPT) will be needed to handle all the class III(b) requirements. You should specify where this would be and briefly describe the distribution and storage of bulk fuel. Fuel is expressed in barrels (1 barrel (bbl) of fuel =42 gallons). The two fuel tankers identified in the CSS planning data will provide offshore bulk fuel (JP-8). The Navy would manage the offshore petroleum discharge facility (tankers and mooring). The Army has the on-shore responsibility. TPTs include 18 fuel tanks at 5,000 bbl each, six 350 gallons-per-minute (GPM) pumps, 42,000 feet of hoseline, and an assortment of storage bags with capacities ranging from 50,000 to 210,000 gallons.

Sealift will transport most class V to the AO. Realize that Puerto Cortes has class V hazardous materials (HAZMAT) restrictions. The conventional ammunition company will probably have to do split logistics to handle the ammunition at the port and in the AO.

Supplies for this scenario are either operational project stocks (OPROJ), unit basic load (UBL) to accompany troops (TAT), direct support (DS) accompanying, or materiel provided by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)/US Army Materiel Command (AMC). There are fast sealift ships (FSSs) that arrive by C+20 with supplies from wholesale agencies in the continental United States (CONUS). Additive OPROJ increases a unit's capability beyond table of organization and equipment (TOE) -required levels; nonadditive brings them up from their MTOE authorized to required levels. The arrival of the FSSs does not stop supplies from being delivered by air. Short tons of airlanded supplies have been nationally computed so you don't have to do the figuring. You must account for this flow when adjusting the TPFDL. Class III(b) buildup may have to be rescheduled because it arrives too late or is insufficient for the operation. Battle staffs must figure out how to adjust. Most bulk POL, major end items, and ammunition comes by ship. Buildup and daily resupply tonnages for DS/general support (GS) stocks by air are already figured. Therefore, all you have to do is flow them in.

ARFOR and on-shore Marine forces (MARFOR) POL requirements are in the CSS planning data. Use these to compute support requirements, capabilities, and develop support plans.

There are extra reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) and water storage bags on OPROJ as well as a water team in the provisional corps support battalion (CSB). Days of supply for water can be computed according to the formulas in FM 101-10-1, volume 2. You should determine whereto obtain, store, and distribute water.

The Texaco refinery in Puerto Cortes has POL storage capability. This is already included in available storage numbers in the CSS planning data.

ITEMS TO BE CONSIDERED DURING COA DEVELOPMENT

You should fill in required “to be determined” (TBD) areas in the CSS planning data. This will help you in your COA development.

You must analyze the flow of CSS units against the TPFDL. Do they agree with the echelonment and makeup of the COSCOM? If not, what do you recommend for inclusion or deletion? What is your rationale?

Consider how logistic units and materiel are “tailored” in the TPFDL (or task organization), CSS overlay, and concept of support in respect to mission and environment (for example, tropical weather, diseases, poor roads, infrastructure, lack of robust host nation support (HNS), joint logistic requirements, echelonment, and so forth).

G1 Areas

How will replacement operations be conducted for a force projection of this duration and scope?

Are the medical units in the TPFDL sufficient? How does the theater evacuation policy affect medical TPFDL development? What items are addressed in the OPORD, medical annex, and the CSS planning data that are uniquely related to force projections (vaccinations, medical intelligence, more medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) as opposed to hospitalization, water, subsistence from local economy, and so forth)’? What is the possible patient evacuation flow from the forward areas to the mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF)?

What critical military occupational specialty (MOS) shortages would impede operations in a force-projection operation (terminal operators, forklift operators, linguists, and so forth)? Since there are limited CSS units and replacements, what should you, as the G1, anticipate to handle catastrophic events involving CSS unit personnel? What about morale, welfare, and recreation programs?

G4 Areas

Does this operation need more field service units? Why? How are general supplies planned for force projections (that is, pre-positioned war reserves and operational project stocks, DLA supporting depots, reliance on HNS, direct support system air lines of communication (ALOCs)? Do we need GS supply companies?

Theater supplies go to many different locations in AO Dragon. Where are the logical places to locate various stockage points, transshipment points, and terminals? How should available COSCOM units be placed within AO Dragon? How do the conditions at each air and sea port of debarkation affect their intended use? Are there any perceived shortfalls in materiel and/or units?

How will bulk fuel be received, stored, distributed?

What are the unique maintenance aspects of force projections, and how is this related to the OPORD and CSS planning data (that is, consolidated maintenance, tailored repair parts, interoperability, and so forth)? How should aviation maintenance be handled? How should the ARFOR support the Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and common sister service equipment?

What are the fixes for limited HNS, congested terrain and main supply routes (MSRs), potentially isolated units, and limited space to establish logistic support bases? Should an intermediate staging base (ISB) be considered? If so, where should it be? What are its advantages and disadvantages?

How does the COSCOM fit into the joint rear area command (JRAC) (joint bases and base clusters defense plan, real estate management, civil affairs, and HNS)? What is the protection priority for logistic bases? Who provides this protection?

What are the corps MSRs in AO Dragon? Who will conduct MSR maintenance and security?

Does the COSCOM need to develop logistic support areas (LSAs)? Should the task organization of the COSCOM be rearranged (that is, should CSBs be modified)?

Which corps units should be earmarked for postconflict and redeployment operations?

SISTER SERVICE JOINT LOGISTICS

You must plan for ARFOR logistics. As such, the JTFSO OPORD specifies that the ARFOR will provide certain joint logistic support. The following information may be used to analyze joint logistics for the 21st Abn Corps concept of support.

Air Force Force (AFFOR) Requirements

Mail, mortuary affairs, and class I requirements will be based on the final flow of Air Force units into Honduras for each phase. Each phase's incremental Air Force population is computed based on the TPFDL. Daily sustainment figures should be used to arrive at US Air Force net requirements that the ARFOR would have to fulfill. Total Air Force personnel figures, according to the original TPFDL, should be around 4,556 personnel. For class I and water, this would equate to approximately 9.56 short tons of food per day (4,556 x 4.2 = 19,135.2 pounds) and 56,950 gallons of water (4,556 x 12.5 = 56,950 gallons). These figures are valid once the ARFOR is at full strength. The US Army Reserve Forces (USARF) element that the ARFOR coordinates with is the Prime Fare. You must show how the ARFOR will handle its supply requirements and which COSCOM units provide support.

Class III(b) requirements are listed as a single fuel (JP-8). Rough-cut estimates for daily bulk fuel requirements from the CSS planning data are shown in the M/S320C Staff Planning Book, appendix 13.

ARFOR maintenance units would assist in common equipment maintenance. Class IX requirements would include generators; high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); and commercial utility combat vehicles (CUCVs).

Common class V requirements support the security police (40-mm, 5.56-mm, 7.62-mm, grenades, and 9-mm). Only emergency resupply from the ARFOR is needed. Security units deploy with their UBL and are not expected to be directly engaged in combat activities. For ARFOR aircraft, class V configuration. packaging, and assembly require special handling beyond ARFOR ordnance unit capabilities.

MARFOR Requirements

ARFOR supports only on-shore MARFOR ground units' JP-8 requirements. Use equivalent Army unit consumption rates for MARFOR units.

The MARFOR has a 600,000-gallon amphibious assault fuel dispensing system that will be located at San Lorenzo. Its AV-8s and some helicopters will be located there. However, these systems use JP-4 and will be supported by offshore US Navy force (NAVFOR) replenishment systems. Therefore, the only ARFOR requirements will be to provide 59,286 gallons of JP-8 to ground elements of the MARFOR once they arrive onshore (after 10 days) (600,000 gallons divided by the daily consumption rate of 59,286 gallons equals a 10-day supply). If you expect the ground fight to last more than 10 days, then the ARFOR must consider MARFOR requirements for JP-8. In addition, some MEDEVAC support maybe required.

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 1. Introduction to Force-Projection Doctrine

Appendix 8 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 1. Homework Study Questions

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Before coming to class develop responses to these questions using the readings you had as homework assignments. These questions provide a basis from which the instruction will begin.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORPS FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS (3 HOURS)

1. What are the general planning considerations for force-projection operations?

2. What are some specific planning considerations for each of the eight stages of force projection?

3. What are the major differences between a developed and an underdeveloped theater? How does this affect force projection?

4. What could be some major logistic considerations in force projection to an underdeveloped theater?

JOINT TASK FORCE (2 HOURS)

1. Why is a joint task force (JTF) formed?

2. How is a JTF formed?

3. How is a JTF staff organized?

4. What planning responsibilities does the JTF have during force-projection operations?

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (1 HOUR)

1. How do the Marines organize to conduct amphibious operations?

2. How would a JTF command and control an amphibious operation?

CONTINGENCY AIR OPERATIONS (1 HOUR)

1. How should air assets be phased into theater during force-projection operations into an underdeveloped theater?

2. What is a joint force air component command (JFACC)? How is it organized? What are its responsibilities?

3. What is the relationship of a JFACC to the JTF commander?

LIGHT FORCES (1 HOUR)

1. What are the types of light forces? What are their capabilities and limitations for force-projection operations?

2. What are JTF planning considerations for the use of light forces: light infantry division, airborne division, air assault division? Who commands and controls?

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) (1 HOUR)

1. What are the SOF units available to a JTF?

2. What are the capabilities and limitations of Army, Air Force, and Navy SOF?

3. How does a JTF commander command and control SOF units? What is a joint special operations area (JSOA)?

CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Lesson 4. Corps Force-Projection Planning Exercise

Appendix 9 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. TF Brown OPORD Format

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xx December 199_

OPERATION ORDER 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO)

References:
USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9_
JTF SOUTH OPORD 9-5 (OPERATION TIERRA CALIENTE)
CJCS Warning Order, DTG031800ZDEC9_
COMJTF SOUTH OPREP-1, DTG 062300DEC9_
Maps: Series USACGSC 50-355, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN LORENZO), edition 1982, 1:50,000
Series USACGSC 50-356, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (CHOLUTECA—EL TRIUNFO), 1:50,000
Series USAGCSC 50-357, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN MARCOS DE COLON), 1:50,000
Series USACGSC 50-358, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SOTO CANO—TEGUCIGALPA), 1:50.000
Series TPC, BELIZE-EL SALVADOR—GUATEMALA—HONDURAS-MEXICO, sheet K-25A, edition 3, 1:500,000
Series TPC, EL SALVADOR—HONDURAS-NICARAGUA, sheet K-25B, edition 5, 1:500,000
Series TPC, COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA-PANAMA, sheet K-25C. edition 3, 1:500,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

Task Organization. Annex A

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces.

(1) General, Enemy forces consist of the Atlantican 1st Corps. These forces include six motorized infantry regiments (3-Type I and 3-Type II); three infantry regiments (Type I); one armor brigade; one regiment of attack helicopters with Mi-1s/2s and Mi-24D; three regiments of jet fighter bombers consisting of MiG-21s, Albatrosses, and Floggers; one tank battalion; one artillery brigade with MRL, 122-mm, 152-mm, and antitank guns; and ND- 1 surface-to-surface missiles.

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(2) Current situation. The enemy crossed the HONDURAN border in a two-axis attack with three motorized infantry regiments northwest of SOMOTILLO (EK1041) along Route 33 and one infantry regiment along the PAN-AMERICAN Highway (Route 1). 1st Corps is currently in defensive positions along the CHOLUTECA River in control of the city of CHOLUTECA with two motorized infantry regiments and one infantry regiment, heavily supported by their organic, towed field artillery brigade. The third motorized rifle regiment is in position occupying key terrain south of CHOLUTECA along Route 33, supposed by one T-62 tank battalion. The remainder of the infantry division occupies SAN MARCOS DE COLON (EK2086), along the PAN-AMERICAN Highway and the port of CORINTO (DJ8180). The three motorized infantry regiments of the second motorized infantry division remain at EL SAUCE (EK5028) and appear to be the corps reserves. The armored brigade is located at LEON (EJ1177) and appears to be the operational reserve protecting the Atlantican capital of MANAGUA (EJ8045). Atlantican Air Force assets have provided sufficient air support to ground forces to have neutralized Honduran attempts to launch air strikes against Atlantican forces in the CHOLUTECA region. The ND-1 has not been employed.

(3) Additional enemy capabilities and limitations. Enemy Type I units are normally at 100-percent strength with all new, modem equipment. The regiments in CHOLUTECA are at approximately 80-percent strength. Type II units are at 70-percent strength in regular forces with percentages up to 80 percent with mobilized reserves. Equipment is about half modem and half antiquated with poor availability of repair parts for old equipment. The ND- 1 has serious engineering and design flaws and presents no significant military threat to the accomplishment of our mission. The enemy does not have the capability to attack further without a 30-day resupply period.

(4) See Intelligence Annex for additional information.

b. Friendly forces. As listed in paragraph le, JTFSO OPORD 9_-5, dated xx December 199.

c. Attachments and detachments. None.

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION

INTENT:

a. Concept of operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay)

(1) Maneuver.

(a) Deep.

(b) Reconnaissance and security.

(c) Main attack (___).

(d) Supporting attack (_____).

(e) Rear.

(f) Reserve.

(2) Fires. See Annex__(Fire Support).

(3) Counterair operations. See Annex__ (Air Defense).

(4) Intelligence. See Annex __ (Intelligence).

(a) Priority intelligence requirements.

(b) Additional intelligence requirements.

(c) Intelligence collection priorities and electronic warfare priorities are further identified and tasked to subordinate units in the attached Intelligence Collection Plan.

(5) Electronic warfare. Annex __ (Electronic Warfare).

(6) Engineer. Annex __ (Engineer).

(7) Deception. Annex __ (Deception).

(8) Other annexes as needed.

b. Tasks to maneuver units.

(1) 17th Inf Div (Lt)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(2) 1st Bde, 102d Abn Div

(a)

(b)

(c)

(3) 1st MEF (TF WHITE)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(4) 21st Avn Bde

(a)

(b)

(5) Reserve

(a) Position at _____

(b) Priority of employment _____

c. Tasks to Combat Support Units.

(1) Fire Support (see Annex _____).

(2) Air Defense (see Annex _____).

(3) Chemical (see Annex _____).

(4) Engineer (see Annex _____). Priority to _____

(5) IEW (see Annex _____).

(6) MP (see Annex _____).

(7) Signal (see Annex _____).

(8) Civil Affairs (see Annex _____).

d. Coordinating instructions.

(1) OPORD effective _____. This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation of order.

(2) Intelligence requirements (CCIR) (Annex ____)

(a) PIR

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

(b) EEFI

1.

2.

3.

4.

(c) FFIR

1.

2.

3.

4.

(3) Antiterrorist actions.

(4) Air defense weapons status.

(5) MOPP __.

(6) OEG.

(7) Troop-safety criteria (corps only). _____?

(8) Vehicle recognition signals.

(9) Any necessary descriptions of phase lines.

(10) Counterfratricide measures.

(11) Others as needed.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of support.

(1) BEFORE (C+l to C+22).

MANNING. Priority of support and personnel replacements to

ARMING. Priority is for

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FUELING.

FIXING. Units will deploy with __ DofS of CL IX. Controlled substitution authorized to_____ level. Cannibalization authorized to _____ maintenance. Priority of maintenance is to _____ in order. Aircraft maintenance facility located vic the CSA.

MOVING. Initial priorities for movement on routes southward to TAAs are _____ _____. Northward movement priority is to medical evacuation.

SUSTAINING. Priority of supply, in order, is to _____. Units will deploy with days of supply (DofS) CL I; CL II, IV, & VI UBL; CL IX 15 DofS. AAFES Tactical Field Exchange service will open by C+ 14. Stockage objectives: all classes (except III(b) & V). 10 DofS by C+20; CL HI(b) &V, 15 DofS by C+14. CL VIII: units will deploy with 3 DofS. Initial ration cycle is M-M-M, with T-M-M by C+10. MSCs will establish and run mortuary affairs collection points vic their support areas, pushing remains to the Joint point. Protection priority is to CL III & V, primary FOB protection provided by organic elements and supporting MPs.

(2) DURING (C+23 to C+27).

MANNING. Priority of support and personnel replacements _____. Medical evacuation policy ___ days. Replacement operations remain for critical MOSs only.

ARMING.

stockage objectives of ___DofS by C+30.

FUELING.

stockage objectives of ___DofS by C+30.

FIXING. Unit support priorities remain unchanged, as does priority of maintenance. Units will evacuate as necessary to maintenance collection points in FOB B.

MOVING. Priority southbound traffic is CL III & V; northbound traffic is medical evacuation and then to maintenance evacuation.

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SUSTAINING. Priority of supply, in order, remains unchanged. Ration cycle remains T-M-M. All classes of supply (except CL III(b) & V) should reach stockagc objectives of ___ DofS by C+30.

CRITICAL DECISION POINTS.

(3) AFTER (C+28 to Redeployment).

On order, priority is to reorganizing, in order,_____,_____,_____, followed by rearming and refueling. Minimum level of combat readiness is ____%.

MANNING. Priority of support and personnel replacements, in order, _____. Medical evacuation policy changed to 2 days. Replacements in critical MOSs will be provided to reach minimum combat readiness levels.

ARMING. DODIC priorities _____.

FUELING. Priorities _____. Stockage objectives will be met by C+30.

FIXING. Priorities remain unchanged. Maintenance facilities remain at FOB B and PUERTO CORTES.

MOVING. Priority CL III & V forward, rearward northbound remains medical evacuation and then to maintenance evacuation.

RECONSTITUTION. Priorities to _____

WEAPON SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS. Priorities to_____

PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

b. Material and services.

c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.

d. Personnel.

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e. Civil-military cooperation. See Annex ___ (Civil Affairs).

f. Transportation.

g. Miscellaneous.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

(1) Rear CP at _____.

(2) Main CP at _____.

(3) TAC CP at _____, moves with _____.

b. Signal (see Annex____).

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

TF BROWN

17th lnf Div (Lt)
HHC, 17th Inf Div (Lt)

21st Avn Bde (Corps)

Corps Troops

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1st Bde, 102d Abn Div

21st Corps Artillery

1st MEF (TF WHITE) (OPCON)
- CE, 1st MEB
  - GCE, RLT 5
  - RCB ACR (OPCON)
- ACE, MAG 50
- CSSE, BSSG 50
- Air Contingent
  - VMFA-212
  - VMFA-323
  - VMFA-210
  - VMAQ-2
  - VMGR-352
  - VMO-2

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ANNEX D (ENGINEER) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. Annex___ (Intelligence) to OPORD ____

b. Friendly situation.

(1) OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 1.

(2) HONDURAN FORCES assist with

2. MISSION

TF BROWN conducts mobility, countermobility and limited survivability (M/CM/S) operations in sector to support covering force operations and corps defense in section commencing _____.

3. EXECUTION

a. Scheme of engineer operations.

(1) OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 3a.

(2) Corps conducts M/CM/and limited survivability operations in two different zones and along the corps MSR according to task organization.

(3) Scatterable mines

(a) General

1. Authority to emplace scatterable mines is held by _____ for their area of operation. It maybe for the delegated to _____ .

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2. Obstacle employment is limited to

(b) Allocation

1. Gator—unavailable to non-US forces

* * * * * * *

(4) 502d Engineer Combat Battalion

(a) _____

(b) _____

(c) _____

(d) _____

(e) _____

(5) Coordinating instructions:

(a) This plan effective for planning on _____, execution on _____ .

(b) Materials will be prestocked at work sites, MSR and bridge construction sites.

(6) Post conflict: On order, all units will provide CMO, to include road construction. H^2O treatment, hospital construction, orphanage construction, burial, and school assistance.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 5.

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ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO)

b. Friendly forces. Paragraph lb to OPORD 7-5.

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of tires.

b. Air support

(1) General. Corps has __ CAS sorties per day during operations stage, including__ AC-130 sorties per night.

(2) Allocation. Daily CAS sorties for planning.

1st MEF (Fwd): __
102d Div: __
17th Div: __

(3) Miscellaneous

(a) Unexpended ordnance will be jettisoned into corps free fires area (FFA).

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(b) Plan four CAS sorties per target.

c. Field artillery support

(1) General

(a) Priority of tires initially is to 1st MEF (Fwd).

(b) Targeting priorities:

(2) Organization for combat:

1-57 FADS _____
2-45 FADS _____
2-46 FADS _____
2-47 FADS _____
A/2-48 FADS _____
21st FA Bde HQ
21st Target Acq Det
1-651 FA _____
2-651 GSR _____
3-651 GSR _____
2-661 (MLRS) _____

(3) Miscellaneous

(a) Priority of positions to _____ FA in order.

(b) During main attack reinforced units have priority of fires of GS FA battalions.

(c) All FA TACFIRE equipped.

(d) Offensive electronic warfare.

d. EW organization for combat

210th MI Battalion (TE)_____

220th MI Battalion (AE)_____

(1) ESM priorities: enemy artillery, rocket artillery, maneuver elements, C3, and air defense

(2) ECM priorities: enemy artillery and rocket forces C3.

c. High-payoff targets

(1) Matrix

Priority	Description
1	Motorized division
2	Artillery brigade
3	Tank battalion
4	C^3 facilities
5	Air defense
6	Helicopter battalion
7	Lines of communication

(2) Attack guidance matrix:

(3) Fire planning and control: no missile or cannon fires beyond PL BORDER. Only air missions authorized beyond PL BORDER.

(4) Safety

(a) Emergency cancellation of frees in clear text. Fires will be resumed upon failure to authenticate.

(b) 2-hour notification required by corps to change border or phase-line restrictions.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 5.

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ANNEX G (AIR DEFENSE) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces.

(1) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO).

(2) Atlantican People's Aviation Command (PAC) has three regiments of three squadrons of 12 to 15 fighter/bomber aircraft, plus one helicopter regiment with attack, transport, and utility aircraft.

(3) PAC has provided effective air support to its ground forces and has neutralized Honduran attempts to launch air strikes. PAC airstrikes against airfields at TONCONTIN (DL7949) and SOTO CANO (DL3389) have been ineffective, and some attrition has been caused to PAC by inplace US and Honduran air and AD assets.

(4) ATLANTICA possesses ND-1 (SCUD variant) missile, HE capable only, with 500 km to 600 km range. Reported design faults in this system do not negate the threat of its use of Honduran territory.

b. Friendly forces

(1) Annex C (Operation Overlay) to JTFSO OPORD 9_-5.

(2) Prior to operations, JTFSO conducts entry operations using SOTO CANO (DL3389), LA MESA (DN0109) and PUERTO CORTES (CN9941). 1st MEF (Fwd) lands GOLFO DE FONSECA (DK4060/4070).

c. Attachments and detachments. 1-500 ADA Battalion (Patriot) attached to 21st ADA Bale.

2. MISSION

21st ADA Bde provides DS HIMAD protection to TF BROWN assets in the HONDURAN theater of operations during entry and combat operations.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation.

(1) TF BROWN OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO) paragraph 3a.

(2) JTFSO air assets provide AD coverage in theater and give first line of AD.

(3) 1st MEF (Fwd) extends AD umbrella north to 90° casting and east to 62° casting to protect corps assets in SAN LORENZO (DK5183).

(4) 102d Abn Div and 17th Inf Div (Lt) provide own AD with integral AD assets.

b. Priority for AD protection. Priorities, in order, are the SOTO CANO airfield. LA MESA airfield, CHOLUTECA bridge, PUERTO CORTES port facilities, MSR chokepoints, and deployed combat and CS forces.

c. 1-500 ADA Battalion (Patriot). Arrives SOTO CANO C+6. Provides HIMAD protection at SOTO CANO airfield.

d. 1-461 ADA (HAWK). Arrives SOTO CANO C+8.

(1) Provides two batteries to protect 1-500 ADA Battalion (Patriot). SOTO CANO airfield. corps avn assets and CSS assets at SOTO CANO in order.

(2) Provides one battery to protect LA MESA airfield, corps avn assets and corps CSS assets at LA MESA, in order.

(3) Provides one battery to protect CHOLUTECA bridge.

e. 1-430 ADA (Chap). Arrives PUERTO CORTES C+l4. Provides protection in port area. Priority for protection is to port facilities and installations, CSS assets, in order.

f. Coordinating instructions.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

See Annex __ (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. ADA brigade commander is overall commander of corps AD assets and will coordinate fire control procedures with air elements.

b. Signal.

(1) Annex J (Signal) to _____.

(2) _____

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ANNEX J (SIGNAL) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO)

b. Friendly forces. Paragraph lb to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO).

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 3a.

b. Signal tasks to subordinate and supporting units.

(1) JCSE will augment CINCSOUTH/J6 and provide engineering, technical support. and liaison communications to TF BROWN HQ.

(2) ABCCC will provide C2 during forced entry operations.

(3) 1st MEF (Fwd) will provide own organic communications support and establish C^2links to Honduran ACR.

(4) 21st Sig Bde

(a) 771st Cmd Sig Ops Bn (forced entry) will install communications for the corps assault, TAC, and main CPs.

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(b) 770th Sig Spt Bn (MSE) will install communications for 21st COSCOM and corps rear area enclaves (APODs and SPODs).

(c) 705th Sig Spt Bn (MSE) will provide area communications support in corps forward area and liaison communications to 1st MEF (Fwd) and 1-102 Abn.

(d) 712th Sig Rdo Bn (Abn) will provide backbone troposcatter, FM retransmission throughout corps area.

(e) TACSAT Co will provide single and multi-chamel TACSAT (INMARSAT and DSCS GMF) teams to support MSCs.

(f) DCS entry will be provided through PANAMA, NAVCOMSTA PUERTO RICO, and FT. BRAGG.

(5) 21st Sig Bn will provide area communications support to units in 17th Inf Div area of operations.

c. Coordinating instructions

(1) General

(a) Honduran, US Air Forces, and US Naval Forces (including Marines) per JSOI.

(b) 21st (Abn) Corps SOI in effect for TF BROWN operations.

(c) Message formats per JANAP 128.

(2) Telephone/wire subscribers per 21st Corps SOP,

(3) Telephone Switch/packet switch/SATCOM networks per attached network diagrams.

(4) All transmissions will be secured per NSA approved COMSEC devices.

(5) DISA and Joint Staff/J6 liaison teams at USCINCSO/J6 for satellite frequency coordination.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. COMSEC and signal equipment maintenance

* * * * * * *

(3) All DS/GS COMSEC and signal maintenance air-evacuated by backhaul to FT. BRAGG.

b. Other CSS per unit SOPS.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. TF BROWN Signal Office vic SAN LORENZO. Succession of command: corps signal brigade commander, corps signal brigade deputy commander, senior surviving corps signal battalion commander.

b. Signal. JSOI and CEOI versions ___ in effect for duration of the operation. Frequency list and COMSEC compromise per 21st Sig Bde TSOP.

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APPENDIXES
1. Single-Channel TACSAT Network Diagram for Forces Entry Operations (Omitted)
2. Telephone/Packet Switch Network Diagram (Omitted)
3. DSCS GMF/DCS Entry Network Diagram (Omitted)

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ANNEX P (REAR AREA OPERATIONS) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO)

b. Friendly forces. Paragraph lb to OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO).

c. Assumptions. Host nation will assist with rear area security: how-ever, not all rear area security requirements can be completely satisfied by host nation.

2. MISSION

Upon arrival in theater NLT C+14, 21st MP Bde (Abn) will coordinate with the 21st COSCOM commander, base cluster commanders and host nation security assets to provide rear area protection from government of ATLANTICA urban and rural leftist groups and revolutionary organizations inside HONDURAS to ensure uninterrupted logistics flow forward. Protected areas to include the corps command posts, CSA, FOBS ALPHA and BRAVO, the port of PUERTO CORTES, the airfields at LA MESA, SOTO CANO, and TONCONTIN, and MSRs _____ and _____.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. Terrain management to be conducted by G3. Priority of rear area protection as follows (in order): the airfield at SOTO CANO, the seaport of SAN LORENZO, the segment of MSR _____ from SOTO CANO to SAN LORENZO, MSR _____. FOB BRAVO, the airfeld at TONCONTIN FOB ALPHA, the remainder of MSR _____, the airfield at LA MESA, the CSA, and the seaport of PUERTO CORTES.

b. Tasks to subordinate units.

(1) 21st MP Bde (Abn).

(a) Provide Level II and III response for areas as outlined in paragraph 3a.

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(b) Operate an EPW collection point in FOB BRAVO vic SAN LORENZO.

(c) DIRLAUTH for coordination of effort of host nation and 1st MEF (Fwd) security assets.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. 21st MP Bde (Abn) will draw support from 21st COSCOM assets in the CSA and FOBS ALPHA and BRAVO.

b. Host nation assets will provide for their own support from HN sources.

5, COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

(1) 2199th RAOC located in FOB ALPHA vic SOTO CANO.

(2) DIRLAUTH for coordination of effort of HN and 1st MEF (Fwd) security assets.

b. Signal. Annex J.

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ANNEX S (CIVIL AFFAIRS) to OPERATION ORDER 7-5—TF BROWN (TIERRA OCHO)

Reference: See basic OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALPHA

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. See JTFSO OPORD 9_-5 and TF BROWN OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), Annex P, Rear Area Operations. The government of ATLANTICA and its supporters will conduct an extensive anti-US disinformation and propaganda campaign. The purpose of this campaign is to destabilize US-Honduran relations and to create a Vietnam-like attitude within the general US population toward US involvement.

b. Friendly forces. OPORD 7-5 (TTERRA OCHO), paragraph 1. Higher CA headquarters is the JCMOTF, 301st CA Brigade with 96th and 99th CA Battalions.

2. MISSION

On order, TF BROWN conducts CA operations in support of military operations and furtherance of US policies and objectives in theater.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. CA operations will be conducted according to JCMOTF Civil Affairs Policy Directive No. 1. Primary emphasis will be on transitioning the region to peaceful conditions while complying with the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, or agreements with respect to inhabitants, governments, and economics of occupied, liberated, or host countries. Priority of non-foreign nation support (FNS) on an area basis, urban to rural, keying on population centers. Within the corps area, the command is authorized to take appropriate action to prevent civil interference with military operations and to restore and maintain law and order, while minimizing collateral damage.

b. Before operations. Priority of effort to providing FNS to the corps. Priority to contracting airfield and port services, transportation and security assistance, and laborers for construction, material handling, KPs, etc. Next priority to displace civilians and transients (DCT) assistance to the government of HONDURAS, then humanitarian assistance (HA), military civic action (MCA), nongovernmental organization (NGO) interface and civil defense.

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c. During operations. Priority of effort to DCT, civil defense, FNS, HA, MCA and NGO interface.

d After operations. Priority of effort to HA, DCT, MCA, NGO interface, FNS and civil defense.

e. 17th Inf Div (Lt)

(1) Plan and conduct CMO in sector.

(2) Prepare to distribute civil relief supplies as directed.

(3) Be prepared to provide one brigade OPCON to JCMOTF in postconflict for security enhancement.

f. 102d Inf Div (Abn)

(1) Plan and conduct CMO in sector.

(2) Prepare to distribute civil relief supplies as directed.

g. 1st MEF (Fwd)

(1) Plan and conduct CMO in sector.

(2) Prepare to distribute civil relief supplies as directed.

h. 51st Engineer Brigade

(1) Be prepared to be OPCON to JCMOTF for HA and CMA.

(2) Be prepared to construct refugee camp vic SAN LORENZO.

i. 21st COSCOM

(1) Be prepared to establish DC, refugee, and evacuee assembly areas vic SAN LORENZO until GOH and OAS can assume responsibility.

(2) Prepare to distribute civil relief supplies as directed.

j. Coordinating instructions.

(1) CA operations will be closely coordinated and integrated with other operations.

(2) Commanders establish liaison with GOH authorities in sector.

(3) Evacuation of local civilians will be accomplished only when their presence interferes with military operations, when they arc not indigenous to the area and cannot be accommodated in the area for security reasons, and when their remaining will expose inhabitants to an unacceptable degree of risk.

(4) Control of civilians and maintenance of law and order will be through, or coordinated with, local authorities where possible.

(5) Without specific approval, use of military resources for local civilian purposes is prohibited,

(6) Civilian stocks of food, clothing, and fuel will be identified and placed under control of competent civilian authority.

(7) Civilian resources and facilities usable by the enemy will be identified. Destruction will be accomplished on order.

(8) Destruction of civilian resources or facilities which would result in civilian hardship will not be accomplished without specific approval.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO). paragraph 4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

See OPORD 7-5 (TIERRA OCHO), paragraph 5.

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CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION

Examination

SCOPE

This examination includes an initial requirement to review a force-projection scenario and to become familiar with Joint Task Force Barbella (JTFBA) Operation Order (OPORD) 9_- 15 that will be used to plan combat operations in support of the government of Barbella. Review the following situation and the order before you take the 20-question exam. The examination is designed to measure how well you mastered the learning objectives as presented in the course material. As you take this examination, you will need to recall and use the information gained from previous subcourses, particularly that from previous joint and tactics instruction. The two-part exam consists of multiple-choice and multiple-response items. Part I examines force-projection doctrine and the operational environment in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility. Part 11 examines the planning of corps force-projection operations. The examination items focus on your ability to comprehend tactical concepts and principles rather than on your ability to memorize definitions or look up answers. The practical exercises completed during the subcourse will prepare you for, and will be similar to, what you will see on the exam.

EXAM PREPARATION

1. Review your notes and the material in the S320C subcourse.

2. Review study assignments, practical exercises, and the practical exercise solutions as necessary. The examination focuses on your comprehension of principles and concepts.

3. *It is essential that you read the following pages before starting the exam.* These pages contain the general situation and provide information necessary to complete part II of the examination.

4. The general situation provides you with enough basic information to set the stage for the special questions used to measure your mastery of TLO C.OO. These questions are designed to determine your ability to apply the concepts presented in your tactics instruction. Although you may be able to find answers to some exam questions in the references, the questions in part II of the exam require you to apply your knowledge in a scenario-based situation.

RESTRICTIONS

1. Possession or use of old or new Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) examinations and of old or new CGSOC solution-discussion booklets is prohibited.

2. Discussion of examination questions between students before or during the completion of this examination is considered collaboration and is not authorized.

3. Unauthorized assistance with this examination is not permitted.

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GENERAL

In the practical exercises in lessons 3 and 4, you worked with a relatively complete joint task force (JTF) operation order (OPORD) that supported the exercise requirements. The following material has been purposely abbreviated to allow you to review the information; reflect on its meaning; and think about the service, joint, and combined implications. The information, which is of sufficient depth to support the examination questions, describes the initial situation and perspective and gives you extracts of the recently received Joint Task Force Barbella (JTFBA) OPORD 9_- 15 (Island Storm).

SPECIAL SITUATION

The 21st Airborne Corps G3 has the reputation of being a demanding professional—the troops say he's more of a slave driver. He also has some definite ideas on officer professional development. One such idea affects you as a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

The G3 often challenges new CGSC grads to do an *independent* staff action that parallels the efforts of the coordinating staff. He will have you work alone on a specific requirement. This task may have the newcomer develop a partial tactical plan, analyze unit training, or research other G3 issues. His scheme accomplishes several objectives-he gains an appreciation of what you know and the quality of your thinking, he checks your ability to express yourself, and he frequently uses your fresh insights of the situation to challenge the views presented by other staff officers. This method has proven successful in enhancing staff products and in introducing the new officer to the corps planning staff.

GENERAL SITUATION

The G3 said you should use the following excerpts from the JTFBA OPORD 9_- 15 (Island Storm) for planning. He chose not to overwhelm you with all the planning documents and has selected only those he thinks you need. The situation sketches on the next page will help you as you read the material.

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

Sketch Map 5-1, Situation

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REGIONAL SKETCH MAP



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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE BARBELLA
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307
1 April 199_

JTF BARBELLA (JTFBA) OPORD 9_-15 (ISLAND STORM) (U)

( ) REFERENCES: a. ( ) CINCUSACOM OPLAN 5600-9_, 1 March 199_.-

b. ( ) 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps Field Standing Operating Procedures (FSOPs), 8 May 199_.-

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.

1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. This Operation order (OPORD is the execution order for Operation ISLAND STORM, the defense of the island of BARBELLA against invading forces.

b. ( ) Area of Concern. Not applicable (NA).

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. NA.

d. ( ) Enemy Forces. Annex B.

(1) ( ) General. The organization of the BARBELLA Liberation Army of Honor (BLAH) has assumed control of two-thirds of the Barbellan Army. Several Third-world nations supported BLAH members with arms, training, and equipment; these nations have been at odds with the current regime of BARBELLA for several years. Two months ago, BLAH attacked the legitimate government of BARBELLA to oust the current president. In fierce fighting, BLAH has forced the Barbellan Army into defensive positions east of the rivers RIO LOBO and RIO TACO. The capital of SAN LEON and the port city of GUAYAMA have received sporadic shelling for over a month. The situation has been a stalemate for 3 weeks. Intelligence reports this week indicate that BLAH Third-world support has increased and that BLAH is preparing for an attack to eliminate the remainder of the Barbellan Army. The attack is expected within 2 weeks. The president of BARBELLA has requested UNITED STATES (US) assistance to restore the legitimate government of BARBELLA and eliminate the forces of BLAH.

(2) ( ) Vulnerabilities. BLAH forces are well led and well organized; however, they depend on logistic support from outside the country. Supplies and equipment are delivered through the ports of CABO ROJO and PONCE. Limited amounts are also being supplied by air through the WAYNE Airfield. Routes 8 and 3 are the only connecting routes between BLAH forces in the north and in the south. Eliminating these routes would intensify the logistic problems for the forces in the north.

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE BARBELLA
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307
1 April 199_

JTF BARBELLA (JTFBA) OPORD 9_-15 (ISLAND STORM) (U)

( ) REFERENCES: a. ( ) CINCUSACOM OPLAN 5600-9_, 1 March 199_.-

b. ( ) 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps Field Standing Operating Procedures (FSOPs), 8 May 199_.-

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.

1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. This operation order (OPORD) is the execution order for Operation ISLAND STORM, the defense of the island of BARBELLA against invading forces.

b. ( ) Area of Concern. Not applicable (NA).

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. NA.

d. ( ) Enemy Forces. Annex B.

(1) ( ) General. The organization of the BARBELLA Liberation Army of Honor (BLAH) has assumed control of two-thirds of the Barbellan Army. Several Third-world nations supported BLAH members with arms, training, and equipment; these nations have been at odds with the current regime of BARBELLA for several years. Two months ago, BLAH attacked the legitimate government of BARBELLA to oust the current president. In fierce fighting, BLAH has forced the Barbellan Army into defensive positions east of the rivers RIO LOBO and RIO TACO. The capital of SAN LEON and the port city of GUAYAMA have received sporadic shelling for over a month. The situation has been a stalemate for 3 weeks. Intelligence reports this week indicate that BLAH Third-world support has increased and that BLAH is preparing for an attack to eliminate the remainder of the Barbellan Army. The attack is expected within 2 weeks. The president of BARBELLA has requested UNITED STATES (US) assistance to restore the legitimate government of BARBELLA and eliminate the forces of BLAH.

(2) ( ) Vulnerabilities. BLAH forces are well led and well organized; however, they depend on logistic support from outside the country. Supplies and equipment are delivered through the ports of CABO ROJO and PONCE. Limited amounts are also being supplied by air through the WAYNE Airfield. Routes 8 and 3 are the only connecting routes between BLAH forces in the north and in the south. Eliminating these routes would intensify the logistic problems for the forces in the north.

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

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e. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) The Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), as directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), has directed joint and combined operations in BARBELLA to eliminate the BLAH forces and to restore the legitimate government to power throughout the country. CINCUSACOM has further directed that necessary civil-military operations (CMO) will be conducted to restore the country to prewar conditions and to ensure the stability of the legitimate government.

(2) ( ) Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), designates the commander of the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) and provides forces to execute missions for JTFBA.

(3) ( ) CINCUSACOM provides necessary naval and marine forces and provides air protection for deploying air flow.

(4) ( ) US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) provides necessary air and/or sea transportation.

(5) ( ) 3d (BARBELLA (BA)) Infantry (Inf) Brigade (Bde) (Light (Lt)) is currently at 80 percent strength.

f. ( ) Assumptions

(1) ( ) The strategic objectives specified in the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) warning order will be the strategic objectives for the operation.

(2) ( ) The Department of State will obtain overflight and basing rights as required.

(3) ( ) NIMITZ Naval Station will remain open during the initial deployment.

(4) ( ) CMO and psychological operations (PSYOP) will require the mobilization of Reserve Component civil affairs personnel.

(5) ( ) Airlines of communication (ALOC) and sea lines of communication (SLOC) will remain open.

g. ( ) Legal Considerations

(1) ( ) Protocol I to the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of 1976 between the UNITED STATES and BARBELLA.

(2) ( ) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mutual Support Act (Amended), 10 U.S.C. Sections 2341 through 2350 as implemented by Department of Defense (DOD) Dir. 2010.9 and DOD Inst. 2010.10.

(3) ( ) Executive Order (EO) 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents.

2. ( ) Mission. On order, 21st Abn Corps, as JTFBA, conducts operations in the joint operations area (JOA) to restore the legitimate government of BARBELLA by destroying BLAH forces in BARBELLA and conducting CMO within unit capabilities to restore the country to prewar conditions and ensure the stability of the government.

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Annex C.

(1) ( ) General. I intend to quickly isolate BLAH forces from any support outside the country, disrupt their command and control (C^2) and lines of communication (LOCs) within BARBELLA, and destroy the BLAH forces piecemeal. We must keep civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure to a minimum, but this is secondary to mission accomplishment. Our PSYOP and CMO units must convince the Barbellans that we are there to help. At the end of the operation, we must have destroyed all BLAH forces, must have occupied the major cities and airfields in the BLAH sector, and must be prepared to conduct stability and nation assistance operations as required until our redeployment.

(2) ( ) OPORD structure. Operations will be conducted in eight stages: Stage 1, Mobilization; Stage 2, Predeployment Activities; Stage 3, Deployment; Stage 4, Entry Operations: Stage 5,Operations; Stage 6, War Termination and Postconflict Operations; Stage 7, Redeployment and Reconstitution: and Stage 8, Demobilization.

(a) ( ) Stage 1 (Mobilization)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. The President authorizes selective call-up of 99th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion (Bn).

2. ( ) Objective. 99th CA Bn mobilizes and conducts appropriate predeployment training.

(b) ( ) Stage 2 (Predeployment Activities)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Stage 1 objectives are achieved. Execution is ordered by the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

2. ( ) Objectives

a. ( ) Develop final orders.

b. ( ) Marshal all forces and prepare them for departure.

c. ( ) Establish initial C^2 structure in BARBELLA.

d. ( ) Establish liaison with the military command of BARBELLA.

(c) ( ) Stage 3 (Deployment)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Stage 2 objectives are achieved. Combatant commander orders deployment.

2. ( ) Objectives. Assault forces deploy to BARBELLA. Follow-on forces remain at points of embarkation prepared to deploy in accordance with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). [TPFDL is not provided for this operation. Assume that the TPFDL supports your course of action (COA).]

(d) ( ) Stage 4 (Entry Operations)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Stage 3 objectives arc achieved.

2. ( ) Objectives. Isolate BLAH forces from all support from outside the country. Establish initial lodgments.

(e) ( ) State 5 (Operations)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Stage 4 objectives are achieved. Commander. Joint Task Force BARBELLA (COMJTFBA), orders execution. Operations security (OPSEC) conditions are met (ANNEX L).

2. ( ) Objectives

a. ( ) Expand lodgments to allow landing and positioning of follow-on forces.

b. ( ) Isolate BLAH forces in country by disrupting C^2 and destroying LOCs.

c. ( ) Fix BLAH forces.

d. ( ) Destroy all BLAH forces.

e. ( ) Reestablish the legitimate government of BARBELLA throughout the country.

f. ( ) Occupy all major cities and airfields in country.

g. ( ) Conduct stability and nation assistance operations as required within unit capabilities.

(f) ( ) Stage 6 (War Termination and Postconflict Operations)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Stage 5 objectives achieved. COMJTFBA orders execution.

2. ( ) Objectives

a. ( ) Perform nation assistance and stability operations within unit capabilities.

b. ( ) Provide one brigade under the operational control (OPCON) of Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) for postconflict operations. Provide other assistance as requested by CMOTF within capabilities.

c. ( ) Transfer responsibility for stability operations to host nation police and military. Move units as relieved to assembly areas for reorganization and preparation for redeployment.

d. ( ) CMOTF assumes OPCON of all forces actively involved in postconflict operations.

(g) ( ) Stage 7 (Redeployment and Reconstitution)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. Units not required for ongoing postconflict operations have transferred responsibilities and are marshaled for redeployment. CMOTF has assumed OPCON of all corps forces required to support postconflict operations.

2. ( ) Objectives. Redeploy all forces not required to support postconflict operations, Disband JTFBA. Reconstitute forces as required after redeployment.

(h) ( ) Stage 8 (Demobilization)

1. ( ) Conditions for Execution. 99th CA Bn redeploys to home station.

2. ( ) Objective. 99th CA Bn demobilizes.

(3) ( ) Employment

(a) ( ) Stage 2. Army forces (ARFOR) establish C^2 in BARBELLA at SAN LEON.

(b) ( ) Stage 4

1. ( ) ARFOR. Establish initial lodgments in BARBELLA sufficient to support future operations. Conduct forced entry operations if required.

2. ( ) Air Force forces (AFFOR). Establish air superiority in the JOA. Protect ALOCs. Esaiblish an air blockade of the JOA. Provide close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI) to the ARFOR within capabilities. AFFOR have priority of use for NIMITZ Airfield.

3. ( ) Navy forces (NAVFOR). Protect SLOC. Establish sea blockade of JOA. Conduct an amphibious assault into amphibious objective area (AOA) GREEN vicinity GUAYAMA in support of ARFOR operations. Disembark 5th MEF (Fwd).

4. ( ) 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt). Prevents enemy penetration of RIO TACO and RIO LOBO defenses.

(c) ( ) Stage 5

1. ( ) ARFOR. Disrupt BLAH force LOCs to isolate northern and southern BLAH forces, Destroy BLAH forces in zone. Occupy all cities and airfields. Initiate CMO within capabilities.

2. ( ) AFFOR. Support ARFOR operations as required.

3. ( ) NAVFOR. Support Marine forces (MARFOR) and ARFOR operations as required.

4. ( ) 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt). Supports ARFOR operations as required.

(d) ( ) Stage 6.

1. ( ) ARFOR. Transition all stability and CMO responsibilities to host nation forces. Provide one brigade OPCON to CMOTF to support ongoing postconflict operations. Move forces to assembly areas to reorganize and prepare for redeployment as transition with host nation forces is completed.

2. ( ) MARFOR. Reembark on NAVFOR vessels.

(e) ( ) Stage 7. Redeploy all forces not required for ongoing postconflict operations. Disband JTFBA and ARFOR HQ.

(4) ( ) Deployment. NA.

b. ( ) Tasks

(1)( ) Stage 2

(a) ( ) ARFOR. Develop OPORD. Marshal assault forces. Establish initial command, control, and communications (C3). Establish liaison with 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt).

(b) ( ) AFFOR. Marshal forces. Begin initial deployments to BARBELLA. Begin buildup of ordnance stocks required for counterair, CAS, and Al missions.

(c) ( ) NAVFOR. Deploy to BARBELLA.

(2) ( ) Stage 4

(a) ( ) ARFOR. Main effort in stages 4 and 5. Receive OPCON of 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt). Marshal all follow-on forces. Provide terminal operations for reception of forces.

(b) ( ) NAVFOR. Assume control of all air and air defense operations in the land area of operations. Priorities: CAS—20 percent, AI—30 percent, counterair—50 percent.

(c) ( ) 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt). OPCON to ARFOR.

(3) ( ) Stage 5

(a) ( ) ARFOR. Receive OPCON of MARFOR. Maintain and secure all airfields with the ARFOR area of operations (AO) as required by the ARFOR tactical plan. Conduct CMO and stability operations as required and within capabilities.

(b) ( ) AFFOR. Priorities: CAS—50 percent. AI—30 percent, counterair—20 percent.

(c) ( ) NAVFOR. 5th MEF (Fwd), designated MARFOR, is OPCON to ARFOR.

(4) ( ) Stage 6

(a) ( ) ARFOR. 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt) returned to host nation military command. MARFOR released frorn OPCON to NAVFOR. Host nation military command provides appropriate military and police forces to relieve ARFOR and MARFOR units.

(b) ( ) NAVFOR. Reembark and assume OPCON of MARFOR.

(c) ( ) 3d (BA) Inf Bde (Lt). Reverts to host nation military command control

(d) ( ) CMOTF. Receives OPCON of one brigade from ARFOR. Assumes control of all postconflict operations.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) Provide liaison as required to support operations.

(2) ( ) ARFOR are responsible for reception and staging at all ports of debarkation (PODS).

(3) ( ) ARFOR provide common classes of supply, mortuary services, and terminal service for all land forces less MARFOR.

(4) ( ) Component commands will submit supporting OPORDs to J3, JTFBA.

(5) ( ) All joint air requests will be coordinated through the air operations center (AOC).

(6) ( ) Chemical weapons are not authorized for use.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. ( ) Concept of Support. Logistic support is the responsibility of the component commands. COMJTFBA exercises directive logistic authority. The ARFOR (as JTFBA executing organization) is responsible for all US Army combat service support (CSS) at the general support (GS) and direct support (DS) (nondivisional)/DS-backup levels. The ARFOR provide common classes of supply to land forces less 5th MEF (Fwd), 5th MEF (Fwd) will self-sustain from offshore. The joint logistic base will be initially located vicinity SAN LEON. Priority of support is to the ARFOR. No significant logistic shortfalls currently exist.

b. ( ) Logistics. Annex D.

c. ( ) Personnel. Annex E.

d. ( ) Public Affairs. Omitted

e. ( ) Civil Affairs. Omitted

f. ( ) Environmental Services. Omitted.

g. ( ) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Omitted.

h. ( ) Medical Services. Annex Q.

5. ( ) Command and Control

a. ( ) Command Relationships. Annex J. OPCON unless otherwise stated.

b. ( ) Command Posts

(1) ( ) JTFBA rear command post (CP) located at NIMITZ Naval Base.

(2) ( ) JTFBA main CP located at SAN LEON.

(3) ( ) JTFBA tactical CP located at GUAYAMA.

c. ( ) Succession to Command. To be published (TBP).

d. ( ) Command, Control, and Cornmunications Systems. Annex K. The 21st Abn Corps signal operation instructions (SOI) are in effect.

t/
Lieutenant General
Commander, JTFBA

ANNEXES:

A—Task Organization
B—Intelligence
C—Operations
D—Logistics
E—Personnel (Omitted)
J—Command Relationships (Omitted)
K—Command, Control, and Communications Systems (Omitted)
L—Operations Security (Omitted)
Q—Medical Services (Omitted)
Z—Distribution (Omitted)

OFFICIAL:
s/
t/
Major General
Director, J5

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE BARBELLA
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307
1 April 199_-

ANNEX A TO JTF BARBELLA (JTFBA) OPORD 9_-15 (ISLAND STORM) ( )
TASK ORGANIZATION ( )

Joint Task Force BARBELLA (JTFBA)
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps
- Army Forces (ARFOR) operational control (OPCON)
  - 31st Air Assault (AASLT) Division (Div) (-) (OPCON)
    - HHC, 31st AASLT Div
    - 1st Brigade (Bale), 31st AASLT Div
    - 2d Bde, 31st AASLT Div
    - 31st Aviation (Avn) Bde
    - 31st AASLT Division Artillery (DIVARTY)
    - 31st Division Support Command (DISCOM) (-)
  - 102d Abn Div (-) (OPCON)
    - HHC, 102d Abn Div
    - Division-Ready Brigade (DRB) 1 (Light (Lt))
      - Bde Headquarters (HQ)
      - Infantry (inf) battalion (bn) (abn)
      - Inf bn (abn)
      - Field artillery (FA) battery (btry) (six 105-mm howitzers)
      - Stinger platoon (pit) (20 teams)
      - Engineer (engr) company (co)
      - Light airfield repair package (LARP)
      - Military police (MP) plt
    - DRB 2 (Lt) (Same as DRB 1)
    - 102d DIVARTY (-)
    - 102d DISCOM (-)
  - 3d (BARBELLA (BA)) Inf Bde (Lt) (OPCON stages 4 and 5)
    - 1-3 Inf (Lt) (BA)
    - 2-3 Inf (Lt) (BA)
    - 3-3 Inf (Lt) (BA)
    - 2-53 FA (l05-mm, Towed (T))
    - 3d Inf Bde (Lt) Logistics Element
  - 1-3 Armor (Abn)(M551) (OPCON)
  - 21st Abn Corps Avn Bde
    - HHC, 21st Avn Bde
    - 21st Attack (Atk) Helicopter (Hel) Bn
    - 121st Command (Cmd) Hel Bn
    - 127th Medium (Mdm) Lift Hel Bn
    - 175th Air Cavalry (Cav) Squadron (Sqdn)

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21st Abn Corps Artillery (Arty)
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 21st Corps Arty
1-651 FA (155-mm, T)
2-651 FA (155-mm, T)
3-651 FA (155-mm, T) (Abn)
21st Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Bde
HHB, 21st ADA Bde
1-430 ADA (Chaparral (Chap))
1-461 ADA (Hawk)
51st Engr Bde
HHC, 51st Engr Bde
500th Combat (Cbt) Engr Bn
502d Cbt Engr Bn
538th Cbt Engr Bn
4019th Engr Port Construction (Const) Co
5047th Engr Assault (Aslt) Floatbridge (Fltbrg) Co (Abn)
5048th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Abn)
4505th Engr Detachment (Det) (Diving)
21st Military Intelligence (MI) Bde (Abn)
HHC, 21st MI Bde
210th MI Bn (Tactical Exploitation (TE))
220th MI Bn (Aerial Exploitation (AE))
221st MI Bn (Operations (Ops)) (Abn)
250th Long-Range Surveillance Company (LRSC) (OPCON to corps G2)
21st MP Bde
HHC, 21st MP Bde
206th MP Bn (Abn)
208th MP Bn (Abn) (with enemy prisoner of war (EPW) augmentation)
21st Signal (Sig) Bde
HHC, 21st Sig Bde
704th Cmd Sig Ops Bn (Abn)
705th Sig Support (Spt) Bn (Abn)
712th Sig Radio (Rdo) Bn
770th Sig Bn Area Spt (Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) (Abn)
21st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) (-)
21st Corps Personnel (Pers) Group (Gp) (-)
Air Force Forces (AFFOR) (OPCON)
52d Air Force (AF) (-)
Navy Forces (NAVFOR) (OPCON)
Task Force (TF) 45
5th MEF (Fwd) (OPCON ARFOR once designated Marine Forces (MARFOR) in stage 5)

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) (OPCON to JTFBA stages 4 and 5)
- HHC, 13th Special Forces (SF) Gp
- 1-13 SF
- 1-150 Avn (Special (Sp) Ops)

Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) (OPCON stages 4 and 5)
- 301st Civil Affairs (CA) Bde
  - 96th CA Bn
  - 99th CA Bn US Army Reserve (USAR)

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) (OPCON stages 4 and 5)
- 7th Psychological Operations Group (POG)

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JTFBA OPORD 9_-15 INFORMATION

The following tables summarize information that will eventually be written in narrative form for inclusion in several annexes of JTFBA OPORD 9_- 15. The primary heading for each table shows the annex where the information will be placed as the order is written. This method of displaying the information will save you time and is adequate for completing the requirements of the examination.

INTELLIGENCE NOTES

(Information to be included in Annex B, JTFBA OPORD 9_-15)

	Characteristics of Area and Enemy Situation (See sketch map 5-1)	
Topic	**Area Assessment**	**Remarks**
Hydrographic	1. Drainage: Central mountain range to coast in all directions. 2. Coastal swamp: Island coastal plain is mangrove swamps that preclude military operations; amphibious operations possible only in the vicinity of Guayama. 3. Elevations: 1,500-2.000 feet above sea level.	High tide operations only between Rio Taco and area directly east of Guayama.
Major Rivers	1. Rio Isla—5-l5m width; average depth is 15 ft; fordable. 2. Rio Lobo—20-50m; depth varies from 20-30 ft; nonfordable, swift, steep banks, some engineer preparation required but does not present obstacle to crossing. 3. Rio Taco—Average width 20m; depth 20 ft; unfoldable, banks require engineer preparation.	Rivers widen closer to the coast.
Bridges	Both major bridges across the river on routes 5 and 9 have been destroyed; small footbridges are plentiful but primitive.	
Roads	1. Route 1: Single hard-surface road. 2. Routes 3,5,8, and 9 are hard pack gravel; engineer preparation required for sustained military operations, little cover and concealment except on route 8 in mountain areas: cross-country maneuver limited by stone fences.	Isabella Mountain routes easily restricted.
Cities	1. Major ports: *San Leon, Guayama, and Cabo Rojo 2. Limited ports: Isabella, Nimitz Naval Base (deep water port). 3. Capital: San Leon (cultural and economic center), population 100,000,	*Most extensive port.
Airfields	1. San Leon International: C-5 capable, space to stockpile supplies; limited ramp space unless civilian traffic curtailed. 2. Nimitz Naval Base: C-141 capable, engineer prep needed to improve limited ramp and storage space for extended operations. 3. Wayne Airfield: Same as Nimitz description above. 4. Ponce Airstrip: C-130 capable if 3 days available for engineer work.	
Weather	1. Warm temperatures with high humidity. 2. Winds average 10 knots from the east. 3. Sudden, violent thunderstorms common, large amounts of rain and high winds occur for short duration. 4. Median temperature is 85 °F.	

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Topic	Enemy Situation	Remarks
Enemy	Barbella Liberation Army of Honor (BLAH) with headquarters located at Manati—2 inf bdes (each bde has 1 motorized bn, 1 mech bn, and 2 inf bns); each bde has 1 plt of light amphibious tanks, an antiaircraft gun pit, an attack helicopter bn, and arty btry.	Tanks—PT-76 with 76-mm main gun and 7.62-mm mg Mech Bn—BMP-1 equipped ADA—ZSU-23-4s and SA-7s Hel—Armed UH-1s FA—D-30, 122-mm x 8 tubes
Enemy Locations	1. Northern brigade located vicinity of Rio Lobo. 2. Southern brigade located vicinity of Rio Taco. 3. Light inf co protects Wayne Airfield. 4. Light inf co protects Ponce Airstrip and 18 UH-1s. 5. Primary support base at Cabo Rojo	UH-1 missions in the south also fly missions for the northern brigade
Readiness	Well-trained and equipped units.	
Current Situation	Hasty defense along Rios Taco and Lobo.	
Objectives	San Leon and Guayama. Intelligence estimates show that BLAH forces could attack in 2 weeks; bridging at Cabo Rojo believed important in attack plans.	
COA (most likely)	Main attack in the north to secure San Leon with a supporting attack in the south to prevent shifting of friendly forces and to secure Guayama.	
Popular support	Fragmented, disorganized, and supportive of whomever is in power at the moment. All major cities have strong factions supportive of the government and BLAH activities.	
Essential Elements of Information	1. When will the BLAH forces launch their final attack? 2. What intelligence, logistics, and other support will BLAH forces receive before and during their attack? 3. Where are rally points, logistic centers, cache points, and C3 nodes to support BLAH forces after JTFBA intervention?	

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOTES
(Information to be included in Appendix 5 to Annex C, JTFBA OPORD 9_-15)

Topic	Annex Information
Mission Statement	On order, JSOTF conducts operations in Barbella to support conventional force operations as directed by COMJTFBA.
Concept of Operation	JSOTF deploys to Barbella and provides SO support to conventional operations as requested by COMJTFBA and COMARFOR. On completion of conventional operations, JSOTF provides SO support to CMOTF, if required.
Coordinating Instructions	Targets of opportunity will not be engaged unless specifically authorized by JTFBA Joint Targeting Board (JTB). Components will conduct their own combat search and rescue operations. SOF will provide support within capabilities on request on JTFBA.
Command and Control	Deploying SOF change of operational control (CHOP) to JTFBA on arrival at APOD; liaison will be maintained when SOF operate in proximity to conventional forces.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT NOTES
(Information to be included in Appendix 8 to Annex C, JTFBA OPORD 9_-15)

Topic	Annex Information
US National Policies	1. DOD Dir 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, governs the conduct of all JTFBA operations. Commanders will ensure that operations are conducted IAW the principles of the law of war. Legal review and guidance from servicing JAs will be obtained for all policies, OPORDs, target lists, and procedures prior to the conduct of military operations and as the tactical situation permits. 2. Operations will reflect the limited nature of the US interests in Barbella— restoring the legitimate government of Barbella throughout the country.
Coordinating Instructions	1. All practical means will be employed to limit risk to lives and property of friendly forces and civilians. 2. Nothing in these ROE will be interpreted to infringe on the inherent right of a commander to exercise self-defense and take immediate action in response to an enemy direct attack with all lawful and appropriate means necessary to save US and Barbellan lives and to protect US property. 3. Every effort will be made to observe fires regardless of the target location. Unobserved fires will be used only when absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment and will meet the following criteria: •No unobserved fires will be directed against targets in populated areas unless the unit is in contact and in serious danger of being overrun or unless authorization is granted be COMJTFBA. •Unobserved fires maybe used against all clearly identified targets in uninhabited or sparsely populated areas if deemed essential by the tactical unit commander directing the fire. 4. Indirect fire weapons maybe used in a direct-fire role in populated areas when necessary at the discretion of the tactical commander controlling the fire. 5. When the tactical situation allows, commanders will make all attempts to notify civilians in a target area to allow their evacuation. 6. Air operations will be governed by these same ROE unless otherwise specified by COMJTFBA. 7. Whenever possible, nominated targets will be approved by the Barbellan Military Command. 8. In general, targets will not be engaged outside Barbellan national territory; however, hot pursuit is authorized in all situations.

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT NOTES
(Information to be included in Annex D, JTFBA OPORD 9_-15)

Topic	Logistic Assessment
Concept of Logistic support	Component commands are responsible for providing single-service logistic support. Cross- and common-servicing agreements will be developed by joint boards in coordination with USACOM J4. Logistics will be a combination of service assets and operational project stocks. Logistics will develop incrementally according to stockage objectives and echelonment of forces to meet support requirements during each stage.
Army Forces (ARFOR) Tasks	1. Responsible for support to ARFOR in JOA. 2. Provides all class I, III, common V, VIII (less blood products), distribution, and terminal services for all land component forces in Barbella, less Marine forces. 3. Responsible for any combined operations logistic support.
Air Force (AFFOR) Tasks	1. Responsible for all support to AFFOR. 2. Provides all air base engineering and security. 3. Provides intratheater tactical airlift support. 4. Provides intertheater aeromedical patient evacuation. 5. Provides whole blood products within the JOA.
Navy Forces (NAVFOR) Tasks	1. Responsible for all NAVFOR in JOA. 2. Responsible for MARFOR in JOA. 3. Provides backup hospital beds offshore. 4. Provides logistics over the shore in support of MARFOR units.
Supply/ Distribution	Supply bases will be established in country to provide centralized logistic support.
Distribution and Allocation	1. San Leon and Nimitz Naval Base will be the main logistic bases in the JOA. 2. An intermediate staging base on the island of Tropicana maybe necessary if the capabilities at the main logistic bases in Barbella restrict the operational tempo.
Level of supply	1. Components will maintain 3 DofS level in all classes of supply. 2. Bulk POL buildup will be provided by civilian ships, 3. Service components will buildup to a 10 DofS level prior to stage 5.
Enemy Material	Captured classes I and VIII will be used to support EPW operations.
Local Acquisitions	1. DLA contracting teams will arrange local support. 2. Host nation support is extremely limited.
POL	1. ARFOR will store and distribute bulk POL products in support of land-based forces. 2. HNS facilities are not available. 3. Single fuel (JP-8) support will be through the offshore petroleum discharge facility. 4. Intratheater aircraft with bulk fuel delivery systems (bladder birds) are not available.
Mortuary Affairs	1. Concurrent return program in effect. 2. ARFOR is responsible for the concurrent remains program.

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Nonnuclear Ammunition	1. ARFOR has JTFBA responsibility. 2. All ammunition resupply from CONUS will be by strategic air.
Maintenance	1. Service components are responsible for maintenance of all organic supplies and equipment. 2. ARFOR will coordinate with ARFOR units for mutual maintenance support,
Medical Services	1. Barbella is characterized as a Third-world country with limited medical infrastructure. 2. All local water sources are considered nonpotable. 3. Theater evacuation policy is 24 hours. 4. Urgent casualties will be evacuated to NAVFOR beds, an ISB (if used)), or CONUS. 5. ARFOR medical units are responsible for medical treatment of EPW and medical support of civil-military operations (CMO).
Mobility support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis	1. ARFOR will secure APODs and SPODs as required. 2. Airhead management will be provided by AFFOR units. 3. Terminal services area joint ARFOR and AFFOR responsibility.
Security Assistance	ARFOR is responsible for classes I, IV, X, and medical operations in support of humanitarian relief operations.

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