CSI REPORT
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ:
TWO LETTERS ON STRATEGY
Edited and translated by
Peter Paret and Daniel Moran
NOTE: The original edited and translated version of Carl von Clausewitz:
Two Letters on Strategy was published earlier by the U.S. Army War College
Art of War Colloquium in November 1984. This edition has retained the
editing style of the original. The present text, however, rejoins the original
letters into whole documents, contradicting what the translators indicate as
their intentions in paragraph 3, "A Note on the Text," page 7. Professor Paret
has granted his kind permission to allow us to revise the first pages of
Clausewitz's text in accordance with the translation found in Peter Paret,
Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power
(Princeton, 1992).
The portrait of Clausewitz is taken from a lithograph in the possession
of Peter Paret. The portrait of Roeder was originally published in the fifth
volume of Kurt von Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führerrum, [1938?]. The page of
Clausewitz's letter of 22 December 1827 was first published as an example
of Clausewitz's handwriting in Rudolf von Caenunerer, Clausewitz, Berlin,
1905.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 1984 by Army War College Foundation, Inc.
The introduction, copyright © by Peter Paret, 1984.
|
1. The first problem |
10 |
|
2. M's and Roeder's solutions |
13 |
|
3. The second problem |
46 |
This edition of Carl von Clausewitz's Two Letters on
Strategy was made possible by the Army War College
Foundation and by the Art of War Colloquium of the Army
War College, which sponsors the volume as part of its program
of republishing military classics for the professional
development of the officer corps. The Army War College
wishes to express its gratitude to the co-editors and translators,
Professor Peter Paret, Spruance Professor of International
History at Stanford University, and Dr. Daniel Moran.
In recent years, Carl von Clausewitz's On War has attracted
many new readers in this country, stimulated in large part by
the publication in 1976 of a new translation and edition of the
work by Professors Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Generally
readers have concentrated on Clausewitz's philosophy, theory,
and strategic concepts, as developed in Books One, Two, Three,
and Eight of On War. His views on operations, on the other
hand, have been largely neglected. The present work provides
us with an opportunity to study Clausewitz's thinking on
operational issues in a specific strategic context.
Two Letters on Strategy deals with the planning and conduct
of a campaign, based on problems set by the Chief of Prussian
General Staff in 1827. In reading Clausewitz's discussion, we
must remember that he generally used the term "strategy" in its
normal 19th-century connotation, which he himself was
instrumental in establishing - that is the conduct of major
operations and not the more comprehensive definition found in
the Army's Field Manual 100-5.1 Three levels of war are
defined in FM 100-5:
Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are the broad
divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war.
Military strategy employs the armed forces of a nation to
secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the
threat of force. Military strategy sets the fundamental conditions
for operations.
The operational level of war uses available military resources to
attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the
theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and
conducting campaigns.2
Clausewitz discusses the operational level of war in Book
Five, Chapter Two of On War, where he relates the factors of
space, mass, and time to theater of operations, the army, and
the campaign. He makes the distinction between levels of
military action when he relates them to time and space. He
states, "the concepts characteristic of time-war, campaign and
battle-are parallel to those of space-country, theater of
operations and position...."4 Clausewitz also says: "Tactically,
every engagement ... at the strategic level the campaign
replaces the engagement and the theater of operations takes
the place of the position. At the next stage, the war as a whole
replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of
operations."5 Clausewitz, although recognizing the three levels
of war, generally uses the term strategy to describe the
operational level. An outline of his concept of the levels of war
follows:
|
Classification
|
Time
|
Space
|
referred to as the
next stage (strategy) |
the war |
the country |
|
strategy (operations) |
the campaign |
the theater of operations |
|
tactics (tactics) |
the battle |
the position |
The terms in parenthesis are used today to describe these
levels.
In Book Three, Chapter Two of On War, Clausewitz lists
the elements of strategy: moral, physical, mathematical,
geographical and statistical (logistics).6 In Book Four, Chapter
One, he calls them the operative elements in war.7 He states
that strategy "presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to
say that very few people have clear ideas about its details."8
Clausewitz then goes on to list some of the obvious facts about
strategy: "that success is always greatest at the point where the
victory was gained, and that consequently changing from one
line of operations, one direction, to another can best be
regarded as a necessary evil, that a turning movement can only
be justified by general superiority or by having better lines
of communications or retreat than the enemy's; that
flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that
every attack loses impetus as it progresses."9 Books Six and
Seven of On War cover the conduct of operations within a
theater, discussing such concepts as base of operations, lines of
communications, and turning movements. Two Letters on
Strategy relates these concepts to a particular campaign plan.
Two Letters on Strategy expands on many of the ideas
expressed in On War, particularly those that deal with campaign
plans. For this reason, Two Letters on Strategy should be of
value to the US Army in its effort to study large unit operations.
This work deals with the positioning and maneuver of corps as
well as the evaluation of campaign plans. Although written for a
hypothetical situation in 1827, the principles discussed are as
timeless as those covered by Clausewitz in On War. The serious
reader must follow the text on the maps at the back of the
volume in order to understand the arguments put forward by
Roeder and Clausewitz. The relationship of time, distance, and
mass in these problems and solutions can only be appreciated
through a knowledge of the geography of this theater of
operation.
References to On War in the introductory material and in
the endnotes are to the revised and expanded edition by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, published by Princeton
University Press in 1984.
Wallace P. Franz
Colonel, Infantry
US Army War College
May 1984
ENDNOTES
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., edited and
translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton
University Press, 1984, p. 70.
2. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C., 20 August 1982, p. 2-3.
General Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven discusses the
levels of war as understood in the German Army at the end of
World War I:
In the German Army, then, starting in the general staff,
the employment of the term 'strategisch' (strategical) has
fallen more and more into disuse. We replace it, as a rule, by
the term 'operativ' pertaining to operations and thereby
define more simply and clearly the difference from
everything that is referred to as 'taktisch' (tactical). All that
pertains to operations as such takes place, on the whole,
independently of actual combat, whereas in the term
'strategisch' (strategical) things become easily confused, as
has been proved by the example of our enemies who are
wont to speak of strategical conditions when it is merely a
question of purely local matters. At any rate, the term
'strategy' ought to be confined to the most important
measures of high command.
Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Generalship in the
World War, translated by the Army War College, Washington,
D.C., 1934, p. 34.
3. Ibid., pp. 280-281.
4. Ibid., p. 379.
5. Ibid., p. 358.
6. Ibid., p. 183.
7. Ibid., p. 225.
8. Ibid., p. 70.
9. Ibid., p. 71.
In 1827 the Prussian general-staff officer, Major von
Roeder, requested Clausewitz's comments on solutions of two
operational problems that had been set by his superior,
Lieutenant-General von Müffling, Chief of the General Staff.
Müffling, best known for his service as Prussian liaison officer
in Wellington's headquarters during the Waterloo campaign,
never freed himself from the cautious strategic concepts current
in the Prussian Army before 1806. Position warfare and the
occupation of territory dominated his thinking, rather than the
defeat of the enemy's forces. But he was an efficient peacetime
chief of staff, who took the training of his officers seriously, and
whose operational exercises, war games on the map and on the
ground, and innovations in communications and map-making,
contributed to the growing professionalization of the general
staff.
At the time, the general staff was still far from the army's
central planning and, in effect, executive organ it became some
forty years later under Moltke. In 1821 it had been detached
from the Ministry of War; but the Chief of Staff continued to
report to the minister on all major business, and his right to
report directly to the monarch was severely circumscribed; he
was still an advisor, who responded rather than initiated. The
staff itself was small for a major power with a peacetime army
of some 127,000 officers and men, which could be expanded to
over 400,000 if the reserves were called up. The central body, or
Great General Staff, in Berlin numbered 19 officers, including
the chief; 27 officers served with the guards, the eight army
corps, and the artillery inspectorate general. Five officers
holding other assignments were attached to the staff and kept
informed of its work, though they participated in it only when
their special expertise was needed. The senior in this group was
Clausewitz, since 1818 Director of the War Academy.
Trigonometric and topographic sections, an archive, and a
duplicating office completed the organization.1
Roeder was the head of the General Staffs "Central
Theater of War," the section that dealt with operations against
Austria. Born in 1787, seven years younger than Clausewitz, he
had been Scharnhorst's student at the Academy for Young
Officers in 1804 and 1805, during which time he first met
Clausewitz. After serving in the War of 1806 he resigned his
commission and studied at the Universities of Berlin and
Heidelberg, before re-entering, the Prussian Army as a second
lieutenant at the beginning of the Wars of Liberation in 1813.
In the battle of Grössgorschen he was severely wounded, but
recovered to participate in the fighting that autumn and in the
campaign of 1814. During the Hundred Days, Roeder, by then a
captain on the general staff, was assigned to one of the brigades
in III Corps, whose chief of staff was Clausewitz. He fought in
the battles of Ligny and Wavre, in which the corps, by tying
down Grouchy's far stronger force, helped make the victory of
Waterloo possible. After the war Roeder continued to serve as
a general staff officer and royal adjutant until he retired with
the rank of major-general in 1841. Six years later he was
promoted to the nominal rank of lieutenant-general.2
While not a man of striking originality, Roeder was an
intelligent officer, broadly experienced as a planner and in the
field. His early association with Scharnhorst and other members
of the reform movement left a permanent mark on his ideas
and attitudes. He was one of the men who carried a hint of the
reform era's idealism and independence of judgment to the
army's peacetime routine in the sluggish, conservative decades
after 1815. His memoirs indicate that he looked up to
Clausewitz, who in turn liked him and--as the following letters
show--trusted him sufficiently to express his opinions at length
and frankly, to the point of openly criticizing Müffling's
operational and strategic views.
The problems Müffling assigned to Roeder and others on
the staff toward the end of 1827 were, like the majority of his
exercises, defensive in nature. Prussia had become a major
power, her territory now stretching from the Niemen and the
Republic of Cracow in the east to the Rhine and beyond in the
west; but larger, richer, better armed neighbors lay on her
borders. Neither a preventive strike nor an offensively waged
defensive were part of Müffling's thinking. In any future war, he
expected "an enemy to invade Prussia from west, east, or south.
Political weakness [would] compel Prussia to fight on the
defensive on her own territory."3 Within these constraints,
Roeder worked out his answers, and then forwarded Müffling's
exercises to Clausewitz, together with his solutions and a
solution to the first problem by another officer, who signed
himself merely with the initial M-possibly First-Lieutenant
Count Monts of the Great General Staff.
In a first reply, dated 22 December, Clausewitz critically
discussed the terms of Müffling's problem and then turned to
the solutions by M and Roeder. In a further letter two days
later, he analyzed Müffling's second exercise and Roeder's
solution. Together the two letters were well over 8,000 words in
length. Clausewitz never found it difficult to express his
thoughts in writing, but the timing of Roeder's request may
have contributed to the extensiveness and thoroughness of his
response. Only a few months earlier he had decided that the
manuscript of On War, which had occupied him for nearly a
decade, should be "thoroughly reworked once more." The
revisions he had in mind, would, he hoped, "bring out the two
types of war with greater clarity at every point." By this he
meant, on the one hand, wars waged for major objectives, which
can be achieved only by the far-reaching destruction of the
enemy's powers and will of resistance; and, on the other,
limited wars waged for limited ends. He also wanted his
revisions to develop more fully another, related point: "that war
is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."4
Roeder's request thus reached Clausewitz during a period of
intense intellectual reappraisal, and he seems to have
welcomed the opportunity to apply his ideas on fundamental
issues of war to specific operational situations.5
The opening paragraphs of Clausewitz's letter of the 22nd
criticize Müffling's first problem for its failure to indicate the
political purposes of the antagonists, and to establish the level
of significance the military operations possessed for the
opposing governments. Without this information, sensible
strategic and operational planning was out of the question. That
this was not mere pedantry on Clausewitz's part, that a limited
conflict between Prussia and Austria lay as much in the realm
of the possible as the desperate struggles of the Silesian and
Seven Years Wars, is shown by the Campaign of 1778, the
so-called "Potato War," between the two powers, which
consisted primarily in feints and armed demonstrations while a
diplomatic settlement was worked out. Then, and at all
times, political interest largely determined-or should
determine-the scale and type of military effort. In the rather
casual context of a private letter to a younger comrade,
Clausewitz tests and applies hypotheses that eventually receive
their ultimate formulation in the polished, compact prose of the
revised opening chapter of Book I of On War.
Since Clausewitz wrote in reaction to Müffling's exercises,
his letters focus on problems of defense, a circumstance that led
the German editor, when the letters were published in Berlin in
1937, to give his edition the subtitle Thoughts on Defense.
Actually, their scope is far broader. Among important
themes - besides the political nature of war - are Clausewitz's
arguments for the need for flexible planning, balancing the
geographic, economic, and social givens with the constantly
changing political situation, the strengths and weaknesses of the
political and military leadership, and other imponderables; his
thesis of the reciprocal relationship of attack and defense; his
rejection of Müffling's static doctrine in favor of an aggressive,
active defense. Another recurring theme is the dismissal of pet
phrases such as "freedom of action" or "mobile operations,"
which he feared were too often substitutes for hard thinking
about the realities of specific situations.
Today, over a century-and-a-half since the exchange
between Clausewitz and Roeder, we recognize the two letters
as a valuable gloss on major themes of On War. That On War
does not, and should not, contain the kind of extensive,
systematic analysis of a particular operational problem that is
developed in the letters, further increases their significance.
Certainly, in many respects war has changed almost beyond
recognition. But the reader who takes the trouble to imagine
the realities of war at the beginning of the industrial revolution,
will find Clausewitz's analysis interesting in its own terms.
Beyond that, the two letters suggest how Clausewitz might have
dealt with the different and yet related problems of war today
and in the future. If we take account of the technological and
tactical conditions of the 1820s, and think or play through the
strategic and operational solutions Clausewitz proposes to
Roeder, we will find ourselves face to face with the theorist in
his workshop. In new form we encounter, and perhaps come to
understand better, the interaction of practical knowledge,
political and psychological insights, and the ability to abstract
and generalize without ever departing from the hard facts, that
lies at the core of Clausewitz's unique and lasting achievement.
ENDNOTES
1. The figures, which do not precisely coincide with the number of positions authorized at the time, are taken from the
Army List for 1827: Rang- und Quartier-Liste der Königlich Preussischen Armee, Berlin, 1827.
2. Roeder's memoirs, Für Euch, meine Kinder!, published posthumously in Berlin in 1861, are an interesting source for
the conduct of operations in the Prussian army from the perspective of a junior staff officer. They repeatedly mention Clausewitz; see, for instance, pp. 56, 305, 306, 314, 315, and 319.
3. Herbert von Böckmann, "Das geistige Erbe der Befreiungskriege," in Von Scharnhorst zu Schlieffen, ed.
Friedrich von Cochenhausen, Berlin, 1933, p. 122. Böckmann's essay contains a good analysis of Müffling's ideas. See also "C. v. W." [i.e. Philipp Friedrich Karl von Müffling], Betrachtungen über die grossen Operationen und Schlachten der Feldzüge von 1813 und 1814, Berlin and Posen, 1825; and the discussion of Müffling as Chief of Staff in Kurt von Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, IV, Hamburg, [1937?], pp. 313-18.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, "Note of 10 July 1827," On War, rev. ed., edited and translated by Mchael Howard and Peter
Paret, Princeton, 1984, p. 69.
5. For a more extensive discussion of Clausewitz's thinking at the time he received Roeder's letter, see Peter Paret,
Clausewitz and the State, Oxford and New York, 1976, pp. 378-81.
Our edition is based on Zwei Briefe des Generals von
Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr, a special issue of the
Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, a periodical published by
the Ministry of War and the General Staff of the Army, Berlin,
1937. The editor of the issue was not identified. The originals of
Clausewitz's letters were in the possession of the General
Staff archives (Kriegsarchiv des Grossen Generalstabes,
Manuskripte, Kap. IV, Nr. 243), and disappeared or were
destroyed during the Second World War.
The German edition printed Clausewitz's letters verbatim,
but modernized his orthography and made a few changes in his
punctuation. Müffling's problems and the solutions by Roeder
and M were partly quoted, partly paraphrased. We have
translated all quoted material, but have restated the
paraphrased passages in our own words.
With some adjustments, we have adopted the German
editor's practice of printing Clausewitz's letters in sections,
each part after the text by Müffling, Roeder, and M to which it
refers.* The arrangement involves neither deletions of, nor
changes in, Clausewitz's wording, but should assist the reader in
following his argument.
Clausewitz's German, though precise and supple, is
sufficiently complex to demand a relatively free translation. He
wrote in the sophisticated idiom of the Goethe period, many of
whose terms and expressions have undergone some change in
meaning in the intervening century-and-a-half, and should not
be translated literally. To convey the logical and rhetorical links
between sentences, which reflect Clausewitz's dialectic, often
calls for the substitution of words or the rephrasing of
sentences.
In a very few instances, which we mark, we were
unable to resolve an ambiguity of meaning. Occasionally, to
clarify an antecedent or the meaning of a term, we have added
an explanatory word or two in brackets. Several footnotes were
taken over from the 1937 German edition, and identified as
such. The remaining notes, signed "Eds.," are by the present
editors. Italicized words and phrases are Clausewitz's own.
Brief passages from the opening part of Clausewitz's first
letter are quoted in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State,
Oxford and New York, 1976, pp. 379-80; and in the same
author's "The Genesis of On War," in Carl von Clausewitz, On
War, rev., ed., edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, Princeton, 1984, p. 7. A longer segment from the
same letter is printed as an appendix in Alexander Atkinson;
Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy, London, 1981,
pp. 284-92, a version that is close to a literal translation and
consequently contains numerous errors and infelicities. These
segments aside, the present edition, to the best of our
knowledge, is the first publication of the material in English.
The following conditions should be assumed [map 1]:
Relations between Austria and Prussia are strained.
Saxony is allied to Austria.
Austria has assembled her forces in Bohemia, Moravia,
and her German territories, and established magazines in
Komotau, Aussig, Gabel, Arnau, and Jung-Bunzlau.
Prussia has mobilized the Guards; the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and
6th Army Corps; and the Silesian Division of the 5th Corps.1
The fortresses at Erfurt, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau,
Küstrin, Glogau, Schweidnitz, Silberberg, Neisse, and Kosel are
supplied for six months.
On June 1 news arrives that the Austrian forces on the
Danube have set out for Bohemia. It is certain that Austria will
take the offensive once these units have reached their
destinations. Austrian strength is assumed to be 130,000 men;
Saxon strength, 20,000.
Prussia can put five corps (150,000 men) in the field. An
additional half a corps and some reserve formations will
garrison these fortresses that are threatened.
Prepare a memorandum discussing the following:
a) Possible operations by Austria and her ally.
b) Analysis of these in time and space.
c) Which operation is most dangerous to Prussia?
d) The overall disposition of Prussian forces, from which
each of the Austrian moves can be countered.
e) A detailed assessment of each possible operation,
paying particular attention to the one deemed most dangerous.
The Austrians can advance 1. through Silesia; 2. between
the Oder and the Elbe, along the shortest route to Berlin; or 3.
along the left bank of the Elbe. Inferior to these three main
options "are all others, which seek to achieve their purpose by
[dividing the army into] a main and a subsidiary force."
The first option is improbable because it compels Austria
to reveal her intentions sooner,(1)2 lose "all advantages of the
initiative," (2), and concede the occupation of Saxony, and
perhaps also of parts of Bohemia, in exchange for Silesia.
The second option is the most likely, because if Prussia
places great value on protecting Berlin, she is forced into "the
most disadvantageous defensive" (3).
The Third option is "totally unthinkable," because the
enemy advancing along the left bank of the Elbe below Torgau
lacks an operational objective.
The following are estimates of the distances and times
required for these operations:
An Austrian advance from Vienna through Silesia covers
678 kilometers. After the Austrians cross the Silesian border,
their further intentions would become known in Berlin on
about the 15th day of the operation.
An advance between Oder and Elbe covers 542 kilometers.
The Austrians leave Bohemia on the 14th day, and enter
Prussian territory on the 19th. Their further intentions would
become known in Berlin on the 20th day.
In the third case, an offensive along the left bank of the
Elbe covers 633 kilometers. If the enemy advances over
Leipzig, and intends to cross the Elbe at Dessau, he will reach
Bitterfeld, halfway between the Prussian frontier and Dessau,
on the 22nd day (4).
The course of the Elbe from Bohemia to Wittenberg is
nearly the same as the route to Berlin. Torgau lies 113
kilometers from the point where the Elbe crosses the
Bohemian-Saxon border, and 113 kilometers from Berlin. The
Austrians can move a siege train by barge to Torgau, a very
considerable advantage for them. If they base their operations
on this possibility, this is the plan that poses the greatest threat
to Prussia (5).
The Austrian columns could advance on both banks of the
Elbe, with pontoon bridges between them, until they combine
at the Prussian border and operate jointly, something "the
defensive system" (6) cannot prevent. It follows from this a)
that the Prussian army cannot take up positions far from Torgau
(7), and b) that it should not be pushed forward to the Saxon
border, so that "under all circumstances it retains its freedom of
action"(8).
The general deployment of the Prussian army should be as
follows [map 2]: the 4th Corps at Eilenburg, the 3rd Corps at
Torgau, the 2nd Corps at Herzberg, the available units of the
5th Corps at Schlieben, the Guards at Zossen, one half of the
6th Corps at Dobrilugk, the other half of the 6th Corps will
garrison the Silesian fortresses, and initially is stationed at
Neisse [the Silesian town (see map 1), not the river of the same
name. Eds.].
If the Austrians enter Silesia (1st option), the Prussian
right wing is given the mission to occupy Saxony, while the main
body of the army moves east to the Bober River, and for the
time being remains on the defensive. After Saxony has been
overcome, an offensive can be launched against the Austrian
advance in Silesia.
In the second case, an Austrian advance between Oder and
Elbe, the Prussian army concentrates between Torgau and
Herzberg. If the enemy bypasses it as he advances on Berlin,
which would be unlikely, the Prussian army remains based on
the Elbe (9), and attacks his rear.
In the third case, an Austrian advance on the left bank of
the Elbe, the Prussian army assembles on the right bank, its
right flank at Wittenberg, its left at Torgau. In this impregnable
position, with a bridgehead at each wing, the commanding
general would be free to seize the initiative as soon as he
deemed it appropriate (10). If, however, the enemy advances on
both banks of the Elbe, the best area of concentration for the
Prussian army would be at Herzberg. If the Austrians remain
divided, the advance on the right bank should be attacked, since
it presents the greater threat. If the Austrians unite on the right
bank, the fortresses at Torgau and Wittenberg, as well as the
Elbe and Elster rivers, offer ample opportunity for mobile
operations, until the time has come to offer battle.
These recommendations presuppose that the loss of Berlin
would have no impact on the outcome of the war, and if
necessary could be tolerated by Prussia. If the Prussian army
were ordered to cover Berlin, which would mean withdrawing
from the advantageous position on the Elbe, its situation would
become critical. For instance, a position at Luckau, with the left
wing on the Spreewald, would leave the right wing dangling
(11). The enemy could deny the Prussian army all freedom of
movement (12), or compel it "to resort without hesitation to
battle" (13). A general who wished to risk nothing could
withdraw behind the Nuthe and Notte rivers, but would then be
thrown so completely on the defensive that the enemy could
immobilize him there, while laying siege to Torgau. (14). It
would be very difficult to relieve the fortress.
In conclusion, if the army withdraws from the Elbe, it
would not be possible to devise any truly promising defensive
strategy for it. If, on the other hand, the commanding general
understands how to exploit the river position, Austria "can
achieve lasting advantages only by winning a major battle" (15).
The Austrian army can advance 1. on the right bank of the
Elbe, over Rumburg and Zittau through Lusatia toward Berlin;
2. over the Erz Mountains on the left bank of the Elbe into
Saxony; or 3. through Silesia. The Saxon army will probably
assemble at Dresden, or, if the Prussians enter the country
before the Austrians, withdraw into or behind the Erz
Mountains, or entrench itself around Dresden. In all
circumstances it seems advantageous for the Austrians to join
up with the Saxons as soon as possible, and either the first or
the second option would bring about an early junction.
Of these two options, the advance on the right bank of the
Elbe through Lusatia appears the more decisive(1)3 since it is
the shortest route to Berlin, and is free of Prussian fortresses,
which would be difficult to bypass or whose investment would
require detaching troops from the advance.
The second option lacks a definite objective. The Austrians
would probably choose it only if they wish to avoid battle at the
beginning of the campaign, and find it sufficient to control
Saxony and the left bank of the Elbe, and possibly to invest
Erfurt (2).
In the third option, the Austrian objective could only be to
invest some of the Silesian fortresses. In that case, the Prussians
will certainly advance and force a battle. Even were the
Austrians to win this battle, they would still not gain the
advantages they might derive from the first option (3).
As to the time required for these operations: In the first
case (a march through Lusatia), the enemy could reach
Hoyerswerda on the 21st day after leaving the Danube. In the
second case (an advance on the left bank of the Elbe), he would
reach the Erz Mountains before Dresden on the 20th day. In
the third case (an attack on Silesia), if the enemy were to move
through Trautenau, he would reach Landeshut on the 17th day.
These estimates make no allowance for opposition. The
situation would be different if even weak Prussian detachments
were to occupy the mountains, and harass the enemy along his
frontier or on the march.
"It must be apparent that the attack on Berlin through
Lusatia presents the greatest danger to Prussia, since, as
mentioned above, it takes the shortest route to the capital,
through an area without fortresses"(4).
In considering how Prussia might best counter each of
these threats, we must leave out of account the possibility that
Prussian units stationed near the border enter Saxony and
occupy the mountains before the Austrians. A preventive
strategy is excluded by the nature of the exercise, which
stipulates that Prussia must await the Austrian offensive.
Consequently it is proposed that the main Prussian force (the
Guards and the 2nd and 3rd corps) deploys between
Hoyerswerda, Senftenberg, Spremberg, and Kalau [map 2]. The
2nd Corps, particularly its Landwehr units, would of course
arrive later than the others. The 4th Corps assembles between
Elsterwerda and Mückenberg behind the Black Elster River,
the Silesian Division of the 5th Corps at Görlitz. The line units
of the 12th Division (6th Corps) march to Landeshut, while its
Landwehr units garrison the Silesian fortresses [off map 2,
south-east of Görlitz].
Should the Austrians advance through Lusatia, the
Prussian commander-in-chief would learn on the evening of the
18th day after the enemy had left the Danube that the
Bohemian-Saxon border had been crossed. He would then issue
the following orders:
1. The division stationed at Hoyerswerda send out a
strong cavalry reconnaissance toward Bautzen, which takes up
positions approximately halfway to the town. It is not to become
involved in a decisive action, but return to Hoyerswerda if it
encounters superior forces (6).
2. Reconnaissance detachments will be sent out from
Senftenberg, Mückenberg, and Elsterwerda.
3. The division at Senftenberg will deploy east behind
Hoyerswerda.
4. The 4th Corps, stationed between Elsterwerda and
Mückenberg, will deploy east between Mückenberg and
Senftenberg, while continuing to hold the river-crossing at
Elsterwerda.
5. The line units of the 2nd Corps, having in the
meantime arrived at Luckau, will continue south to Alt-Böbern,
and join forces with the Guards.
6. The corps at Görlitz is ordered to engage weaker
enemy forces, avoid stronger formations, and keep open its line
of retreat into Silesia (7).
If the Austrians press their offensive toward Berlin, they
will be met by three-and-a-half corps (the Guards, 3rd and 4th
corps and the line units of the 2nd Corps), while the Görlitz
corps operates on their right flank. The terrain will determine
where the main Prussian army gives battle, and circumstances
will dictate whether it is opportune to await the arrival of the
Landwehr of the 2nd Corps. If that seems necessary, the battle
could be fought between the Nuthe and Notte rivers, or
perhaps already at Luckau.
Should the Austrians choose the second option (an
advance on the left bank of the Elbe), they might cross the Elbe
at Dresden. The main Prussian army would then block their way
behind the Black Elster River, and the Görlitz corps would
operate against their right flank. If, on the other hand, the
enemy proceeds further along the left bank, the 4th Corps
stands ready at Torgau, the rest of the main army withdraws to
the area around Torgau-Herzberg, with the Görlitz corps at
Elsterwerda. If the Austrians were then to cross the Elbe above
Dresden, which is unlikely, they should be attacked. If they do
not cross, the Prussian forces on the right bank must follow the
enemy's movement on the left until the Landwehr of the 2nd
Corps arrives, and then take the offensive.
In the event the Austrians proceed over Trautenau to
Landeshut (the third option), their objective would be to lay
siege to the Silesian fortresses. To cover the siege, they would
probably deploy along the Katzback River [map 1]. The
Prussians respond as follows: The units of the 12th Division at
Landeshut withdraw to Schweidnitz, to obstruct the enemy
advance as much as possible. "Depending on circumstances,"'
they would then "reinforce the threatened fortresses, and
conduct mobile operations among them" (8). The Görlitz corps
confronts the enemy between the Bober and Katzback rivers,
while the main army moves east to join it (9). In the event that a
secondary enemy column is pushed through Zittau, all or part
of the Görlitz corps remains in place against it. An advance
between the Oder and Bober rivers is unlikely, nor would it be
dangerous, since its left flank would be exposed to
counterattacks.
Whether a battle should be fought before the Landwehr of
the 2nd Corps arrives from the north by way of Guben, or
whether battle should be avoided until their arrival, depends on
circumstances that cannot be determined in advance (10).
December 22,1827
You have asked me, dear friend, to give you my opinion of
the strategic problems and the two solutions you have sent me.
I do so with the understanding that you will treat my
communication, which is made purely in the interest of
scholarship, as entirely confidential.
Forgive me if I start at the very beginning; but nowhere is a
basic understanding, the true and unambiguous recognition of
inescapable facts, so lacking as in the so-called science of
strategy.5
War is not an independent phenomenon, but the
continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the
main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in
nature, and their political character increases the more the plan
encompasses the entire war and the entire state. The plan for
the war results directly from the political conditions of the two
belligerent states, as well as from their relations to other
powers. The plan of campaign results from the war plan, and
frequently-if there is only one theater of operations-may
even be identical with it. But the political element even extends
to the separate components of a campaign; rarely win it be
without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle,
etc. According to this point of view, there can be no question of
a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a
purely military scheme to solve it. That it is essential to see the
matter in this way, that the point of view is almost self-evident
if we only keep the history of war in mind, scarcely needs proof.
Nevertheless, it has not yet been fully accepted, as is shown by
the fact that people still like to separate the purely military
elements of a major strategic plan from its political aspects, and
treat the latter as if they were somehow extraneous. War is
nothing but the continuation of political efforts by other means. In
my view all of strategy rests on this idea, and I believe that
whoever refuses to recognize that this must be so does not yet
fully understand what really matters. It is this principle that
makes the entire history of war comprehensible, which in its
absence remains full of the greatest absurdities.
How then is it possible to plan a campaign, whether for
one theater of war or several, without indicating the political
condition of the belligerents, and the politics of their
relationship to each other?
Every major war plan grows out of so many individual
circumstances, which determine its features, that it is
impossible to devise a hypothetical case with such specificity
that it could be taken as real. We are not referring simply to
trivialities, but to the most important issues, which nevertheless
have almost always been ignored. For instance, Bonaparte and
Frederick the Great are often compared, sometimes without
keeping in mind that one man ruled 40 million subjects, the
other 5. But let me call attention to another, less noticeable and
yet very significant distinction: Bonaparte was a usurper, who
had won his immense power in a kind of perpetual game of
chance, and who, for the greater part of his perilous career, did
not even possess an heir; while Frederick the Great disposed of
a true patrimony. Had nature given both men identical
psychological qualities, would they have acted in the same
manner? Certainly not, and that alone makes it impossible for
us to measure them by the same standard. In short, it is
impossible to construct a hypothetical case in such a way that
we can say that what was left out was not essential. We can of
course think of many characteristics of the opposing armies and
states that are identical, and have the effect of canceling each
other out; but solving such problems would be no more than a
useful exercise. Our best solutions could not be applied to real
conflicts.
If, therefore, such exercises allow us to leave many things
out of consideration because we believe they neutralize each
other, we still cannot ignore those conditions that have brought
about the war and that determine its political purpose. The
political purpose and the means available to achieve it give rise
to the military objective. This ultimate goal of the entire
belligerent act, or of the particular campaign if the two are
identical, is therefore the first and most important issue that the
strategist must address, for the main lines of the strategic plan
run toward this, goal, or at least are guided by it. It is one thing
to intend to crush my opponent if I have the means to do so, to
make him defenseless and force him to accept my peace terms.
It is obviously something different to be content with gaining
some advantage by conquering a strip of land, occupying a
fortress, etc., which I can retain or use in negotiations when, the
fighting stops. The exceptional circumstances in which
Bonaparte and France found themselves since the Wars of the
Revolution, allowed him to achieve major victories on almost
every occasion, and people began to assume that the plans and
actions created by those circumstances were universal norms.
But such a view would summarily reject all of the earlier history
of war, which is absurd. If we wish to derive an art of war from
the history of war -and that is undoubtedly the only possible
way-we must not minimize the testimony of history. Suppose
we find that out of fifty wars forty-nine have been of the second
kind- that is, wars with limited objectives, not directed at the
total defeat of the enemy -then we would have to believe that
these limitations reside in the nature of war itself, instead of
being in every case brought about by wrong ideas, lack of
energy, or whatever. We must not allow ourselves to be misled
into regarding war as a pure act of force and of destruction, and
from this simplistic concept logically deduce a string of
conclusions that no longer have anything to do with the real
world. Instead we must recognize that war is a political act that
is not wholly autonomous; a true political instrument that does
not function on its own but is controlled by something else, by
the hand of policy.
The greater the extent to which policy is motivated by
comprehensive interests, affecting the very existence of the
state, and the greater the extent to which the issue is cast in
terms of survival or extinction, the more policy and hostile
feelings coincide. As policy dissolves into hostility, war becomes
simpler; it proceeds according to the pure concept of force and
destruction, and satisfies whatever demands can be logically
developed from this concept, until all its component parts come
to possess the coherence of a simple necessity. Such a war may
seem entirely apolitical, and on that account has been
considered the norm. But obviously the political element exists
here no less than it does in other kinds of war. It merely
coincides so completely with the concept of force and
destruction that it vanishes from sight.6
In light of this discussion, I have no need to prove that wars
exist in which the objective is even more circumscribed - a bare
threat, armed negotiations, or in the case of alliances, the mere
pretext of action [by one of the allies]. It would be unreasonable
to maintain that such wars are beneath the art of war. As soon
as we concede that logically some wars may not call for extreme
goals, the utter destruction of the enemy, we must expand the
art of war to include all gradations of military means by which
policy can be advanced. War in its relation to policy has above
all the obligation and the right to prevent policy from making
demands that are contrary to the nature of war, to save it from
misusing the military instrument from a failure to understand
what it can and cannot do.
Consequently I must insist that the military goals of both
sides are stated whenever a strategic plan is drawn up. For the
most part these goals arise out of the political relations of the
two antagonists to each other, and to other states that may be
involved. Unless these relations are outlined, a plan can be
nothing more than a combination of temporal and spatial
relationships, directed toward some arbitrary goal-a battle,
siege, etc. To the extent that this goal cannot be shown as
necessary or superior to others, it can be challenged and
contradicted by other projects, without these coming any nearer
the absolute truth than did the first plan. That is, indeed, the
history of all strategic discussions until today. Everyone rotates
within some arbitrary circle. No one tries to push his argument
back to the origins of the war that is to be fought, to its true
motive, to the one and only point where the logical
development and conclusion of the military operations can
alone originate. Whatever correct and effective strategic
decisions are made, result from the instinctive tact of talented
commanders, who with a glance penetrate and assess a mass of
circumstances. This instinct suffices for action, but obviously
not for analysis, even though action is something far greater
than the laborious unfolding and laying bare of facts.
You see from this, dear friend, how little I can make of
your assignment.7 Above all, I must ask: do the Austrians
intend, or could they intend, to defeat and disarm Prussia with
150,000 men, or would they be satisfied with a limited
objective? In the Seven Years War they were unquestionably in
a position to achieve the former; their primary means would,
have been an advance through Saxony and Lusatia on Berlin.
They failed to do so, and this failure was rightly counted as a
great error on their part, just as it was considered an error that
they directed their operations more toward Silesia than Lusatia.
But if circumstances are such that the total defeat of the
Prussian military monarchy is not possible, then an advance
through Lusatia toward Berlin would no longer be the most
suitable operation and consequently no longer present the
greatest danger to Prussia.8
You will agree, of course, that in circumstances in which
Austria has only enough power to seize some territory with one
or a few fortresses, and in which only a modest plan promises
success, while a more ambitious one promises none
because it disregards the means available, the modest Austrian plan would
carry the greatest threat to Prussia. You can see that the
question as to which operation is the most dangerous assumes
an aura of universality, in this problem as well as in both
solutions, that it does not really possess, an error that recurs
constantly in a strategic discussion, with the result that general
strategic arguments nearly always prove inapplicable to reality.
The greatest threat for Prussia can only be determined if we
know what the Austrian objective can be or will be. In the
present instance this objective must either result from a
definition of the overall political situation, or it must be
arbitrarily specified as a given of the exercise. Both the problem
as well as the solutions ascribe an obscure (that is,
unarticulated) importance to the capital city, which in reality
Berlin cannot possess. The Seven Years War demonstrated this
clearly enough.9 Equally obscure is the notion, involved in the
first assumption, that an Austrian thrust through Lusatia would,
so to speak, split the Prussian monarchy into two parts, because
if our army were defeated and relentlessly pursued, it would
have to decide whether to withdraw behind the Oder or escape
across the lower Elbe. This would be a serious crisis -but only
in the face of an enemy able to carry out such a great project. It
can hardly be doubted that for the Austrians such an operation,
flanked from Bohemia by Silesia on the right, and on the left by
the Elbe fortresses, would be very difficult.
It could only succeed if the difficulties were offset by a great
preponderance of force. Of this preponderance the
problem has nothing to say; it appears on the contrary to
assume a kind of equilibrium of strength.
Furthermore it seems to me that this problem assigns
undue significance to the question as to which Austrian
operation poses the greatest threat. Attack and defense
determine their measures reciprocally. But surely in
theory-that is, for the purposes of general analysis-the
sequence of ideas arising from this interaction must start
somewhere? Quite so. The sequence begins, I am convinced,
with the defensive, in part because peacetime military
arrangements are directed primarily toward defense, which thus
precedes the offensive; in part because offensive plans depend
on the disposition of the defense, without which they would
have no factual basis. The defensive, on the other hand, does
not lack the necessary data in the absence of an attack, because
these reside in the overall character and circumstances of the
country. At the general level, then, the main characteristics of
defensive operations develop directly out of existing conditions.
In specific cases, however, this is by no means always necessary,
but only if one cannot discover the enemy's intentions early
enough to take the required countermeasures. This certainly
does not seem to be the case here. From the direction of their
advance, the location of their magazines, the mobilization of
their transport, and other information, one would soon learn
whether the Austrians were directing their main force toward
Silesia or Saxony. Whether they intend to advance along one
bank of the Elbe or the other, they might perhaps conceal until
the last moment. But this would make very little difference to
us since the slightest movement right or left on our part would
compensate for it. If, as is most natural with respect, to our
peacetime deployment, we assemble our three Silesian
divisions at Neisse, Liegnitz, and Sprottau respectively, the
Second and Third Corps and the Guards in Lower Lusatia, and
the Fourth Corps on the right bank of the Elbe at Torgau, we
can await information that we would certainly receive on the,
direction of the enemy's main force, and then lead our main
force against it. For this reason it seems to me that this
particular exercise ranges quite unnecessarily into the realm of
speculative reflection. Wherever concrete conditions are
decisive, such speculations, which all too often degenerate into
hair-splitting, are no longer of interest. If the question of
Prussia's greatest military weakness is to be raised, the problem
would have to be totally recast.
Having now shown that the exercise is too incomplete to
permit a solution that is not totally arbitrary and furthermore
that the particular issue that is supposed to be the key to a
solution -namely the question as to the most dangerous line of
advance -would in practice never form a basis for our actions. I
shall proceed to the individual points of the second [M's]
solution. I shall analyze these points historically, since the
solution is too illogical to permit a strictly logical rebuttal.10
Critique of M's Solution
1. Why would an attack on Silesia reveal Austrian
intentions sooner than attacks elsewhere? Because the border
is somewhat farther from Berlin? That is too petty and
insignificant a consideration to influence the choice of
operational lines. If the Austrians set out from Vienna and the
Danube toward our border, we will certainly grasp that we are
their target, and prepare ourselves to be in the right place at the
right time. We would not delay our measures until the
Austrians had crossed the frontier.
2. The advantage of initiative here means the advantage of
surprise. Only when surprise is present does the initiative
confer an advantage; otherwise, in war as in card games, it is a
disadvantage.11 This inheres in the nature of things, but for want
of space cannot be discussed here. If Berlin is to be surprised,
this can certainly be achieved more easily by way of Saxony; if it
should be Silesia, that would not be the case. Obviously the
Austrians can attack us much earlier in southern Silesia than in
the Mark Brandenburg.
3. The reason for the Austrians to prefer an advance on
Berlin is that if Prussia places a high value on protecting her
capital she will be forced into a most disadvantageous
defensive. On the mere possibility that Prussia would make this mistake,
the Austrians are supposed to base their line of advance. Again,
this consideration is far too insignificant. And why should
Prussia's defensive be most disadvantageous? What an empty
phrase! A strong position behind the Notte and Nuthe rivers,
two fortresses on the enemy's left flank [Torgau and
Wittenberg], an entire province [Silesia] on his right -how can
anyone call that disadvantageous? I do not say that this is where
we should make a stand; I merely want to show that the reason
given here itself needs justification.
4. What is the purpose of indicating the three distances
from Vienna to Berlin and to two points on the Prussian
frontier? At most the figures might be used to determine how
far forward we could assemble our forces. But the author does
not use them for this purpose, to which, in any case, the
distance from Vienna to Berlin would be irrelevant. It seems as
though this distance is meant to demonstrate the danger for
Prussia of the second option. But the author does not draw this
conclusion; rather he believes the danger to derive from
something else -the Elbe and Torgau.12 In the end, however,
that maneuver [the siege of Torgau] leaves the importance of
Berlin quite out of the account. If Berlin really were
the keypoint of Prussia's entire, defensive system, its
distance from Vienna would not matter very much, since
this situation -unlike some other subordinate strategic
options - demands more than a mere race.13 That Prussia would
not learn the direction of the Austrian offensive until her
frontier had been crossed, is an arbitrary, improbable
assumption, totally unsuited to provide a premise for strategic
analysis. I confess, then, that I find these calculations of time and
space unnecessary on the one hand, and without practical value
on the other.
5. The fact that Austria can move a siege train by water to
Torgau is relevant only to a siege of Torgau. Why it should pose
the greatest danger to the Prussian state would first have to be
demonstrated. Again this is merely an unsupported assertion.
There may be cases when a siege of Torgau would be more
dangerous to the Prussian state than a siege of Glatz, but the
opposite could also be true. If Torgau is invested without great
superiority of force, success would hardly be conceivable. The
then becomes the best means for Prussia to gain a general siege
strategic victory. So long as the relationship between the two
sides is not more fully specified, we cannot really think about
these issues in a practical way. My analysis merely tries to show
that the proposition on which the author's reasoning rests is, as
so very often in strategic theorizing, an entirely unproven thesis,
a mere phrase.
6. The Austrians are supposed to be able to proceed
safely on both banks of the Elbe until they
reach the vicinity of Dresden.14 This is inferred from the
defensive system of Prussia. If by this term the author means the Prussian intention to fight
the campaign on the strategic defensive, then his inference is
false. If circumstances were as described, nothing would be
more compatible with this intention than to attack one of the
Austrian columns before the two could unite. If the author
means a specific defensive system, which might perhaps consist
in a deliberate withdrawal, we would have to assume that this
system, which incidentally is not mentioned in the assignment,
had been betrayed to the Austrians. Otherwise they would
always have to accept the possibility of having to pay a price for
separating their forces. If we consider that while the Austrians
are assembling their army on the Eger, the Prussians assemble
theirs on the Elster, it is hard to predict with certainty who
would arrive first in the vicinity of Dresden. And I doubt that
the Austrian commander would risk an advance in two columns
on both banks of the Elbe. Instead of envisioning the situation
of both armies shortly before the campaign begins, and asking
what the most advisable course of action for each would be, a
general concept, namely the concept of the defensive, once again
is taken as the basis for a conclusion that is not only without
practical value, but also inherently wrong.
7. The conclusion the author now draws, that the
Prussians should place themselves near Torgau, again seems
entirely illogical to me. It is not clear why the Prussians could
not occupy more advanced positions and withdraw from them
in time to concentrate on Torgau. Besides, the conclusion
assumes an intention that must at least be discussed, since it is
by no means inevitable -I mean the intention of the Prussian
commander to cover Torgau and prevent a siege. Far from
being a universal necessity, this intention is fundamentally
contrary to the nature of things. Fortresses exist to be besieged.
A siege weakens the enemy, and hastens the moment when we
can defeat him more easily. This is a natural sequence in theory,
and in all wars fought over major issues it is also the natural
course of events. On the other hand, in limited wars, the play of
balanced forces frequently causes armies to cover fortresses.
The history of war is full of examples. It would take me too far
afield to disentangle this seeming anomaly here, and to show
that it is entirely, natural and justified. I only assert that in the
present case this intention [of preventing a siege of Torgau] is
not justified, and cannot be conceded as a general, self-evident
necessity.
8. What does it mean to say that the Prussian army should
retain its freedom of action? Obviously the farther forward its
position, the greater its freedom of action, since by advancing it
will increase the number of possible lines of retreat in its rear.
The phrase "freedom of action" is among the most pernicious
of all strategic cliches, because it is used more often than any
other, and no one feels obliged to define its actual meaning.
In general, then, the author concludes that the best
position for the Prussian army lies between Herzberg and
Torgau, where, in one way or another, it can offer the most
effective resistance. I have no wish to criticize this conclusion in
and of itself, only to point out that it bears little or no relation
to the author's construct of strategic theorizing and calculations
of time and space. The Prussian army is strong in this position
because of the Elbe, the three fortresses, the sheltered
character of the whole deployment, and because the Silesian
border runs parallel to the enemy's lines of communication.
These things can be said in a few words, sound common sense
will accept them, and require no ingenious, long drawn-out
strategic deduction.
9. Since so few facts are given [in the problem], it is
impossible to determine whether a flanking position with our
back to the Elbe would be superior to any other. The Prussian
army appears to find itself in such an excellent strategic position
here that it can evade an attack in three directions toward the
Elbe, toward Berlin, and toward Silesia -and still retain the
advantage of posing a strategic threat to the enemy, either on
his two flanks or in his rear. Nevertheless, the army's main line
of retreat should certainly be determined, that is, the line to be
used in case of extreme misfortune, with which all other
operational, decisions ought to be correlated. The fact that at
Vilna [in 1812] the Russians were still undecided whether to
withdraw their main force toward St. Petersburg or toward
Moscow nearly led to the disaster of the army's surrender in the
open field. If it were considered absolutely necessary to cover Berlin,
a flanking position so near the city would not be appropriate. I
believe, however, that protecting Berlin is not an essential
element of the Prussian defense; consequently in a great many
cases, which need of course to be studied in detail, a flanking
position would prove highly advantageous.
10. A position behind the Elbe, just as behind any large
river, is tactically unassailable. The strength
of the position does not depend on the two fortresses.
But we do not gain a favorable battlefield by deploying behind the
Elbe, because we force the enemy to by-pass us. It is only from
this compulsion that our advantages must come.
11. In how many positions do both wings rest on major
strategic strong points? To have one such point is already worth
a great deal. Once again, the reason why we should not deploy
at Luckau, the lack of support for the right wing, is one of those
strategic terms that cannot bear close inspection. Whether we
might not find some tactical support for the right wing [e.g.,
some farm buildings, a small rise in the ground, a swamp. Eds.]
would have to be discovered on the spot. How many battles are
fought in which only one wing of the defender's position is
secure!
12. The enemy could no more determine the movement of
the Prussian army at Luckau than anywhere else. This is one of
the most abominable strategic clichés. Basically it says
absolutely nothing, since, after all, the actions and movements
of one commander do always strongly influence the conduct
and movement of the other. If the statement means anything at
all, it can only be that one general can compel the other to
follow him everywhere, to submit to him wholly, to deprive him
even of the possibility of indirect resistance by means of
retaliatory countermovements. This does not in any sense seem
to me to hold true for a Prussian army at Luckau, and we may
assume that had the author developed his ideas in greater
detail, their inadequacy and one-sidedness would have become
obvious.
13. Battle is here presented as something evil, at least that
battle that is resorted to without hesitation. Here we enter the
morass of muddled concepts that made up the general-staff
science of the Old Regime. Against a determined enemy, who
does not shy away from fighting, battle is the only effective
means of resistance. We may fight him under the most
advantageous circumstances possible, but we must be resolved
to fight. In such cases there is no substitute for battle. If the
defender has occupied an exceptionally strong position, he will
force the attacker to bypass him. If this position is well-placed
strategically, to be bypassed offers an advantage to the defense.
But the advantage becomes reality only if it catches the attacker
in the process, en flagrant delit, as Bonaparte would say. In
short, a battle is inevitable: either a battle in the tactical
defensive, if the attacker finds bypassing too dangerous, and
therefore proceeds to attack our position; or an offensive battle,
if the attacker pursues his [original] objective and risks
bypassing our position. If the tactical features and strategic
location of the defender's position are so strong that the enemy
dares to do neither and gives up his advance entirely, then this
success without battle arises only from the strictly necessary
presupposition that the defender was in fact prepared to fight.
If the attacking army does not advance resolutely, if it does
not plan an energetic offensive, if it has taken the field merely
to await some favorable opportunity, and will only attempt
something should this opportunity arise, then the defense can
certainly do likewise. Against such an opponent, the defense
may make it its business to avoid battle entirely, to regard it as an
evil, and to direct all actions and movements toward ensuring
that the advantageous conditions for battle that the enemy
seeks will not occur.
It is important not to confuse the two cases. To expect
favorable results from passive resistance against a determined
opponent goes against the nature of things. On the contrary,
nothing is so certain as that such an approach would lead to
half-measures, wasted time, confusion, and-following this
splendid purgatory -to the most complete defeat.
All this being said, the advance on Luckau and Herzberg
surely suggests that the Austrians are seeking a decisive battle.
14. If the Prussian commander retreats north over Torgau
simply to bring this fortress into play, obliging the Austrians to
besiege it, and then, after they have been weakened by the
siege, to attack them, I would find this most sensible. In that
case, however, the Prussian commander has no need to
withdraw behind the Nuthe River. Rather he will try to halt
behind the Elster. Should the Austrians want to drive him off
and force him either to withdraw behind the Nuthe or to give
battle, the Prussian commander may prefer to accept battle,
even if the enemy had not weakened himself significantly by
laying siege to Torgau. In light of the general circumstances
there seems to be no reason to shrink from this battle, while a
retreat to the vicinity of Berlin would be undertaken only on
the most pressing grounds.
But even supposing such grounds were present, I would
not find the retreat as disadvantageous as the author does. He
says that the Prussian commander would be thrown back on the
most disadvadvantageous defensive, a well known, ready-made
figure of speech from the strategist's workshop.15 If the
expression disadvantageous refers to the defense itself, the
statement is clearly wrong, for a defensive position behind such
a line of marshes as exists along the Nuthe cannot possibly be
considered a disadvantage. Should the expression refer to the
fact that if the enemy lays siege to Torgau, defensive operations
would no longer be appropriate, and would therefore be
detrimental, then I cannot persuade myself that our army would
find it all that difficult to advance from this position by one
route or another to relieve Torgau.
15. Here we must first ask, what is the meaning of leaving
the Elbe? Does the author mean, evacuate the entire area, and
let the Austrians take Torgau at leisure; or is he merely
referring to a situation in which one wing of the army is not at
all times covered by the river? Again, unfortunately, we are
dealing with jargon, which, as usual, bears only a faint
resemblance to well defined, specific concepts. Even a retreat
behind the Nuthe would make the subsequent relief of Torgau
neither impossible nor very difficult, as anyone will agree who
thinks of the numerous ways for doing this that are open to the
Prussian army. Only if the Prussians were to take no steps to
relieve the fortress, could the Austrians occupy Torgau without
a battle and so acquire an enduring advantage. But this is an
empty supposition. If, on the other hand, the author means that
as long as we retreat at least one day's march from the Elbe, the
Austrians would succeed in taking Torgau, he lacks all basis in
fact. After all, we can advance from any point to attack them.
In general, it is not clear how an attacking army can
achieve a permanent advantage over a defending force that is
its equal physically and in morale, without defeating it in battle.
If such a victory is necessary to the success of the Austrian
campaign, this necessity is not a consequence of any particular
strategic combination on the part of the Prussians, but follows
quite simply from the nature of things.
That the author again regards battle as an evil, an
incongruity, reflects the same confusion that we have
discussed under point 13, above.
With this I conclude my remarks on Solution M. I feel only
too keenly how cursory they are, and how much they may leave
unclear. But to make good these failings, I would need a great
deal more time.
You see, my dear friend, I have scarcely left any
propositions unchallenged that are meant to yield a solution to
the problem. It is not so much the solution as this type of
arguing that I should feel obliged to attack, were I competent to
do so.16 I hate the sort of technical language that leads us to
believe we can reduce the individual case to a universal, to the
inevitable. Strategists manipulate these terminologies as if they
were algebraic formulae, whose accuracy has long been
established, brief formulae that may be used as substitutes for
the original reality. But these phrases do not even represent
clear and definite principles. Rather they are nebulous,
ambiguous expressions, whose true meaning remains open to
question. This is no accident. Their vagueness is intended,
because they did not derive from what is essential and could be
presented as universal truth. Consequently the inventors of
these terms found it natural to allow a certain latitude in their
meaning.
I recognize that my finding fault with more or less
everything in Solution M conveys a strong impression of a mind
already made up. But I am convinced that I do not hold
preconceived opinions, nor could I, because I do not follow a
particular [strategic] system, and demand nothing but the plain,
straightforward truth, the simple linking of cause and effect. I
hope you will not suspect that mere contrariness or, worse,
personal antipathy are involved. Pointless contradiction is
utterly repugnant to me; and with respect to the author, I am
truly sorry not to find him farther along the road toward a
natural view of strategic issues, a road I have pursued for many
years with the greatest enthusiasm, because despite everything I
agree with his practical judgments more often perhaps than
with anyone else's.17
Critique of Roeder's Solution
After all this, my analysis of your solution will require far
less time, I fully approve of its simplicity and realism. You set
up no scaffolding of superfluous circumstances; your reasoning
is not based on mere clichés. But let me be more specific about
particular issues.
1. You are right to characterize the operation through
Lusatia as the most decisive. This is the way to put it. The most
decisive operation, however, is not always the one that best
suits the enemy's circumstances. Of course, the exercise
demands that in planning the preliminary concentration of the
[Prussian] army, you determine [in the abstract] what attack
would be the most decisive. But, as I have already noted, this
would not be necessary in practice.18
2. Your description of this option is accurate. It proves
the soundness of your point of view that you characterize the
option as a possibility and not simply as an outright error, as
does Solution M.
3. This also holds true for the third operational option.
But your assertion that for the Austrians a victorious battle
would be more advantageous in Lower Lusatia than at the foot
of the Silesian mountains is based on the one-sided assumption
that the Austrians are in the position to fight a war aiming at
major decisions.
4. I have already indicated my objections and
qualifications to this assertion.
5. Your calculations of times are simple and sound,
without the false implications of the other solution. Such
calculations are, of course, always necessary; but in this case
they lack the great significance that the problem seems to
attribute to them. Nothing is less likely than that the Austrians
would march from the Danube to our border in one fell swoop.
Therefore we should not be concerned that the Landwehr units
of the 2nd Corps would not be available. But that you have
emphasized - or rather, mentioned - this possibility makes your
calculations superior to those of the other solution, since it is
only on account of such possibilities that these calculations are
necessary at all.
6. I have nothing to say against the details of our
disposition given here, except that such specifics cannot
reasonably be required or given in advance. With the
information that the enemy has crossed our border will
naturally come much other news about the number and
strength of his columns. Only then will we decide the details of
our disposition.
7. I consider this eccentric deployment the one true fault
of your answer.19 In such a confined space, at a moment when a
great battle may be expected, a divided deployment is always an
error, unless it is justified by a preponderance of force. Nothing
can protect such a deployment from the danger that the enemy,
with one and the same army, may defeat the separate parts one
after another, as the famous campaign of 1796 [Napoleon's, in
Italy] with its five distinct phases has shown. Over longer
distances such an enveloping form of attack or defense becomes
less dangerous, and if distances are really great, as in Russia in
1812, a division of forces may cease to be dangerous at all, and
its special characteristic will then naturally become
advantageous. In 1813 the distances were fairly large, and yet
there was always the greatest danger that Blucher would be
overwhelmed by the main enemy army, which, in fact, did
defeat Schwarzenberg at Dresden. The enveloping form of
attack is always the more decisive, the one that leads to greatest
success, but for that reason also the riskier, in which success is
less certain. Success and danger always stand side by side, and
form the dynamic law of war. If we wish to increase the first, the
second rises as well, and it then becomes, a question of whether
or not this is in accord with the needs and particular
characteristics of our situation. Thus, if our circumstances do
not allow us to take great risks, we can increase our success only
when danger itself is not great, that is, when we possess a
preponderance of physical and moral force. This utterly simple
principle, grounded directly in the concepts [of success and
danger] themselves, allows for clear and definite solutions in a
great variety of strategic questions, over which, in the usual way
people argue fruitlessly.
It is very tempting, if one of our territories lies to one side
or behind the enemy advance, to base a considerable force
there. This idea has seduced you, but one must resist. That is
not to say that we must give up the advantage of this
circumstance entirely. Rather we ought to detach a few small
units of rangers, whose combined strength is not so essential to
the whole that it could not be spared in a decisive battle.20 In an
army of 120,000 men, for instance, 5,000 men would not be
missed. But these 5,000, in combination with the forces in the
area that they could bring into action-Landwehr units,
garrison troops, reservists, etc. -can act very effectively against
the enemy's lines of operation. This type of operation against an
attacker's lines of communication, which arises, in a sense,
automatically as he advances, leaving territory to his left and
right that he cannot occupy, is the only kind that offers an
absolute advantage. It is a unique advantage of the strategic
defensive, but it cannot be achieved by detaching significant
forces to act against the enemy's flanks, since those who fight
on his flank cannot fight on his front.
8. The division's war of maneuver is one of those
miserable catchphrases. You will forgive me if I say that you did
not form a clear conception of what this would mean.
9. I believe I have already said that if the Austrians were
to advance on Silesia rather than Saxony, we would discover it
early enough to assemble our main army in Silesia itself, rather
than first in Lower Lusatia. The problem is at fault here.
10. Your conclusion is very sensible, and shows that you
regard the major battle from the correct point of view.
And now, enough. Perhaps I have already worn you out. If
I have now and again failed to make myself understood, or if
I have not been able to convince you on every point, we can
certainly continue our discussion in person.
Your Friend,
von Clausewitz.
For the purposes of this exercise, the conditions described
in the first problem are modified in several respects. First, it is
assumed that the Prussian troops will not cross the Saxon
border, but must await the Austrian attack on their own soil.
They must therefore forego all offensive operations at the start
of the campaign, even though, if time permitted, these might
prove most advantageous. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
entire Austrian force will advance between the Elbe and Spree
rivers.
Analyze two possible deployments for the Prussian army,
which consists of five corps of 30,000 men each [map 3]:
a) Four army corps are stationed between Senftenberg
and Spremberg, with the fifth corps at Görlitz;
or
b) all five corps assemble along the Elbe near Torgau:
One corps on the left bank, one corps at Torgau, and three
corps on the right bank between the Elbe and Black Elster rivers.
Compare these two deployments.
Roeder addressed the problem by first analyzing the
specific steps taken at the beginning of the campaign in each of
the two cases; then by comparing the two opening stages of the
campaign; and finally by drawing a conclusion from his
comparison.
If, Roeder argued, Austrians were faced with the
Prussian deployment given in the first case (four corps between
Senftenberg and Spremberg, the fifth at Görlitz), they would
have to leave a significant covering force at Görlitz, perhaps as
much as one-and-a-half corps, since the Prussians there
threaten the Austrian line of retreat. If the Austrians were to
lose a battle, this threat could become particularly dangerous. It
would probably be impossible to defeat the Prussians at Görlitz,
who would avoid engaging a superior force. (1)21
After detaching the covering force, the Austrians would retain
three-and-a-half corps for their offensive. How should they be
employed? To bypass the left wing of the main Prussian force
with an advance between the Spree and Neisse rivers is out of
the question. (2) If they bypass the right wing, the Austrians
could cross the Black Elster between Elsterwerda and
Senftenberg. But the terrain would be difficult for them, and we
could attack them under favorable conditions. If they cross
below Elsterwerda, they would have the Elbe and Torgau to
their rear, and a battle would probably be fought between
Senftenberg and Spremberg.
Should the Prussian army lose this battle, it would
probably have to retreat to Berlin. A good position can be taken
up on the heights near the city; if we did not feel strong enough
to accept battle there, we would have to withdraw behind the
Havel River. (3) If in the meantime the enemy lays siege to
Torgau with half a corps, and we bring up reinforcements, we
would outnumber him and could take the offensive.
If the entire Prussian army deploys on the Elbe (the
second case), an Austrian advance on the left bank of the river
is unlikely. If, on the other hand, the Austrians cross the Black
Elster and advance on its right bank, they would lose direct
communications with their country, and it isn't clear what they
would gain. Consequently this move is also unlikely. (4) An
Austrian advance between the Elbe and the Black Elster is
their most likely move. How should we respond? We can
deploy either between the Elbe and the Black Elster, (5) or
before the bridgehead at Torgau. (6) We might also cross to the
left bank of the Elbe, and take up a position near Torgau. In
this case the enemy could bridge the Elbe at Mühlenberg, cross
to the left bank, and advance. The Prussians, however, would
still have the option to avoid battle. If they accept battle and
lose, they might cross to the right bank at Torgau, and retreat to
Wittenberg. (7)
These two defensive plans are comparable in several
respects. In either case the enemy must win a battle before he
can besiege Torgau. In both cases a Prussian victory would
seem to lead to similar results. A Prussian defeat between
Senftenberg and Spremberg would take the army further from
Torgau, because it would have to withdraw to Berlin. But the
retreat would leave the army in touch with the main part of its
homeland, and thus with its reinforcements. Stationing one
corps at Gör1itz seems advisable, because it would threaten the
Austrian flank. The force should, however, be commanded by a
skillful, energetic general. If such a man is not available, it
would be preferable not to detach the corps.
It would help us to choose between the two plans, if we
knew the exact lay of the land where battles are likely to occur.
One would also like to know more about the environment of
the fortresses at Torgau and Wittenberg, before deciding
whether our forces should be deployed there. (8)
In conclusion, if Görlitz were fortified it would offer a
position that combines the advantages of both plans. We would
threaten the enemy flank, whatever he might do; we would
retain contact with the main mass of Prussian territory; and we
would remain free to turn toward Silesia. (9) Of course, we
would not benefit to the same extent from the advantages of the
Elbe with its two fortresses. The choice of our deployment
would also depend on whether we could expect to be reinforced
by the 1st Corps from East Prussia, and the 7th and 8th corps
from the Rhine.
24 December 1827
Dear Friend:
Believing that I had discharged my debt to our friendship
by the lengthiness of my remarks if by nothing else, I now see
that you call on me for a further exercise. I shall take up pen
again, not without the fear that your patience has already been
exhausted by my first letter.
In that letter I pointed out the extent to which the first
problem lacks the specific information that alone would permit
a solution that is not wholly arbitrary.22 The second problem is
an extension of the first. Admittedly, it is more detailed, not as
generalized; nevertheless its terms are such that the specifics I
missed in the first exercise would also be very significant here.
On the other hand, we see that as the conditions of the exercise
are presented in greater detail, the specific arrangements of the
enemy assume increasing importance. Since it is impossible to
generate all essential facts in a hypothetical exercise, it is
evident that the more detailed our account, the more illusory it
becomes. We make any number of tacit assumptions, and
develop an analysis that in the end might not be relevant to one
case in a hundred. Reasoning of this kind may still be useful to
train our judgment, of course. But it is clear that such an
analysis can never be satisfactorily refuted by equally arbitrary
arguments. If we are contentious we won't be able to reach
agreement; if we honestly seek a solution we will eventually fall
into a disagreeable state of perplexity, in which we might almost
despair of the validity of any theory whatever.
By positing two different means of execution, and asking
you to choose between them, the second exercise expects you to
criticize each by means of the other. This seems to me
particularly inappropriate since the two approaches differ only
in one unimportant point. In any strategic problem, but most
especially in those that pose alternatives and ask us to choose
between them, I feel the need to reduce the issue to general
principles, that is to reveal the relationship between one or the
other option and the facts that inevitably result from the nature
of the situation. In this way, at least, we can recognize the
nature of each measure, and its unique characteristics. In the
event that we must execute one scheme or the other in real life,
we can then decide for ourselves whether the characteristics of
one or the other are better suited to our requirements and
circumstances. In short, when we evaluate hypothetical plans,
we must suspend final judgment on many points, while on
others we can be conclusive, because they violate conditions
that are set down clearly enough in the problem. I shall now
offer such comments on the various aspects of your analysis.
You say that a superior enemy force could not defeat the
Prussian corps at Görlitz, or rather, you assume it, and indeed it
is no more than an assumption. Both experience and the nature
[or logic] of the situation teach us that it is very difficult to avoid
a developing battle if we are to maintain contact with the
enemy and miss no favorable opportunities. An enveloping
attack (what Jomini calls operating on exterior lines) is
therefore always very dangerous, and is warranted only by a
preponderance of force or the knowledge that the enemy is not
seeking a decisive action. Nor can you be certain that the enemy
will always keep one-and-a-half corps against your corps at
Görlitz. When he is about to attack your main force, he may
leave only half a corps there. In any case, the force at Görlitz
does not present all that much of a danger for him, since in an
emergency he can withdraw to the Elbe and by means of a
pontoon bridae cross the river below Dresden as well. The
calculations pertaining to the corps at Görlitz are thus
extremely uncertain; it would be a mistake to trust them rather
than the far safer method of maintaining a unified force.
In strategy we must distinguish between outflanking and
bypassing a position. It is one thing to envelop a position with
individual corps or even with the whole army, and attack it from
the flank or rear. It is obviously something quite different to
bypass the position in order to pursue the object of the attack,
without regard to the enemy being left behind. In the first case,
the position retains its strategic effectiveness; indeed, the attack
demonstrates that it cannot be ignored, and it only remains for
the tactical features of the position to prove their strength. In
the other case, the position has lost its strategic effectiveness. It
is extremely rare that an attacker can bypass a position that isn't
very badly situated. But it is equally rare that a position cannot
be outflanked. In most cases the defender must be prepared for
this eventuality, and make his arrangements accordingly. A
position that is given up because it is being enveloped, is hardly
worth taking in the first place. I do not think the Austrians
could bypass your position either on the right or the left. They
could certainly envelop it more easily on the right than on the
left; but you cannot assert that enveloping it on the left would
be out of the question.
3. A retreat behind the Havel River would indicate that
we intend to base ourselves on the western part of the
monarchy. If that were not the case, the move would be entirely
inappropriate.
4. Presumably the real question is whether the Austrians
if they want to carry out their offensive, can do anything other
than fight a battle. My answer is that they can't. First, because
they are not stronger than we are; secondly, because they are
entirely surrounded by our territories, and thus clearly at a
disadvantage. Their ability to force us to withdraw and then to
besiege and capture Torgau is reduced by these two
circumstances to such an extent that it would make little sense
for them to base their plans on this possibility. If they want to
fight, they must cross to the right bank of the Elbe where we
are, and naturally they would prefer to cross somewhere out of
our reach. But it is obviously wrong to hold that they could not
seek battle by advancing on the right bank with part or all of
their army. Crossing the river would complicate their
communications; but, as I have just indicated, they can hardly
bypass us or force us back [on the left bank].23
5. If we deploy between the Elbe and the Elster, it would
have to be south of Torgau. Hemmed in between two rivers that
present real obstacles to movement, the one because of its size,
the other by the nature of its banks, places us in a situation in
which our lines of retreat are exceptionally limited, a fact that
exerts a very undesirable influence on the conduct of battle. If,
to take advantage of a [tactically] strong position, we choose to
fight in this area, we should at least keep open a line of retreat
in Torgau itself. That demands that we deploy south of the
town, and not too near to it.
6. Deploying before Torgau, with our backs against the
town, like a bridgehead of flesh and blood, would mean
needlessly resorting to a measure of despair. Such a position,
benefitting from two protected flanks, but with a front
that - being convex - is very weak, and which in general
restricts the defender to extreme passivity, is suitable only to a
force that because of its weakness can no longer stay in
field. It has been driven into a corner; its back is against the
wall because it is on the verge of giving way before the superior
strength of the enemy.
7. A large river, flowing in such a direction that the
defense can maintain its lines of communication for several
days' march on both banks, certainly offers the defense some
favorable opportunities. This is even more true when a fortress
with a bridgehead protects his movement from one bank to the
other, as Torgau does, and when another fortress, as
Wittenberg, some distance to his rear, multiplies the number of
options. It seems, indeed, that, at the moment the enemy
advances, the defender can avoid battle by crossing to the other
side of the river, without ceasing to cover the area through the
overall strategic effectiveness of his position. At first glance it is
not obvious why this game could not be repeated indefinitely.
But, first of all, it must be said that in most cases the strategic
value of a position declines markedly when a large river
separates the defense from the attacker, since this allows the
attacker to divide and maneuver his forces in ways that would
not be possible without this barrier. Secondly, it is rare that the
lines of communication on both banks of the river are of equal
value to the defense, and that either one could be given up at
any moment. Thirdly, the retreat of a large army over a bridge
across a river is not a trivial act; on the contrary, in the presence
of the enemy it is barely possible. Fourth, to break out on the
enemy's side of the river, should this become necessary, is no
simple matter, even in the vicinity of a friendly fortress. Fifth,
and finally, it would be very difficult repeatedly to shift all those
elements that constitute the rear of the army into their
appropriate positions. For all these reasons, a defender could
scarcely cross the river more than, a couple of times, even under
the most favorable conditions, before, in his effort to counter
the movements and actions of the enemy, a part or the whole of
his army would suddenly find itself on the same bank as the
attacker.
If we apply these considerations to the Prussian army at
Torgau, we must agree that advantages could indeed be
obtained by skillful use of the Elbe in combination with the two
fortresses, whether to avoid battle for a time, or to give it under
favorable circumstances. But we cannot say in advance exactly
how this might be done, because no hypothetical case can
specify all the unique, momentary conditions that give rise to
opportunity. It must also be added that we ought not exaggerate
the absolute value of these favorable conditions; they merely
provide the opportunity for auspicious courses of action. If the
Prussian commander does not seize this opportunity with great
skill, the advantages of his position would soon disappear.
8. As you have correctly remarked, the position on the
Elbe presupposes that the army will base itself on the western
part of the monarchy, and give up its connection with the east.
Should this not be in accord with the general [political and
strategic] circumstances, the position would be unnatural and of
doubtful value.
It seems to me that overall the difference between
deploying behind the Black Elster and at Torgau is not great. If
we want to remain realistic, we would have to say that in the
event of a major battle, this particular difference would be only
a minute factor in the final result. The degree to which both
commanders have united their forces for combat, the good
planning and skillful conduct of the battle, the perseverance of
the commanders, the courage of the troops, their confidence in
their leader, the obedience of the subordinate generals-are
these not all factors that have greater significance and that
affect the outcome more directly?
Whether the Russians in 1812 withdrew from Moscow to
Vladimir or turned south to Kaluga -this one basic alternative,
while not primarily determining the direction of the French
retreat, as is sometimes claimed, was nevertheless a matter of
extraordinary importance.24 There can be no doubt that the
change of a single strategic line may have decisive influence.
But we ought not to suppose that it is therefore important
whether the Prussians fight at Senftenberg or at Torgau, unless
we wish to impute strategic value to things that have nothing to
do with strategy.
9. Deploying the main army at Görlitz (assuming the
place is fortified), which is your ultimate conclusion, would put
the army in a flanking position. Naturally the territory that
flanking positions are supposed to cover does not lie directly
behind them. Such positions can therefore be adopted only if
the army has a very broad base of operations, so that the
flanking force retains a line of retreat. That is the case here. But
this line of retreat will always be rather constricted, sometimes
more so, sometimes less. The danger that the army will be
forced into an eccentric line of retreat, away from the main part
of its home territory, from the center of gravity of the entire
military base, constitutes a grave disadvantage of positions of
this kind. The position must make up for this flaw by its very
great tactical strength, so that the enemy either cannot attack it
at all, being immobilized as it were by its strategic power, or is
unlikely to succeed if he does attack. This justifies the flanking
position, but we still lack the real reason for it: its strategic
effectiveness. If you consider the present case with these points
in mind, you will agree that if the army at Görlitz were
defeated, it would have to retreat on the highway to Breslau,
and would therefore be in danger of being driven south to
Silesia. A strategist of the old school would say: in that case the
army is lost. I won't, because it would be an entirely unjustified
assertion. But you will concede that a thousand serious
disadvantages would result from such a retreat. Finally, a strong
tactical position has not yet been located in the area around
Görlitz, and its strategic effectiveness would not be very great in
any case, since the Austrians could base themselves on the
Elbe.
Your third study meets my entire approval [Roeder had
also sent Clausewitz a brief memorandum, which treated the
following: a) two armies of equal strength meet, each with a
vertical line of retreat; b) the same armies meet, one with a
vertical line of retreat, the other with a line of retreat that is an
extension of one of its wings. What are their respective
advantages and disadvantages?] I would only add that it is
difficult to provide a strategic cover for oblique lines of
communication.25
von Clausewitz
ENDNOTES
1. A Prussian corps, at war-strength consisted of two
divisions, one artillery brigade, one Jäger detachment of two
companies, and one engineer detachment. A reserve infantry
regiment, a reserve Landwehr [second line] infantry battalion,
and a reserve Landwehr squadron might also be added.
The division consisted of a line infantry brigade and a
Landwehr infantry brigade of two regiments each, and of a
cavalry brigade. Besides the two regular cavalry regiments, the
cavalry brigade probably also included a Landwehr cavalry
regiment; at any rate, a corps had a total of four line and two
Landwehr cavalry regiments.
The artillery consisted of nine heavy artillery batteries, and
of three light- or horse-artillery batteries. Ed. of the 1937
German text.
2. Numerals in parenthesis in Ms text were added by
Clausewitz. His comments are similarly identified, and refer to
the numerals in the text. Eds.
3. Numerals in parenthesis in Roeder's text were added
by Clausewitz. His respective comments are similarly identified.
Eds.
4. In peacetime, the 2nd Corps was stationed on the
Baltic, several hundred kilometers farther away from the
theater of operations than the Guards and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
6th corps. Eds.
5. Clausewitz writes "wie die sogennannte Strategie,"
which, taken literally, would make little sense. The rest of the
sentence makes it apparent that he is referring to the "science"
or "discipline" of strategy. Eds.
6. Compare On War, Book I, ch. 1, sections 25 and 26
(pp. 87-88). Eds.
7. "Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken
zur Abwehr," special issue of the Militärwissenschaftliche
Rundschau, March 1937, 5-9.
8. The editor of the German text points out that it is
Roeder who calls an Austrian advance through Lusatia on
Berlin the most dangerous threat to Prussia. See p. 22. Eds.
9. During the Seven Years War Berlin was briefly
occupied, once by the Austrians, once by the Russians. Eds.
10. As will be seen, Clausewitz does not mean he will test
M's solution against historical examples, though his discussion
does occasionally refer to incidents in the past. He is here using
"historical" in opposition to "a strictly logical," i.e., theoretical,
refutation, to signify a realistic, concrete analysis of M's
"individual points." For Clausewitz's belief that history, as the
reflection of reality, is the only valid basis for a theory of war,
see the statement in his letter to Roeder above, p. 8, and many
passages in On War, for example Book II, ch. 6 (pp. 170-74). Eds.
11. The comparison with games points to the belief that
the cardplayer tends not to play his best cards at once, but
gradually in the course of the game. Ed. of the German text.
See also the discussion of Clausewitzs essay "On Progression
and Pause in Military Activity," which compares gambling and
war, in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 361-62. Eds.
12. The reference is to the danger that according to M a
siege of Torgau constituted for Prussia. Ed. of the German text.
13. This seems to refer to those cases in which it was
important to occupy a significant area and establish defensive
positions there before the enemy could do so. Ed. of the
German text.
14. M wrote "at the Prussian border." Major von Roeder's
solution (p. 15) counted on the possibility that the enemy would
cross the Elbe in the vicinity of Dresden. Ed. of the German text.
15. In this passage M did not refer to "the most
disadvantageous defensive," but to Prussia being "thrown ...
completely on the defensive" (p. 18). That difference does not,
however, affect the sense of Clausewitz's argument. Ed. of the
German text.
16. Clausewitz writes "venn ich dazu berufen ware" -which
means either "were I competent to do so," or "were I
called upon to do so." Both versions are possible, though the
latter seems close to a tautology: "I should feel obliged to
attack [the argument] were I called upon to do so." It seems
preferable to interpret the statement as an expression of
Clausewitz's habitual courteous self-depreciation. Eds.
17. That Clausewitz, having demolished M's solution, can
claim he agrees with him perhaps more than with anyone else,
may seem strange. In part, the statement is a further expression
of the polite, unassertive manner that he habitually assumed
toward his subordinates. But his overt tolerance covers a good
measure of sarcasm, and probably also a rejection of the
conventional military judgment of the day, which Clausewitz
considers so inadequate that even an M might not be the most
competent strategic analyst. Eds.
18. Apparently Clausewitz is again referring to the absence
of specific information on the political situation, which alone
would determine whether an advance through Lusatia would be
appropriate. Ed. of the German text.
19. Roeder makes no provision for uniting the Görlitz
corps with the main Prussian Army concentrated northeast of
Hoyerswerda, rather this corps would be forced northeast into
Silesia. Eccentric deployment is the same as divergent
deployment, i.e., away from the center. See On War, pages
367-369. Eds.
20. Clausewitz writes "Parteigänger," who might be either
elite regulars -Jäger (rangers) or Schützen (sharpshooters) -
trained in detached, small unit operations, or regular line
infantry and light cavalry used for this purpose, or irregulars. Eds.
21. Numerals in parenthesis in Roeder's text were added
by Clausewitz. His respective comments are similarly identified. Eds.
22. This sentence introduces a characteristic example of
Clausewitz's dialectic method of analysis. Eds.
23. To convey Clausewitz's meaning in this paragraph, a
very free translation of the final sentence seems necessary. The
German reads: "Der Grund, dass sie dann ihre
Kommunikationen aufgeben wurden, bezieht sich auf das
Vorbeigehen oder Herausmanovrieren, welches ich eben als
untuhlich gezeight habe." Eds.
24. Vladimir is about 150 miles east of Moscow on the road
to Gorki while Kaluga is about 100 miles southwest of Moscow.
By placing his army at Kaluga, Kutusov was in a position to
threaten Napoleon's line of retreat from Moscow. This
maneuver also tended to concentrate Kutusov's army with
Russian forces operating south of the Konigsberg-Vilna-Smolensk-Moscow
line, a move to Vladimir would have continued to drive major Russian
armies apart. Eds.
25. See On War Book Six, Ch. Four, page 462 for
Clausewitz's discussion of lines of communication.
See also Erich von Manstein's Lost Victories,
Henry Regnery Co., 1958, for WW II examples of
divergent lines of operation; p. 291, pp. 368-369.
and
pp. 369-370 for an example of oblique lines of
communication for German forces in southern
Russia. Eds.
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