Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944
by Gary J. Bjorge
Printed courtesy of the US. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
FOREWORD
Coalition warfare is generally a two-edged sword. When several countries join forces to fight
a common enemy, the weight of their combined effort can be overwhelming. The effectiveness
of this effort, however, can be dissipated or even rendered counterproductive if members of the
coalition cannot find common ground among themselves on such vital issues as the nature and
objectives of the war and the appropriate strategy, command structure, and methods for fighting it.
In this Special Study, Dr. Gary Bjorge of the Combat Studies Institute offers a case study in
coalition warfare during the Second World War. While the focus of his study is Merrill's
Marauders, his analysis offers a broader perspective on how coalition considerations affected
strategy, command and protocol, and military operations and tactics in the China-Burma-India
theater. The lesson for today's professional officer is clear. It may be the responsibility of the
political authorities to fashion a wartime coalition, but once in place, the partnership will have
an impact on military considerations from the strategic through the tactical levels. Few officers
involved in the combined effort will escape the fallout in one form or another from decisions
made by the coalition leaders. Officers must be prepared for this, and Dr. Bjorge's study is
designed to assist in that preparation.
January 1996
JERRY D. MORELOCK
Colonel, Field Artillery
Director, Combat Studies Institute
CSI Publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bjorge, Gary J.
Merrill's Marauders : combined operations in northern Burma in
1944/ by Gary J. Bjorge
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references
1. United States. Army. Composite Unit (Provisional), 5307th- History. 2. World War. 1939-
1945
Regimental histories-United States. 3. World War, 1939-1945-Campaigns-Burma. I. Title.
2. Operations in northern Hukawng Valley, January 1944
15
3. Advance to Walawbum, 23 February-4 March 1944
20
4. Fight at Walawbum, 4-8 March 1944
22
5. Inkangahtawng, 12-23 March 1944
26
6. Shaduzup and Nhpum Ga, 24-29 March 1944
29
7. Advance to Myitkyina, 28 April-17 May 1944
39
8. Myitkyina, I8 May-end of July 1944
41
During World War II, the United States fought as a member of
the largest military coalition ever formed. Across the world, millions
of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen joined with the fighting
forces of other nations to defeat the Axis Powers. As they did so,
they wrote many new chapters in the history of coalition warfare and
combined operations. Of those chapters, none illustrates the benefits
and the difficulties inherent in this type of warfare more vividly than
does the story of what happened to "Merrill's Marauders" in northern
Burma.
"Merrill's Marauders" is the popular name given to the U.S.
Army's 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) (also known by its code
name Galahad), a regiment-sized unit organized and trained for
long-range penetration behind enemy lines in Japanese-held Burma
in World War II. The 5307th had a short history. Recruitment for
the unit began on 1 September 1943, and it was disbanded on 10
August 1944. The unit did not reach India until 31 October 1943 and
was only in combat in Burma from the end of February 1944 to the
first days of August. But during that period, the 5307th established
an impressive record. In fighting against Japanese forces and in its
constant struggle against disease, leeches, insects, harsh terrain, and
the weather, the "Marauders" earned the following Distinguished
Unit Citation:
The 5307th Composite Unit (Prov) was the first United States
ground combat force to meet the enemy in World War II on the
continent of Asia. After a series of successful engagements in the
Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys of North Burma, in March and April
1944, the unit was called on to lead a march over jungle trails through
extremely mountainous terrain against stubborn resistance in an attack
on Myitkyina. The unit proved equal its task, overcame all the obstacles
put in its way by the enemy, and the weather and, after a brilliant
operation 17 May 1944, seized the airfield at Myitkyina, an objective
of great tactical importance in the campaign, and assisted in the capture
of Myitkyina on 3 August 1944. The successful accomplishment of
this mission marks the 5307th Composite Unit (Prov) as an outstanding
combat force and reflects great credit on Allied Arms.1
The accomplishments of the 5307th, however, were achieved at a
tremendous human cost. The total strength of the unit at the beginning
of its operations was 2,997 officers and men. Because some of the
men received rear-echelon assignments such as parachute riggers and
"kickers" (i.e., men who kicked bundles of supplies out of transport
aircraft during air drops), the actual number of men who set out on
the first mission on 24 February was 2,750. After this operation
ended with the capture of Walawbum on 7 March about 2,500
remained to carry on.2 The unit's second mission, from 12 March to
9 April, resulted in 67 men killed and 379 evacuated because of
wounds or illness. Thereby reduced to about 2,000 men, the 5307th
was augmented by Chinese and native Kachin soldiers for its third
mission, the operation to take the Myitkyina airfield, which began on
28 April. Only 1,310 Americans reached this objective, and between
17 May and 1 June, the large majority of these men, most of whom
were suffering from disease, were evacuated by air to rear-area
hospitals. By the time the town of Myitkyina was taken, only about
200 of the original Galahad force was present.3 A week after
Myitkyina fell, on 10 Aupst 1944, the 5307th, utterly worn out and
depleted, was disbanded.4
Why did the 5307th end up this way? Why was the first U.S.
combat unit to fight on the Asian continent driven until it suffered
over 80 percent casualties and experienced what an inspector general's
report described as "an almost complete breakdown of morale
in the major portion of the unit"?5 Colonel Charles N. Hunter, the
second ranking (and sometime ranking) officer of the unit during its
existence, expected heavy casualties from the start. In briefings at
the War Department in September 1943, he was told that casualties
were projected to reach 85 percent.6 But at the end of the 5307th's
campaign, he still felt that the unit had been badly misused and had
suffered unnecessarily. Years later, in a book about the 5307th titled
Galahad, he placed the blame for what happened to the unit squarely
on the personality and personal ambition of the campaign's commander,
Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell:
Galahad Force was the most beat upon, most misunderstood, most
mishandled, most written about, most heroic, and yet most unrewarded
regimental sized unit that participated in World War II. That it was
expendable was understood from its inception; what was not understood
and has never been adequately explained, is why it was expended
to bolster the ego of an erstwhile Theater Commander such as "Vinegar
Joe" Stilwell.7
Colonel Hunter's account of events is compelling and moving. It
is easy to understand why he felt that Stilwell had sacrificed the
5307th to bolster his ego. Yet in assessing the criticism of Stilwell,
it must not be forgotten that, during this period, he was acting under
orders from above and was under pressure to achieve specific military
objectives set by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In
addition, Stilwell had to cope with the problems created in the
China-Burma-India theater of war (CBI) by coalition warfare and the
need to conduct combined operations. In this theater, more than in
any other theater in which the United States fought during World War
II, the problems peculiar to coalition warfare were present. While
the coalition partners of the United States in the CBI-China and Great
Britain-helped augment United States resources and contributed
significantly to the war against Japan, they also created situations that
forced Stilwell to lay heavy burdens on the 5307th. Ultimately, it
was not so much that the 5307th was a victim of Stilwell's ego, but
that both the 5307th and Stilwell were affected by the exigencies and
requirements of coalition warfare and combined operations.
Coalitions, by nature, are somewhat delicate creations. They are
formed by sovereign nations who join together to provide the strength
of numbers for the pursuit of a common goal or goals. But national
differences in strategic aims can diminish the force a coalition can
bring to bear at a particular place and time. Also, differences in
military capabilities, warfighting doctrine, cultural traditions, social
values, and language can make it difficult for coalition forces to
achieve unity of effort in combined operations. All of these debilitating
conditions were present in the CBI as the three coalition
partners sought to fight the war against Japan in ways consistent with
their national objectives. Interestingly, because of these different
objectives, neither Great Britain, the former colonial ruler of Burma
nor China-who would regain a land link to the outside world if
northern Burma were retaken-were as committed to retaking northern
Burma as was the United States. These different viewpoints had
created tensions in the coalition since the start of the war. In 1944,
lack of agreement about what to do in Burma contributed greatly to
what happened to the 5307th.
The British did not give a high priority to retaking northern Burma
because of doubts about Chinese military capabilities and the belief
that reestablishing a land link to China would not make much
difference in the war against Japan. Great Britain's primary focus
remained on Europe and the Mediterranean area. The British did not
want to commit large forces to retaking Burma, and at the great war
conferences of 1943, they consistently argued either for reducing the
scale of operations to be undertaken in Burma or for bypassing Burma
altogether and going to Sumatra.
China's position was that of Chiang K'ai-shek, president and
commander of the Chinese Army. His government was weak and
faced many internal challenges, especially from the Communists. He
did not want to see his military forces consumed in battles with the
Japanese because he would then have fewer troops to support him in
internal disputes. He welcomed American aid and sought more. Yet
he was also leery of training and assistance programs because they
might strengthen his domestic rivals. As Stilwell told General
George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army in mid-1943,
"[Chiang] did not want the regime to have a large, efficient ground
force for fear that its commander would inevitably challenge his
position as China's leader."8 Chiang's fundamental approach to the
war with Japan was to adopt a defensive posture and let the United
States win it for him, preferably with air power. He was more
interested in expanding the airlift from India to China than in reestablishing a land link.
In contrast to Great Britain and China, the United States took an
activist position on Burma and on China itself. As opposed to
Britain's negative view of what China could offer, the United States
saw China's geographic position and large manpower pool as great
assets. America believed that it was possible to improve the Chinese
Army so that it could make a positive contribution to the coming
offensive against Japan. Even before becoming an active belligerent,
the United States, in May 1941, had begun sending lend-lease material
to China. In July 1941, the American Military Mission to China
had been established to help China procure weapons to fight its war
against Japan and to train personnel to use them. Stilwell had been
sent to China in February 1942 to expand this effort, with specific
orders to "increase the effectiveness of United States assistance to the
Chinese government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in
improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army."9 After the
Japanese occupied Burma in the spring of 1942 and cut Chinas last
landline of communication to the outside world, the United States
made reestablishing that land link a high priority. Overland transportation
was seen as essential to providing more aid to China.
At the coalition war conferences convened during 1943, the concept
of Bunna as the route to China led the United States to stress
continually the need to retake Burma. At the Casablanca Conference,
held on 14-23 January, the American JCS put an offensive to retake
Burma high on the conference agenda and obtained British agreement
to conduct the operation in the winter of 1943-44. At the Trident
Conference held in Washington in May 1943, the United States
agreed with the British that developments in the war in Europe made
it advisable to scale back this offensive so that it would just cover
northern Burma. At American insistence, however, it was also
agreed that a land link to China through this area must be gained
during the coming winter dry season.
Three months later, the Quadrant Conference, held in Quebec,
Canada, on 19-24 August, reaffirmed the need for restoring land
communications with China. Looking into the future, American and
British planners envisioned Chinese forces and U.S. forces in the
Pacific converging on the Canton-Hong Kong area. Once emplaced
there, these forces would drive north to liberate north China and
establish staging areas for operations against Japan. The year 1947
was set for operations against Japan proper.10 Retaking northern
Burma and constructing the Ledo Road south through Myitkyina to
the old Burma Road was a fundamental part of this strategic plan, in
that the road would bring in supplies for the Chinese forces that would
move toward Canton from the northwest.
The Quadrant Conference also led to the U.S. decision to send a
combat unit, Galahad, to CBI to participate in the upcoming winter
offensive. The U.S. Army had long had a large number of support
units in the theater. In late December 1942, the U.S. 823d Engineer
Aviation Battalion had taken over construction from the British of
the part of the Ledo Road that lay in India. U.S. medical personnel,
quartermaster units, and air corps units also had steadily increased in
number during 1942 and 1943. But despite Stilwell's requests (since
July 1942) for a U.S. combat corps-or at least a dvision-no
fighting units had been sent to the theater. Now, one was going,
perhaps to demonstrate the seriousness of America's interest in
retaking northern Burma. Or, perhaps, it was being sent as a reward
to Brigadier Orde C. Wingate for his aggressiveness, which the
United States had found in short supply among the British generals
in India.
Wingate was an innovative thinker, who before being assigned to
the British forces in Burma in early 1942 had gained experience in
guerrilla warfare in Palestine and Ethiopia. Analyzing the tactics
used by the Japanese in capturing Burma, he determined that the key
to their success was superior mobility. Repeatedly, Japanese units
had moved quickly along small trails in the jungle to outflank and
envelop road-bound Allied units. Wingate's answer to this tactical
challenge was to free Allied units from reliance on roads. He
proposed forming highly mobile units (long-range penetration
groups [LRPGs]) that would be inserted deep behind the Japanese
lines by gliders and transport aircraft and supplied from the air. It
was assumed that this method of supply would allow the LRPGs to
outmaneuver the Japanese and attack their lines of communications
at will. Following the cancellation of an offensive into Burma
scheduled for March 1943, General Archibald Wavell, Supreme Commander, India, had authorized. Wingate to carry out a raid into Burma
to test the validity of Wingate's theories. Despite incurring high
losses and effecting little lasting damage, the raid captured the public
imagination with its daring. Prime Minister Winston Churchill
invited Wingate to London for a personal briefing and then took him
to Quebec to attend the Quadrant Conference. There, Wingate won
approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) for an expanded
program of LRPG operations in Burma. General Marshall and
Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army
Air Corps, were so impressed by Wingate's presentation that they
agreed to send approximately 3,000 American infantrymen to India
to form an LRPG code-named Galahad. They also decided to send
two of the Air Corps' best airmen, Colonel Philip G. Cochran and
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Alison to India "to activate and command
No. 1 Air Commando, a custom-made aggregation of liaison aircraft,
helicopters, light bombers, fighters, gliders, and transports" that
would support Wingate's LRPG operations.11
While Galahad was forming in the United States and moving
across the Pacific, plans were being made by the newly created
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) to implement the decisions of the
Trident-Quadrant Conferences. The British established SEAC to
provide stronger direction to the upcoming operations in Burma. Its
geographical area of responsibility included Burma, Ceylon, Sumatra,
Malaya-but not India or China. Reflecting the preponderance
of British forces in the theater, a British officer, Vice Admiral Lord
Louis Mountbatten, was named supreme Allied commander. Stilwell
was appointed Mountbatten's acting deputy, but Stilwell's
American operational theater, CBI, was not made subordinate to
SEAC. Also, Stilwell, in his position as Allied chief of staff to
General Chiang K'ai-shek, was not subordinate to Mountbatten.
Related to the establishment of SEAC was a crisis in Stilwell's
command relationship to Chiang. When Mountbatten went to
Chungking, China's wartime capital, on 16 October to meet Chiang
and establish a personal relationship, he was told that Chiang not only
did not want Stilwell appointed as Mountbatten's deputy but wished
to have Stilwell recalled to Washington. Mountbatten objected
strongly to such a change so close to the upcoming offensive into
Burma and precipitated two days of negotiations that ended with
Stilwell ostensibly returned to favor. But ritual smiles and professions
of a new, deeper level of mutual understanding could not
reverse the damage already done. Stilwell became more distrustful
of Chiang, and a cloud hung over their relationship.
Based on the Quadrant decisions, the CCS gave SEAC two objectives.
One was to carry out operations "for the capture of Upper
Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland
communications with China."12 The other was "to continue to build
up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the
development of air facilities with a view to a) keeping China in the
war, b) intensifying operations against the Japanese, c) maintaining
increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China, and d) equipping
Chinese ground forces."13
To achieve these two objectives, the capture of Myitkyina was
deemed essential. Japanese fighter planes flying from their air base
at Myitkyina were able to harass the air route between northeast India
(Assam) and China and keep the transports flying farther north over
higher mountains in the Himalayas. Taking Myitkyina would eliminate
this fighter threat. It would also improve greatly the air transport
link between India and China, making it possible for transport aircraft
to fly a more direct route, at lower altitude, thereby saving fuel and
increasing payloads. Furthermore, Myitkyina was on the existing
prewar road network in Burma, so once the Ledo Road was completed
through Mogaung to Myitkyina, it would be relatively easy to
extend it to the old Burma Road (see map 1).
SEAC planners developed a multifaceted plan named Champion
to retake northern Burma and presented it at the Sextant Conference
held in Cairo, Egypt, in November 1943. The first phase of the plan
called for the advance of the Chinese Army in India (CAI) into
northwest Burma to provide a protective screen for the engineers
constructing the Ledo Road. This phase was already under way by
the time of Sextant. Road building had resumed in earnest in October
following the end of the summer monsoon. In the second phase, two
British corps were to invade Burma from the west and southwest in
mid-January. In February, three LRPGs were to be landed in central
Burma. In addition, a major amphibious landing would be effected.14
Meanwhile, fifteen Chinese divisions (the Y-Force or Yoke
Force that had been equipped and trained by the United States) were
expected to attack the Japanese westward from Yunnan province (in
China) into eastern Burma. This Y-Force had also been scheduled
to take part in an offensive into Burma in March 1943, but Chiang
K'ai-shek had withdrawn his agreement to employ this force and
thereby scuttled the offensive. Now, at year's end in Cairo, Chiang
was meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill for the first time, and it
was assumed that his firm commitment to join in this new operation
could be obtained.
Once again, however, the vagaries of coalition warfare intervened.
The Sextant Conference ended without a clear commitment by
Chiang K'ai-shek for Chinese participation in Champion. Then, after
Sextant, decisions reached by Churchill and Roosevelt with Stalin at
Teheran ensured that Chiang would not become involved. At Teheran,
Roosevelt and Churchill committed themselves to a cross-Channel
assault and a landing in southern France as soon as possible, and
Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany was
defeated. This led Churchill to voice strong opposition to the
amphibious landing that was part of Champion, even though Chiang had
made it clear that such an operation was a prerequisite for his sending
the Y-Force into Burma. Churchill, at this point, felt that China
mattered little in the war against Japan. He believed that Stalin's
promise to join the war against Japan after Germany's defeat meant
that Russian bases would soon be available, and in his opinion, such
bases would be better than anything the Chinese could offer.15 Also,
Churchill wanted the amphibious landing craft allocated to Champion
shifted to the Mediterranean to be used in the landing in southern
France. On 5 December, Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to Churchill's
request (overruling the JCS for the only time during the war), and a
message was sent to Chiang explaining their decision. Chiang replied
that without an amphibious landing to divert Japanese forces, he
could not risk sending the Y-Force into Burma.
On 12 December, Stilwell returned to Chungking from Cairo and
tried to change Chiang's mind about employing the Y-Force. He was
unsuccessful, On 18 December, however, Chiang made a significant
concession and gave Stilwell complete authority over the CAI. The
entry in Stilwell's personal diary for 19 December reveals the excitement
and the hope that this move engendered:
19 December. First time in history. G-mo [Generalissimo Chiang
K'ai-shek] gave me full command of the Ledo [X force] troops.
Without strings-said there would be no interference and that it was
"my army." Gave me full power to fire any and all officers. Cautioned
me not to sacrifice it to British interests. Otherwise, use it as I saw fit.
Madame [Chian- K'ai-shek's wife] promised to get this in writing so
I could show it to all concerned.
It took a long time, but apparently confidence has been established.
A month or so ago I was to be fired and now he gives me a blank check.
If the bastards will only fight, we can make a dent in the Japs. There
is a chance for us to work down to Myitkyina, block off below
Mogaung and actually make the junction, even with Yoke sitting on its
tukas. This may be wishful thinking in a big way, but it could be.16
In a nutshell, this diary entry captures the nature of Stilwell's
problems. In keeping with the Quadrant-Sextant goal of retaking
northern Burma, he was focused on the objectives of capturing
Myitkyina and linking up with the Y-Force (Yoke Force) attacking
from Yunnan. But if the Y-Force did not advance, he was not sure
if the Ledo Force (the two divisions called the CAI or the X-Force)
could reach Myitkyina and make the linkup alone. Stilwell acknowledged
that all hope of success might be wishful thinking, but he was
determined to give his enterprise a try. A letter written to his wife on
the same day further reveals his thoughts:
Put down 18 December 1943 as the day, when for the first time in
history, a foreigner was given command of Chinese troops with full
control over all officers and no strings attached.... This has been a
long uphill fight and when I think of some of our commanders who are
handed a ready-made, fully equipped, well-trained army of Americans
to work with, it makes me wonder if I'm not working out some of my
past sins. They gave me a shoestring and now we've run it up to
considerable proportions: The question is, will it snap when we put
the weight on it? I've had word from Peanut [Stilwell's name for
Chiang K'ai-shek] that I can get away from this dump tomorrow. That
means I'll spend Christmas with the Confucianists in the jungle....
Until this mess is cleaned up I wouldn't want to be doing anything but
working at it, and you wouldn't want me to either, thank God.17
Stilwell's reference to the shoestring that has been run up to
"considerable proportions" refers to the CAI, a force that was his own
creation. In May 1942, he had looked at the 9,000 Chinese soldiers
who had retreated from Burma into India and seen the nucleus of a
force that could play an important role in a campaign to retake
northern Burma. Overcoming British doubts, resistance from the
government of India, and Chiang K'ai-shek's reluctance, he had
obtained agreement to equip and train not only those 9,000 troops but
23,000 more soldiers that were to be flown in from China. A former
camp for Italian prisoners of war located northwest of Calcutta at
Ramgarh was selected as the training site, and on 26 August 1942,
the Ramgarh Training Center was activated.18 On 20 October, the
first of the Chinese soldiers to be sent from China arrived in India.19
The first goal was to train two complete divisions, the 22d and the
38th. Later, the training program was expanded to include another
division, the 30th, and the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group,
commanded by Colonel Rothwell H. Brown of the U.S. Army.
For Stilwell, building the CAI was a way to obtain the military
force that he feared the United States would never be able to provide
him. He also viewed it as an opportunity to test his deeply held belief
that Chinese soldiers, if properly trained, equipped, fed, and led,
would be the equal of soldiers anywhere. In an agreement reached
on 24 July 1942, Chiang K'ai-shek had given Stilwell command of
the CAI at Ramgarh and control of its training- the Chinese were to
handle administration and discipline.20 With this much freedom of
action, Stilwell initiated an American-style training program with
American instructors. They taught the use of rifles, light and heavy
machine guns, 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, rocket launchers, hand
grenades, 37-mm antitank guns, and the functional specialties required
by modem warfare. Artillery units learned how to use 75-mm,
pack artillery, 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, and assault guns. All
units received training in jungle warfare. For medical service personnel,
special emphasis was given to field sanitation so that the diseases that had
taken a heavy toll in Burma in the spring of 1942 could at least be partially
prevented.21
As Stilwell flew toward Burma on 20 December, he was not
worried about the technical proficiency of the CAI. That had been
developed and tested at Ramgarh. What concerned him was the lack
of aggressive leadership on the part of Chinese officers. The CAI's
38th Division had entered the Hukawng Valley in October to screen
the engineers building the Ledo Road and had been stopped by
elements of the Japanese 18th Division. Stilwell was unhappy with
the 38th Division's inability to push ahead and, after arriving at the
front on 21 December, he tried various methods to develop some
forward momentum. He talked directly to the division commander,
Sun Li-jen, and issued him firm, detailed orders. He also went down
to the front to observe what was happening and to try to force the unit
into action. One battalion commander from the 38th Division recounts
how Stilwell sometimes drove down to regimental headquarters in his
jeep and stayed until the regimental or, in some cases, even
the division commander acted to eliminate an enemy position that
was blocking forward movement.22 Stilwell acknowledged that the
Japanese were a tough foe and that the terrain was very difficult. But he also saw the Chinese failure to advance as resulting, in large part,
from their own errors: "Dissipation of force .... Piece-meal action.... Extreme caution and extreme slowness of movement.... Fear
of imaginary terrors.... Bad recon and security.... Fear of going
around.... Result-Loss of men. Loss of chance to bag Japs.23
(See map 2.)
Stilwell looked to the 5307th as a solution to several of these errors,
especially the "fear of going around." Galahad had been formed, as
has already been noted, to be an LRPG under Wingate. Its training
was focused on developing the cross-country mobility that would
enable Stilwell to conduct the "end run" (enveloping) maneuvers that
he felt were needed to encircle the Japanese and dislodge them from
their dug-in defenses. But Stilwell would not be able to employ the
5307th in his operation until the end of February. He would have to
wait, satisfying himself with the knowledge that at least he had finally
taken control of the unit from the British.
When Stilwell first heard that Galahad, the first American ground
combat troops to be sent to CBI, would be coming to India to be part
of Wingate's force, he was extremely angry, as the following entry
in his diary on 1 September 1943, makes clear:
What's the matter with our people? After a long struggle, we get a
handful of U.S. troops, and by God, they tell us they are to operate
under WINGATE! We don't know enough to handle them, but that
exhibitionist does! And what has he done? Made an abortive jaunt to
Katha, got caught E. of the Irrawaddy and come out with a loss of
40%--Net result, cut the RR that our people had already cut [by air
attacks]. Now he's an expert. This is enough to discourage Christ.24
Stilwell then began a series of moves in which he attemped to gain
operational control of Galahad. These efforts finally reached the
point where General Marshall felt compelled to send him a message
confirming Wingates' operational control over the 5307th and reminding
him that coalition warfare required compromise:
All American troops in China, Burma, India (including Galahad)
are under your command. As Deputy Commander to Mountbatten you
are to employ your forces, including Chinese troops attached by the
Generalissimo, so as to insure an effective united effort by South East
Asian Command. Galahad was dispatched to India to take part in
long-range penetration operations. If these operations are to be
commanded by Wingate, the American group should operate in combat
under his central direction. The individual and unit training as well as
administration and supply must remain the responsibility of General
Stilwell. However, their training must be closely co-ordinated with that
of the British.... We must all eat some crow if we are to fight the same
war together. The impact on the Japs is the pay-off.25
Stilwell, however, did not give up his pursuit of Galahad. At the
Sextant Conference, he and his chief of staff for plans and operations,
G3 for CB1, Colonel Frank D. Merrill, discussed the employment of
Galahad with Marshall and finally convinced him to support a
transfer of operational control of the unit to Stilwell. Before the
conference ended, a decision was reached. Galahad was to be assigned
to Stilwell.26
On 1 January 1943, Galahad was officially designated the 5307th
Composite Regiment. The next day, the name was changed to
Composite Unit (Provisional). Apparently, this name change was
necessitated by the realization that the man chosen by Stilwell to
command the unit, Frank D. Merrill, was now a brigadier general and
should command more than a provisional regiment.27 Merrill arrived
at the 5307th's training area in central India on 4 January and assumed
command immediately. Within days, despite Hunter's feeling that
the 5307th needed another month of training, Merrill radioed Stilwell
that the unit's "training had advanced to a state which would permit
its being committed to action."28 On 8 January, the 5307th was
attached to Stilwell's field command in northern Burma and directed
to move to Ledo by 7 February.29
The 5307th moved from Ramgarh to Ledo by train, covering a
distance of around 1,000 miles. Then they marched 140 miles by
foot on the newly completed Ledo Road to Ningbyen, a small village
in the northern Huka-kvng Valley. There, the unit assembled during
20-21 February, received an airdrop of supplies, and prepared for its
first mission.
While the 5307th was moving from Ramgarh to Ningbyen, on the
battle line CAI fighting was improving. In a message sent to Marshall
on 28 January, Stilwell expressed satisfaction with the Chinese
soldiers' performance and also made reference to something that
constantly irritated him, namely, British unwillingness to recognize
CAI accomplishments: "My opinion of the Chinese soldier is what
it has always been. With good training, equipment, and leadership,
he is as good as anybody. The foregoing is heartily concurred in
by all liaison officers with whom I have talked. P.S. I will keep you
informed of developments, since I suspect you will hear very little
about us in SEAC communiques."30 On 24 February, Stilwell told
Marshall that a mistake by the 22d Division's 66th Regiment had cost
them a chance to encircle some Japanese, but he gave Marshall a
favorable assessment for both the 22d and 38th Divisions. He
reported that Chinese morale was high and said that he was hoping
for a "better performance during the next step."31 This step was to
be the 5307th's first operation.
Even as the CAI was advancing in the field and the 5307th was
moving forward to join the fighting, there was, at the strategic-political
level, some backsliding by the coalition partners. Chiang K'ai-shek's continued refusal to send his Y-Force across the Salween
River into Burma was evidence of the low priority China gave the
campaign. The CAI's slow rate of movement reflected the Chinese
fear of failure. This situation, in turn, encouraged the British feeling,
long held, that nothing worthwhile could be accomplished in northern
Burma. Firm British support for the north Burma campaign was
essential because Burma was in a British theater and Stilwell had two
British superiors whose approval was required for him to act. In his
position as the acting deputy commander of SEAC, Stilwell was
Mountbatten's superior. In addition, on 31 December, Stilwell had
placed his field combat command that controlled the CAI and the
5307th under General William J. Slim, commander of the British
Fourteenth Army. In early January, the British planners in SEAC
began trying to torpedo Stilwell's offensive. Looking at the Ledo
Force's, slow rate of advance, they were very doubtful that Myitkyina
could be taken soon enough to allow the Ledo Road to be constructed
before the monsoon rains came. Without this road link, they concluded,
Myitkyina could not be held.32 In place of Stilwell's campaign, they revived-and Mountbatten approved-an earlier plan to
bypass Burma and attack Sumatra as a step toward retaking the Dutch
East Indies and Singapore.33 This led Stilwell to write angrily in his
diary on 8 January: "Louis [Mountbatten] welches on entire program
[for Burma offensive]. G-mo's fault of course. Limey program: (1)
Stop road at Ledo. (2) Do not attack Burma. (3) Go to Sumatra. (4)34
Include Hongkong in SEAC!"34
Stilwell's anger deepened when he learned that Mountbatten was
preparing to dispatch a mission to London and Washington in February
to promote his new plan. Without notifying Mountbatte,
Stilwell sent his own mission led by Brigadier General Hayden L.
Boatner, his chief of staff and deputy commander of the CAI, to
Washington to present his views to the JCS. After the JCS strongly
opposed Mountbatten's plan, Mountbatten blamed Stilwell's mission
for influencing their actions and asked that Stilwell be relieved of his
SEAC duties on the grounds of insubordination.35 Marshall quickly
intervened and saved Stilwell's job by explaining to the British that
the JCS had consistently opposed the concept underlying Mountbatten's
proposed operation and that Stilwell's mission had not affected
their position. In characteristic fashion, Marshall also sent a message
to Stilwell, on 2 March, directing him to see Mountbatten at once and
reestablish good personal relations. The meeting was held on 6 March
and achieved that objective. Mountbatten assured Stilwell that he supported
his campaign.
While Stilwell was meeting with Mountbatten, the first combined
operation involving the 5307th and the CAI was drawing to a
successful conclusion. This strengthened Stilwell's position that the
Japanese could be defeated, northern Burma retaken, and the Ledo
Road completed. But, Stilwell told Mountbatten, holding northern
Burma would take more than two Chinese divisions. He encouraged
Mountbatten to put pressure on Chiang K'ai-shek to get the Y-Force
committed. He also asked Mountbatten to help squelch the detractors
of the American-Chinese campaign in northern Burma.36 These
people, in Stilwell's opinion, were hurting his efforts to build up
Chinese confidence and make Chiang feel that his troops in Burma
were gaining glory for both China and for Chiang himself.
The first operation involving the 5307th had begun on the morning
of 24 February with the front line positioned approximately fifteen
kilometers north of Maingkwan, the former administrative center of
the Hukawng Valley and the largest town in northern Burma (see map 3). While the main body of the Chinese 38th and 22d Divisions and
the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group put pressure on the 18th
Division front north of Maingkwan, the 5307th, with the 38th Division's
113th Regiment following, moved east around the 18th Division's right flank. Stilwell's intention was to have the 5307th
establish a roadblock well behind the front and trap the 18th Division.
On 28 February, Stilwell, having decided that the roadblock should
be located at Walawbum, a small village some fifteen kilometers
south of Maingkwan, sent out a liaison aircraft to deliver his order to
move there as rapidly as possible. On 2 March, the 5307th crossed
the Tanai River, some twenty kilometers northeast of Walawbum, set
up an assembly area, and received its final orders from Stilwell's
headquarters. Movement toward Walawbum began at dawn on 3
March. During the day, the 5307th's 1st Battalion secured a dropping
zone at Lagang Ga, and the 3d Battalion set up heavy weapons
commanding the road south of the town. On the morning of 4 March,
the 2d Battalion reached the road about a mile and a half west of town
and set up a roadblock.37
The Japanese response was quick in coming. After learning of the
5307th's presence, General Giichi Tanaka, the commander of the
18th Division, decided that he could use a small rear guard to delay
the cautious Chinese and turn the bulk of his two regiments to face
the threat in his rear. On 3 March, just as the 5307th was moving
forward to establish its positions, the Japanese 55th Regiment began
to move south toward the 5307th's right flank and the 56th Regiment
began to move southeastward toward its left flank.38
Heavy Japanese attacks be an on 4 March and continued through
the next day. The 2d Battalion of the 5307th received especially
heavy blows, and after fighting for thirty-six hours without food and
water and with ammunition running low, it abandoned its roadblock
on the night of 5 March and withdrew to Wesu Ga (see map 4).39
During this time, Allied aircraft bombed and strafed apparent Japanese
troop concentrations. The air attack diminished Tanaka's ability
to execute his plan, but his failure to destroy the 5307th was due more
to the arrival of the Chinese tank force led by Colonel Brown. On
the afternoon of 5 March, this unit pushed into an area between the
18th Division headquarters and 56th Regiment headquarters and,
without realizing the significance of its target, began firing on
Tanaka's command post.40 The tanks were also blocking the trial
that the 55th Regiment was to use for its attack. Face with this
situation, Tanaka decided, late on 5 March, to move his force to the
west between the advancing 22d Division and the 2d Battalion
roadblock and reestablish a line across the Kamaing Road south of
Walawbum. Because of the slow advance of the 22d Division, Tanaka
was able to accomplish this maneuver and escape what could have
become a trap.
On 7 March, in keeping with Stilwell's orders to keep casualties
low,41 Merrill arranged for the 113th Regiment to take over the
5307th's positions, and the 5307th withdrew from the battle. Its first
mission thus ended as a success. Casualties had been light: only
eight men had been killed and thirty-seven wounded during the
fighting in which an estimated 800 Japanese had died.42 The 5307th
had proven its ability to move cross-country supported by long-distance
radio communication and regular airdrops. It had also worked
successfully with the Chinese and another group that had become part
of the combined force, the native Kachin people.
The importance of support from the local inhabitants cannot be
overestimated. General William J. Slim has noted the value of the
help given the Japanese by the Burmese in the spring of 1942: "For
warning of our proximity they relied largely on Burman informers,
and for their routes on local guides."43 Charlton Ogburn, a veteran
of the 5307th, writes in his book The Marauders that in northern
Burma, the situation was reversed to the great benefit of the Allies:
The advantage the Japanese had in having only to hide and wait and
hold on ... would have forced us to pay an exorbitant price for any
successes, despite the Allies' superiority in numbers and virtual command
of the air, but for one asset we had: the local population was with
us. Thinly settled as the hills of northern Burma were, that factor made
a critical difference.44
The Americans made a conscious effort to gain and nurture this
asset. Boatner directed the medical units attached to the CAI "to
furnish medical attention to the natives as far as practicable to obtain
their friendship for the U.S. Army."45 Hunter mentions how the
5307th never watered their pack animals at village springs and
sometimes carried water a fairly long distance to their animals in
order to avoid damaging the springs and "irritating the natives in
whose good graces we wished to remain."46 Ogburn notes that
enlisting the cooperation of the Kachins was "an important job of one
of the most important members of the 5307th, our British liaison
officer, Captain Charles Evan Darlington."47 Darlington had served
as a political officer in the area before the war and had lived in
Maingkwan for five years. He was known and respected among the
Kachins and, in Ogburn's words, "was indispensable not only as a
supplier of guides but as a guide himself."48
The 5307th's first mission also showed its ability to coordinate
action with CAI units. Despite the language barrier and differences
between the Americans and the Chinese in diet, methods of cooking,
personal mannerisms, and ways of setting up camp, they developed
a feeling of mutual respect. The Americans understood that they
needed the numbers provided by the Chinese. Because the 5307th
had no artillery, the Americans also appreciated Chinese firepower.
Ogburn describes the warm welcome given the Chinese artillery
when the 113th Regiment relieved the 5307th at Walaxbum:
As the columns moved past each other, we heard cheering in
American voices from up ahead. It grew louder ... coming down the line
toward us, and when it reached us, we could see the cause. In the
Chinese column, a battery of pack artillery was moving forward with
the infantry. We too cheered while the Chinese beamed. The pieces
were only 75-millimeter howitzers and hardly a match for the 105's
and wallopina 150's with which the Japanese had visited humiliation
on us, but all the same, they were guns and they could throw shells and
they were on our side and they were a stirring sight.49
Unfortunately for the 5307th, however, even as the Chinese were
helping them fight the Japanese at Walawbum, they were seriously
degrading the health of the unit by unintentionally contaminating the
drinking water. Hunter notes that before the 5307th pulled out of
Walawbum, 350 cases of amoebic dysentery were diagnosed because
of contaminated drinking water: "Only too late at Walawbum did we
learn that the Chinese units were using the stream, from which we
obtained our drinking water, as a latrine. Those men who, through
force of circumstance or by choice, relied on halizone tablets to purify
their drinking water soon became the victims of amoebic dysentery
of the worst type."50 This situation was undoubtedly exacerbated by
a difference in Chinese and American habits. Ogbum states that the
Chinese "took time to boil all their drinking water, [while] ... far
from boiling what they drank, many of the Marauders could not even
be bothered to await the action of the halizone tablets in their canteens
but would pop the tablets in their mouths like aspirin and wash them
down with a pint of water dipped out of a trail side stream."51
After the battle for Walawbum, the Japanese retained control of
only a small part of the southern Hukawng Valley. To keep the
momentum of the CAI advance, push the Japanese out of the Hukawng
Valley, and enter the Mogaung Valley, Stilwell now directed
the 5307th to undertake another envelopment of 18th Division positions.
The 1st Battalion, followed at a day's interval by the 113th
Regiment, was to conduct a shallow envelopment and block the
Kamaing Road south of the Japanese positions along the Jambu Bum
ridge, the high ground that divided the Hukawng and Mogaung
Valleys. Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d Battalions were to swing farther
east around the Japanese and then move west to block the road in the
Inkangahtawng area, some five miles south of the 1st Battalion's
roadblock. At the same time, the 22d Division and the 1st Provisional
Tank Group were to launch an attack south along the Kamaing Road
over the Jambu Bum ridge (see map 5).
The movement of the 5307th began on 12 March. Rugged terrain
and delaying actions by the Japanese slowed the advance of the 1st
Battalion. Not until early 28 March did the force establish a roadblock
just below Shaduzup. At this point, they were some ten miles
south of the 22d Division's lead elements. Fighting was heavy
throughout the day, with the Japanese using artillery to support
repeated infantry assaults. During the night, the 113th Regiment
moved in to relieve the 1st Battalion from its roadblock responsibility.
On 29 March, the battalion moved a mile to the northeast to rest
near a mobile hospital unit. In action on the Kamaing Road, the
battalion had lost eight men killed and thirty-five wounded.52
Merrill's instructions to the 1st Battalion were to rejoin the main
body of the 5307th after its mission was completed. Accordingly on
30 March, the battalion began to backtrack north to Janpan. Its orders
were to make this march in easy stages because the route was
difficult. In one area, a day's march of ten hours yielded only one
mile of progress.53
On 1 April, the importance of long-distance communication for
the 5307th was demonstrated when a sack of grain being dropped
from a supply plane fell on the 1st Battalion's only long-range radio
and put it out of operation. On 3 April, after two days out of contact
with his headquarters, the battalion commander felt so uneasy that he
decided to go to Shaduzup and find out what was happening. Using
the Chinese radio net there, he learned that the 2d and 3d Battalions
were in desperate straits at Hsamshingyang and Nhpum Ga and
received orders to move to that location as rapidly as possible to
render assistance.54
The difficulty now facing the 5307th had been caused by Stilwell's
decision to divide the force in an attempt to accelerate the destruction
of the 18th Division. When planning for this operation had begun,
Merrill and Sun Li-jen, the 38th Division commander, had advocated
keeping all of the 5307th and the 113th Regiment together to establish
a single roadblock at Shaduzup. Stilwell, however, wanted two
roadblocks, one at Shaduzup and a second one ten miles farther south
in the Inkangahtawng area. He believed that a force making a wide
swing around the right flank of the Japanese could make a deep
penetration without being detected. His concept, then, was to have
two simultaneous attacks on the Kamaing Road while the 22d
Division attacked on the Jambu Bum front. It was assumed that, with
Japanese attention divided three ways, it would be impossible for
them to mount a coherent defense. It was also assumed that soon
after the 2d and 3d Battalions established their roadblock, the 113th
Regiment moving down from Shaduzup, would make contact with
them.55
Simultaneously in these attacks, however, was not achieved. During
the night of 22 March, Stilwell sent a radio message to Merrill: "Japs
withdrawing down the road. Jambu Bum fell today. Come fast
now."56 On 23 March, Merrill responded by ordering the 2d and 3d
Battalions to rush forward. While these two units reached the
Kamaing Road thirty-six hours earlier than originally planned, the
1st Battalion had fallen far behind schedule because of the rough
terrain and was still four days from Shaduzup. Nevertheless, due to
Stilwell's message, the 2d Battalion, after reaching the area north of
Inkangahtawng early on the morning of 24 March, proceeded to
attack the village. If the Chinese had moved south from Jambu Bum
more quickly, and if the 1st Battalion roadblock had been established
at this time, this attack might have been successful. But with a slow
Chinese advance and no distracting roadblock at Shaduzup, the
Japanese were able to concentrate their forces against the 2d and 3d
Battalions. Soon, these two battalions were imperiled. The lay of
the land had forced them to move into a position where they had a
long, exposed left flank, and they were susceptible to being cut off.
The Japanese began moving to do exactly that (see map 6).
After a day of heavy fighting that failed to take Inkangahtawng,
the 2d Battalion commander decided that he had no choice but to
withdraw eastward toward Manpin. As this withdrawal was taking
place on 25 March, the danger presented by the reinforced Japanese
battalion striking north from Kamaing became clear. If this force
reached Auche before the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5307th did, this
portion of the 5307th would be cut off from its route of withdrawal
northward to Nhpum Ga.
To slow the Japanese advance, two platoons
were sent to block the two trails running north from Kamaing. These
units successfully fought a series of delaying actions on 26, 27, and
28 March that allowed the main body to pass through Auche on the
27th and 28th.
With the 2d and 3d Battalions retiring from the Kamaing Road,
Stilwell decided that this was an opportune time to travel to
Chungking to meet with Chiang K'ai-shek. As he flew off to China
on 27 March, however, events were taking another dramatic turn. A
Japanese sketch showing their intention to continue moving north
through Auche to threaten the left flank of the 22d Division was
brought into Stilwell's headquarters. Since the Japanese could not
be allowed to complete this maneuver, the 2d and 3d Battalions were
ordered to stop them.
In response to this order, Merrill placed the 2d Battalion on the
high ground at Nhpum Ga and deployed the 3d Battalion to defend
an airstrip at Hsamshingyang, some three miles to the north. This
division of his force was required because Merrill had over 100
wounded who needed to be evacuated by air and the Nhpum Ga
heights dominated the airstrip.57 The 3d Battalion was also to
provide a reserve force and be responsible for keeping the trail
between Hsamshingyang and Nhpurn Ga open.
The stage was now set for one of the most difficult periods in the short history of the 5307th. The 2d Battalion had hardly finished building its defensive perimeter when the Japanese began attacking
on 28 March.
This same day, Merrill suffered a heart attack and
Colonel Charles N. Hunter relieved him. Then, on 31 March, the
Japanese succeeded in cutting the trail between Hsamshingyang and
Nhpum Ga. For more than a week, the Japanese repulsed all attempts
to reopen the trail and kept the 2d Battalion isolated except for
airdrops. During this time, repeated Japanese artillery barrages and
infantry assaults inflicted serious casualties on the 2d Battalion.
Disease, inadequate nourishment, fatigue, and stress also took their
toll. On 7 April a tired and hungry 1st Battalion arrived in
Hsamshingyang after a grueling march from the Shaduzup area, and
the next day they added their strength (only 250 men from the
battalion were physically able to join in the effort) to another attempt
by the 3d Battalion to break through to the 2d Battalion. Slight
progress was made on 8 April, and then, suddenly, during the
afternoon of 9 April, the Japanese withdrew. The battle had been
won, but the cost to the 5307th had been high. In fighting at the
attempted roadblock at Inkanghtawng, seven men had been killed and
twelve wounded. The Nhpum Ga battle, moreover, resulted in
fifty-two men killed and 302 wounded. In addition, seventy-seven
sick soldiers were evacuated after the fighting ended.58
After the battle at Nhpum Ga, the 5307th was given several days'
rest, and new outfits of clothing were issued. In addition, nutritious
ten-in-one rations were delivered, and mail was received for the first
time in two months.59 But baths and new clothes could not alter
reality; the unit was worn out:
Terribly exhausted; suffering extensively and persistently from
malaria, diarrhea, and both bacillary and amebic dysentery; beset by
festering skin lesions, infected scratches and bites; depleted by 500
miles of marching on packaged rations, the Marauders were sorely
stricken. They had lost 700 men killed, wounded, disabled by nonbattle
injuries, and, most of all, sick. Over half of this number had been
evacuated from 2d Battalion alone. Many remaining in the regiment
were more or less ill, and their physical condition was too poor to
respond quickly to medication and rest.60
Clearly, at this point, the 5307th was facing a mounting health
crisis that threw the unit's ability to undertake another mission into
question. Combat losses, even including the heavy losses suffered
in the fighting at Nhpum Ga, were below projected levels. Nonbattle
casualties that required evacuation, however, were much higher than
expected and were rising rapidly. In February and March, they
totaled 200. In April, alone, they numbered 304, as the effects of the
harsh battlefield conditions at Nhpum Ga began to be felt.61 At
Nhpum Ga, the 5307th had suffered because it was ordered to fight
in a static defensive role for which it was neither trained nor equipped.
Then the heat and diseases of tropical Burma combined to add to the
unit's misery:
The deserted villages of Hsamshingyang and Nphum Ga ... became
saturated with insect pests and disease organisms produced in decaying
animals and men, foul water, and fecal wastes. Mental health, too was
imperiled for the troops on the hill ... [as] their casualties accumulated
on the spot, visible and pitiable testaments to the waste of battle and
the fate that might befall the entire force. Scrub typhus appeared.
Malaria recurrences flared up ominously. The diarrheas and dysenteries
became rampant. Chronic disabilities took acute forms. When the
siege lifted, the men nearly collapsed with exhaustion and sickness.62
Outwardly, the 5307th seemed to recover as it rested and received
good food and good medical treatment at Hsamshingyang, but the
exhaustion and illness of the soldiers could not be overcome with just
a few days rest. Many, if not most, of the soldiers were beginning to
suffer from malnutrition due to extended use of the K-rations that, as
Hunter notes, were "a near starvation diet ... designed to be ...
consumed only under emergency conditions when no other food
could be made available."63 Also, numerous soldiers suffered from
chronic diseases that were sure to flare up again as soon as they began
to experience anxiety and exert themselves. The consensus among
the men of the 5307th was that the unit needed to go "into rainy-monsoon
quarters somewhere to recuperate and reorganize for the next
season."64
This was not to happen. Higher authorities wanted Myitkyina
taken. Stilwell was motivated by his own deep desire to take the
airfield and the town before the onset of the summer rainy season.
The JCS had also made their position clear: the minimum objective
in north Burma was "the seizing and holding of Myitkyina this dry
season."65 Furthermore, developments within the coalition at the
strategic-political and operational levels were putting pressure on
Stilwell to act. Since the tactical situation and the nature of the forces
under his command meant that Myitkyina could only be reached and
attacked by a task force led by the 5307th, the die was cast. The
5307th would be ordered to undertake a third mission.
The pressure to take Myitkyina that Stilwell felt from the coalition
partners was the result of new British and Chinese support for his
north Burma campaign. Because that support was in large measure
a response to U.S. pressure, he knew that he could not slacken his
efforts. When Boatner had met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt
on 18 February while on his mission to Washington for Stilwell,
Roosevelt had expressed his frustration about the situation in Burma.
He had told Boatner that he was more dissatisfied with the progress
of the war there than in any other place.66 In response, Boatner had
urged the president to ask the British and Chinese to be more
aggressive in Burma. This the president did. He expressed his views
to Churchill, and in a letter delivered to Chiang K'ai-shek on 20
March, FDR diplomatically praised the accomplishments of the
Ledo Force while asking for action by the Y-Force to take advantage
of the Japanese dispersal:
Your Chinese Corps on the Ledo Road has administered a serious
setback to the Japanese with heavy losses to the enemy in men and also
in ground and prestige. It is a magnificent outfit. General Stilwell was
able to employ the United States regiment to considerable advantage
and altogether the heavy reverse administered to the crack Eighteenth
Japanese Division represents an important victory....
I am communicating my views to you at length and in considerable
detail in the hope that you will give orders to the commander of your
Yunnan force to cooperate in developing what appears to be a great
opportunity. I send my very warm regards. Signed Roosevelt.67
Chiang K'ai-shek responded to Roosevelt's letter on 27 March, the
day before he met with Stilwell in Chungking. In his reply, he again
expressed his regrets about conditions in China that made it impossible
to send the Y-Force into Burma, but he did make a major
concession, saying, "I have ... decided to dispatch to India by air as
many troops in Yunnan as can be spared in order to reinforce the
troops in Ledo, thus enabling the latter to carry on their task of
defeating the enemy."68
This letter did not satisfy President Roosevelt. On 3 April, he sent
Chiang a more strongly worded message about the need to send the
Y-Force into action immediately. Roosevelt stated plainly that the
United States had been training and equipping the Yoke Force for
just such an opportunity and that, if it did not move now, this effort
could not be justified. On 10 April, Marshall followed up this
message with a message to Stilwell telling him to stop lend-lease
shipments to the Y-Force. To forestall this move, on 14 April, the
Chinese agreed to order an offensive by the Y-Force into Burma.69
In mid-April, therefore, Stilwell knew that President Roosevelt
had personally intervened with Churchill and Chiang K'ai-shek to
gain more support for his campaign. He also had received the
benefits of that intervention. During his meetings in Chungking on
28 and 29 March, the Chinese had agreed to send two divisions, the
50th and the 14th, to north Burma. Then, roughly two weeks later,
they had agreed to send the Y-Force into Burma. If, after all of this
had been accomplished, Stilwell did nothing, he would be wasting
Roosevelt's efforts and embarrassing the president in front of the
Chinese. Stilwell also felt that he would be squandering the support
he had been receiving from the British, especially General Slim.
The British support was extremely important because of the major
Japanese offensive into eastern India that had been launched on 8
March, just two days after Stilwell and Mountbatten had met to settle
their misunderstandings. The offensive had been anticipated, but its
strength had not. Three Japanese divisions advanced to surround
Imphal and Kohima, and by the beginning of April, it seemed possible
that the Japanese might cut the lines of communication supporting
both Stilwell's forces and the airfields used to fly supplies into China.
Stilwell had recognized the seriousness of the threat and, after returning
from Chungking, had decided to offer General Slim the use of his
38th Division--even though he knew that this would mean the end
of his advance and all hope of reaching Myitkyina before the monsoon
rains came. But to his great surprise and relief, when he had
met with Slim, Mountbatten, and Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne
(Brigadier Wingate's successor) at Jorhat, India, on 3 April, to discuss
the situation, the British had stood firmly behind him. Slim had told
him that he could keep the 38th Division and also the two new
Chinese divisions that were arriving.70 Slim had also guaranteed that
any possible interruption of the line of communication to Ledo would
not exceed ten days and that the LRPGs (nicknamed "Chindits")
flown into central Burma in early March would continue to support
Stilwell's campaign in the north instead of shifting their attention to
the west.71
At the Jorhat meeting, Slim and Stilwell also discussed the possibility
of reaching Myitkyina ahead of the rains. Since Slim was
leaving him in control of the three CAI divisions-the 22d, 30th, and
the two new divisions, the 14th and the 50th; and Galahad-Stilwell was optimistic that he still could do it. On 3 March,
when Slim had visited Stilwell's headquarters at the start of the
operation to take Maingkwan and Walawbum, Stilwell had told him
about his idea for a rapid thrust across the Kumon Range to approach
Myitkyina from the north. Whether or not he could actually do it,
Stilwell said, depended on how things went and when he captured
Shaduzup.72 Shaduzup was taken on 29 March. On 3 April, with
his force of more than five divisions left intact, Stilwell told Slim that
he expected to be in Myitkyina about 20 May.73
Originally, when Stilwell had taken field command of the CAI in
December, his vision of how to take Myitkyina had been for the 22d
and 38th Divisions simply to advance across the Hukawng Valley,
push over the Jambu Bum ridge, move down the Mogaung Valley to
Mogaung, and then attack northeastward to Myitkyina. The 5307th
was to aid this advance by making deep flanking movements that cut
Japanese lines of communication and disrupted Japanese defenses.
Stilwell also had hopes that, at some point, a Y-Force offensive would
facilitate his advance by drawing Japanese forces away from north
Burma. However, the slow progress of the CAI in December, January,
and February--coupled with the failure of the Y-Force to
move-had made it less and less likely that this plan would bring his
force to Myitkyina before the rains.
Then, in February, Brigadier J. F. Bowerman, commander of the
British Fort Hertz area in northern Burma, had suggested to Stilwell
that a little-known pass through the Kurnon Range east of Shaduzup
could be used by a mobile force like Galahad to attack Myitkyina
from the north. This idea had appealed to Stilwell because it offered
the chance to make up for lost time. Not only could he break free
from the slow pace of CAI movement, his force could outflank the
Japanese forces defending the Mogaung Valley and achieve surprise
at Myitkyina. This was the plan that Stilwell discussed with Slim
on 3 March and again on 3 April. This is what Slim knew Stilwell
intended to do when Slim told him on 3 April to "push on for
Myitkyina as hard as he could go."75
By mid-April, Stilwell was confident that a deep strike by a
Galahad-led force could reach Myitkyina. Studies of the terrain and
trail network indicated that a task force could cross the Kumon Range.
The new Chinese divisions, moreover, would soon be available. The
airlift of the 50th Division into Maingk-wan was almost completed,
and the 14th Division was assembling at airfields in Yunnan.76 The
only major question remaining before intitiating the operation, already
code-named End Run, was the condition of the 5307th after the
battle at Nhpum Ga.
To determine the status of the 5307th, Stilwell sent his G3, Colonel
Henry L. Kinnison, to Hsamshingyang shortly after the fighting
ended to see firsthand how the men looked. Kinnison told Hunter
about Stilwell's intention to organize a task force to go over the
Kumon Range and approach Myitkyina from the north, and the two
of them, as Hunter recalls, "discussed the condition of the men and
animals in detail."77 During this time, Hunter apparently did not
object to sending the 5307th on this mission. In his memoirs, he only
notes that he asked for "one week's rest before leaving Hsamshingyang."78
Merrill, too, did not object to the mission. Perhaps both he
and Hunter believed taking Myitkyina justified additional sacrifice
on the part of the 5307th. Maybe they felt that objections were futile
because of Stilwell's views that will power could overcome some of
the debilitating effects of tropical diseases, and that soft-hearted
medical officers were probably contributing to the high evacuation
rate for illness in the 5307th. In any case, when Stilwell told Merrill
that he knew he was asking Galahad for more effort than could fairly
be expected of it and that he had no other option but to do so,80 he
left Merrill with no basis to oppose the operation.
Stilwell had no choice but to use the 5307th to execute End Run
because the nature of the forces he commanded made it necessary for
Americans to lead the Myitkyina task force. The Chinese were not
trained for long-distance cross-country maneuver through the jungle.
They also lacked the aggressiveness for such an undertaking.
Moreover, any attempt by Stilwell to send a Chinese force alone against
Myitkyina would certainly have been opposed by Chiang K'ai-shek
as being too risky. Another problem was that a Chinese force would
have required Kachin guides, but the Kachins did not like the Chinese.
Slim notes that in the retreat from Burma in April-May 1942,
the Chinese troops fleeing north through the Mogaung and Hukawng
Valleys had looted villages with "no law and little mercy."81 As a
result, in Ogburn's words, "The Kachins disliked and feared the
Chinese at least as much as the Japanese."82 To ensure full, effective
participation by the Chinese and the Kachins, the force moving on
Myitkyina had to be a combined force under American command.
On 17 April, two days after the 50th Division had completed its
move from Yunnan to Maingkwan, Stilwell met with his staff and
Merrill to discuss the plan. On 21 April, Stilwell set up the task force
to seize Myitkyina. Because the 5307th had lost approximately 50
percent of its strength and was down to about 1,400 men, it needed
to be augmented by Chinese and Kachin soldiers. Three combat
teams commanded by Americans were created, and Merrill was given
overall command. H Force, under Hunter, contained the 1st Battalion
of Galahad, the 150th Regiment of the 50th Division, the 31d Company
of the Animal Transport Regiment, and a battery of 22d Division artillery.
K Force, under Colonel Kinnison, contained the 3d
Battalion of Galahad and the 88th Regiment of the 30th Division.
M Force, under Colonel McGee (2d Battalion commander), contained
the 2d Battalion of Galahad and 300 Kachins.83
On 22 April, two days short of the full week of rest that Hunter
had requested,84 the 5307th left Hsamshingyang and began the
twenty-mile march north to Naubum.85 There, the battalions set
about organizing the combat teams and preparing for the operation.
On 28 April, K Force moved out. H Force followed two days later.
On 7 May, M Force started on its way (see map 7).
Despite their illnesses and fatigue, the soldiers of the 5307th set
out for Myitkyina in fairly high spirits. When they had first heard of
this mission, they had been filled with disbelief and resentment. They
had felt that Stilwell's headquarters "was either ignorant of the shape
[the unit was] in or indifferent to it--or out of its mind."86 However,
their outlook improved after they were promised that, after capturing
the Myitkyina airstrip, they would be relieved and flown to a rest and
recreation area.87 As Ogburn states, "We had it from General Merrill
himself that ... we would be ... given a party to cause taxpayers a
shudder ... and given furloughs."88 This vision gave them the will
to see this new mission through.
The hard reality of the march-the rain, the mud, the steep narrow
trails where exhausted animals slipped and fell down mountain sides
carrying their precious loads with them, the effects of disease and
malnutrition, and the attacks of insects and leeches-all of these
things soon began to sap the soldiers' will. The conditions were far
more difficult than any of them had encountered previously, and
many soldiers had to be evacuated because they were too sick and
weak to continue. At some points, groups of men were left behind
with the promise that help would be sent. Yet most of the troops did
manage to keep moving forward, and on 17 May, H Force attacked
and captured the main Myitkyina airfield.
The men of the 5307th thought that this victory meant they would
be released from their hardship, but-despite the earlier promises-it
was not to be. Again, tactical necessity and the nature of combined
operations made it impossible to relieve them. Instead of being flown
out, they were committed to a positional battle against a growing
Japanese force that was vigorously defending the town of Myitkyina
and threatening to recapture the airfield. As explained by Boatner
later, Stilwell felt that he had to keep Galahad at Myitkyina for four
reasons:
1. GALAHAD was the only U.S. combat unit in the theater available
for the assault on Myitkyina.
2. The Chinese 88th and 150th Regiments that marched over the
Kumon Range with GALAHAD had few evacuations for sickness/fatigue
in spite of their heavy casualties.
3. Since early May Stilwell had been resisting heavy pressure to
evacuate 3d Indian Division [Lentaigne's LRPG Chindit force].
4. The Japanese lines were only 1,500 yards from the airstrip which
was the only base and source of supply. 8 (see map 8.)
Reason four expresses Stillwell's tactical need to keep the 5307th
at Myitkyina and reflects the simple requirement to have sufficient
soldiers in Myitkyina to handle the Japanese. This was a growing
requirement as Japanese strength increased. After 21 May, Stilwell
was even forced to pull two battalions of Army engineers off Ledo
Road construction work and rush them to Myitkyina as reinforcements.90
In addition, ssued to try toúhaps increase, t personnel at î, a
directive was issued to hold the number of sick and fatigued soldiers
being evacuated down to an absolute minimum.91 Second, staff
officers in the rear were ordered to comb their areas for earlier
Galahad evacuees and send as many as possible back to the unit.92
At this time, there was no possibility of relieving the 5307th. The
situation demanded that the unit stay in the fight.
Coalition warfare and the nature of combined operations were also
making, relief of the 5307th out of the question. The5307th was the
only U. S . combat unit in the theater. This gave it a symbolic significance
beyond the combat power that its soldiers could generate.
Stilwell wanted the Chinese to continue fighting, and he wanted the
units of the Indian 3d Division (Wingate's-Lentaigne's Chindits)
that were withdrawing northward toward Mogaung and Myitkyina to
hold their ground. To achieve these goals, he needed the presence of
the 5307th on the battle line. Facing a classic problem inherent in
combined operations, Stilwell was determined not to "let the impression
be created that [he was] withholding U.S. troops from combat
in a sector where as an Allied commander [he] was keeping British
and Chinese troops in combat."93
Keeping the 5307th in Myitkyina was, therefore, Stilwell's way of
addressing a fundamental problem of combined operations-maintaining
teamwork and trust and keeping all forces united in their
efforts. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, states clearly
that, in combined operations, "missions should be perceived as
appropriate and achievable for the forces to which they are given and
equitable in terms of burden and risk sharing."94 The key phrase here
is "equitable in terms of burden and risk sharing," for in combined
operations, the surest way to create discord is to create the impression
that the units of one nation are being favored in some way over the
units of another. When units of one nation are under the command
of an officer from a different country, the danger of such impressions
being formed is especially high. This is why FM 100-5, Operations,
states that "national contingents normally retain command of their
own forces."95 Stilwell, an American, was commander of the CAI,
and since 17 May, the Chindits had also been attached to his command.
As the combined force commander, he certainly did not want
to be seen as playing favorites with the 5307th.
Stilwell's situation was already delicate because of high Chinese
casualties and a feeling among the Chinese that their tasks were more
difficult than those assigned to the 5307th. Lieutenant General
Zheng Dongguo, who had been sent to India to command the CAI in
the field if Stilwell did not, felt that the Chinese were being given the
hardest and most dangerous missions, and that the Americans were
looking for something that could be taken easily. Then, when the
Americans got in trouble as they did at Walawbum, they would call
on the Chinese for help.96 He Junheng, deputy division commander
and chief of staff of the 38th Division, had the same complaint.97
Certainly, in terms of combat casualties, the Chinese were paying a
heavier price than the Americans. By 15 April, Chinese casualties in
north Burma were as follows: 22d Division, 800 men killed and
2,000 men wounded, and 38th Division, 650 men killed and 1,450
men wounded.98 Reflecting the heavy fighting around Myitkyina,
the 150th Regiment of the 50th Division by 20 May had taken 671
battle casualties.99 Boatner was well aware of Chinese concerns and
felt embarrassed in his dealings with the Chinese because of the
5307th's withdrawals from its roadblocks. Under these circumstances,
withdrawing the 5307th from Myitkyina and sending it back
to India would undoubtedly have harmed the combined force's sense
of unity.
Chinese attitudes were also a concern for Stilwell as he dealt with
Lentaigne's requests to allow the Chindits to withdraw quickly to the
north. The Chindits were wearing out just like the 5307th was, and
Lentaigne felt that they were no longer fit for service. But Stilwell
worried about what would happen to Chinese morale if troops who
had only entered combat in March passed through their lines on the
way to India.101 Also, following close behind the Chindits were
Japanese moving northward. If the Chindits did not hold their
blocking positions south of Mogaung, these Japanese units would
move north to fight against the 38th and 22d Divisions in the
Mogaung Valley and reinforce the Japanese at Myitkyina. Thus,
Stilwell refused Lentaigne's request and ordered him to hold the
Japanese well south of Mogaung. Stilwell's answer to statements
about the greatly weakened physical condition of the Chindits was to
respond that the 5307th had been through as much, if not more, and
was still in the field.
This, then, was Stilwell's solution to the problem of equitable
burden sharing. Every nation's units were to suffer equally. Looking
at the 5307th's experience from this perspective, it can be realized
that the unit was not sacrificed, as Colonel Hunter charged, to satisfy
Stilwell's ego. It just happened that it was the only American combat
unit available, and the combined force that Stilwell commanded
needed American participation. Stilwell had, as he told General
Merrill, no choice but to ask Galahad for more than could normally
be expected of it. Without Galahad to help hold up the coalition
banner of shared suffering, the combined forcewould have lacked a
crucial unifying element and a catalyst for action.
Fatigue, disease, malnourishment, and the stress of battle continued
to weaken Stilwell's soldiers. Added to this was the feeling by
the members of the unit that they had been lied to and abused-an
impression that spread through the unit after the men learned that they
were going to be kept at Myitkyina. Morale fell precipitately and, with
it, the men's physical well-being. Shortly after the 5307th had
reached Myitkyina, the regimental and battalion surgeons had
recommended that the entire unit be withdrawn because of its wretched
physical condition.102 For the reasons discussed above, this advice
was not heeded. The directive to hold down medical evacuations and
efforts to beat down fevers with medication led to no improvement.
During the last two weeks of May, evacuations due to illness ran
about 75-100 per day, with a peak day of 134.103 Steadily, the unit
faded away. By 30 May, the 2d Battalion, which had started off for
Myitkyina with 27 officers and 537 men, had only 12 men left in
action.104 The situation in the 3d Battalion was about the same. Only
the 1st Battalion still had some strength-a handful of officers and
200 men.105 In his diary entry for this day, Stilwell was forced to
write, "Galahad is just shot."106
At this time, the 5307th truly was nonoperational, but it was to
continue in existence for two more months. On 25 May, 2,500
Galahad "replacements" landed in Bombay, India, and were rushed
to Myitkyina as quickly as possible. In early June, these soldiers and
the remnants of the 5307th were organized into one "old" Galahad
battalion and two "new" Galahad battalions. With the two engineer
battalions that on 8 June were grouped into a provisional regiment,
they maintained the American presence in what was now the siege
of Myitkyina. But the "new" Galahad was not the "old" Galahad and
never really could be. That force had experienced something special
and accomplished something extraordinary. It was fitting, therefore,
that after Myitkyina fell, the 5307th was disbanded. The fate of the
organization thus mirrored what had happened to virtually all of the
men who had served with it. In the campaign to reach and take the
strategic objective of Myitkyina, they had reached the limit of what
they could do and could do no more.
There is much to be gained by examining the experiences of the
5307th. The soldiers established an inspirational standard of
endurance and courage in the face of an extremely harsh natural environment and a dedicated foe. The unit's long cross-country movements
illustrate the innovative use of the new capabilities given military
forces at the time by advances in communications technology and
aerial resupply techniques. But no lessons to be learned are greater
than those related to the conduct of combined or multinational
operations. If, as Colonel Hunter asserts, "Galahad Force was the
most beat upon regimental-sized unit that participated in World
War II,"107 the reason for this happening is to be found most of all
in the combined nature of the northern Burma campaign. As the only
American combat unit within the combined force, Galahad could not
avoid being given the special burdens that came from being Americans.
Their presence was required to form viable multinational task
forces when the units of other countries could not or would not work
together alone. Their participation in operations was necessary to
encourage the units of other nations to stay in the struggle and to fight
hard. The 5307th was the means by which the American field
commander, General Stilwell, showed that he was not asking more
of his coalition partners than he was asking of American soldiers.
What was especially damaging to the 5307th was that it was a small
unit and the only U.S. combat unit under Stilwell's command. It had
to bear America's fighting burden alone. Eventually, and perhaps
inevitably, it collapsed under the weight of its combined load.
1. Charles N. Hunter. Galahad (San Antonio, TX: The Naylor Co., 1963), 215-16.
2. U.S. War Department, Intelligence Division, Merrill's Marauders (February - May 1945) (Washington, DC: War Department, 1945), 45.
3. Ibid., 113.
4. Hunter, Galahad, 213.
5 . Charlton Ogburn, The Marauders (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 1.
6. Hunter, Galahad, 2.
7. Ibid., 1-2.
8. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Vission to China (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953), 353.
9. Ibid., 182.
10. Ibid., 358.
11. Ibid., 366.
12. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1956), 9.
13. Ibid., 9.
14. Ibid., 62.
15. Ibid., 68.
16. Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 266.
17. Ibid., 266-67.
18. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 214.
19. Ibid., 215.
20. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 117.
21. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 218.
22. Wang Jiren, "Cong Yindu Zhengxun Dao Fangong Gaojie
(From reorganization and training in India to victory in the counteroffensive)," in Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan
(The war of resistance of the expeditionary army in India
and Bunna), ed. by the Historical Materials Research Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi
Chubanshe, 1990). 327.
23 . Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 128-29.
24. James H. Stone, Crisis Fleeting: Original Reports on Military Medicine in
India and Burma in the Second World War (Washington, DC: Office of the
Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1969), 293.
25. Ogburn, The Marauders, 60.
26. Hunter, Galahad, 10.
27. Ibid., 6.
28. Ibid., 121.
29. U.S. War Department, Merrill's Marauders, 16.
30. Message, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 January 1944, in Stilwell's Personal File:
China-Burma-India 1942-1944, ed. by Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1976), 1373.
31. Message, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 February 1944, in Sunderland and Romanus,
Stilwell's Personal File, 1424.
32. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 163.
33. Ibid., 160.
34. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 276.
35. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 163.
45. Gordon S. Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1946), 64.
46. Hunter, Galahad, 58.
47. Ogburn, The Marauders, 105.
48. Ibid., 106.
49. Ibid., 133.
50. Hunter, Galahad, 51.
51. Ogburn, The Marauders, 226.
52. U.S. War Department, Merrill's Marauders, 57.
53. Ibid., 58.
54. Ibid., 59.
55. Ibid., 65.
56. Ibid., 63.
57. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems. 183.
58. Hunter, Galahad, 81-82.
59. Ogburn, The Marauders, 219.
60. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 331.
61. Ibid., 389.
62. Ibid., 389-90.
63. Hunter, Galahad, 16.
64. Ogburn, The Marauders, 219.
65. Message, Marshall to Stilwell, 21 February 1944, in Sunderland and Romanus,
Stilwell's Personal File, 1419.
66. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 164.
67. Letter, Roosevelt to Chiang K'ai-shek, 20 March 1944, in Sunderland and
Romanus, Stilwell's Personal File, 1533.
68. Message, Chiang K'ai-shek to Roosevelt, 27 March 1944, in Sunderland and
Romanus, Stilwell's Personal File, 1557-58.
69. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 313.
70. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 272.
71. Ibid., 268.
72. Ibid., 255.
73. Ibid., 273.
74. Ian Fellowes-Gordon, The Magic War (New York. Charles Scribner's Sons,
1971), 47.
75. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 273.
76. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 202-3.
77. Hunter, Galahad, 85.
78. Ibid.
79. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 297.
80. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 225.
81. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 108.
82. Ogburn, The Marauders, 105.
83. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 223.
84. Hunter, Galahad, 187.
85. Ogburn, The Marauders, 227.
86. Ibid., 225.
87. Hunter, Galahad, 88.
88. Ogburn, The Marauders, 227.
89. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 239-40.
90. Ibid., 237.
91. U.S. War Department, Merrill's Marauders, 111.
92. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 239.
93. Ibid.
94. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1993), 5-3.
96. Zheng Dongguo, "Zhongguo Zhuyinjun Shirno" (The whole story of the
Chinese Army in India), in Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of
resistance of the expeditionary army in India and Burma), ed, by the Historical
Materials Research Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), 82.
97. He Junheng, "Zhuanzhanzhong Yinmian Zhanqu de Xinbian Di Sanshiba Shi"
(The New 38th Division's service in the successive battles of the India-Burma
theater of operations), in Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of resistance
of the expeditonary army in India and Burma), ed. by the Historical Materials
Research Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), 147-48.
98. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 188.
99. Ibid., 230.
100. Ibid., 189 note.
101. Ibid., 230.
102. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 354.
103. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 239.
Fellowes-Gordon, Ian. The Magic War: The Battle for North Burma. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971.
He, Junheng. "Zhuanzhanzhong Yinmian Zhanqu de Xinbian Di Sanshiba Shi"
(The New 38th Division's service in the successive battles of the India-Burma
theater of operations). In Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of resistance
of the expeditionary army in India and Burma). Edited by the Historical
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Hunter, Charles N. Galahad. San Antonio, TX The Naylor Co., 1963.
Liang, Chin-tung. General Stilwell in China 1942-1944: The Full Story. [New
York]: St. John's University Press, 1972.
O'Brien, Terance. Out of the Blue: A Pilot with the Chindits. Glasgow: William
Collins Sons, 1984.
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Peers, William R., and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road. New York: Avon
Books, 1963.
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Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1956.
___. Stilwell's Mission to China. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
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Company, 1946.
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1942-1944. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1976.
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New York: Macmillan, 1970.
U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-5, Operations.
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U.S. War Department. Military Intelligence Division. Merrill's Marauders
(February-May 1944). Washington, DC: War Department, 1945.
Wang Jiren. "Cong Yindu Zhengxun Dao Fangong Gaojie" (From reorganization
and training in India to victory in the counteroffensive). In Yuanzheng Yinmian
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Burma). Edited by the Historical Materials Research Committee of the Chinese
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Periodicals
Haith, Michael E. "'I'll Go Where I'm Sent,' 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell in the CBI."
Military Review 72, no. 5 (May 1992): 73-83.
McMichael, Scott R. "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership: Colonel Charles N.
Hunter with Galahad in Burma." Parameters 16, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 45-57.
Shepard, John E. "Warriors and Politics: The Bitter Lesson of Stilwell in China."
Parameters 19, no. 1 (March 1989): 61-75.
Stone. James H. "Evacuation of the Sick and Wounded in the Second Burma
Campaign, 1943-1945." Militaiy Review, 29, no. 2 (May 1949): 44-51.
___. "The Marauders and the Microbes." Infantry Journal 64, no. 3 (March
1949): 4-11
Dr Gary J. Bjorge is a historian with the
Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. A graduate of the University of Minnesota -Twins
Cities, he earned three M.A. degrees
and a Ph.D. degree from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Bjorge served for several
years as an officer in the Far East with the U.S.
Navy, worked as the East Asian Bibliographer
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and at
the University of Kansas, and also taught at the
University of Kansas. He is the author of
numerous articles and reviews on military history
topics. His translations of Chinese short stories
have appeared in several anthologies of modern
Chinese literature.
COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE Missions
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the U.S. Army Command and General Staff, College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the
following missions:
Prepare and present instruction in military history at US-ACGSC and assist other
USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.
Publish works in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components on
historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concems of the Army.
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