THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on the Tactical Employment, Technique, Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units.

The General Board was established by General Orders Number 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders Number 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders Number 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

File: R 320.2/6

Study Number 49

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT	PAGE
Introduction	4
Chapter 1. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry Units	5
Section 1. Combat Analysis	5
Section 2. Capabilities and Characteristics of Mechanized Cavalry	8
Section 3. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry	12
Chapter 2. Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units	14
Section 1. General	14
Section 2. Organization of Mechanized Cavalry	14
Section 3. Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry	17
Chapter 3. Conclusions and Recommendations	20
Section 1. Conclusions	20
Section 2. Recommendations	21
Bibliography	

Appendices:

1. List of Combat-Experienced Senior Commanders and Mechanized Cavalry Unit Commanders Whose Opinions were Obtained in Writing.

2. Extracts from Minutes of a Conference conducted by Armored Section, Theater General Board, on 27 November 1945.

3. Summary of Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Groups and Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons in the European Theater of Operations.

4. Summary of Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons (assigned to Armored Divisions) and Armored Reconnaissance Battalions in the European Theater of Operations.

5. Summary of Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops (assigned to Infantry Divisions) in the European Theater of Operations.

6. Examples of Combat Missions Performed by Mechanized Cavalry Units.

7. Report of Headquarters, First U. S. Army, on Mechanized Cavalry Operations, period 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945.

8. Miscellaneous Opinions and Information Pertinent to Characteristics of Mechanized Cavalry.

9. Summary of Opinions concerning General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

10. Examples of Opinions of Senior Officers concerning Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

11. Examples of Opinions of Commanders of Mechanized Cavalry Units concerning Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

12. Examples of Opinions concerning Coordination and Cooperation between Mechanized Cavalry of Corps and Divisions, between Mechanized Cavalry and other Ground Arms, and between Mechanized Cavalry and Air Forces.

13. Charts of Proposed Organization for Mechanized Cavalry Units.

14. Summaries of Personnel, Vehicles and Crew-Served Weapons in Proposed Organization for Mechanized Cavalry Units.

15. Examples of Opinions of Senior Officers concerning Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry.

16. Examples of Opinions of Commanders of Mechanized Cavalry Units concerning Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units.

17. Summaries of Mechanized Cavalry Organizations proposed by Headquarters First, Third and Seventh Armies.

18. Summary of Opinions concerning Organization of Mechanized Cavalry.

19. Historical Example of Employment of 316th Provisional Mechanized Cavalry Brigade in Combat.

20. Chart of Suggested Organization of Mechanized Cavalry Brigade.

21. Summary of Opinions concerning Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry.

22. Chart of Assignment and Attachment of Mechanized Cavalry Groups and Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

TACTICS, EMPLOYMENT, TECHNIQUE, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

Prepared by:

Brig Gen J. A. Holly, 012360, USA	Chief, Armored Section (Chairman)
Col W. S. Biddle, 015180, Cav	Armored Section
Col C. H. Reed, 014948, Cav	Armored Section
Lt Col E. C. Orth Jr, 019863, Inf	Armored Section
Lt Col H. W. Candler, 018562, Cav	Armored Section
Lt Col S. McC. Goodwin, 023177, Cav . . .	Armored Section
Lt Col G. C. Benjamin, 023422, Cav . . .	Armored Section
1st Lt D. C. Burdon, 0549768, Cav	Armored Section

Principal Consultants:

Col S. G. Conley, 015707, GSC (Inf)	G-3 Section
Col D. J. Bailey, 016174, CAC	AAA Section
Col C. W. Van Way Jr, 015757, Inf	G-1 Section
Col W. E. Wilkinson, 020529, MC	Surg Section
Col A. E. Harris, 018121, Cav	Armored Section
Col R. O. Ford, 0174149, Ord	G-4 Section
Col H. A. Morris, 020141, CE	Engr Section
Col P. P. Bell, 0215450, FA	Arty Section
Lt Col N. M. Cox, 019883, Inf	Armored Section
Lt Col S. G. Fries, 019827, Inf	Armored Section
Lt Col J. H. Huckins 0251486, Cav	G-3 (Air Grd Ln) Section
Lt Col E. G. Bevan, 0441090, Ord	Ord Section
Maj J. K. Robison, 0264548, Cav	G-2 Section
Capt H. B. Holmes, III, 025348, Sig C . .	Signal Section
Chaplain G. G. Finlay (Capt), 0553348 . .	Chaplain Section

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

TACTICS, EMPLOYMENT, TECHNIQUE, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

INTRODUCTION

Mission

The mission with which the directive pertaining to this report charged its authors was to prepare a report and recommendations, for submission to the theater commander, on the tactical employment, technique, organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.

Scope

The directive prescribed that the report would include investigation and consideration of the following:

The general mission and future role of mechanized cavalry units.

The general organization of mechanized cavalry units.

Armament and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.

Tactical doctrine for employment of mechanized cavalry units.

Sources

For list of principal records studied, see Bibliography, at end of report.

For list of combat-experienced senior commanders and mechanized cavalry unit commanders whose opinions were obtained in writing, see Appendix 1.

For extracts from minutes of a conference conducted by the Armored Section, The General Board, on 27 November 1945, and list of combat-experienced mechanized cavalry unit commanders who attended, see Appendix 2.

Preparation of Report

The information obtained from the sources indicated above was carefully analyzed and evaluated, and then formulated in the following report.

Appendices

In Appendices 10, 11, 15 and 16, which present examples of opinions expressed by officers who employed or commanded mechanized cavalry units in combat, divergent as well as concurrent views have been included.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

TACTICS, EMPLOYMENT, TECHNIQUE, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL MISSION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE, AND FUTURE ROLE OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

SECTION 1

COMBAT ANALYSIS

1. Introduction.

Mechanized cavalry, modern form of an ancient arm, made its first battle-field appearance as an element of the Army of the United States in World War II. All combat experience with this arm, as newly constituted, was therefore gained in this war; and furthermore, the bulk of it was obtained in the European Theater of Operations. Hence, in order that the value of mechanized cavalry may be fairly judged, its combat performance in the European Theater must be analyzed. To make such analysis is the object of this section.

2. Types of Mechanized Cavalry Units which Fought in European Theater of Operations.

a. The following types of mechanized cavalry units fought in the European Theater of Operations:

(1) The mechanized cavalry group, composed of group headquarters and headquarters troop and two attached mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons.

(2) The mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron assigned to the armored division (light).

(3) The mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop assigned to the infantry division.

b. While bearing a different name and having a different organization, the armored reconnaissance battalion, assigned to the armored division (heavy), occupied a position corresponding to that of the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron in the armored division (light).

3. Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique of Mechanized Cavalry at Time of Invasion of Normandy.

a. Mission and Role.

(1) The prescribed mission of mechanized cavalry when the invasion of Normandy began was reconnaissance, and this mission was to be performed with a minimum of fighting.

(2) Paragraph 38 of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, expressed the mechanized cavalry role as follows:

> "Mechanized cavalry units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned missions."

(3) Mechanized cavalry units had been organized and equipped upon the basis of this role and its method of accomplishment and hence had been reduced to minimum strength in respect to both personnel and equipment (see reference listed in paragraph 2 b (4), Bibliography).

b. Tactical Doctrine.

The tactical doctrine which governed the employment of mechanized cavalry units was contained in paragraphs 38 to 41 of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and also in paragraph 2 of Training Circular 107, War Department, 1943.

c. Technique.

Reconnaissance technique was prescribed in paragraph 7 of Training Circular 107, War Department, 1943.

4. Assignment and Attachment of Mechanized Cavalry Units in European Theater of Operations.

a. (1) Thirteen mechanized cavalry groups, and one unattached mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron, fought in the European Theater of Operations.

(2) These units were assigned to armies and habitually attached to corps; and most of these attachments were, in effect, largely permanent. Corps frequently further attached these units, for operations only, to divisions, especially to infantry divisions (see Appendix 3f).

(3) For chart of these units, and their assignments and attachments, see Appendix 22.

b. Thirteen mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons fought in the European Theater of Operations as organic units of armored divisions (light), and two armored reconnaissance battalions as organic units of armored divisions (heavy).

c. Forty-two mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops fought in the European Theater of Operations as organic units of infantry divisions.

5. Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Units in European Theater of Operations.

a. Types of Missions.

(1) For the purpose of this study, the missions performed by mechanized cavalry units in the European Theater of Operations have been classified as:

(a) Offensive combat, including attack as well as pursuit and exploitation.

(b) Defensive combat, including defense, delaying action and holding of key terrain until arrival of main forces.

(c) Reconnaissance.

(d) Security (for other arms), including blocking, moving and stationary screening, protecting flanks, maintaining contact between larger units and filling gaps.

(e) Special operations, including acting as mobile reserve, providing for security and control of rear areas, and operating an army information service.

(2) This classification was based upon that given in paragraph 4, Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, with modifications found necessary in making the study.

(3) It is pointed out that the accomplishment of reconnaissance missions normally involved offensive combat and that the accomplishment of security missions frequently involved offensive combat.

b. Mechanized Cavalry Groups.

(1) For a summary of the employment of mechanized cavalry groups in the European Theater of Operations, based upon a study of the performance of 12 of such units in combat, see Appendix 3.

(2) Types of missions were performed by these units in the following order of the frequency of their occurrence (percentages are approximate): defensive combat (33%), special operations (29%), security (25%) offensive combat (10%), and reconnaissance (3%).

(3) The most striking points revealed by this summary are:

(a) The performance of pure reconnaissance missions by mechanized cavalry groups was rare.

(b) The performance of defensive missions by mechanized cavalry groups was common.

(c) The ratio of days of primarily dismounted employment to days of primarily mounted employment was about 1.8 to 1.

(d) For performance of offensive, defensive and security missions, it was normal for the mechanized cavalry group to be reinforced by a battalion of field artillery, a battalion of tank destroyers and a company of combat engineers.

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons and Armored Reconnaissance Battalions, Armored Divisions.

(1) For a summary of the employment of mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons assigned to armored divisions (light), and armored reconnaissance battalions assigned to armored divisions (heavy), in the European

Theater of Operations, based upon a study of the performance of eight of such units in combat, see Appendix 4.

(2) Types of missions were performed by these units in the following order of the frequency of their occurrence: special operations (48%), security (24%), reconnaissance (13%), defensive combat (11%), and offensive combat (4%).

(3) The most significant points revealed by this summary are:

(a) These units performed considerably more reconnaissance missions than mechanized cavalry groups or mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops in infantry divisions.

(b) Elements of these units were frequently detached, for service with combat commands and task forces.

(c) These units, often less a considerable number of detachments, were in reserve more often than were mechanized cavalry groups and mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops of infantry divisions.

d. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Infantry Divisions.

(1) For a summary of the employment of mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops in infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations, based upon a study of the performance of nine of such units in combat, see Appendix 5.

(2) Types of missions were performed by these units in the following order of the frequency of their occurrence: security (50%), special operations (39%), reconnaissance (6%), defensive combat (4%), and offensive combat (1%).

(3) The main points revealed by this summary are:

(a) The performance of security missions consumed one-half of the time spent by these units in combat.

(b) These units were not normally reinforced, except for the performance of offensive missions.

(4) Although not indicated in the summary, the study showed that these units were normally employed intact.

SECTION 2

CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

6. References.

a. For examples of the employment of mechanized cavalry units in combat, see Appendix 6.

b. For report of Headquarters, First Army, on mechanized cavalry operations, see Appendix 7.

7. Capabilities of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. Paragraph 5, above, reveals and a study of Appendix 6 sustains, the finding that the capabilities demonstrated by mechanized cavalry in the course of its combat performance in the European Theater of Operations were not limited to reconnaissance, nor did such develop to be the primary mission of the arm.

b. (1) Instead, it is found that mechanized cavalry units executed, generally with creditable success, most of the traditional combat missions of the cavalry--namely, to quote paragraph 34 of Field Manual 100-5:

> "Offensive combat; exploitation and pursuit; seizing and holding important terrain until . . . arrival of . . . main forces; ground reconnaissance; . . . screening . . .; security for . . . other forces . . .; delaying action; covering . . . retrograde movements of other forces; combat liaison between large units; acting as . . . mobile reserve for other forces; harassing action; and surprise action against designated objectives deep in hostile rear areas."

(2) In addition, mechanized cavalry units defended extensively, both on river lines and elsewhere; and their offensive operations included attacks against fortified localities and river lines, night combat and fighting in towns, woods, mountains and snow.

c. (1) A study of the combat record further shows that reconnaissance was frequently performed by mechanized cavalry units but usually in conjunction with the execution of other missions rather than as a mission of its own. For such reconnaissance, the technique which had been prescribed proved effective under fluid conditions; but more often the situation was such that information had to be fought for and could not be obtained by stealth and observation. Furthermore, the situation where reconnaissance elements, operating in the prescribed manner, could precede combat elements by an effective distance, seldom presented itself, and more often it was only by fighting that any type of unit could advance. Finally, it is evident that the operations of supporting aviation greatly reduced the use for ground reconnaissance except at relatively close range. Hence, the combat record shows that commanders who had mechanized cavalry elements at their disposal rarely utilized them for reconnaissance and instead employed them on combat missions, held them in reserve or used them for rear area security or control.

(2) Reconnaissance operations performed by mechanized cavalry, especially during the campaign of the Rhineland, included dismounted patrolling, and the combat record shows that in this activity considerable skill was developed. However, it is revealed that the ability of mechanized cavalry to do this work was greatly handicapped by the inadequate number of men in the cavalry reconnaissance squadron and troop available for dismounted employment.

8. Characteristics of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. References.

(1) For miscellaneous opinions and information pertaining to characteristics of mechanized cavalry, see Appendix 8.

(2) Pertinent information is also contained in Appendices 6, 7, 10, 11, 15 and 16.

b. Characteristics.

The following principal characteristics were revealed by mechanized cavalry in the course of its operations in the European Theater:

(1) Mobility.

The mounted mobility of mechanized cavalry was superior on roads. This mobility occasionally suffered by reason of the inadequate speed and range and the excess weight of attached combat vehicles, such as medium tanks and M10 and M36 tank destroyers. Off of roads, the mobility of mechanized cavalry was reduced due to the limited cross country ability of its primary vehicle, the armored car.

(2) Fire Power.

(a) The overall fire power of mechanized cavalry was superior to that of comparable infantry units. However, mechanized cavalry was strikingly inferior to infantry in rifle and automatic rifle strength. Coupled with the inadequacy of personnel in mechanized cavalry units available for dismounted maneuver and for close protection of combat vehicles, this weakness in rifles and automatic rifles seriously reduced the ability of mechanized cavalry to engage in dismounted combat.

(b) The fire power of mechanized cavalry also suffered severely due to the lack of an effective primary weapon in the armored car.

(c) The 60mm mortar was early deemed inadequate for mechanized cavalry, as result of combat experience, and the shortage of men in the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance platoon made it difficult to man the large number of these weapons (three per cavalry reconnaissance platoon) provided. Furthermore, the fact that, in the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance platoon, a vehicle to transport the mortar was normally available, made it less necessary to have a mortar of light weight. Accordingly, a need for a medium-weight mortar, in smaller quantity, was felt; and in the First and Third Armies, the 81mm mortar was provided prior to the end of combat and proved very suitable for mechanized cavalry.

(d) The 37mm gun in the light tank proved inadequate in combat, except in light reconnaissance and

screening action; and it was replaced, prior to the end of fighting, by the 75mm gun (in the M-24 light tank), which proved much more suitable.

(c) The assault gun provided for mechanized cavalry units proved of great value, but the bursting radius of the 75mm projectile was deemed inadequate, as result of combat experience. A caliber of 105mm was felt to be more suitable, and the greater effectiveness of the 105mm howitzer was proven on the many occasions when light field artillery units supported mechanized cavalry.

(3) Adaptability and Flexibility.

(a) A high degree of flexibility and adaptability was demonstrated by mechanized cavalry and enabled it to accomplish a great variety of missions with facility and smoothness.

(b) Mechanized cavalry group and reconnaissance squadron (and armored reconnaissance battalion) headquarters lent themselves readily to the organization and command of task forces of varied composition and strength. Combat engineer and tank destroyer units provided the most common reinforcements, and field artillery, especially of the armored type, was normally in support and less frequently attached. Infantry, in view of mechanized cavalry's weakness in men on the ground, was often needed but not often available.

(4) Self-Sufficiency.

(a) Mechanized cavalry demonstrated an ability and willingness to operate in enemy territory.

(b) This self-sufficiency suffered from shortage of organic cargo vehicles for transportation of ammunition, motor fuel, rations and equipment, and from lack of adequate attached medical personnel and equipment--conditions which were aggravated as attachments increased the normal strengths of units.

(5) Fighting Ability.

(a) The fighting ability of mechanized cavalry was demonstrated by its successful performance of many combat missions.

(b) In view of the nature of its fire-power and its shortage of men available for dismounted combat, this ability was more evident in defensive than in offensive action, except when the latter was mounted. Furthermore, the fact that mechanized cavalry units had been imbued, in training, with the mission of reconnaissance and the doctrine of accomplishing that mission with a minimum of fighting, caused some mechanized cavalry units to commence their operations with a mental obstacle to offensive combat.

(c) In many cases and especially in defensive combat, which found mechanized cavalry units committed for long periods without relief, mechanized cavalry suffered from a lack of reserves and consequent inability to provide depth to its dispositions, to reinforce an action or to relieve troops long committed. The shortage of reserves was believed chargeable, in the case of the mechanized cavalry group, to the lack of a third squadron, and in cases which at various times affected groups, squadrons and troops, to the detachment of subordinate units to perform duties which were not related to the accomplishment of the mechanized cavalry mission (see Appendix 3 e).

(d) In some cases, mechanized cavalry was inadequately reinforced for the performance of particular missions.

(e) With respect to mechanized cavalry groups, it is generally believed, as result of combat experience, that the reorganization, prior to the invasion of Normandy, of mechanized cavalry regiments into mechanized cavalry groups and separate mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, had an adverse affect on the morale and administrative efficiency of these units in the field. This handicap was somewhat obviated by the fact that mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons normally operated under their corresponding groups. Furthermore, the reorganization facilitated the ability of mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons to operate on detached missions (see Appendix 3 e).

SECTION 3

GENERAL MISSION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE, AND FUTURE ROLE OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

9. References.

a. For examples of opinions of officers who employed or commanded mechanized cavalry units in combat, concerning the general mission, tactical doctrine and technique, and future role of mechanized cavalry, see:

(1) Summary: Appendix 9.

(2) Senior Officers: Appendix 10.

(3) Mechanized Cavalry Unit Commanders: Appendix 11.

b. For examples of opinions concerning coordination and cooperation between mechanized cavalry units and other arms, see Appendix 12.

10. General Mission of Mechanized Cavalry.

The great majority of qualified and combat experienced officers whose opinions have been obtained feel:

a. That the mission which was assigned to mechanized cavalry--reconnaissance, with a minimum of fighting--was unsound.

b. That mechanized cavalry should perform the traditional cavalry role of a highly mobile, heavily armed and lightly equipped combat force.

11. Tactical Doctrine and Technique.

a. It is also felt by the great majority of these officers that the tactical doctrine and technique of mechanized cavalry should be generally that prescribed in Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, except where its provisions apply particularly to horse cavalry. However, the opinion is expressed by many of these officers that this field manual must be thoroughly examined and revised as necessary in order that it may conform to modern developments.

b. It is furthermore felt by many of these officers that coordination and cooperation between mechanized cavalry operating under corps and that which is organic to armored and infantry divisions, between mechanized cavalry and other ground arms, and between mechanized cavalry and the air forces, should be improved. The principal measures recommended to achieve this result are: more personal contact between commanders in the field; better selection and training of liaison officers; development of communications; indoctrination of all officers in service schools; and combined maneuvers.

12. Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. It is finally believed by many of these officers that the capability of mechanized cavalry to perform the role of a light, fast and hard hitting combat force should be exploited.

b. This belief pertains especially to mechanized cavalry units normally controlled by corps, which are able to operate without the restrictions usually imposed upon mechanized cavalry units organic to divisions. With the facility with which these units can be utilized as nuclei for task forces, with the current trend towards increasing the size and weight of both armored and infantry divisions, and in the expectation that mobile and relatively thinly-spread units will best be able to withstand the conditions of the future battlefield, these officers feel that there exists for mechanized cavalry a role in the field of light armor which is of unique importance to the accomplishment of the mission of the ground forces.

c. (1) However, all of the officers whose opinions have been obtained are agreed that, in order to enable mechanized cavalry to perform a combat role with full facility and effectiveness, changes in its organization and equipment must be made.

(2) The general nature of these changes has already been suggested. Their more detailed examination is the purpose of Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

SECTION 1

GENERAL

13. References.

a. For charts of organization of proposed mechanized cavalry units, with principal items of equipment, see Appendix 13.

b. For summaries of personnel and principal items of equipment pertaining to these charts, see Appendix 14.

c. For examples of opinions of officers who employed or commanded mechanized cavalry units in combat, concerning the organization and equipment of such units, see:

(1) Senior Officers: Appendix 15

(2) Mechanized Cavalry Unit Commanders: Appendix 16

d. For summaries of mechanized cavalry organizations proposed by Headquarters First, Third and Seventh Armies, see Appendix 17.

14. Basic Considerations.

The following basic considerations affecting mechanized cavalry organization and equipment reflect the consensus of qualified officers, are supported by combat experience and have guided the General Board in the preparation of this chapter:

a. Mechanized cavalry must be maneuverable; and the ratio of men to vehicles in mechanized cavalry units must be as large as practicable.

b. Mechanized cavalry must have speed and range. To that end, its equipment must be light and, until greater technical progress has been made with regard to tracked vehicles, an effective proportion of its vehicles wheeled or semi-tracked.

c. The mechanized cavalryman must be essentially a multi-purpose and multi-weapon soldier. To that end, the organization within mechanized cavalry units of special-purpose elements which are not essential should be avoided; and there should be available to the soldier, in or on his vehicle, not one but several weapons, which he employs as the situation demands.

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

15. Reference.

For summary of opinions of officers who employed or commanded mechanized cavalry units in combat, concerning the organization of such units, see Appendix 18.

16. Trends Supported and Advocated.

The following principal trends in mechanized cavalry organization are revealed by the consensus, supported by the combat analysis and advocated by the General Board:

a. For employment by the corps, the mechanized cavalry regiment should replace the mechanized cavalry group.

b. The mechanized cavalry regiment should comprise three mechanized cavalry squadrons.

c. The mechanized cavalry squadron should comprise three mechanized cavalry troops, a light tank troop, an assault gun troop, and also a rifle, or "dragoon", troop.

d. A squad of mounted riflemen should also be introduced into the mechanized cavalry platoon.

e. Effective ground liaison sections should be provided in both the mechanized cavalry regiment and the mechanized cavalry squadron headquarters.

f. An air liaison section (or sections), comprising sufficient personnel and liaison aircraft to meet the needs of both, mechanized cavalry regimental and mechanized cavalry squadron headquarters, should be introduced .

g. Security detachments should be provided for both mechanized cavalry regimental and squadron headquarters.

h. For employment in the infantry division, a mechanized cavalry squadron, of the same combat strength as the mechanized cavalry squadron of the mechanized cavalry regiment, should replace the present mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop.

i. There should be a band in the mechanized cavalry regiments.

17. Trend not Supported or Advocated.

The following additional trend in mechanized cavalry organization is revealed by the consensus but is not supported by the combat analysis, and is not advocated by the General Board for the reasons stated:

a. Mechanized cavalry squadrons of mechanized cavalry regiments should be administratively self-sufficient.

b. This proposal is not favored because:

(1) It is contrary to the concept of a regiment.

(2) It is uneconomical with respect to both personnel and equipment.

(3) It is unnecessary from the point of view of enabling squadrons to operate independently when required, since the same results can be attained by organizing appropriate platoons of the regimental service troop into squadron sections.

18. Mortar Platoon and Pioneer Element.

Opinion is about equally divided on the following proposals,

but they are not supported by the combat analysis and not favored by the General Board for the reasons stated:

a. (1) The mortar crews in the mechanized cavalry troop should be organized in a mortar platoon.

(2) This proposal is not favored because:

(a) The relatively rare use of the mortar by mechanized cavalry, except in defensive combat, did not justify the organization of such a unit for this exclusive purpose.

(b) In defensive situations, when the use of the mortars of the mechanized cavalry troop in battery was often required, time was normally available to so organize them.

(c) A mortar platoon is provided in the proposed dragoon troop.

b. (1) A "pioneer" or similar platoon should be added to the mechanized cavalry squadron.

(2) This proposal is not favored because:

(a) In combat, engineers were practically always available to perform such pioneer and demolition work as was beyond the capabilities of the mechanized cavalrymen themselves.

(b) It will be practicable to train the riflemen, whom it is proposed to add to the mechanized cavalry organization, to do essential pioneer and demolition work.

19. Tank Destroyer Element.

a. The consensus of qualified officers does not favor the inclusion of a tank destroyer element in the mechanized cavalry organization because:

((1) In combat, necessary tank destroyer units were practically always available for attachment when required.

(2) Improvement of standard organic weapons and ammunition are expected to meet the need.

b. The General Board favors the inclusion of a tank destroyer element in the mechanized cavalry squadron of the mechanized cavalry regi- regiment because:

(1) The combat analysis shows that tank destroyers were habitually needed by mechanized cavalry.

(2) There is no factual proof that improvement of standard organic weapons and ammunition will meet the need, especially in the immediate future.

c. The General Board does not favor the inclusion of a tank destroyer element in the mechanized cavalry squadron organic to the armored and infantry divisions because the medium (or heavy) tank elements of those divisions can be expected to support that unit.

20. Armored Field Artillery and Combat Engineers.

The necessity for making provision in the troop basis of the future Army of the United States for sufficient separate armored field artillery and engineer battalions, for support of mechanized cavalry regiments as required, has been proposed by mechanized cavalry unit commanders (see paragraphs 5d and 5e, Appendix 2) and is supported by the combat analysis; and necessary action in this respect is advocated by the General Board.

21. Mechanized Cavalry Brigade.

a. The organization of a mechanized cavalry brigade (comprising a brigade headquarters and headquarters troop, two mechanized cavalry regiments and suitable supporting units), for assignment to the army and employment on missions where a strong but light and fast combat force is needed, has been proposed by combat experienced mechanized cavalry unit commanders (see paragraph 5e, Appendix 2).

b. This proposal is supported by the combat analysis (see paragraph 12b, above); and a historical example of the employment of a provisional mechanized cavalry brigade in combat, in the European Theater of Operations, is presented in Appendix 19.

c. Further study of this proposal is suggested; and a chart of a suitable organization for such a unit is presented in Appendix 20.

22. Designations of Mechanized Cavalry Units.

The following proposals concerning designations of mechanized cavalry units have been made by mechanized cavalry unit commanders and are considered reasonable and are advocated by the General Board.

a. That mechanized cavalry be called "cavalry" (see paragraph 2c (2), Appendix 2), in view of the predominant position which mechanized cavalry has achieved in relation to horse cavalry.

b. That the word "reconnaissance" be eliminated from the designations of the mechanized cavalry squadron and the mechanized cavalry troop, in view of the proposed combat role of mechanized cavalry (see Appendix 9c).

c. That the proposed rifle troop be designated the "dragoon" troop (see paragraph 5a (3), Appendix 2), in description of its nature and out of respect for tradition.

d. That the light tank company in the mechanized cavalry squadron be called a light tank "troop", for consistency and out of respect for tradition.

e. That the assault gun troop be called the "howitzer" troop, since its primary weapon is not a proper assault gun (see paragraph 5a (15) of reference listed in paragraph 7c of Bibliography).

SECTION 3

EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

23. Reference.

For summary of opinions of officers who employed or commanded mechanized cavalry units in combat, concerning the equipment of such units, see Appendix 21.

24. Trends Supported and Advocated.

The following principal trends in mechanized cavalry equipment are revealed by the consensus of qualified officers, supported by the combat analysis and advocated by the General Board:

a. Vehicles.

(1) An improved armored car, rather than the light tank, should be the combat vehicle of the mechanized cavalry troop.

(2) The motor carriage, 75mm howitzer, M8, should be replaced, in the assault gun troop, by a similar, open turreted vehicle (with an overhead protective shield), mounting the 105mm howitzer and built upon a light-weight full-track chassis. Pending the development of such a vehicle, the motor carriage, 105mm howitzer, M37, should be provided.

(3) The truck, 1/4 ton, furnished to mechanized cavalry units, should be provided with a light armored windshield with short wings, for protection of personnel against frontal or near-frontal small-arms fire.

b. Weapons.

The carbine should be replaced in mechanized cavalry units, generally by pistols for officers, senior non-commissioned officers, crews of turreted vehicles and radio operators, and by rifles, M1, for other personnel.

c. Communications.

Wire communications should be provided in mechanized cavalry units, down to include the mechanized cavalry and light tank troops and the assault gun platoons.

d. Miscellaneous.

Liaison aircraft, in an approximate ratio of three per mechanized cavalry regiment and two per mechanized cavalry squadron, should be provided.

25. Additional Trends Supported and Advocated.

The following additional trends in mechanized cavalry equipment have been proposed by qualified opinion (see paragraph 6 of reference listed in paragraph 7c of Bibliography), are generally supported by the combat analysis, and are advocated by the General Board:

a. Vehicles.

(1) A proportion of trucks, 1 1/2 ton, should supplement the truck, 2 1/2 ton, cargo, in mechanized cavalry squadrons.

(2) Ambulances for mechanized cavalry units should comprise the truck, 1/4 ton, with litter racks, and the truck, 3/4 ton, ambulance.

b. Weapons.

(1) An effective anti-tank gun should be mounted in the light tank.

(2) The Thompson sub-machine gun should replace the sub-machine gun, M3A1.

(3) The rifle, caliber .30, BAR, should be provided, in the rifle (or dragoon) squad.

(4) The proportion of machine guns, caliber .50, should be increased (especially in the mechanized cavalry platoon).

(5) Study should be made to determine the suitability of recoilless weapons for mechanized cavalry use.

c. Communications.

(1) The SCR 510 should be replaced, by the SCR 528 for vehicular use and by the SCR 300 for ground use, or by improved radio sets of those types.

(2) The SCR 538 should be replaced by the SCR 528, or by an improved radio set of this type.

(3) Additional long range radio sets (SCR 399 and 499) should be provided.

(4) VHF radio sets should be provided, for mechanized cavalry regimental and squadron headquarters.

d. Miscellaneous.

Combat clothing should be provided for all mechanized cavalry personnel.

26. Trends not Supported or Fully Advocated.

The following additional trends on mechanized cavalry equipment are revealed by the consensus of qualified officers but are not supported by the combat analysis and are not fully advocated by the General Board for the reasons stated:

a. (1) The personnel carrier should be full-tracked.

(2) This proposal is advocated with the qualification that such carrier not be adopted until sufficiently developed to provide necessary range, mechanical reliability, and silence of operation for mechanized cavalry use.

b. (1) Command vehicles for mechanized cavalry should be full-tracked.

(2) This proposal is advocated with the same qualification expressed above, and with the added proviso that such vehicle must be suited for radio transmission and reception.

27. Tank Destroyer.

a. It has been proposed that the 76mm gun motor carriage, M18, be made available for the current use of mechanized cavalry (see paragraph 6b (3), Appendix 2).

b. This proposal is supported by the combat analysis and advocated by the General Board.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 1

CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded:

28. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. (1) That the mission which was assigned to mechanized cavalry, reconnaissance with minimum of fighting, was unsound.

(2) That the mission of mechanized cavalry should be combat.

b. That the tactical doctrine of mechanized cavalry should be generally that prescribed in Chapter 1 of Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry.

c. That the technique of mechanized cavalry should be based generally on the provisions of Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, except where its provisions apply particularly to horse cavalry.

d. That the future rôle of mechanized cavalry should be the traditional cavalry role of a highly mobile, heavily armed and lightly equipped combat force, and that the capability of mechanized cavalry, particularly that normally operating under the corps, to perform that role, should be exploited.

29. Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. That in order to enable mechanized cavalry to perform a combat role with full facility and effectiveness, changes in its organization and equipment should be made.

b. That changes in mechanized cavalry organization:

(1) Should not make mechanized cavalry units unwieldy by adding excessive personnel and vehicles or unnecessary organizations.

(2) Should provide a marked increase in personnel available for dismounted combat.

c. That changes in mechanized cavalry equipment:

(1) Should not decrease the speed or range of mechanized cavalry by adding vehicles of excessive weight or insufficient sustained mobility.

(2) Should increase the fire power of mechanized cavalry in dismounted combat.

d. That continued effort should be made to improve the range, reliability and silence of operation of full tracked equipment, but that pending such development, an effective proportion of the combat strength of mechanized cavalry units should be mounted in wheeled and semi-tracked vehicles.

e. That continued effort should be made to improve the armored car.

f. That an assault gun, embodying the 105mm howitzer mounted in an open turret on a light-weight full-track chassis, should be developed.

g. That effort should be made to mount an effective anti-tank gun in the light tank, or a vehicle of similar capabilities.

h. That until such a gun and vehicle have been obtained, there is need for a light-weight full-track tank destroyer in the mechanized cavalry squadron of the mechanized cavalry regiment.

i. That liaison aircraft should be provided in mechanized cavalry units.

j. That, for employment by the corps, the mechanized cavalry regiment, with three organic mechanized cavalry squadrons, should replace the present mechanized cavalry group, with attached mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons.

k. That for employment in the armored division, a self-sufficient mechanized cavalry squadron should replace the present mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron.

l. That for employment in the infantry division, a self-sufficient mechanized cavalry squadron should replace the present mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop.

m. That there may be a useful field for the employment of a mechanized cavalry brigade, of two mechanized cavalry regiments and supporting units, assigned to the army.

n. That changes should be made in the designations of mechanized cavalry and certain mechanized cavalry units.

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

30. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine, Technique and Future Role.

a. That so much of Chapter 2 of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, as pertains to the mission and tactical doctrine of mechanized cavalry be revised.

b. That Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, be carefully examined and revised as necessary to the end that it may constitute the basic text for the employment of mechanized cavalry.

c. That the remaining field manuals in the 2-series, pertaining to the tactics and technique of mechanized cavalry units, be revised to conform with the doctrine prescribed in Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, as revised, and with the organization recommended in this report.

31. Organization and Equipment.

a. That the mechanized cavalry units presented in Appendix 13 be adopted.

b. That pertinent tables of organization and equipment be revised.

c. That effort be continued to improve the armored car and the range, reliability and silence of operation of full tracked vehicles.

d. That a 105mm assault gun, mounted on a light-weight full-track chassis, be developed.

e. That effort be made to mount an effective anti-tank gun in a suitable vehicle with capabilities approaching those of the light tank.

f. That the 76mm gun motor carriage, M18, or a similar light-weight tank destroyer, be made available for current use in the mechanized cavalry squadron of the mechanized cavalry regiment.

g. That a provisional mechanized cavalry brigade be formed and tested.

h. That the designation of mechanized cavalry be changed to "cavalry".

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11th: December, 1944 - May, 1945
14th: December, 1944 - May, 1945
15th: July, 1944 - May, 1945
16th: March - May, 1945
101st: February - May, 1945
102d: June, 1944 - April, 1945
113th: July, 1944 - May, 1945
115th: March, April, 1945

b. Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized

117th: August, 1944 - May, 1945

c. Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, Mechanized, Armored Divisions

See page 1, Appendix 4.

d. Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Division

82d (2d Armd Div): June, 1944 - May, 1945

e. Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Mechanized, Infantry Divisions

See page 1, Appendix 5.

2. Letters (Individual)

(Note - Except where otherwise indicated, these letters are contained in files of Armored Section, The General Board)

a. To Chief of Armored Section, the General Board (concerning tactics, employment, technique, organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry units), from:

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Lt Gen W.H. Simpson, USA, Hq Second Army, 14 November 1945
Maj Gen J.A. Van Fleet, USA, Hq III Corps, 16 November 1945
Maj Gen John Millikin, USA, Hq F.A.R.T.C., 13 November 1945
Maj Gen C.R. Huebner, USA, Hq A.G.F., 23 October 1945
Lt Gen L.K. Truscott, Jr, USA, Hq Third Army, 2 November 1945
Maj Gen S.L. Irwin, USA, F.A.R.T.C., 24 October 1945
Lt Gen A.C. Gillem, Jr, USA, Office of the C of S., WD, 25 October 1945
Lt Gen M.B. Ridgeway, USA, Hq U.S.F.M.T., 19 November 1945
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b. Miscellaneous

(1) Col Vennard Wilson, Cav, Hq 106th Cavalry Group, Mecz, 2 November 1944, to CG, XV Corps, subject: "Change in Equipment of 106th Cavalry Group, Mecz" (see AGF Report No 685, WD Observers Board).

(2) Lt Gen W. H. Haislip, USA, Hq Seventh Army, 15 June 1945, to Supreme Commander, AEF, subject: "Reorganization of Mechanized Cavalry Units."

(3) Maj Gen I. D. White, USA, Hq The Cavalry School, 3 November 1945, to Col W. S. Biddle, Cav, Armored Section, the General Board, concerning mission, tactical doctrine, organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.

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(5) Col J. H. Polk, Cav, Hq 3d Cavalry Group, Mechanized, 23 October 1945, to Col W. S. Biddle, Cav, Armored Section, the General Board, concerning mission, tactical doctrine, organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.

(6) Col G. W. Busbey, Cav, Hq 16th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, 4 December 1945, to Col W. S. Biddle, Cav, Armored Section, the General Board, concerning organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.

3. Letters (Others)

(Note - These letters are contained in files of Armored Section, The General Board).

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(2) Hq Army Ground Forces, 12 May 1945, to CG, USFET, subject: "Half-Tracks in Cavalry, Mechanized, Tables of Organization".

4. Recommendations for Changes in Organization and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry.

(Note - This material is contained in files of Armored Section, The General Board).

a. Army Recommendations (see Appendix 17)

(1) Hq First Army, 1 March 1945, Tables of Organization for Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Hq Third Army, 1 June 1945, Proceedings of Board of Officers, subject: "Reorganization of Mechanized Cavalry Units - Changes in existing T/O and T/E of Mechanized Cavalry".

(3) Hq Seventh Army: Conference Report, 24 August 1945, subject: "Changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment, Cavalry Group and Squadron"; Tables of Organization for Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized), 1 September 1945.

b. Other Recommendations

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d. No 406, 25 November 1944, subject: "Comments of Col Henry Reed, Cav, CO, 2d Cavalry Group".

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k. No 686, 28 February 1945, subject: "Resume of Operations of 106th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, 5 August 1944 - 28 January 1945".

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o. No 1001, 1 June 1945, subject: "Miscellaneous".

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6. War Department Publications

a. Field Manuals

100-5 - Operations

2-15 - Employment of Cavalry

2-20 - Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized

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b. Tables of Organization and Equipment

2-22 - Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Group, Mechanized, 13 Oct 1943, Changes 1 and 2

2-25 - Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, 15 September 1943, Changes 1 and 2

2-26 - Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, 15 September 1943, Changes 1 and 2

2-27 - Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, 15 July 1943, Changes 1 and 2

2-28 - Cavalry Assault Gun Troop, Mechanized, 15 September 1943, Changes 1 and 2

17-17- Light Tank Company, 15 September 1943

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c. Training Circular

107 - Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Units, 21 September 1943.

7. Miscellaneous

(Note - This material is contained in files of Armored Section, The General Board).

a. Hq First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945, Annex No 5 (see Appendix 7).

b. Questionnaires answered by officers listed in paragraphs b, c and d, Appendix 1.

c. Minutes of Conference on Mechanized Cavalry, conducted by Armored Section, The General Board, on 27 November 1945 (see Appendix 2 for extracts).

APPENDIX 1

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

LIST OF COMBAT-EXPERIENCED SENIOR COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS, AND MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNIT COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS, WHOSE OPINIONS WERE OBTAINED BY QUESTIONNAIRES OR LETTERS

NOTE: (1) Letters or questionnaires were addressed to all of the following officers who served in combat in the European Theater of Operations:

Commanding Generals of Armies

Commanding Generals of Corps

Commanding Officers of Mechanized Cavalry Groups

Commanding Officers of Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons

Commanding Officers of Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons and Armored Reconnaissance Battalions Assigned to Armored Divisions.

Commanding Officers of Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops Assigned to Infantry Divisions

(2) In addition, letters or questionnaires were addressed to some of the following:

Commanding Generals of Armored Divisions

Chiefs of Armored Sections of Armies

(3) The list which appears below contains the names of those officers from whom replies had been received up to the time when this report was completed.

(4) The general opinions of the majority of the commanders of armored divisions and infantry divisions concerning the cavalry elements of their types of divisions were obtained indirectly, through the committees which prepared the reports on the armored and infantry divisions.

a. Army, Corps and Division Commanders.

Name and Rank	Commanding (During Combat)
(1) Army Commanders	
Lt Gen Alexander M. Patch, USA	Seventh Army
Lt Gen William H. Simpson, USA	Ninth Army
(2) Corps Commanders	
Maj Gen James A. Van Fleet, USA	III Corps
Maj Gen John Millikin, USA	III Corps
Maj Gen Clarence R. Huebner, USA	V Corps
Lt Gen Lucian K. Truscott, USA	VI Corps
Maj Gen Stafford LeR. Irwin, USA	XII Corps
Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem, Jr, USA	XIII Corps

Lt Gen Wade H. Haislip, USA	XV Corps
Lt Gen Mathew B. Ridgway, USA	XVIII Corps (Abn)
Maj Gen Walton Walker, USA	XX Corps
Maj Gen Ernest N. Harmon, USA	XXII Corps

(3) Division Commanders

Maj Gen Walter M. Robertson, USA	2d Infantry Division
Maj Gen Isaac D. White, USA	2d Armored Division
Maj Gen John W. Leonard, USA	9th Armored Division
Maj Gen Orlando Ward, USA	20th Armored Division

b. Mechanized Cavalry Group Commanders

Col Charles H. Reed, Cav	2d Cavalry Group
Col F. W. Drury, Cav	3d Cavalry Group
Col James H. Polk, Cav	3d Cavalry Group
Brig Gen Joseph M. Tully, USA	4th Cavalry Group
Col John C. Macdonald, Cav	4th Cavalry Group
Col Edward M. Fickett, Cav	6th Cavalry Group
Col Lawrence G. Smith, Cav	14th Cavalry Group
Lt Col Robert J. Quinn, Jr, Cav	15th Cavalry Group
Col George W. Bushey, Cav	16th Cavalry Group
Col Cyrus A. Dolph III, Cav	102d Cavalry Group
Col Vennard Wilson, Cav	106th Cavalry Group
Col William S. Biddle, Cav	113th Cavalry Group
Col Garnett H. Wilson, Cav	115th Cavalry Group

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders

(1) Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders.

Lt Col Stephen W. Benkosky, Cav	2d Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col John F. Rhoades, Cav	4th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Edward C. Dunn, Cav	4th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Samuel McC. Goodwin, Cav	6th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Lawrence E. Schlanzer, Cav	19th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Frederick H. Gaston, Cav	24th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Walter E. Day, Cav	28th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Thomas B. Hargis, Cav	42d Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Allen D. Hulse, Cav	113th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Charles J. Hodge, Cav	117th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Harold J. Samsel, Cav	117th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Anthony F. Kleitz, Jr, Cav	125th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Jeff Hollis, Cav	125th Cav Rcn Sq

(2) Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Commanders (in Armored Divisions).

Lt Col Robert B. Walton, Cav	33d Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col Herbert M. Foy, Jr, Cav	41st Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col George C. Benjamin, Cav	85th Cav Rcn Sq
Col Albert E. Harris, Cav	86th Cav Rcn Sq
Lt Col S. Whipple, Jr, Cav	92d Cav Rcn Sq

d. Others

(1) Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Commanders (in Infantry Divisions)

Captain James Hume, Jr, Cav	30th Cav Rcn Tr
Captain Walter B. Moseley, Cav	88th Cav Rcn Tr

Captain Harry McNamara, Jr, Cav	102d Cav Ron Tr
Captain Bernard C. Johnson, Cav	? Cav Ron Tr
Captain Luther S. Crawford, Cav	? Cav Ron Tr

(2) Chiefs of Armored Sections of Armies.

Col Claude A. Black, Inf	Armored Section, Ninth Army
Col John T. Cole, Cav	Armored Section, Seventh Army

(3) Miscellaneous

Brig Gen Halley G. Maddox, USA	G-3, Third Army
Col David Wagstaff, Jr, Cav	Hq, 12th Army Group
Lt Col Glen F. Rogers, Cav	Armored Section, Seventh Army
Lt Col Jasper J. Wilson, Cav	G-3 Section, XIX Corps
Major Morton McD. Jones, Jr, Cav	Troop CO, Sq S-3, Sq Ex-O, 17th Cavalry Ron Sq
Major John M. Davis, Cav	G-3 Section, Third Army
Major Thomas S. Stewart III, Cav	S-3, 6th Cav Gp
Major Thomas J. Brett, Cav	Ex-O, 11th Cav Gp
Major Walter B. McKenzie, Cav	Ex-O, 6th Cav Ron Sq
Captain Calvin Satterfield III, Cav	Troop CO, 28th Cav Ron Sq
Captain John Consolvo, Cav	Asst Opns O, 6th Cav Gp
Captain Lawrence B. Cann, Jr, Cav	Troop CO, 28th Cav Ron Sq
1st Lt Donald C. Burdon, Cav	Plat Ldr, 28th Cav Ron Sq

APPENDIX 2

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE ON MECHANIZED CAVALRY

Tuesday, 27 November 1945

(Conducted by Armored Section, Theater General Board)

- E X T R A C T S -

1. Introduction.

* * * * *

b. The purpose of the conference was to consider the draft report on mechanized cavalry.

c. The following officers attended the conference:

* * * * *

Visiting Officers

Brig Gen Joseph M. Tully - Former CO, 4th Cav Gp, Mecz
Col Edward M. Fickett, Cav - Former CO, 6th Cav Gp, Mecz
Col John C. Macdonald, Cav - Former CO, 4th Cav Gp, Mecz
Col Lawrence G. Smith, Cav - CO 14th Cav Gp, Mecz
Col Garnett H. Wilson, Cav - CO, 115th Cav Gp, Mecz
Lt Col Edward C. Dunn, Cav - Former Ex O, 4th Cav Gp, Mecz
Lt Col Anthony F. Kleitz, Jr, Cav - Former CO, 125th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz
Maj William A. Kraft, Cav - Former S-3, 15th Cav Gp, Mecz

* * * * *

2. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

* * * * *

c. (1) Major General Gay (Chief of Staff, The General Board) asked whether consideration had been given to eliminating the word "mechanized" in the designation "mechanized cavalry".

(2) It was unanimously agreed by the visiting officers:

(a) That "mechanized cavalry" should be designated as "cavalry".

(b) That horse cavalry should be designated as "cavalry (horse)".

3. Organization and Equipment - General.

a. With respect to basic principles on organization and equipment of cavalry, it was unanimously agreed by the visiting officers:

(1) That cavalry must be maneuverable and the ratio of men to vehicles as large as practicable.

(a) The first statement of this principle was not acceptable to the visiting officers. It read as follows: "Cavalry must be maneuverable. To that end, its strength in personnel and vehicles, and in the number of organizations comprising its units, must be limited, and the ratio of men to vehicles as large as practicable."

* * * * *

4. Proposed Organization - General.

a. Colonel Reed presented the proposed cavalry organization, comprising: for corps cavalry, a regiment of three squadrons, each squadron composed of a headquarters troop, two cavalry troops, a dragoon troop, a light tank troop and an assault gun troop; for infantry division cavalry, an identical squadron with administrative elements added; and for armored division cavalry, the squadron recommended for the infantry division but augmented by a third cavalry troop and a fourth assault gun platoon.

b. Colonel Reed gave the following reasons for the proposal to have but two cavalry troops in each squadron of the regiment;

(1) From the tactical viewpoint, the ratio of two cavalry troops, primarily for mounted employment, to one dragoon troop, primarily for dismounted employment, was considered sound.

(2) In combat, mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron commanders normally committed only two mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops and utilized the third mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop in a supporting or relief role.

(3) The dragoon troop would be more suited to support a mechanized cavalry troop than would a third mechanized cavalry troop.

(4) Relief for committed cavalry troops would be accomplished by the cavalry regimental commander, through rotation of cavalry squadrons.

(5) Combat experience had proven a six-troop organization for a cavalry reconnaissance squadron sound. It was felt that a seven-troop organization, except in the case of the cavalry squadron in the armored division, troops of which are frequently detached, would be unwieldy.

(6) The addition of a third cavalry troop in the cavalry squadron would increase the strength of the proposed cavalry regiment from about 3000 officers and men and 700 vehicles to about 3500 officers and men and 825 vehicles, and thus tend to make the cavalry regiment unwieldy.

* * * * *

d. Colonel Fickett supported the proposed organization with the reservation that there must definitely be three squadrons, because he considered that six cavalry troops in the regiment were essential.

e. (1) Brigadier General Tully favored adding a third cavalry troop to the cavalry squadron, because:

(a) There was no assurance that three cavalry squadrons would be provided in the cavalry regiment.

(b) Even if they were provided, there was no assurance that one or even two cavalry squadrons might not be detached from the regiment.

(c) The cavalry troop was the basic troop, and for sound organization three were essential. Furthermore, it was necessary to assume that, especially in the next war which would probably be decided quickly, higher commanders would assign missions to cavalry units which would extend them to the limit, and hence units large enough to perform those missions must be provided.

(d) A regiment of 3500 was not considered too large.

(2) Brigadier General Tully added that he would give up the assault gun troop, if necessary, to gain a third cavalry troop. . . . .

f. (1) Colonel Reed pointed out that, in view of the fact that it was expected that the new infantry division would have a cavalry squadron instead of a cavalry troop, the attachment of cavalry squadrons of cavalry regiments to infantry divisions would be less frequent than had been the case (affecting mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons of mechanized cavalry groups) during the recent campaigns.

(2) Brigadier General Tully replied that he knew three infantry division commanders who had used cavalry successfully and would like as much of it as they could get.

g. Lieutenant Colonel Dunn stated that he would give up the dragoon troop to gain a third cavalry troop.

h. Lieutenant Colonel Kleitz favored combining the light tank and assault gun troops, if necessary, in order to insure there being three cavalry troops.

* * * * *

j. (1) Colonel Macdonald favored three cavalry troops, because:

(a) A triangular organization was needed.

(b) The dragoon troop would not constitute the third troop of the triangle, since, in his opinion, it would habitually be split up among the two cavalry troops.

(c) There was no reason why a cavalry colonel could not handle a regiment of 3500.

(2) Colonel Fickett and Colonel Reed stated that organizations similar to the proposed dragoon troop had been used by them successfully in combat, as troops under squadron control rather than as elements attached to cavalry reconnaissance troops.

5. Organization.

a. With respect to details of organization, it was agreed by the visiting officers, unanimously except where otherwise indicated:

* * * * *

(3) That dragoons should be introduced into the cavalry squadron as a troop in the cavalry squadron and a squad in each cavalry platoon.

(a) Lieutenant Colonels Dunn and Kleitz desired no dragoon troop in the cavalry squadron but a dragoon section (two squads) in the cavalry platoon.

(4) That there should be three cavalry troops in the cavalry squadron.

(a) Colonel Fickett desired only two cavalry troops in the cavalry squadron provided that there would surely be three cavalry squadrons in the cavalry regiment.

* * * * *

(7) That the approximate maximum strength of the cavalry regiment should be 3500 officers and men and 850 vehicles.

(8) That the principal administrative functions in the cavalry regiment should be organized on the regimental level.

* * * * *

(12) That the proposed organization of the cavalry troop be adopted.

(a) Colonel Fickett favored three instead of two 1/4 ton trucks in the cavalry section.

* * * * *

(18) That the cavalry squadron in the infantry division should be identical to that in the armored division.

* * * * *

c. (1) Colonel Reed presented a proposed organization of a cavalry brigade, comprising brigade headquarters and headquarters troop, two cavalry regiments, one armored field artillery battalion, one armored engineer battalion, one quartermaster motor company, one medical collecting company and one ordnance maintenance company. After discussion, one armored infantry battalion was added, and the vote on this force was:

(a) For: Colonels Fickett, Macdonald, Wilson and Smith; Lieutenant Colonel Kleitz.

(b) Against: Brigadier General Tully, Colonel Harris, Lieutenant Colonel Dunn, Major Kraft.

(2) After further consideration, it was felt that a cavalry division would be a sounder organization, and the following composition was proposed: division headquarters and headquarters troop, one signal troop, two cavalry regiments, one armored infantry regiment, three armored field artillery battalions, one engineer battalion, one AAA battalion, two medical companies, one quartermaster supply battalion, and one ordnance maintenance battalion. The vote on this force was:

(a) For: Brigadier General Tully; Colonel Fickett, Wilson, and Smith; Lieutenant Colonels Dunn and Kleitz.

(b) Against: Colonels Macdonald (desired cavalry brigade) and Harris (desired nothing between cavalry regiment and armored division); Major Kraft (desired a brigade headquarters and headquarters troop only, to which cavalry regiments and supporting troops could be attached as needed.)

d. (1) Colonel Bell (Field Artillery Section, The General Board) pointed out that, since it was contemplated that . . . . the bulk of corps artillery would be medium or heavy, a requirement for artillery to support the cavalry regiment should be made of record, if such requirement were foreseen.

* * * * *

e. (1) (a) Colonel Morris (Engineer Section, The General Board) felt that, if there was expected to be a a constant need for engineers in support of the cavalry regiment, this fact should also be recorded.

* * * * *

6. Equipment.

a. With respect to details of equipment, it was agreed by the visiting officers, unanimously except where otherwise indicated:

* * * * *

(9) That the pistol should be provided for officers, sergeants, crews of turreted vehicles, and radio operators, and that its caliber should be reduced from .45 to .38.

* * * * *

(11) That the caliber .30 Browning Automatic Rifle should be provided.

(a) Colonel Fickett felt that the caliber .30 machine gun, M1919, A6, should be furnished, instead of the BAR.

* * * * *

(18) That long range radio sets should be provided in regimental headquarters troop as follows:

(a) One SCR 399, for service with liaison officer at higher headquarters.

(b) Two SCR 499, one for service at the regimental command post and the other prepared for service at the most distant squadron headquarters.

(19) That four VHF radio sets should be provided, one for regimental headquarters and one for each squadron headquarters.

(20) That liaison aircraft in regimental headquarters should comprise three L-5s and six L-4s, until a plane combining the capabilities of the two should be developed.

* * * * *

b. (1) Brigadier General Holly expressed concern over the fact that apparently no weapon was being provided in the proposed cavalry organization which was suitable for meeting heavy armor.

(2) Colonel Biddle stated that, while questionnaires had revealed a strong minority of opinion that a light-weight tank-destroyer should be included organically in the cavalry squadron, the committee had not favored this proposal because:

(a) Tank destroyers had always been available for support during the recent hostilities.

(b) The light tank destroyer, M18, was no longer being produced.

(c) It was felt that recoilless weapons and improvement of the gun in the light tank would meet the need.

(3) (a) Colonel Bell pointed out that tank destroyers, as such, would probably disappear, but that, for any immediate needs, some M18's were available.

(b) Colonel Harris (Armored Section, The General Board) suggested that, pending the development of a high-velocity gun for the M24 light tank, some M18 tank destroyers should be added to the light tank troop.

(c) Colonel Reed stated that he had tried such a combination in combat and that it had not proven very satisfactory, due to the fact that the M18, with its light armor, could not operate as a tank.

(4) Colonel Reed explained that, while the 75mm gun on the M24 light tank was not a proper anti-tank gun, it had succeeded in knocking out heavy enemy tanks on occasion. He further pointed out that the maneuverability of this tank, and the nature of cavalry tactics, enabled cavalry to operate despite the presence of enemy armor.

(5) It was unanimously agreed by the visiting officers that the present gun in the M24 light tank was inadequate and that every effort should be directed towards placing an effective anti-tank gun in the light tank.

* * * * *

APPENDIX 3

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT - MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUPS

1. This summary comprises:

   a. Types of missions performed.

   b. Nature of combat (mounted or dismounted).

   c. Units attached or in direct support.

   d. Organization for combat.

   e. Units detached.

   f. Higher headquarters under which operating.

2. The following comments are applicable to all annexes of this appendix:

   a. The source of this information is the reports after action against enemy of the units concerned.

   b. The following reports after action against enemy were not available to the General Board:

Unit	Months
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	Sep and Dec, 1944
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	July, 1944
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	May, 1945
106th Cav Gp, Mecz	July, 1944, to May, 1945
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	May, 1945

3. The 117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, which was not normally attached to a mechanized cavalry group, is included in this summary, as a separate unit.

APPENDIX 3

a. TYPES OF MISSIONS PERFORMED

(Appendix 3, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	OFFENSIVE		DEFENSIVE		RCN		SECURITY		SPEC OPNS		DAYS CONSIDERED
-----	DAYS	%	DAYS	%	DAYS	%	DAYS	%	DAYS	%	-----
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	29	9.9	112	38.1	8	2.7	118	40.1	27	9.2	294
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	22	10.5	119	56.4	8	3.8	44	20.8	18	8.5	211
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	66	21.6	65	21.2	10	3.3	96	31.4	69	22.5	306
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	53	17.4	52	17.0	Ø	Ø	36	11.8	164	53.8	305
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	1	0.7	70	47.9	Ø	Ø	34	23.3	41	28.1	146
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	14	9.4	19	12.8	1	0.6	14	9.4	101	67.8	149
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	14	4.5	15	4.9	22	7.2	152	49.3	105	34.1	308
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	7	11.9	5	8.6	Ø	Ø	3	5.1	44	74.4	59
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	16	18.4	33	37.9	9	10.4	16	18.4	13	14.9	87
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	14	4.2	116	35.5	6	1.8	71	21.2	125	37.3	335
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	35	11.2	160	51.3	16	5.1	39	12.5	62	19.9	312
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	40	69.0	2	3.4	2	3.4	14	24.2	58
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	18	6.7	120	44.9	12	4.5	82	30.1	35	13.1	267
TOTAL (No of Days)	289		929		94		707		818		
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	----		----		----		----		----		2837
PERCENTAGES	10.2%		32.8%		3.3%		24.9%		28.8%		100%

NOTE: Offensive combat includes attack, and pursuit and exploitation. Defensive combat includes defense, delaying action, and holding key terrain. Security includes screening (both moving and stationary), blocking, flank protection, maintaining contact and filling gaps. Special operations includes mobile reserve, rear area security, and Third Army Information Service. The accomplishment of reconnaissance missions normally involved offensive combat. The performance of security missions frequently involved offensive combat.

UNIT	OFFENSIVE DAYS	DEFENSIVE DAYS	RCN DAYS	SECURITY DAYS	SPEC OPNS DAYS	DAYS CONSIDERED
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	6	6
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	6	Ø	Ø	17	2	25
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	17	17
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	20	20
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	3	44	47
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	3	Ø	7	4	10	24
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
TOTAL (No of Days)	9	Ø	7	24	99	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	139
PERCENTAGES	6.5%	Ø%	5.0%	17.3%	71.2%	100%

UNIT	OFFENSIVE DAYS	DEFENSIVE DAYS	RCN DAYS	SECURITY DAYS	SPEC OPNS DAYS	DAYS CONSIDERED
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	1	Ø	8	34	9	52
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	5	Ø	5	11	1	22
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	8	6	10	21	Ø	45
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	52	52
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	10	Ø	8	132	56	206
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	5	Ø	6	23	18	52
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	16	1	9	14	12	52
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	40	Ø	Ø	3	43
117th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
TOTAL (No of Days)	45	47	46	235	151	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	524
PERCENTAGES	8.6%	9.0%	8.8%	44.8%	28.8%	100%

(3) RHINELAND CAMPAIGN

(Appendix 3, a, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	OFFENSIVE DAYS	DEFENSIVE DAYS	RCN DAYS	SECURITY DAYS	SPEC OPNS DAYS	DAYS CONSIDERED
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	12	82	Ø	48	12	154
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	12	94	1	5	10	122
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	20	50	Ø	39	45	154
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	31	41	Ø	4	80	156
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	1	61	Ø	13	23	98
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	5	16	1	12	26	60
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	4	14	14	6	Ø	38
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	4	2	Ø	1	24	31
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	2	33	1	Ø	10	46
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	9	107	Ø	27	13	156
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	6	151	Ø	2	29	188
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	2	120	7	32	27	188
TOTAL (No of Days)	108	771	24	189	299	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	1391
PERCENTAGES	7.8%	55.4%	1.7%	13.6%	21.5%	100%

UNIT	OFFENSIVE DAYS	DEFENSIVE DAYS	RCN DAYS	SECURITY DAYS	SPEC OPNS DAYS	DAYS CONSIDERED
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	7	27	Ø	Ø	Ø	34
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	25	Ø	Ø	Ø	25
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	7	5	Ø	17	5	34
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	11	8	Ø	7	6	32
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	3	Ø	Ø	38	41
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	12	Ø	Ø	29	41
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
TOTAL (No of Days)	25	80	Ø	24	78	
GRAND TOTAL OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	207
PERCENTAGES	12.1%	38.6%	Ø%	11.6%	37.7%	100%

UNIT	OFFENSIVE	DEFENSIVE	RCN	SECURITY	SPEC OPNS	DAYS CONSIDERED
--	DAYS	DAYS	DAYS	DAYS	DAYS	
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	9	3	Ø	36	Ø	48
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	5	Ø	2	28	7	42
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	25	4	Ø	2	17	48
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	11	3	Ø	25	9	48
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	9	Ø	21	18	48
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	9	Ø	Ø	2	37	48
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	1	Ø	14	29	44
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	3	3	Ø	2	20	28
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	14	Ø	5	16	3	41
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	18	21	39
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	10	8	Ø	19	11	48
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	2	2	11	15
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	Ø	Ø	4	37	7	48
TOTAL (No of Days)	86	31	16	222	190	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	545
PERCENTAGES	15.8%	5.7%	2.9%	40.7%	34.9%	100%

b. NATURE OF COMBAT

(Appendix 3, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	PRIMARILY MOUNTED		PRIMARILY DISMOUNTED		DAYS CONSIDERED
------	Days	Percent	Days	Percent	------
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	137	51%	132	49%	269
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	68	42%	93	58%	161
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	59	25%	1175	75%	234
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	57	39%	89	61%	146
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	51	42%	71	58%	122
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	17	29%	41	71%	58
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	51	22%	182	78%	233
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	17	77%	5	23%	22
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	33	42%	46	58%	79
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	107	46%	126	54%	233
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	62	25%	194	75%	256
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	4	9%	40	91%	44
117th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz	97	40%	146	60%	243
TOTAL (No of days)	760	---	1340	---	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	---	---	2100	---	2100
TOTAL PERCENTAGES	---	36.1%	---	63.9%	100%

NOTE: Since mounted and dismounted phases of combat were necessarily closely interrelated, this compilation classifies combat days into those which were primarily mounted and those which were primarily dismounted. In general, dismounted combat had mounted support; and mounted action was assisted by dismounted action when resistance or other factors required.

c. UNITS ATTACHED OR IN DIRECT SUPPORT

(Appendix 3, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

TYPE OF COMBAT	MAXIMUM	MINIMUM	NORMAL
OFFENSIVE	2 FA Bns 1 TD Bn 2 Engr Bns (as Inf) 2 Engr Cos	NONE	1 FA Bn 1 TD Bn 1 Engr Co
DEFENSIVE	4 FA Bns 1 TD Bn 4 Engr Bns (as Inf) 1 Engr Bn 1 Sig Plat	NONE	1 FA Bn 1 TD Bn 1 Engr Co
RECONNAISSANCE	1 Tank Bn 1 FA Bn 1 TD Bn 2 Engr Cos	NONE	NONE
SECURITY	1 FA Bn 1 TD Bn 1 Engr Bn 1 Engr Co	NONE	1 FA Bn 1 TD Co 1 Engr Co

NOTE: This compilation represents a general consolidation of the experience of the several groups.

(1) TYPICAL FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT, MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP WITH NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

(Appendix 3d, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



(2) FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT, OFFENSIVE MISSION, MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP, HEAVILY REINFORCED
(Appendix 3d, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



(2d Cavalry Group, Reinforced: Offense near SAUER and MOSELLE Rivers, Luxembourg and Germany, 1 - 3 March, 1945.)

(3) FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSIVE COMBAT, MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP WITH MAXIMUM ATTACHMENTS
(Appendix 3, d, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



NOTE: Engineer units, except that marked (C), were general service and were employed as infantry.

(2d Cavalry Group, Reinforced: Defense along MOSELLE River, 24 December 1944 20 February 1945. Frontage: 27 miles)

(4) FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT, AGGRESSIVE RECONNAISSANCE, MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP, HEAVILY REINFORCED
(Appendix 3d, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



(Light Tank Bn acted as Gp Res, between periods of commitment)

(4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced: Reconnaissance, vic MEUSE River, 7 September - 9 September, 1944.)

(5) FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT, SECURITY MISSION, MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP, HEAVILY REINFORCED
(Appendix 3d, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



(16th Cavalry Group, Reinforced: Security, mopping up NAHE River valley, 19 March, 1945.)

e. ORGANIC UNITS DETACHED.

(Appendix 3, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(IN DAYS)

UNIT	2d Cav Gp	3d Cav Gp	4th Cav Gp	6th Cav Gp	11th Cav Gp	14th Cav Gp	15th Cav Gp	16th Cav Gp	101st Cav Gp	102d Cav Gp	106th Cav Gp	113th Cav Gp	115th Cav Gp	117th Cav Sq	Atchd to: Army Gps	Armies	Corps	Armd Divs	Inf Divs	Unknown or Others
2 Cav Sqs							N	O	N	E						N	O	N	E	
1 Cav Sq	31	12	38	22		22	193		11	101		5	14			169	69	9	171	31
1 Cav Sq (-1 Tr)	26		25									109				74	26		60	
3 Rcn Trs							N	O	N	E						N	O	N	E	
2 Rcn Trs	5																	5		
1 Rcn Tr	22		171	11	23	29	42		11	50	60	319		54	67	305	226	17	96	81
1 L Tk Co							98	1					27						27	99
1 A/G Tr					23		98										23			98
1 Plat, Rcn Tr					145					13							13			145
1 Plat, L Tk Co					23												23			
1 Plat, A/G Tr							N	O	N	E						N	O	N	E	

NOTE: The types of duty performed by the units while on detached service were as follows, in days: combat - 355; mobile reserve - 39; rear area security - 409; command post security - 844; army information service - 15; unknown - 172.

f. HIGHER HEADQUARTERS UNDER WHICH OPERATING

(Appendix 3, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	ARMY	CORPS	ARMD DIV	INF DIV	OTHERS
2d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	203	7	64	Ø
3d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	136	Ø	37	1
4th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	167	28	94	Ø
6th Cav Gp, Mecz	173	139	4	5	Ø
11th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	84	Ø	61	Ø
14th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	75	Ø	23	Ø
15th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	16	Ø	179	77
16th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	3	Ø	5	14
101st Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	47	27	9	Ø
102d Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	160	5	96	Ø
113th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	110	4	179	Ø
115th Cav Gp, Mecz	Ø	Ø	Ø	44	Ø
117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	Ø	68	10	157	9
TOTAL (NO OF DAYS)	173	1208	85	953	101
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	---	---	----	---	2520
PERCENTAGES	6.9%	47.9%	3.4%	37.8%	4.0%

APPENDIX 4

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT

MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS

AND ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS, ARMORED DIVISIONS

1. This summary comprises:

a. Types of missions performed.

b. Units attached or in direct support.

c. Organic units detached.

d. Typical employment of detached units.

2. The following comments are applicable to this appendix:

a. The source of this information is the reports after action against enemy of the following units, for the months indicated:

UNIT	MONTHS
82d Armd Rcn Bn (2d Armd Div) -	June, 1944 to May, 1945
25th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (4th Armd Div)	July, August, 1944; November, 1944 to April, 1945
85th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (5th Armd Div) -	September, 1944 to April, 1945
86th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (6th Armd Div) -	July, 1944 to May, 1945
87th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (7th Armd Div) -	September, 1944 to November, 1944; January, 1945; March to May, 1945
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (9th Armd Div) -	October, 1944 to May, 1945
90th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (10th Armd Div) -	November, 1944; January, 1945 to April, 1945
92d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (12th Armd Div) -	December, 1944 to May, 1945

b. The units whose records were studied were selected as representative of units of this type serving in the four U.S. armies.

a. TYPES OF MISSIONS PERFORMED

(Appendix 4, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	OFFENSIVE		DEFENSIVE		RCN		SECURITY		SPEC OPNS		DAYS CONSIDERED
----	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	----
25th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	4	2%	10	5%	25	12%	110	51%	74	30%	223
82d Armd Rcn Bn	21	7%	35	11%	75	23%	15	5%	188	54%	334
85th Cav Rcn Sq, Macz	10	4%	52	21%	20	8%	56	22%	113	45%	251
86th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	2	1%	47	17%	76	27%	59	20%	102	35%	286
87th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	6	3%	21	11%	6	3%	9	5%	148	78%	190
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	0	0%	16	10%	0	0%	44	26%	107	64%	167
90th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	6	4%	1	1%	15	10%	66	44%	62	41%	150
92d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	19	12%	6	4%	23	14%	55	35%	57	35%	160
TOTAL (No of Days)	68	---	188	---	240	---	414	---	851	---	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1761
PERCENTAGES		4%		11%		13%		24%		48%	100%

NOTE: Offensive combat includes attack, and pursuit and exploitation. Defensive combat includes defense, delaying action, and holding key terrain. Security includes screening (both moving and stationary), blocking, flank protection, maintaining contact and filling gaps. Special operations include mobile reserve and rear area security. The accomplishment of reconnaissance missions normally involved offensive combat. The performance of security missions frequently involved offensive combat.

b. UNITS ATTACHED OR IN DIRECT SUPPORT

(Appendix 4, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

Type of Combat	Maximum	Minimum	Normal
Offensive	1 Armd Inf Bn 1 Armd FA Bn 2 Tk Cos 1 TD Co 1 Armd Engr Co 1 Engr (C) Bn	None	1 FA Bn 1 Tk Co
Defensive	1 Armd Inf Bn 1 Rcn Co, Armd Regt 1 FA Bn	None	1 FA Bn 1 TD Plat
Reconnaissance	1 Armd Inf Co 1 Med Tank Co 1 FA Bn 1 TD Co 1 Engr Plat	None	None
Security	1 FA Bn 1 TD Co	None	1 Tk or TD Plat

NOTE: This compilation represents a general consolidation of the experiences of the several units.

c. ORGANIC UNITS DETACHED

(Appendix 4, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	RCN TR	RCN TR	RCN TR	RCN TR	AG PLAT	AG PLAT	AG PLAT	AG PLAT	TK CO	DAYS CONSIDERED
25th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	158	153								223
82d Armd Rcn Bn	47	35								334
85th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	97	36	35		66	36	35			251
86th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	202	161	57		63					286
87th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	66	42	27							190
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	116	116	107		98	98	59		39	167
90th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	94	40			30	30				150
92d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz	58	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	160
TOTALS	838	609	252	26	283	190	120	26	65	1761

NOTE: The detached units were normally attached to combat command of their respective armored divisions, and were given combat missions.

d. TYPICAL EMPLOYMENT OF DETACHED UNITS

(Appendix 4, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



APPENDIX 5

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT

MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS

IN INFANTRY DIVISIONS

1. This summary comprises:

a. Types of missions performed.

b. Units detached or in direct support.

2. The following comments are applicable to this appendix:

a. The source of this information is the reports after action against enemy of the following units, for the months indicated:

UNIT	MONTHS
1st Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (1st Inf Div)	June, 1944, August, 1944, March, 1945
3d Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (3d Inf Div)	August 1944 to April 1945
5th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (5th Inf Div)	October, 1944, January, 1945; March, 1945 to May, 1945
30th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (30th Inf Div)	June, 1944,; August, 1945 to May, 1945
79th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (79th Inf Div)	September, 1944, November, 1944, January, 1945, March, 1945, April, 1945
80th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (80th Inf Div)	December, 1944; March, 1945 to May, 1945
83d Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (83d Inf Div)	July, 1944, September, 1944, November, 1944; January, 1945 to April, 1945
90th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (90th Inf Div)	June, 1944, July, 1944, September, 1944
104th Cav Rcn Tr, Mecz (104th Inf Div)	November, 1944 to April, 1945

b. The units whose records were studied were selected as representative of units of this type serving in the four U.S. armies.

a. TYPES OF MISSIONS PERFORMED

(Appendix 5, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

UNIT	OFFENSIVE		DEFENSIVE		RCN		SECURITY		SPEC OPNS		DAYS CONSIDERED
	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%	
1st Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	0	0%	5	2%	0	0%	184	68%	82	30%	271
3d Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	Data on types of missions by days not available.										
5th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	4	2%	0	0%	3	2%	85	47%	87	49%	179
30th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	1	0.3%	26	9%	16	5%	115	39.7%	136	46%	294
79th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	0	0%	7	4%	21	11%	62	34%	93	51%	183
80th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	2	2%	3	3%	19	20%	29	29%	46	46%	99
83d Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	0	0%	0	0%	12	5%	175	73%	54	22%	241
90th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	0	0%	7	9%	21	26%	41	50%	13	15%	82
104th Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz	11	6%	10	5%	3	2%	70	39%	87	48%	181
TOTAL (No of Days)	18	--	58	--	95	--	761	--	598	--	
GRAND TOTAL NO OF DAYS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1530
PERCENTAGES	--	1%	--	4%	--	6%	--	50%	--	39%	100%

NOTE: Offensive combat includes attack, and pursuit and exploitation. Defensive combat includes defense, delaying, action, and holding key terrain. Security includes screening (both moving and stationary), blocking, flank protection, maintaining contact and filling gaps. Special operations includes mobile reserve and rear area security. The accomplishment of reconnaissance missions normally involved offensive combat. The performance of security missions frequently involved offensive combat.

b. UNITS ATTACHED OR IN DIRECT SUPPORT.

(Appendix 5, Employment of Mechanized Cavalry)

Type of Combat	Maximum	Minimum	Normal
Offensive	1 Lt Tank Co 1 A/G Plat (105 SP)	None	1 Lt Tank Co
Defensive	1 TD Co 1 Engr Co	None	None
Reconnaissance	1 Lt Tank Plat	None	None
Security	1 Lt Tank Co	None	None

NOTE: This compilation represents a general consolidation of the experience of several troops.

APPENDIX 6

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS IN COMBAT

1. This appendix comprises the following historical examples of the employment of mechanized cavalry units in combat in the European Theater:

a. Mechanized Cavalry Groups.

(1) Offensive Combat.

(a) 3d Cavalry Group: Pursuit from LEINBERG to REGENSBURG, 22 - 24 April 1945.

(b) 6th Cavalry Group: Attack to Seize L'HOPITAL and Clear KARLSBRUNN FOREST, 2 - 5 December 1944.

(2) Defensive Combat.

(a) 2d Cavalry Group: Defense of West Bank of MOSELLE River, in MOUTFORT Area, LUXEMBOURG, 24 December 1944 - 3 March 1945.

(b) 113th Cavalry Group: Defense of North Flank of 12th Army Group, SITTARD Area, 19 September - 12 November 1944.

(3) Reconnaissance.

113th Cavalry Group: Reconnaissance of XIX Corps Zone of Action, L'ESCAUT Canal to ALBERT Canal, 5 - 8 September 1944.

(4) Security.

(a) 4th Cavalry Group: Screening VII Corps Right Flank, South of AACHEN, 16 September - 2 October 1944.

(b) 11th Cavalry Group: Protection of North Flank of XIII Corps, during Advance from RHINE to ELBE Rivers, 2 - 15 April 1945.

b. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons.

(1) Offensive Combat.

2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Crossing of MOSELLE River and Seizure of WINCHERINGEN, as Diversion for Attack of XX Corps, 19 February 1945.

(2) Defensive Combat.

38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Defense of MONSCHAU Area against German Attack, 16 - 17 December 1944.

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, Armored Divisions.

(1) Offensive Combat.

87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Attack against MEINKENBRACHT, 12 April 1945.

(2) Defensive Combat.

89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Delaying Action, by Troops A, B, C and E, BEFORT Area, 16 - 25 December 1944.

(3) Reconnaissance.

92d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Reconnaissance for 12th Armored Division, NEUSTADT Area, 8 - 16 April 1945.

(4) Security.

86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Screening Assembly Area of 6th Armored Division, near MUEHL-HAUSEN, 5 - 12 April 1945.

d. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Infantry Divisions.

(1) Offensive Combat.

104th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: Attack from BORGENTREICH Area to WESER River, in Advance of 104th Infantry Division, 7 April 1945.

(2) Reconnaissance.

80th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: Reconnaissance during Advance of 80th Infantry Division to KASSEL, 1 - 3 April 1945.

2. The sources of these accounts are the reports after action against enemy of the units concerned.

a. (1) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP - OFFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(a) 3d Cavalry Group, Pursuit from LEINBERG to REGENSBURG, Preceding XX Corps, to Seize Crossings over Danube, 22 - 24 April 1945.

On 21 April 1945, the 3d Cavalry Group, composed of the 3d and 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, was disposed as shown on the accompanying sketch. The mission then assigned to XX Corps, to which the group was attached, was, commencing early 22 April, to advance southeast in assigned zone, to make contact with Soviet Army troops, reported moving west from VIENNA (XX4090). The 3d Cavalry Group, with Companies A and C, 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), Company A 245th Engineer (C) Battalion, and the 5th Ranger Battalion, attached, and with the 274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, was given the mission to pursue vigorously the routed German forces, southeast to REGENSBURG (XU1856), and to seize and hold the bridges across the DANUBE River, in the corps zone. The group was to be followed by the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions, advancing abreast, the 65th Infantry Division on the right.

The group commander decided to move with squadrons abreast, the 43d on the right. The VILS River was to become the boundary between squadrons, when that stream had been reached. Isolated enemy centers of resistance were to be reported and by-passed, and organized enemy defensive positions were to be developed. The 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with three companies of the 5th Ranger Battalion, Company C 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and one platoon of Company A 245th Engineers (C) Battalion attached, and with one battery of the 274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, was to pursue in its zone, maintaining contact with the 65th Infantry Division, which was to follow. The 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, on the left, with the 5th Ranger Battalion (less three companies), Company A 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company A (less one platoon) 245th Engineer (C) Battalion, attached, and with the 274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (less one battery) in direct support, was to pursue in its zone and to maintain contact with the 71st Infantry Division, following in its rear, and to seize and hold all bridges over the NAAB River found intact. Group headquarters was to move with the west column.

At 0600 hours on 22 April, the advance was commenced. The weather was cloudy and cold, and there was rain and snow. The terrain was found to be mountainous and wooded, and the roads muddy and occasionally, although shown on the map, non-existant. The advance was opposed by road blocks and minefields, a great many of which were defended by small arms and automatic weapons and in some instances were supported by the antitank fire of 20mm and 88mm guns.

The 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron encountered one organized enemy defensive position, which it developed and penetrated. The same squadron overran a German Stalag and released over 2000 Allied prisoners of war. The 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron seized a bridge across the NAAB River and held it until the infantry came up and relieved it, 24 hours later. By the afternoon of the third day, both squadrons had reached their objective, the DANUBE River. Approximately 2000 prisoners of war had been taken and an unknown number of casualties inflicted on the enemy.

The following were the principle results of this operation: the enemy was routed before he could organize a defensive stand north of the DANUBE; the seizure of the bridge across NAAB River assisted the advance of the left division; the operation set the stage for XX Corps' assault on REGENSBURG.



3D CAV GROUP:

Pursuit from LEINBERG
to REGENSBURG, preceding
XX Corps
22 - 24 April 1945

a. (1) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP -- OFFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(b) 6th Cavalry Group: Attack to Seize L'HOPITAL and Clear KARLSBRUNN Forest, 2 - 5 December 1944.

On 1 December 1944, the 6th Cavalry Group (less 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron), reinforced by 5th Ranger Battalion, Company C 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion and Company B 293d Engineer (C) Battalion, was attached to XX Corps and given the mission of: protecting the right flank of the corps; breaching the German line of defense at L'HOPITAL (WQ2662); and clearing the forest of KARLSBRUNN to the northeast. The 6th Cavalry Group promptly moved into an assembly area northeast of SAINT AVOLD (WQ2556) and the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with Company D 5th Ranger Battalion attached, relieved one battalion of the 10th Infantry Regiment in CARLING (WQ2563) and made plans for a frontal assault on L'HOPITAL, which was separated from CARLING by a deep railway cut. Meanwhile, the 5th Ranger Battalion (less Company D), which was to make the main effort on the left, moved into an assembly area northeast of CARLING under cover of woods.

The attack was to begin at 0830 hours on 2 December, with artillery support being provided by the 5th Infantry Division. However, due to lack of time, this arrangement had not been completed. Actually, the attack of the ranger battalion, reinforced by light tanks, started at 0900 hours; but the tanks could not be used effectively due to the deep mud, and the ranger battalion soon came under heavy artillery and automatic weapons fire. As a result, its attack, after the railroad tracks had been crossed, was temporarily halted. In the meantime, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was engaged along the railroad cut between CARLING and L'HOPITAL.

During the night of 2 - 3 December 1944, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron pushed vigorously across the railroad cut and entered the southern edge of L'HOPITAL. Here they came under heavy artillery and mortar fire; and after clearing a portion of the town, they were forced, by enemy counter-attack, to withdraw to the railroad embankment, with heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the main attack by the 5th Ranger Battalion advanced slowly through the woods to the northeast of L'HOPITAL. 4 December was spent in advancing the ranger battalion and in making arrangements to receive artillery support from the 19th Field Artillery Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. Early 5 December, after a heavy artillery preparation on L'HOPITAL, the town was captured and cleared by a vigorous combined attack of the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 5th Ranger Battalion, the former attacking east across the railroad while the rangers drove in from the northeast. The vigor of the attack carried the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron through the enemy supports and well into the forest of KARLSBRUNN. As a result, enemy artillery was forced to displace; and, thus freed from artillery fire, the 6th Cavalry Group quickly cleared the forest and gained the high-ground to the east.

The action was almost entirely dismounted, armored car, tank and destroyer support being difficult due to the heavy mud and the steep approaches to the railway embankment. The attacking forces were initially handicapped by lack of sufficient time for making reconnaissance and for arranging for artillery support. However, when these difficulties had been overcome, the objectives were gained without undue losses, the attack being pushed very vigorously. This action illustrates the handicap under which mechanized cavalry forces were placed when operating dismounted without their normal mobile fire support. It also, however, illustrates the ability of mechanized cavalry to overcome that handicap, when reinforced with infantry and aggressively led.



A - Direction of attack - 6th Cav Rcn Sq

B - Direction of main effort - 5th Ranger Bn

C - Direction of drive after capture of L'HOPITAL

6TH CAV GROUP:

Offense (attack)
vic ST AVOLD, FRANCE
2-5 December 1944

a. (2) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP - DEFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(a) 2d Cavalry Group: Defense of West Bank of MOSELLE River, in MOUTFORT Area, LUXEMBOURG, 24 December 1944 - 3 March 1945.

On 23 December 1944, the 2d Cavalry Group received the mission of protecting the right (east) flank of XII Corps along the west bank of the MOSELLE River, from HAUTE KONTZ (VU9795) on the south to MERTERT (WL0923) on the north. All enemy pockets on the west bank of the MOSELLE were to be reduced and the enemy was to be held east of the MOSELLE within the sector. Contact was to be gained and maintained with XX Corps on the right and with the 4th Infantry Division on the left, a front of 25 miles. In this sector, the MOSELLE River had a width of from 500 to 600 feet and a depth of up to 25 feet. On the west bank, the hills rose steeply to a height of 450 meters; on the east bank, the slope was gradual. This bank was known to be held by enemy infantry and fortress machine gun battalions, generally unaggressive except for patrols. Two enemy bridgeheads existed on the west bank, within the sector, one at MACHTUM (WL0618) and the other at MERTERT. There was also an enemy bridgehead at WASSERBILLIG, two kilometers from the north boundary of the sector.

The corps commander constituted the group as Task Force Reed, and he attached to it the following units: 372d and 398th Engineer (GS) Regiments, 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion (3 inch, towed), 255th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How), 276th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and one signal platoon. The engineer regiments were to be used as infantry. For execution of the mission, the task force was disposed as follows (see sketch): Combat Team Hargis, comprising 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop E and Company F), one battalion of 372d Engineer (GS) Regiment, and one tank destroyer company, on the right; Combat Team Costello, comprising 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop E), 398th Engineer (GS) Regiment, and one tank destroyer company, on the left; the remainder of the force in reserve, at MOUTFORT (WL9311).

Three defensive lines were organized: an outpost line, held by 11 platoons, on the river bank; a support line, manned by 16 platoons, along the hills from 1000 to 2000 yards west of the river; and a reserve line, not occupied, on the commanding ground two to three miles from the MOSELLE. Numerous obstacles were erected, and fires were carefully prepared; and an elaborate communications system was put in effect.

Aggressive patrolling into the MERTERT and MACHTUM bridgeheads was initiated without delay and resulted in the withdrawal across the river of the force at MERTERT. A dismounted attack, supported by tanks, drove the enemy from the high ground adjacent to MACHTUM on 30 December; and on 11 January, Troop C 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attacked dismounted and, after 12 hours of street fighting, cleared the town. Patrolling across the MOSELLE River was also undertaken and on 19 February, an offensive operation was executed east of the river (see Appendix 6 b (1)). Supporting artillery, with the assault gun troops attached was active, day and night. It was possible to rotate organizations frequently; and health and morale remained excellent.

To summarize this performance by the 2d Cavalry Group: a force of some 5500 successfully defended a front of over 25 miles for more than two months, thus releasing an infantry division for offensive combat; mechanized cavalry, with its mobility and excellent communications, demonstrated its suitability to defend long river lines, with infantry, artillery and engineer support.



2D CAV GROUP:

Defense, MOSELLE
River line
24 Dec 1944 - 3 Mar 1945

a. (2) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP -- DEFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(b) 113th Cavalry Group: Defense of North Flank of 12th Army Group, SIITARD Area, 19 September -- 12 November 1944.

During the night 19 - 20 September 1944, the 113th Cavalry Group, comprising the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the 744th Light Tank Battalion (less one company), the 246th Engineer (C) Battalion, Company C 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion, an engineer company (less two platoons) and a tank destroyer platoon, took over the defense of the north flank of XIX Corps (and First Army and 12th Army Group), in the SITTARD area, from the MAAS River to the HOLLAND - GERMANY border, a front of about six miles. The tank battalion (less two companies), with a cavalry reconnaissance troop and engineer company and the tank destroyer company (less one platoon) attached, was on the right, and the cavalry squadron (less a reconnaissance troop), with a company of engineers and a platoon of tank destroyers attached, was on the left.

Early on 20 September, the work of organizing the position was commenced and aggressive reconnaissance was initiated to the north and contact established with the enemy, who, it was learned, belonged to the 176 Infantry Division, supported by artillery and tanks. The terrain east of the German border was open and gently rolling, with excellent fields of fire and observation. West of the border, the ground was generally flat and wooded and cut with numerous drainage ditches. At 1200 on 22 September, the 113th Cavalry Group assumed responsibility for a widened sector, extending to GANGELT (VK7767), Germany, some four miles further east.

During the period 29 September - 3 October, the 113th Cavalry Group (the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop B) rejoined on 30 September) advanced its line on the left four miles, forced a temporary vehicular crossing over SAEFFELBACH near ISNEBECK (VK7073), and took part in a general offensive action launched by the 29th Infantry Division. Thereafter, the group resumed the defensive, with three units abreast, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the 744th Light Tank Battalion (less one company) and the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop B), from right to left in that order. Reserves amounted to only one platoon for the group and one platoon for each unit. Up to three light and two medium artillery battalions supported the group, whose organic assault guns proved invaluable in this situation. Aggressive patrolling was conducted, and much information of the enemy was gained. Every practicable measure was taken to strengthen the defense of this vital line, which was based upon no appreciable water obstacle.

On 2 November, the 17th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, normally of the 15th Cavalry Group, took its place in the line, relieving the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which passed into group reserve. From then on, it was possible to rotate complete units, from the line into reserve, and the effect of this system was very beneficial. However, it was not long used; for on 12 November, the Guards Armored Division of 30 British Corps relieved the 113th Cavalry Group, which then passed into reserve.

To summarize this performance by the 113th Cavalry Group: a division-sized front was successfully held for six weeks while larger units of the corps were operating against the SIEGFRIED LINE; the mechanized cavalry demonstrated remarkable staying power, although little rotation of units was possible; a need for a third squadron, to provide a mobile reserve and to make possible the relief of units long committed, was keenly felt.







113TH CAV GROUP:

Defense of N. Flank
of 12th Army Group,
SITTARD Area
19 Sep - 12 Nov 1944

a. (3) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP - RECONNAISSANCE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

113th Cavalry Group: Reconnaissance of XIX Corps Zone of Action, L'ESCAUT Canal to ALBERT Canal, 5 - 8 September 1944.

On 4 September 1944, the 113th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, bivouacked south of TOURNAI (VH9332), Belgium, received the mission of moving across L'ESCAUT CANAL early 5 September, to reconnoiter aggressively, east and northeast, in the zone of action of XIX Corps, a strip of land some 20 miles wide and 125 miles long, passing between CHARLEROI (VJ6606) and BRUSSELS (VJ6255), both exclusive, and striking the MEUSE River between LIEGE (VJ4629), exclusive, and MAASTRICHT (VK5252), inclusive. The enemy situation was to be determined, and strong opposition by-passed; and road and bridge conditions on five principal routes, which the corps planned to use in its main advance, were to be reported. The 113th Cavalry Group, which comprised, besides group headquarters, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop B and Company F), was to be reinforced by Company B 82d Engineer (C) Battalion and Company C 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion. No support from the main combat elements of the corps, temporarily immobilized due to gasoline shortage, could be expected.

Early on 5 September, the advance was begun, with squadrons abreast, the 113th on the right, and with a platoon of engineers attached to each squadron. On 6 September, a tank destroyer platoon was also attached to each squadron. Squadrons advanced with two cavalry reconnaissance troops abreast. By night of 5 September, the line of the NAMUR (VJ9612) BRUSSELS (VJ6255) Railway had been reached, enemy resistance having been scattered and generally light until late in the day when the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had encountered stiff opposition. Early on 6 September, the advance was resumed, with the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in sharp contact throughout the day and the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron making favorable progress on its left although delayed on its right at JODIGNE (VJ9840), until this resistance was by-passed.

On 7 September, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron fought its way to ST TROND (VK2049), where strong resistance was encountered, while the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, now reinforced by Troop C 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, advanced to the vicinity of HASSELT (VK3162), which was captured before dark.

By this time, the 2d Armored Division had been refueled, and its reconnaissance elements had overtaken the 113th Cavalry Group. The corps commander had decided that the 2d Armored Division would operate in the left portion of the corps zone; and at 0800 hours on 8 September, the 113th Cavalry Group received orders to close in somewhat to the right. By mid-afternoon the ALBERT CANAL was reached by all troops; and by dark, it had been determined that all bridges over the canal and and the MEUSE (MAAS) River had been destroyed by the enemy. The 113th Cavalry Group screened the line of the canal, while reconnoitering FORT EBEN EMAEL (VK5446) and the area lying between the canal and the river, until the 30th Infantry Division came up on the afternoon of 10 September, when the group disposed itself so as to cover the division's flanks.

Mechanized cavalry's self-sufficiency was well illustrated in this operation. It is also of interest that although this was a reconnaissance mission, most of the resistance encountered had to be fought and defeated in order to permit the 113th Cavalry Group to advance and accomplish its mission.



113TH CAV GROUP:

Reconnaissance, L'ESCAUT
CANAL to MEUSE (MAAS) River
5 - 8 September 1944

a. (4) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP - SECURITY

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(a) 4th Cavalry Group: Screening VII Corps Right Flank, South of AACHEN, 16 September - 2 October 1944.

On 15 September 1944, the 4th Cavalry Group, composed of the 4th and 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, with the 759th Light Tank Battalion (less Company A), the 87th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion (three inch, towed) and Companies A and C of the 297th Engineer (C) Battalion attached, was given the mission of screening the right, south flank of the VII Corps in its attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE near AACHEN (WK8343).

On 16 September, the group, with squadrons abreast, was disposed as follows (see sketch): the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with an engineer platoon attached, and one light tank company in direct support, was on the right. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with an engineer company and a treadway bridge detachment attached, was on the left. The 87th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was in position just west of BULLINGEN (WK9502), in direct support of both squadrons. Group headquarters and the remainder of the force were in BUTGENBACH (WK9204).

The terrain south of AACHEN (WK8343) was hilly and densely wooded. The weather was cold, with heavy fogs in the late evening and in the early hours of the morning. An enemy fortifications as well as extremely dense woods made vehicular movement impracticable, the group commander directed that both squadrons send out aggressive dismounted patrols, to the east.

These patrols encountered the outer fringes of the SIEGFRIED LINE on the first day. They consisted of road blocks, sited in depth and in most cases "booby-trapped" and covered by small arms fire. Numerous enemy patrols were working in the surrounding woods. The cavalry patrols were accompanied by elements of the attached engineers, which removed the "booby-traps" and reduced the road blocks, after capture. One company of light tanks was used to patrol the road between BUTGENBACH (WK9204) and KALTERHERBERG (WK3215). On 18 September, the sector was enlarged to a width of 12 to 15 miles, including the towns of HOFEN (WK9517) and ALZEN (WK9615).

On 17 September, the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron repulsed an enemy counterattack, of estimated strength of 100 infantrymen. On 18 September, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron also repulsed an enemy counterattack, of estimated strength of one company of infantry. Cavalry patrols were successful in locating enemy defensive positions, and a valuable file of enemy information was compiled.

The roving tanks played an important role in denying enemy patrols entry through the gaps which existed on the wide front. Furthermore, the deception created through the continued movement of armored vehicles and the interdictory fires laid down by the assault guns, artillery howitzers and tank destroyer guns, created the illusion of greater strength than actually existed. The fact that, on 1 October, an entire Corps (V Corps) commenced taking over the sector of the 4th Cavalry Group is felt to have been eloquent proof of the magnitude of that unit's accomplishment.



4TH CAV GROUP:

Screening Right
Flank of VII Corps
16 Sep - 2 Oct 1944

a. (4) MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUP - SECURITY

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(b) 11th Cavalry Group: Protection of North Flank of XIII Corps During Advance from RHINE to ELBE, 2 - 15 April 1945.

On 1 April 1945, the 11th Cavalry Group, with the 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was in an assembly area in the vicinity of RONUT (RA6868), about fifteen miles west of MUENSTER (RA9385), attached to XIII Corps, the left corps of Ninth Army. At this time, the 11th Cavalry Group was given the mission of protecting the left (north) flank of XIII Corps from COESFELD (RA7174), east, and of maintaining contact with Second British Army on the left. This mission was initiated early on 2 April; and in its execution, the 11th Cavalry Group, up to 15 April, travelled about 225 miles.

Although the mission of the 11th Cavalry Group was one of security, its performance required much offensive combat. The stiffest enemy resistance was met in the area north of MUENSTER, after the crossing of the DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, and north of HANNOVER (RA3724), at the crossing of the LEINE River; but throughout the advance, it was necessary for the 11th Cavalry Group to fight its way into the towns which lay in its path.

Maintaining contact with Second British Army presented some problems. As far east as HANNOVER, American and British forces were in close proximity, with one and then the other leading; and the task was mainly one of coordination. For example, just west of HANNOVER, a British unit came into a town from the north as the 11th Cavalry Group entered it from the west. Again, just north of HANNOVER, the route taken by the 11th Cavalry Group turned out to be the identical route which had been assigned to a British reconnaissance unit. After HANNOVER had been passed, however, British elements turned north toward HAMBURG (RS5065), and so a considerable gap, measuring from a few to as many as fifty miles, developed. During this period, contact with the British was maintained by personal visits of the squadron commander and members of his staff and by an officer-radio liaison team. This liaison was maintained until the time when the group reached the ELBE River.

The 11th Cavalry Group was employed tactically as follows. Squadrons, with a tank destroyer company attached to each, were disposed abreast, in sectors facing generally north. Upon group order, the western squadron would move east on a route passing to the south of the eastern squadron, and fight its way to occupy a sector further east, and this movement was so timed as to insure the arrival of the squadron on its new line in time to protect the north flank of the leading elements of the 84th Infantry Division, the left division of XIII Corps, which was advancing east in a zone immediately to the south of the 11th Cavalry Group. Each squadron habitually employed three task forces or teams, each composed of a cavalry reconnaissance troop, with a platoon of light tanks, a platoon of assault guns and a platoon of tank destroyers attached. The order of march of these teams, during the squadron's advance to its new sector, was alternated.

This operation illustrated the marked ability of mechanized cavalry to cover open flanks and to maintain contact with adjacent units, in fast-moving situations.



11TH CAV GROUP:

Protection of Corps Flank
2 - 15 April 1945

b. (1) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON -- OFFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Crossing of MOSELLE River and Seizure of WINCHERINGEN as Diversion for Attack of XX Corps, 19 February 1945.

On 18 February, the 2d Cavalry Group which, heavily reinforced as Task Force Reed, was defending the west bank of the MOSELLE River from HAUTE KONTZ (WU9795) to MERTERT (WL0923) (see Appendix 6 a (2) (a)), was ordered to make a crossing of the MOSELLE River during the night 18-19 February, in squadron strength, to seize and hold the town of WINCHERINGEN (WL0513). The purpose of the operation was to create a diversion to assist the offensive of XX Corps, scheduled to attack north at 0600 hours, 19 February, to clear the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle and capture TRIER (WL5332). It was expected that leading elements of the 10th Armored Division would reach WINCHERINGEN by 1600 on 19 February. One chemical smoke generator company was to be attached.

At this time, the enemy troops in the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle comprised elements of the 11 Panzer Division, the 416 Volks Grenadier Division, and two fortress machine gun battalions. The divisions were generally facing south, opposing the XX Corps. However, combat groups of the 11 Panzer Division were in reserve east of WINCHERINGEN; and the line immediately around WINCHERINGEN was held by the 44 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, one company of which occupied the town and manned outposts on the river bank. Some artillery and mortars supported this company. The battalion reserve was located several kilometers to the east.

The town of WINCHERINGEN was dominated by hills on the west, north and south, and possession of these hills would assure capture of the town and assist in repelling counter-attacks. Secrecy in crossing the river and launching the attack before enemy reinforcements could arrive was considered essential. It was decided not to cross opposite WINCHERINGEN but at EHMEN (WL0212), one mile up the river, where good covered approaches existed and where there were good beaches, on both sides.

No artillery preparation was contemplated. However, counter-battery and defensive fires were planned for delivery on call, a total of two battalions being available. In addition, six towed three-inch guns were already in position, to give direct fire support after daylight; and the chemical smoke generator company was to site its generators so as to be able to smoke the river and cover reinforcement of the attack and evacuation of wounded. Boats were to be manned by engineers. The assault force was to comprise the 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troops C and E and Company F), with Company C 285th Engineer (C) Battalion attached.

The crossing was started at 0100 hours, 19 February, with one platoon of engineers leading and, upon landing, outposting the beaching site. The remainder of the attacking force followed, and the crossing was completed by 0330 hours. Complete surprise had been effected; and no enemy resistance was encountered until the movement towards WINCHERINGEN began. Then the force received small-arms, mortar and artillery fire, the latter being generally ineffective as it fell north of the crossing site. By daylight, the hills west and south of the town had been seized and the western end of the town captured. Fighting continued throughout the day, and attempts of the enemy to relieve the town were broken up by artillery concentrations and direct three-inch gun fire. At 1730 hours, a final attack was launched to clear the town. At 1800 hours, leading elements of the 10th Armored Division arrived and supported the assault; and by 1900 hours, the town had been successfully cleared.



2D CAV RCN SQ:

Offense (river crossing)
MOSELLE River
19 February 1945

b. (2) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON - DEFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Defense of MONSCHAU Area Against German Attack, 16-17 December 1944

On 10 November 1944, the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, under control of the 102d Cavalry Group, took over defense of a sector of the V Corps front, facing the SIEGFRIED LINE, in vicinity of MONSCHAU (WK9318). This sector was of particular importance, since it guarded the approach to the important network of roads which led to EUPEN (WK7927) and LIEGE (WK4728). On 16 December 1944, the squadron was disposed with cavalry reconnaissance troops abreast, in order, from right to left, C, B and A. Troop C was reinforced by a section of the 3d Platoon of Company F, while the 2d Platoon of Company F covered the 500 yard gap between Troops C and B. Troop A was in contact with the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, on the left; and Company F, less detachments, was in MONSCHAU. The squadron had in support, besides Troop E, the 62d Field Artillery Battalion and two medium field artillery battalions.

Early on 16 December, German infantry struck this position; and during that day and the next, seven attacks were made. These attacks, comprising the northern effort of the German winter offensive, were, except for the fifth attack, broken up by defensive fires. After the second attack the squadron commander asked group for reinforcements, and Company A 146th Engineer (C) Battalion, and six machine gun crews from the 186th Field Artillery Battalion, were sent forward. Troops C and B were each reinforced with a platoon of engineers, and the engineer company (less two platoons) was placed in squadron reserve on the high ground just west of MONSCHAU. The six machine gun crews were placed in support of the tank platoon in the center. There was considerable activity on both sides during the night, 16-17 December.

At 0900 hours, 17 December, a fifth attack, which was made between the 1st and 2d Platoons of Troop B on MUTZNICH HILL (see sketch), broke through the position, on a front of 200 yards, and overran three artillery observation posts. The squadron commander sent a platoon of engineers and a section of light tanks to Troop B's support; and with these units and 2d Platoon Troop B, a counter-attack was launched and the enemy driven from his forward position.

During the height of this action, the squadron commander had called upon the group commander for additional reinforcements; and at 1100 hours, Company A 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and one platoon of Company A 10th Tank Battalion were dispatched to the squadron. Upon arrival, at about 1200 hours, the infantry company was directed to patrol the woods in rear of Troop B's position and the tank platoon was ordered into squadron reserve. During this time, about twenty enemy planes, one of which was shot down, strafed the squadron's position. At 1700 hours, the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division closed into the area just west of MONSCHAU. The following morning, 18 December, this regiment relieved the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in that portion of its sector which was occupied by Troop C.

The outstanding success of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in defending its vital sector against repeated enemy attacks is felt to have been mainly due to: excellent organization of the ground, including very thorough laying of mines, installation of warning devices and erection of wire, and very careful siting of weapons and utilization of terrain; well planned and effective supporting fires; excellent communications; determination to hold the position.



38TH CAV RCN SQ:

Defense of MONSCHAU
16 - 17 December 1944

c. (1) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON,

ARMORED DIVISION -- OFFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Attack against MEINKENBRACHT, 12 April 1945.

On 11 April 1945, the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, of the 7th Armored Division, then in the vicinity of LANDBECK (WG3190), was given the mission of capturing the town of MEINKENBRACHT (WG2498) and of reconnoitering the routes MEINKENBRACHT (WG2498) - ERNDORF (WG2199) and MEINKENBRACHT (WG2498) - LINNEPE (RB2301). The attack was part of the mopping up operation by the 7th Armored Division in the Ruhr pocket.

The squadron's plan called for Troops B, C, D, each with one platoon of Company F attached, to advance through the woods dismounted and assault the town, each troop operating in the zones shown on the sketch and Troop E supporting the attack from the position indicated. The final assault on the town was to be made from the south by Troop C, while Troop D was to furnish security on the east flank and take the high ground north of the town. Troop B was to cut the main approach route from the west, take the high ground southwest of town, and join the Troop C attack on squadron order. The 434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was to be in direct support.

At 0600 hours, 12 April, the leading elements of the troops moved out and proceeded to the designated forward assembly area in the vicinity of OBER SALWEY (WG2594), where the reconnaissance troops dismounted and prepared to go forward on foot, accompanied by tanks. Squadron headquarters was set up just east of OBER SALWEY, while Troop E went into position as shown on sketch. Troop A at this time was attached to Combat Command R on a separate mission.

While the reconnaissance troops were pushing through the woods, the 434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and Troop E fired artillery preparations on the town. Troop B ran into very little resistance and had the least trouble with terrain; and it pushed rapidly ahead of Troops C and D. Taking advantage of this fact, the squadron commander ordered Troop B into the town ahead of Troop C, and this maneuver was accomplished with little loss to the attacking forces. The speed of the attack resulted in the capture of 581 prisoners and the complete collapse of the defenses of the town. Troop B then proceeded rapidly through the town and pushed reconnaissance to ERNDORF (WG2199) and LINNEPE (RB2301), finding them unoccupied by the enemy. Troop C and D continued to advance to their zones and assembled in MEINKENBRACHT.

This action illustrates a rapid and successful dismounted assault, by mechanized cavalry, against a defended town. The rapid advance of Troop B was promptly exploited to accomplish the squadron's mission, and it also reduced the enemy's pressure on Troop C and D, thereby decreasing the number of casualties which might have been suffered in those troops.



87TH CAV RCN SQ:

Attack against
MEINKENBRACHT
12 April 1945

c. (2) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE

SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION - DEFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Delaying Action, by Troops A, B, C and E, BEFORT Area, 16 - 25 December 1944.

At the outbreak of the German counter-offensive, 16 December 1944, the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was in vicinity of BISSEN (VP7933). The squadron commander was ordered to move Troops A, B, C and E (-) to the HALLER (VP9536) - CHRISTNACH (VP9433) area, without delay. These troops, upon arrival, were to be attached to Combat Command A, whose mission was to defend the BEFORT (VP9638) area.

Upon arrival at HALLER, Troop A was attached to the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion and was given the mission of outposting BEFORT (VP9638), while Troop B was given the mission of outposting WALDBILLIG (VP9534) and CHRISTNACH. During the night 16-17 December, the enemy infiltrated into the lines of the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion; and at 1000 hours, 17 December, Troop A counter-attacked the enemy position and drove them from the high ground north of BEFORT. At 1930 hours, the Commanding Officer, Troop A, received orders to hold BEFORT as long as possible and to cover the withdrawal of the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, which withdrew during the night 17-18 December to positions shown on sketch, northeast of ERMSDORF (VP9137). By 1400 hours, 18 December, Troop A had, under continuous heavy pressure from the enemy, completed its withdrawal to WALDBILLIG (VP9534).

Meanwhile, Troop B outposted CHRISTNACH and WALDBILLIG during the night 16-17 December; and at 1000 hours, 17 December, it received orders to move to MULLENTHAL (VP9733). At 1230 hours, 17 December, Troop B was ordered to attack MULLENTHAL. Reinforced by four tank destroyers, Troop B attacked at 1330 hours, encountering determined enemy resistance which stopped the attack. Troop B was then ordered to withdraw and organize defensive positions on the high ground covering approaches to WALDBILLIG (VP9534).

Troop C arrived at HALLER (VP9536) at 0730 hours, 17 December, and was ordered to attack dismounted in a northwesterly direction towards BEFORT. Attacking at 0800 hours, 17 December, with one platoon of Battery B 482d AAA Battalion in support, Troop C advanced to the line shown on sketch; but continuing enemy pressure forced Troop C to withdraw to the vicinity of HALLER. At 0230 hours, 18 December, Troop C was ordered to move to SAMELBORN (VP9335) to defend the high ground along the north-south road in that vicinity. At 0400 hours, 18 December, Troop C organized the defensive position with three platoons in line. Battery A 482d AAA Battalion covered the area on the south flank of Troop C. Troop A remained in WALDBILLIG; and at 1530 hours, 18 December, it was ordered to move to MEDERNACH (VP9136) immediately, where it received the mission of establishing active patrols in the vicinity of ERMSDORF (VP9137), EPPELDORF (VP9339) and GILSDORF (VP8842). Troops B and C maintained their defensive positions, and Troop A continued its patrolling, through 21 December.

On 21 December, a task force of the 10th Armored Division attacked and secured positions west of EPPELDORF (VP9339), as shown on sketch. Troop A was ordered, on 22 December, to maintain active patrolling between the task force of the 10th Armored Division and the strong points established to the south (see sketch). All troops continued in these positions until 26 December, when Troops A, B and C were withdrawn to a rest area.

TROOPS A, B, AND C, 89TH CAV RCN SQ

Delaying action and defense
BEFORT area
16 - 25 December 1944



c. (3) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON,

ARMORED DIVISION - RECONNAISSANCE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

92d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Reconnaissance for 12th Armored Division, NEUSTADT Area, 8 - 16 April 1945.

On 8 April 1945, the 92d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, then generally south of WURZBURG (WN5835), received orders to initiate reconnaissance from its assembly position east in direction of NEUSTADT (WO0713). Two platoons of medium tanks were attached to the squadron and one section, each, was attached to Troops A, B, C and D. One light tank platoon, each, of Company F was attached to Troops A, C and D. The 342d Armored Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the squadron. The division mission at this time was to continue the attack to the southeast.

At 1200 hours on 8 April 1945, the squadron moved out, Troops A, C and D moving as indicated on sketch. Troop B was in squadron reserve; and Troop E and 342d Armored Field Artillery, initially at WILLANZHEIM (WN8023), prepared to give supporting fire. The troops advanced initially against light resistance; but by 1800 hours they had encountered a strong enemy line running generally from POSSENHEIM (WN8524) - DORNHEIM (WN8720) - NENZEHEIM (WN8418). At dark, Troops A, C and D were all in enemy contact just west of this line.

On 9 April, the 92d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron maintained its contact while it observed and probed the enemy's positions to determine his strength and dispositions. On 10 April, the squadron received orders to continue its frontal pressure on hostile positions in conjunction with an attack of Combat Command B on the north, and to be prepared to pass through the gaps developed by this attack. On 11 April, Troop A made physical contact with Task Force Norton of Combat Command B at ZIEGENBACH (WN8926). The squadron maintained its pressure on hostile positions through 12 April, and that afternoon the troops were able to advance. However, prior to darkness all troops met heavy enemy small arms and bazooka fire, and a line of contact was established as shown on sketch. The squadron also kept contact with Combat Command B on the north and the 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the south.

On 13 April, the troops advanced again and at darkness Troop C was in contact with the enemy at ALTHEIM (WO0110), Troop D at IPSHEIM (WN9807), Troop B at OBER NESSELBACH (WO0013), while the remainder of the squadron moved to RUDISBRONN (WN9511). Because of the road net, the advance on this day was made on only two roads, Troop C being followed by Troop B, and Troop D by Troop A. On 14 April, the squadron prepared to continue its advance to the east.

On 15 April, Troop D, followed by Troop A, moved out on the route shown, encountering light opposition. By the night of 15 April, Troop D had penetrated the enemy position to NEU SELINGSBACH (WO1000), and the squadron command post had moved to LINDEN (WC0604). In the meantime, Troop A advanced against NEUHOF (WT1199); and by 1700 hours on 16 April, it had secured the town, in conjunction with Troop C moving in from the north. Meanwhile, Troop D remained in position at NEU SELINGSBACH.

The squadron had thus accomplished its mission of reconnaissance in force to the southeast, having pushed against stiffening enemy resistance a distance of 30 miles.



92D CAV RCN SQ

Reconnaissance for
12th Armd Div
8 - 16 April 1945

c. (4) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON,

ARMORED DIVISION - SECURITY

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: Screening of 6th Armored Division, near MUEHLHAUSEN, 5 - 12 April 1945.

On 4 April 1945, the 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of the 6th Armored Division was given the mission of screening along a line northeast of MUEHLHAUSEN (WH9094), extending from HOHEN (RD1405), through GROSS BRUECHTER (RD0308) and KEULA (RC9408), to HUEPSTEDT (RC8807). At this time, two combat commands of the 6th Armored Division were in assembly areas in vicinity of MUEHLHAUSEN (WH9094) and LANGENSALZA (WJ0383) while the third combat command had been committed to the north and west, to wipe out an enemy pocket. First Army had not yet come up abreast of Third Army. The screening position was on the extreme left flank of Third Army.

The squadron commander divided his security line into three sectors, and to each sector he assigned a cavalry reconnaissance troop, reinforced by one platoon of light tanks and one platoon of assault guns. The three troops moved out at 0200 hours, 5 April, from the MUEHLHAUSEN area. One troop advanced on KEULA, one on GROSS BRUECHTER and one on EBELEBEN (RD0802). The squadron, less the three reinforced troops, followed the route of the troop marching on GROSS BRUECHTER.

Enemy resistance during the movement was light, consisting mostly of small arms fire. All towns were cleared by 2000 hours with minimum loss to the squadron. The squadron command post was located at UKEICH (RC9903). By 1000 hours, 6 April, road blocks had been established on all main routes leading south toward MUEHLHAUSEN, ERFURT (WJ3270) and WEIMAR (WJ5271), and patrols were operating over unimproved roads between these main roads.

During the ensuing week, the screen was constantly probed by the enemy seeking to go south out of NORDHAUSEN (RD1227), in the direction of ERFURT and WEIMAR. Several concentrated attacks were made by the enemy, but all were successfully repulsed, although not without loss to the squadron. This screen was maintained until contact was established with elements of the First Army, at 1630 hours, 12 April 1945, in the vicinity of NORDHAUSEN. It was later learned that as result of the establishment and maintenance of this screen, the enemy was forced to move east rather than south, as had been his original intention.



86TH CAV RCN SQ:

Screen for 6th Armd Div N.E. of MÜHLHAUSEN
5 - 12 April 1945

d. (1) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP,

INFANTRY DIVISION -- OFFENSIVE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

104th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: Attack from BORGENTREICH Area to WESER River in Advance of 104th Infantry Division, 7 April 1945.

On 4 April 1945, the 104th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, of the 104th Infantry Division, with one platoon of infantry and the Assault Gun Platoon of the 750th Tank Battalion attached, moved from PADBERG (RB7212), Germany, to HOTTHEIM (RB8233). On 5 and 6 April, this force, known as "Task Force Laundon", moved through BLANKENRODE (RB8227) and BORGENTREICH (RC0532), protecting the division left flank.

On 7 April 1945, Task Force Laundon, preceding the 413th and 415th Regimental Combat Teams, captured the towns of LAMERDEN (RC1026), EBERSCHUTZ (RC1328) and HUMME (RC1526). At HUMME, the force divided with one platoon moving along Route 2 and capturing SCHONEBERG (RC1626) and EDERSCHUTZ (RC1228). The 2d Platoon moved north from HUMME and captured STAMMEN (RC1531). This platoon then proceeded along Route 1 and captured FRIEDRICHSFELD (RC2032), turned north again on Corn Phase Line and captured GOTTSPUREN (RC2233). The 1st Platoon moved along Route 1 to the west end of GIESELWERDER (RC2635) where it found the bridge over the WESER River blown, reaching that point at 1505 hours. By 1700 hours, the final objective on the WESER River had been reached by all platoons. On the following day, the troop commenced a new mission of protecting the division left flank.

This operation demonstrated the ability of a mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop, fighting on a lightly defended front, to operate with speed in advance of regimental combat teams, capturing successive key positions and making it possible for the bulk of the division to advance without loss of time.



104TH CAV RCN TR:

Attack to WESER
River
7 April 1945

d. (2) MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP, INFANTRY DIVISION - RECONNAISSANCE

(Appendix 6, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

80th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: Reconnaissance during Advance of 80th Infantry Division to KASSEL, 1 - 3 April 1945.

At 1400 hours on 1 April 1945, two task forces of Combat Command "A", 6th Armored Division, were halted by corps order six miles south of KASSEL (RC2004), its mission of seizing KASSEL having been changed. By 1700 hours, the 318th Regimental Combat Team of the 80th Infantry Division passed through and relieved the combat command of the 6th Armored Division in its zone. The 80th Infantry Division was disposed with regimental combat teams abreast, in order, from east to west, 319th, 318th and 317th. The 9th Armored Division, under First Army, was operating in the zone to the west of the 80th Division.

On the morning of 1 April 1945, the 80th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop of the 80th Division, assembled in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (RH1575), was assigned the mission of reconnoitering in the division zone and maintaining contact with elements of the First Army on the division's left flank. In the pursuance of this mission, the first platoon reached FRITZLAR (RH0863), where it made contact with the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion of the 9th Armored Division, the 102d Cavalry Group and the 2d Ranger Battalion, all elements of the First Army. The platoon proceeded through HADDAMAR (RH0785), LOHNE (RH0788), MERZHAUSEN (RH0793), and then northeast to NIEDENSTEIN (RH1094). In the meantime, the third platoon followed the task force of the 6th Armored Division via WAHLERN (RH1379), ZENNERN (RH1080), WERKEL (RH1085), WEHREN (RH0987), KIRCHBURG (RH0990), and BERKHEIS (RH1294). No opposition was met by either platoon but 15 P's were taken during the day. As for the 2d Platoon, it remained in troop reserve.

On 2 April, the division met stiffening resistance in the outskirts of KASSEL (RC2004). This increased resistance was felt by the 1st and 3d Platoons as they continued north, and sporadic anti-tank and small arms fire was received enroute. However, the 1st Platoon reached ISTTRA (RC0402) and the 3d Platoon reached BREITENBACH (RH0999), without difficulty. During this operation 15 prisoners were captured, and two enemy trucks and two 88mm guns destroyed. Contact was maintained with the 2d Ranger Battalion and the 102d Cavalry Group; and contact was also established with the 273d Infantry Regiment of the 69th Division. On 3 April, the 80th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop performed the mission of reconnoitering the zone of advance of the 317th Regimental Combat Team to EHLEN (RC1004). Later that day, the troop was relieved by the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz) and was attached to the 319th Regimental Combat Team. The troop was then given the mission of reconnoitering the division's right flank south of KASSEL (RC2004).

This operation illustrates a typical assignment for a cavalry reconnaissance troop of an infantry division--reconnaissance, with security also provided. Enemy resistance was light and scattered, but was about the maximum which could be successfully engaged while maintaining required speed.



80TH CAV RCN TR:

Reconnaissance for
80th Inf Div S. of
KASSEL
1 - 3 April 1945

APPENDIX 7

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS FIRST U.S. ARMY ON MECHANIZED CAVALRY OPERATIONS

FIRST US ARMY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945
Annex No. 5
Armored Section Report

* * * * * * * *

SECTION VII - ARMORED OPERATIONS

A. MECHANIZED CAVALRY OPERATIONS

Campaigns in Western Europe proved the doctrine of "sneaking and peeping" by reconnaissance units to be unsound. Cavalry units had to fight to obtain information. Organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry based solely on requirements for reconnaissance missions was proved to be equally unsound. Both cavalry groups and squadrons were handicapped in the performance of their assigned missions because of lack of organic strength and firepower.

Mechanized cavalry accomplished the following assigned missions over the period covered by this report:

1. Dismounted attack of an important terrain feature.

2. Dismounted attack in a zone.

3. Seizing and holding a town or communications center.

4. Counter-reconnaissance, screening and blocking.

5. Filling a gap and maintaining contact between division, corps, and armies.

6. Pursuit.

7. Covering force and rear guard.

8. Defense of wide sectors of the Siegfried Line.

9. Reconnaissance in force.

10. Patrolling and mopping-up of an area.

11. Reconnaissance of routes and bridges including seizure and holding them.

12. Offensive operation in the enemy rear area.

Reinforcement of cavalry units with motorized infantry, tank destroyers, artillery, engineers and tanks was required for accomplishment of most combat missions. Such attachment permitted units to brush aside enemy resistance and push rapidly forward into enemy rear areas. Cavalry squadrons were the basic tactical unit. Vigorous patrolling of enemy positions convinced the enemy that our

positions were held in force. The fact that an entire corps was used to relieve one cavalry group at the Siegfried Line emphasizes the contribution by cavalry on combat missions.

Assault gun troops were generally used in battery for indirect fire support and when artillery was available this unit was placed under the Artillery Commander for coordination of harassing and interdictory fires.

Mobility and speed made possible quick reduction of towns and villages by attack from the rear and by surprise.

Communication often was the key to success in moving rapidly, concentrating where resistance was weakest, by-passing heavy resistance, penetrating into rear area installations, cutting off routes of enemy withdrawal, preventing demolition of bridges, and close coordination and cooperation with fighter bomber cover in reduction of strong-points, neutralization of enemy armor, and scattering enemy units forming for counterattack. On 31 August 1944 when the VII Corps changed direction to the north, the 4th Cavalry Group filled the gap between First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army, advanced on a wide front, captured Mezieres, established a bridgehead over the Meuse River and saved a full infantry division to the corps for the decisive battle in the vicinity of Mons.

During the German counteroffensive, the 14th Cavalry Group fought a successful rearguard action covering the enemy salient until the 7th Armored Division could be moved to that sector.

A definite need was demonstrated for the rifle trooper in cavalry organization and combat although there was no requirement for horses for mounting him. Cavalry retained its tactical importance and use, and the fact that horses were not required as a means of obtaining mobility and speed did not eliminate the necessity for troops to perform the cavalry mission. Lack of strength and firepower for combat necessitated battlefield improvisation.

The flexibility visualized in the group organization was not required; and the elimination of the regiment removed those elements of unity, esprit-de-corps, history and morale which concern the preponderant part of the soldier's life, the importance of which cannot be minimized and which makes for the close association and cooperation required of cavalry on the battlefield.

* * * * * * * *

E. COMBAT LESSONS

1. Mechanized cavalry must be organized and equipped for combat and must fight to gain information.

2. Flexibility visualized in the group organization for cavalry units was not required.

3. Mechanized cavalry must be capable of accomplishing all cavalry missions in addition to performing reconnaissance.

APPENDIX 8

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

MISCELLANEOUS OPINIONS AND INFORMATION CONCERNING

CHARACTERISTICS OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

(NOTES - Opinions pertaining to characteristics are also contained in:

Appendix 10, General Mission, etc (Senior Officers).
Appendix 11, General Mission, etc (Mechanized Cavalry Commanders).
Appendix 15, Organization and Equipment (Senior Officers).
Appendix 16, Organization and Equipment (Mechanized Cavalry Commanders).

Information pertaining to characteristics is also contained in: Appendix 6, Combat Examples.
Appendix 7, Report of Headquarters, First Army, on Mechanized Cavalry Operations.)

a. Mobility

(1) The following is an example illustrating the superior mounted mobility of mechanized cavalry, on roads:

On 20 April 1945, the 115th Cavalry Group (less 104th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) was relieved from attachment to the 66th Infantry Division near ST NAZAIRE (VN5662), France, where it had been holding a defensive sector since 12 March, and was alerted for movement to Germany. On 21 April, the march began, and on 25 April, the destination, GEISLINGEN (WS5504), was reached, and the group became attached to VI Corps. On 26 April, the 115th Cavalry Group commenced a mission of aggressive reconnaissance under the 103d Infantry Division. Thus in the space of six days, this mechanized cavalry unit relinquished a defensive sector in northwestern France, marched approximately 950 miles, and commenced a reconnaissance mission in southwestern Germany. The tracked vehicles of the group made the trip by rail.

(2) The following example illustrates the unsuitability of heavy vehicles for service with mechanized cavalry units in fast moving situations.

Early on 1 September 1944, the 113th Cavalry Group crossed the OISE River at BEAUMONT (VS0375), and at about midday, it commenced a two day 150 mile advance generally north and northeast, providing security for the 30th and 79th Infantry Divisions. Reinforcing the group were Company B 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion and Company B 82d Engineer Battalion, of which a platoon was attached to each squadron.

Resistance on the first day of the operation was very light and so the speed of the advance was 20 and even 25 miles per hour for long periods. The tank destroyer company was equipped with M10 tank destroyers, and these vehicles soon showed themselves unable to stand the pace. Instead, they gradually dropped out or fell back, and they did not reach the Belgian border until 3 or 4 September. As a result, the group was required to perform this

important security mission without tank destroyer support.

b. Fire Power

(1) The following is a tabulation of the fire power of the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron and the infantry battalion:

Weapon	Cavalry Squadron	Infantry Battalion
75mm gun	17	0
75mm howitzer	6	0
57mm gun	0	3
37mm gun	37	0
81mm mortar	0	6
60mm mortar	27	9
Cal. .50 mg	25	6
Cal. .30 mg	122	22
Cal. .30 BAR	0	45
Cal. .30 rifle	126	624
Cal. .30 carbine	394	249

(2) The following principal points are revealed:

(a) The cavalry squadron has marked superiority in most supporting weapons and in machine guns.

(b) The infantry battalion has marked advantage in BARs and in rifles.

(3) It can be deduced that in a dismounted fire-fight, when weapons have to be transported long distances by hand, the infantry battalion, having more of such weapons which are easily transportable, can develop greater strength, particularly as the cavalry squadron must normally leave about 25 percent of its fighting strength with the vehicles as drivers. However, when conditions are fairly fluid and fighting can be done from vehicles or at short distances from them, the cavalry squadron can quickly develop a fire power at least 200 percent greater than the infantry battalion, although having only 75 percent of the infantry battalion's strength in personnel.

c. Adaptability and Flexibility.

The following are some examples of task forces which were built around mechanized cavalry groups and commanded by mechanized cavalry group commanders (see also Appendix 6):

Task Force Polk (Defense of MOSELLE River Line, October 1944)

Hq & Hq Tr, 3d Cav Gp, Mecz
3d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
43d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
1st Bn, 330th Inf
Hq & Hq Btry, 40th FA Gp
689th FA Bn (155mm how)
241st FA Bn (105mm how)
807th TD Bn
135th Engr (C) Bn
1 Regt de Paris (Fr)
2 Regt de Paris (Fr)
Div Bn (Fr)
Bn Freddy (Fr)

Task Force Fickett (Offensive, from KOBLENZ (WL9997) to the FRANKFURT (WM7776) - GIESSEN (WG6623) Autobahn, March 1945)

Hq & Hq Tr, 6th Cav Gp, Mecz	253d AFA Bn
6th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz	Co B 808th TD Bn
28th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz	Co C 808th TD Bn
Co K 304th Inf Regt	Co A 44th Engr (C) Bn
Co L 304th Inf Regt	Co C 293d Engr (C) Bn

d. Self-Sufficiency

The following is an example illustrative of the ability of mechanized cavalry to operate in enemy territory.

On 29 April 1945, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop B) under control of the 113th Cavalry Group, struck east and southeast into enemy territory from the 83d Infantry Division's bridgehead across the ELBE River at ZERBST (RD9683), with mission of establishing contact with Russian forces, reported to be advancing from the east. For two days, the squadron fought its way towards the Russian lines; and in the afternoon of 30 April, after having captured 5000 German prisoners and inflicted numerous additional casualties against the enemy, it established the required contact, the first for Ninth Army, at APOLLENSDORF (RE3174), more than 25 miles beyond leading elements of the 83d Infantry Division.

e. Fighting Ability

The following comparison of the casualty rates of mechanized cavalry and two of the other ground arms reveals one reason for the staying power demonstrated by mechanized cavalry in combat. The tabulation presented is based upon the experiences of three infantry divisions, three armored divisions and three mechanized cavalry groups (with two attached mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons each), which arrived on the European continent at approximately the same time.

	Infantry Divisions	Armored Divisions	Cavalry Groups
Average days on continent	307	312	304
Percentage of combat days	80%	73%	85%
Average combat loss per 1000 men per 30 day month	105	58	36
Average non-combat loss per 1000 men per 30 day month	70	47	16
Total losses per 1000 men per 30 day month	175	95	52

NOTE: Figures for non-combat losses were available for only one of the three cavalry groups.

(1) The main point revealed by this tatulation is that, while the cavalry units were engaged more constantly than were the infantry and armored units, their average rate of loss was far less than that of the others.

(2) Study of combat interviews and conversation with combat-experienced mechanized cavalry leaders point to the following reasons for this difference:

(a) The more fluid and dispersed type of warfare in which the mechanized cavalryman often engages, and the protection which he receives from his vehicle, make him less vulnerable to combat loss.

(b) The mechanized cavalryman's vehicle, from which he was seldom far or long removed, provided him comforts and added necessities, such as food, clothing and heat, which rendered him less liable to non-combat loss.

(c) The lower rates of expansion and attrition in the mechanized cavalry, as compared with the infantry and armored force, resulted in a greater availability of trained leaders, in all grades, whose experience reduced combat losses and whose constant supervision of living conditions, morale and esprit reduced non-battle losses.

APPENDIX 9

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS (FROM QUESTIONNAIRES)

GENERAL MISSION, TACTICAL

DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE AND FUTURE ROLE OF

MECHANIZED CAVALRY

		Army Corps, and Div Comdrs	Mecz Cav Group Comdrs	Mecz Cav Rcn Sq Comdrs	Others	Totals
a. Should the mission of mecz cavalry be combat rather than primarily reconnaissance?	YES	13	12	12	25	62
	NO	4	0	0	1	5
b. Should the tactical doctrine and technique of mecz cavalry be generally that prescribed in FM 2-15?	YES	9	10	11	26	56
	NO	1	2	1	0	4
c. Should the word reconnaissance be dropped from the designation of the mecz cavalry squadron and mecz cavalry troop?	YES	13	12	12	25	62
	NO	4	0	0	1	5
d. In order to enable mecz cavalry to perform its combat role with full facility and effectiveness, is it essential that changes in its organization and equipment be made?	YES	17	12	12	26	67
	NO	0	0	0	0	0
e. Should the mecz cavalry regt be assigned organically to corps instead of being attached?	YES	5				5
	NO	1				1

APPENDIX 10

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF OPINIONS OF SENIOR OFFICERS CONCERNING GENERAL MISSION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE AND FUTURE ROLE OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

(NOTE - Sources are letters addressed to Chief of Armored Section, The General Board, in reply to requests for opinions, unless otherwise stated.)

a. Army Commander

Lt Gen W. H. Simpson, USA, CG, Ninth Army

"The general mission of mechanized cavalry is reconnaissance, and it is generally agreed that this will be its future role . . . In addition to its primary mission of reconnaissance, mechanized cavalry must be capable of performing secondary missions such as flank protection, screening, and pursuit as well as typical offensive and defensive combat."

"I believe that it would be uneconomical to assign mechanized cavalry groups and squadrons organically to the corps. They should continue under army control."

b. Corps Commanders

(1) Maj Gen John Millikin, USA, CG, III Corps

". . . . Mechanized cavalry should cease to be a reconnaissance force only. It should return to the traditional cavalry role of a light, highly mobile, combat force."

(2) Maj Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA, CG, III Corps

"Mechanized cavalry regiments (or groups) should be organically assigned to corps (one to each) rather than, as at present, to armies. Each corps with which I am familiar always had a group attached to it. Such a light, highly mobile, well armed combat force was invaluable. Often the mission did not justify the use of a division; therefore by using the cavalry group I was able to preserve the integrity of divisions and at the same time better perform the mission. Since the necessity for such a unit to each corps is conceded, it would appear that by having it assigned, rather than attached, combat efficiency would be increased."

(3) Maj Gen S. Leroy Irwin, USA, CG, XII Corps

"In the ETO, cavalry was most successful in combat, both offensive and defensive. It is particularly well adapted to the active defense of river lines and similar natural obstacles. On the offensive, proper exploitation of its fire power often enabled a relatively insignificant cavalry unit to achieve surprising results."

(4) Lt Gen Wade H. Haislip, USA, CG, XV Corps

Extract from letter, Headquarters Seventh Army, 15 June 1945,

to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, subject: "Reorganization of Mechanized Cavalry Units":

"This type organization (mechanized cavalry group) has proven itself to be invaluable to a corps commander. It has speed, communications, and combat value which have enabled it to perform all types of missions. Contrary to previous War Department doctrine, this organization through necessity engaged in combat missions to a much greater degree than on purely reconnaissance missions, and has proven the efficacy of a small, well-trained, well-equipped combat unit. Its major deficiency is in lack of adequate rifle strength to balance its mounted units. . . . . Its best reconnaissance has been performed by means of the attack."

(5) Lt Gen Walton H. Walker, USA, CG, XX Corps

"Generally a reconnaissance role, used for fighting reconnaissance to flanks or front when an armored division is not in the lead."

c. Division Commanders

(1) Maj Gen I. D. White, USA, CG, 2d Armd Div

Extract from letter, Headquarters, the Cavalry School, 3 Nov 1945, to chief of mechanized cavalry subsection, Armored Section, The General Board:

". . . . There should be no limitations placed on the type of mission given the cavalry mechanized unit. We should . . teach that aggressive action generally requiring combat is the best way to obtain information of the enemy."

(2) Maj Gen John W. Leonard, USA, CG, 9th Armd Div

". . . These units (mechanized cavalry) should be organized, equipped and trained to perform reconnaissance, security and combat missions for the unit to which they are assigned or attached. I believe that in the ETO situations where mechanized cavalry units were used purely for reconnaissance alone were rare. Generally, they were used on missions involving combat and had to be strongly reinforced. . . . ."

"I believe there should be a definite close tie-up between the mechanized cavalry groups and the armored elements . . . . Coordination of effort in training and training doctrines, development of equipment and weapons, interchange of ideas and information would be more simple and better controlled under one head."

(3) Maj Gen W. M. Robertson, USA, CG, 2d Inf Div

"Study of the operations in Europe will lead to the conviction that armor must, to be successful, be employed with increasingly large amounts of infantry, and conversely, that the infantry division, to be successful, must be employed with increasingly large amounts of armor. If this be true, then the cavalry must provide the mobility on the battlefield required for operations of pursuit and exploitation."

APPENDIX 11

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF OPINIONS OF OFFICERS WHO COMMANDED MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS IN COMBAT CONCERNING THE GENERAL MISSION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE, AND FUTURE ROLE OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY.

(NOTE: Sources are answers to questionnaires, unless otherwise stated.)

a. Mechanized Cavalry Group Commanders.

(1) Col James H. Polk, Cav — CO, 3d Cav Gp, Mecz

"FM 2-15 must be entirely rewritten based on the following assumptions: Horse cavalry is strictly a special purpose unit . . . . ; mechanized cavalry has assumed the traditional role of cavalry except in the concept of its use in mass, and it has become the light, fast, hard hitting unit of the corps -- a complement to the infantry division and the armored division; mechanized cavalry may be grouped into brigades or divisions for special operations; mechanized cavalry is ideally suited to the task force principle -- by supplementing its regiments by the other arms, it can successfully operate in almost any terrain against any type of resistance."

(2) Col (now Brig Gen) Joseph M. Tully, Cav — CO, 4th Cav Gp, Mecz

See Exhibit A, AGF Report No. 483, 29 December 1944 (War Department Observers Board), for a thorough discussion of mission, doctrine, tactics and technique.

(3) Col Edward M. Fickett, Cav — CO, 6th Cav Gp, Mecz

Extract from Section IV, Report After Action against Enemy, Headquarters, 6th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, for April, 1945 (see also inclosure to AGF Report No. 1007, 5 June 1945):

"The cavalry groups . . . for the most part . . . have been employed as light combat commands, completely in accord with the principles considered sound prior to the adoption of the present organization and prior to the announcement of the present doctrine of employment and operation. . . ."

"Efforts and doctrine directed towards making the cavalry squadron exclusively a reconnaissance unit, not participating in combat other than as a necessity of extrication from enemy reaction or in the exceptional case of limited engagement by fire to obtain information desired, is faulty. . . . There is no occasion, no opportunity, and no justification for the maintenance in large commands of such an extremely costly, highly trained organization simply for the purpose of executing reconnaissance. Foremost among the reasons for this statement is . . . that the reconnaissance contemplated carries the organization into enemy territory well in advance of leading combat echelons of larger commands. In practice, this can rarely be done, the exception being a break-through situation. . . . Force is definitely required; stealth will not take the squadron as a unit through the enemy's lines. A second . . . reason for this statement is the fact that tactical air reconnaissance . . . almost supplants entirely the need of a ground reconnaissance agency in the field of distant reconnaissance. . . . The cavalry . . . remains . . . as a combat arm. As such, it must be capable of execution of the normal cavalry missions as outlined in FM 2-15. The tactical concepts announced therein for horse cavalry are, with certain modifications because of differences in transportation and arms, equally applicable to mechanized cavalry

units. Cavalry is . . . an organization trained, equipped and capable of executing offensive and defensive action, delaying action, reconnaissance, pursuit, and exploitation, the execution of all these actions being characterized by lightness, speed, and the delivery of a tremendous volume of firepower, action over short periods of time and with limited objectives rather than engagement in sustained action. . . . Groups have normally been augmented or reinforced. . . . While these task forces have been outstandingly successful . . ., these attachments do not in any way alter the fact that the cavalry squadron . . as now organized and equipped is not the efficient fighting force in its own right that is required by the nature of the missions assigned it and by the action expected of it. There is no question but that the cavalry squadron must be a light organization. At the same time it must be given the means of executing offensive missions."

(4) Col Vennard Wilson, Cav — CO, 106th Cav Gp, Mecz

"The cavalry troop of the infantry division . . . was a great disappointment to me. . . . I prefer it as a squadron organization, even if a short squadron. We need a great deal more education at Leavenworth as to its capabilities for the benefit of division staffs."

b. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders.

(1) Lt Col John F. Rhoades, Cav — CO, 4th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz

"During the war in Europe, the 4th Cavalry was repeatedly committed in every type of role except one -- we were not dropped by parachute or glider. Troops were detached and operated separately; the squadron, both organic and reinforced by infantry, artillery, tank destroyers, and medium tanks and engineers, was detached from group; the group was committed separately, both unsupported and strongly 'beefed' up by attachments of all arms. We were committed both mounted and dismounted in attack, penetration, mop-up, pursuit, and defense, in every conceivable type of terrain and weather. As a result of our experiences, I am convinced that there is nothing new in tactics -- the doctrines of horse cavalry as they have been taught for the past many years are 100% sound, correct, and applicable to modern war."

(2) Lt Col Samuel McC. Goodwin, Cav — CO, 6th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz

"The doctrine for the employment of horse cavalry enunciated in FM 2-15 is applicable to mechanized cavalry except where this doctrine is keyed to the mobility, speed, and limitations due to the living flesh and instinct of the horse. An examination, paragraph by paragraph, of this doctrine should be made by an experienced board of mechanized officers to render the doctrine complete and correct. The combat spirit implied in this field manual as the distinctive characteristic of the cavalryman has passed . . . . to the mechanized-armored fighter. The specific role of light cavalry as formerly assigned to the horse cavalry unit is the role developed by those mechanized cavalry groups that fought as task forces across Europe."

(3) Lt Col Charles J. Hodge, Cav — CO, 117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz

"The mission of cavalry is to 'fight'. . . . Any teachings that limit the combat activities of cavalry to reconnaissance only are far removed from experience and actuality and as such are misleading sufficiently to become dangerous doctrine to the young cavalry officer."

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commander, Armored Division.

Summary of comments in Report After Action Against Enemy, Hq, 86th Cav Rcn Sq, August, 1944:

It was indicated that more successful operation of the squadron would have been effected had the squadron been allowed to operate as a unit rather than have its troops attached to combat commands. The squadron commander felt that he could give better support to the reconnaissance troops had they been under him, than was given to them by the combat command.

APPENDIX 12

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF OPINIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN CORPS AND DIVISION MECHANIZED CAVALRY AND BETWEEN MECHANIZED CAVALRY AND OTHER GROUND ARMS, WITH AND WITHOUT AIR SUPPORT

(NOTE - Sources are answers to questionnaires, unless otherwise stated.)

a. Senior Commanders

(1) Maj Gen John Millikin, USA, CG, III Corps

Extract from letter, Headquarters Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, 13 November 1945, to Chief of Armored Section, The General Board:

"Liaison aircraft will greatly facilitate communications. Consideration might well be given to the 'radio link' telephone service normal between corps and division."

(2) Maj Gen W. M. Robertson, USA, CG, 2d Inf Div

Extract from letter, Headquarters XV Corps, 20 October 1945, to Chief of Armored Section, The General Board:

"One method which was used . . . was to establish phase lines on which information would be exchanged with units in the same zone of action. Another was by the provision of liaison parties, radio equipped, through whom complete information was available at all times. These methods (had) in each case to be improvised, and in some cases taught. Likewise, the personnel to effect this coordination had to be withdrawn from units already below strength and gathered together with improvised equipment and materials to perform the task. The principle must be that this coordination must be planned in advance, personnel and equipment effected, and then carried through with vigor and intelligence."

b. Mechanized Cavalry Group Commanders and Staffs

(1) Col James H. Polk, Cav CO, 3d Cav Gp, Mecz

Between corps and division mechanized cavalry:

"Very little can be prescribed . . . It is a question of education . . . and a proper cavalry doctrine . . .
The following is also recommended: exact similarity in organization and equipment; centralized control in the training of cavalry officers and specialists; proper training manuals and publications; large scale maneuvers."

Between mechanized cavalry and other arms:

"Here the problem is chiefly a technical one - that of radio communication. A better radio set must be developed, that is capable of setting up on all radio channels used by the combatant branches."

(2) Col Vennard Wilson, Cav CO, 106th Cav Gp

"I do not feel that any special coordination is required between various cavalry elements. . . Each has a mission from his own commander, and when missions (in terms of terrain or areas) are properly assigned, coordination is obtained through sending liaison officers, with adequate communications, to adjacent units. . . . . I do not like to work a cavalry group on a corps mission on the immediate front of a moving armored division. . . . . They used their own squadrons in their zones, and I worked the zones of the infantry divisions and kept track of the cavalry of the armored division through liaison. By personal visits to the headquarters of the infantry divisions in my zone, I gave them my planned moves, which were always coordinated to the best interests of the force as a whole, and coordinated my movements with theirs. It was by agreement between division commanders and myself that plans were made as to what roads or areas were to be covered by us, and what we would leave for them. The division commander then decided as to whether he would utilize his cavalry or his infantry to cover places which I was not taking. In other words, the coordination was with the division, not the cavalry of the division. I have also changed corps boundaries (in effect) by coordination with the commander of an adjacent division. I advised the division commanders as to what use they could best make of their own cavalry to tie in with mine. . . . . The personal visit of the cavalry regiment commander is the only way to secure adequate coordination."

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders

(1) Lt Col Samuel Mc C Goodwin, Cav — CO, 6th Cav Ren Sq, Mecz

"Service, tactics, technique of (corps and division cavalry) must spring from the same origin. The following means will assist in accomplishing this: rotation of officer assignments . . . . ; practical, common source of officer and enlisted training; publication of a sound, practical common doctrine, by the Cavalry School; attendance of selected cavalry officers at the Armored Force, Infantry and Artillery Schools; adoption of common radio equipment and . . . . systems of nettings of all cavalry units; revision of current C.G.S. School policies on employment of cavalry . . . . ."

(2) Lt Col Allen D. Hulse, Cav — CO, 113th Cav Ren Sq, Mecz

"When operating adjacently - proper liaison. When corps cavalry is operating in front of a division, the organic division cavalry should be attached to the corps cavalry or should perform missions for the division on the flanks or to the rear."

d. Mechanized Cavalry Squadron Commander, Armored Division

Lt Col Sherburne Whipple, Jr., Cav — CO, 92d Cav Ren Sq, Mecz

"Advance to contact - Corps cavalry operates on exposed flank (or flanks). Divisional cavalry may precede division along assigned axis, or may operate on division's flank (s).
When reconnaissance is desired by corps, duplication of effort by corps and divisional cavalry should be avoided. Armored divisional cavalry should be attached to corps cavalry in this case.
In defense - Corps cavalry may operate on corps flanks-- fill gaps between corps. Likewise divisional cavalry may operate on division flanks or fill gaps within a division sector.

In attack - Corps cavalry may make a holding or limited objective attack, protect flanks, or be held in reserve to exploit a break through or initiate reconnaissance. Divisional cavalry can be used for the same mission within division boundaries.
In pursuit - Corps cavalry may operate on corps flank (s) along axes (or zone) of pursuit generally parallel to armored divisions making the main effort. Armored division cavalry may precede the division along assigned axes (or zone), or may operate on one or more flanks of the division. Infantry divisions generally follow armored divisions, in which case infantry division cavalry is used to maintain liaison, reconnoiter routes, etc.
Delay or withdrawal-Employment is similar to pursuit, in reverse. Corps cavalry should be used in advance of divisional cavalry only for the purpose of preliminary reconnaissance and should withdraw to flank (s) as soon as relieved."

e. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Commander, Infantry Division

Capt Harry J. McNamara, Cav — CO, 102d Cav Ron Tr, Mecz

Between corps and division mechanized cavalry:

"A few of the methods and techniques used by my organization were: the monitoring of corps cavalry radio nets; close liaison with corps cavalry units and their hqs. . . . . It is recommended that during the training and maneuver period, greater stress be placed on the part each unit is to play, and problems presented where this coordination can be effected. . . . ."

Between mechanized cavalry and other arms:

"During combat it was necessary to orient other arms as to the mission of cavalry and its possibilities. In most cases other arms did not understand how cavalry was to be employed, or its organization. After it was proved that cavalry could be a definite help to these other arms in carrying out their missions, it was very easy to obtain coordination and cooperation."

APPENDIX 13

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

CHARTS OF PROPOSED ORGANIZATION

FOR MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

a. Cavalry Regiment

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Regiment

c. Service Troop, Cavalry Regiment

d. Medical Detachment, Cavalry Regiment

e. Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment

f. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment

g. Cavalry Troop

h. Cavalry Platoon

i. Dragoon Troop

j. Dragoon Platoon

k. Light Tank Troop, Cavalry Squadron

l. Howitzer Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment

m. Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division

n. Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division

o. Howitzer Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division

A. CAVALRY REGIMENT

(APPENDIX 13 REPORT ON MECHANIZED CAVALRY)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

53 LIGHT TANKS M-24
18 TANK DESTROYERS M-18
18 HOWITZER MOTOR CARRIAGES
107 ARMORED CARS
114 PERSONNEL CARRIERS
120 2 1/2 T TRUCKS
38 1 1/2 T TRUCKS
372 1/4 T TRUCKS
9 3/4 T AMBULANCES
10 TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES
4 WRECKERS 10 T

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS

18 76MM GUNS (IN TDs)
18 105MM HOWITZERs SP
53 75MM GUNS (IN TANKS)
107 37MM (OR LARGER) GUNS IN A/CS
328 .50 CAL MGs
160 .30 CAL CO-AXIAL MGS
366 .30 CAL VEH & GRD MOUNT
36 81MM MORTARS

b. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13 Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



* Vehs in Air Ln Sec: 3-2½ T Trucks
1-1½ T Truck
5-½ T Trucks

c1. SERVICE TROOP, CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS

2-Armored Cars
36-2 1/2 T Trucks
7-1½ T Trucks
19-¼ T Trucks
4-Wreckers, 10 T.
4-Tank Recovery Vehicles

2-37mm (or larger) guns (in trad carrs)
28-.50 cal MGs
2-.30 cal co-axial MGs
22-.30 cal MGs veh & grd mount

d. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

1-2½ T Truck
4-1½ T Trucks
9-3/4 T Ambulances
23-¼ T Trucks

e. CAVALRY SQUADRON,
CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS

17-Light Tanks, M-24
6-Tank Destroyers, M-18
6-Howitzer Motor Carriages
34-Armored Cars
36-Personnel Carriers
2-Tank Recovery Vehicles
75-2½ T Trucks
7-1½ T Trucks
101-½ T Trucks
(10 w/reel)

6-76mm guns (in TDs)
6-105mm howitzers, SP
17-75mm guns (in tanks)
34-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
94-.50 cal MGs
51-.30 cal co-axial MGs
108-.30 cal MGs veh and grd mount
12-81mm mortars

f. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS

3-Armored Cars
3-Personnel Carriers
6-2½ T Trucks
3-1½ T Trucks
16-¼ T Trucks (1 ¼ T Truck, 1 /reel)
3-37mm (or larger) guns in Armd Cars
8-.50 cal MGs
3-.30 cal co-axial MGs
7-.30 cal MGs veh & grd mount

g. CAVALRY TROOP
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND TEAM WEAPONS

10-Armored Cars	10-37mm (or larger) guns in armd cars
4-Personnel Carriers	10-.30 cal co-axial MGs
3-2½ T Trucks	15-.30 cal MGs veh & grd mount
1-1½ T Truck	18-.50 cal MGs
21-¼ T Trucks (1 w/reel)	3-81mm mortars

h. CAVALRY PLATOON
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



Vehicles
3-Armored Cars
1-Personnel Carrier
5-¼ T Trucks

WEAPONS

Crew Served
3-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
3-.30 cal co-axial MGs
4-.30 cal MGs veh & gnd mount
5-.50 cal MGs (3 in armd cars, 2 in ¼ T trucks)
1-81mm Mortar

Individual
17-Pistols
24-Rifles
12-SMGs
1-BAR

Legend:
p-pistol-cal .45
r-M-1 rifle
s-submachine-gun
RO-radio operator

i. DRAGOON TROOP

(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND TEAM WEAPONS

1-Armored Car
13-Personnel Carriers
3-2½ T Trucks
1-1½ T Truck
10-¼ T Trucks (1-w/recl)
1-37mm (or larger) gun in armd car
10-.50 cal MGs
1-.30 cal co-axial MG
12-.30 cal MGs veh & grd mount
3-81mm mortars

j. DRAGOON PLATOON
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



VEHICLES
3-Personnel Carriers
1-¼ T Truck

WEAPONS
2-.30 cal MGs(on pers carr)
1-.50 cal MGs(on pers carr)
6-BARs
33-Rifles
4-SMGs
5-Pistols

r-Rifle
s-SMG
p-Pistol

k. LIGHT TANK TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND TANK WEAPONS

17-Light Tanks, m-24	17-75mm Guns
1-Personnel Carrier	4-.50 cal MGs
3-2½ T Trucks	17-.30 cal co-axial MGs
1 Tank Recovery Vehicle	37-.30 cal MGs veh & gr
3-1/4 Ton Trucks (1 w/reel)	

1. HOWITZER TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, CAVALRY REGIMENT
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND TEAM WEAPONS

6-Tank Destroyers, M-18
6-Howitzer Motor Carriages
7-Personnel Carriers
1-Tank Recovery Vehicle
4-2½ T Trucks
9-¼ T Trucks

6-105mm Howitzers, SP
6-76mm guns (in TDs)
18-.50 cal MGs
7-.30 cal MGs

m. CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION AND INFANTRY DIVISION
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

17-Light Tanks, M-24
8-Howitzer Motor Carriages
35-Armored Cars
38-Personnel Carriers
3-Tank Recovery Vehicles
1-Wrecker, 10 T
34-$2\frac{1}{2}$ T Trucks
9-$1\frac{1}{2}$ T Trucks
110-$\frac{1}{4}$ T Trucks
2-3/4 T Ambulances

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS

8-105mm howitzers, SP
17-75mm guns (in tanks)
35-37mm (or larger) gun (in armd cars)
101-.50 cal MGs
52-.30 cal co-axial MGs
116-.30 cal MGs veh & grd mount
12-81mm mortars

n. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION AND INFANTRY DIVISION
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



VEHICLES
4-Armored Cars
3-Pers Carriers
16-2½ T Trucks
3-1½ T Trucks
19-½ T Trucks (1-½ w/reel)
1-10 T Wrecker
1-Recovery Vehicle

WEAPONS
4-37mm (or larger) guns in (armd cars)
17-.50 cal MGs
4-.30 cal co-axial MGs
15-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mount)

o. HOWITZER TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION AND INFANTRY DIVISION
(Appendix 13, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)



SUMMARY OF VEHICLES AND TEAM WEAPONS

8-Howitzer Motor Carriages	8-105mm Howitzers, SP
9-Personnel Carriers	18-.50 cal MGs
1-Tank Recovery Vehicle	7-.30 cal MGs
3-2½ T Trucks	
9-½ T Trucks	

APPENDIX 14

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARIES OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS IN PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS

a. Cavalry Regiment

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Regiment

c. Service Troop, Cavalry Regiment

d. Medical Detachment, Cavalry Regiment

e. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment

f. Cavalry Troop, Cavalry Squadron

g. Dragoon Troop, Cavalry Squadron

h. Light Tank Troop, Cavalry Squadron

i. Howitzer Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment

j. Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division

k. Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division

a. CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(1) PERSONNEL

UNITS	Cav Tr	Total Cav Trs (3)	Drag Tr	Tk Tr, L	How Tr	Sq Hq and Hq Tr	Total Sq	Total Sqs (3)	Regtl Hq and Hq Tr	Regtl Sv Tr	Med Det (atchd)	Total Hqs, etc.	Total Regt
Officers	5	15	6	6	6	11	44	132	25	12 +3 (atchd)	10	47 +3 (atchd)	182
WOs	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	5	5
Enlisted Men	155	465	191	109	126	107	998	2994	169	189	82	440	3434
Atchd Chaps	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	3	3

(2) VEHICLES

TDs - M18	--	--	--	--	6	--	6	18	--	--	--	--	18
Tks, L - M24	--	--	--	17	--	--	17	51	2	--	--	2	53
Mot Carrs, 105mm How	--	--	--	--	6	--	6	18	--	--	--	--	18
Armd Cars	10	30	1	--	--	3	34	102	3	2	--	5	107
Pers Carrs	4	12	13	1	7	3	36	108	6	--	--	6	114
Recovery Vehs	--	--	--	1	1	--	2	6	--	4	--	4	10
10 Ton Wrks	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	4	4
2½ Ton Trks	3	9	3	3	4	6	25	75	8	36	1	45	120
1½ Ton Trks	1	3	1	--	--	3	7	21	6	7	4	17	38
1/4 Ton Trks	21	63	10	3	9	16	101	303	27	19	23	69	372
3/4 Ton Panel Ambs	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	9	9
TOTAL	39	117	28	25	33	31	234	702	52	72	37	161	863

(3) AIRPLANES (Liaison)

L-5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	--	3	3
L-4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	6	6

(4) WEAPONS

76mm Guns in TDs	--	--	--	--	6	--	6	18	--	--	--	--	18
75mm Guns in Tks	--	--	--	17	--	--	17	51	2	--	--	2	53
105mm Hows (SP)	--	--	--	--	6	--	6	18	--	--	--	--	18
37mm (or heavier) guns in Armd Cars	10	30	1	--	--	3	34	102	3	2	--	5	107
.50 Cal MGs	18	54	10	4	18	8	94	282	18	28	--	46	328
.30 Cal MGs (Co-Axial)	10	30	1	17	--	3	51	153	5	2	--	7	160
.30 Cal MGs (Veh & Grd Mt)	15	45	12	37	7	7	108	324	20	22	--	42	366
81mm Mortars	3	9	3	--	--	--	12	36	--	--	--	--	36

b. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS

Comd Section
1-Col, Regtl Comdr
1-Lt Col, Ex O
1-T/4, Stenographer
2-Drivers, truck, light
1-Orderly

2-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
4-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

S-1 Section
1-Major, S-1
1-M/Sgt, Sgt Major
1-Clerk, records
2-Clerks, typists
1-Driver

1-1 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
5-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

S-2 Section
1-Major, S-2
1-Capt, Asst S-2
1-M/Sgt, Int
1-Draftsman
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck, clerk

1-Pers carr
1-1/4 T Truck

2-Officers
6-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

S-3 Section
(Operations, I & E, Ln)
1-Lt Col, S-3
1-Major, Asst S-3 & Ln
1-Capt, I & E, Asst S-3
1-Capt, Asst operations
2-Capts (or Lts), Ln
1-M/Sgt, Operations
1-Draftsman
2-Clerks
1-Sgt, I & E
1-Cpl, Ln
1-Driver, perscarr
4-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
2-Operators, radio
1-Pers carr
4-1/4 T Trucks

6-Officers
13-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

Air Ln Section
4-Capts, Pilots
5-Lts, Pilots
1-T/Sgt, C of sec
4-T/3, Airplane mechs
5-T/4, Airplane mechs
2-Operators, radio
9-Drivers, truck

3-L-5 Airplanes
6-L-4 Airplanes
3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
5-1/4 T Trucks

9-Officers
21-Enlisted Men
9-Airplanes
9-Vehicles

COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON

Comd & Msg Cen Section
1-Capt, Com O
1-Lt, Asst Com O
1-M/Sgt, Com
1-S/Sgt, Msg cen
1-Sgt, Msgr dispatcher
1-Cpl, Asst dispatcher
2-Cpls, code clerks
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio
3-Messengers
4-Drivers, 1/4 T truck

1-Pers carr
4-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
16-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

Radio Section
1-Sgt, C of sec
3-Drivers, armd cars
3-Drivers, SCR 399 and 499 vehs
11-Operators, radio
2-Repairmen, radio

3-Armd cars
1-2 1/2 T Truck (SCR 399)
2-Pers carrs (SCR 499)
1-1 1/2 T Truck, radio repair

20-Enlisted Men
7-Vehicles

Wire Section
1-Sgt, wire chief
2-Operators, switchboard
4-Linemen
2-Drivers, truck, light

2-1 1/2 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck

9-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Total, Platoon:
2-Officers
45-Enlisted Men
15-Vehicles

SECURITY PLATOON

Comd Section
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-S/Sgt, Plat sgt
1-Sgt, Tank comdr
2-Drivers, tank
2-Asst drivers, tank
2-Gunners, tank
2-Cannoneers, tank
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck

2-Tanks, light
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
11-Enlisted Men

Traffic Section
1-Sgt, Sec ldr
5-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
9-Riflemen

5-1/4 T Trucks

15-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

Guard Section
1-Sgt, Sec ldr
1-Cpl, Asstsec ldr
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio
1-Driver, 2 1/2 T truck
10-Riflemen
1-Pers carr
1-2 1/2 T Truck

16- Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Total, Platoon:
1-Officer
42-Enlisted Men
10-Vehicles

Total, Regimental Headquarters:
23-Officers
136-Enlisted Men
9-Airplanes
45-Vehicles

HEADQUARTERS TROOP

Comd Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-Bugler, driver
1-Messenger

1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
2-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex O & Mtr O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
4-Cooks
2-Cooks' helpers
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply asst
2-Armorers
2-Drivers, truck, light
8-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-1 1/2 T Truck, Offs' mess
1-2 1/2 T Truck, Supply
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
24-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, motor
5-Mechanics
1-Mechanic, driver

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

7-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

(b. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Regiment, Contd)

Total, Headquarters Troop:
2-Officers
33-Enlisted Men
7-Vehicles

TOTAL, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP:
25-Officers
169-Enlisted Men
9-Planes
52-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
2-Light tanks, M24
6-Pers carrs (two w/SCR 499 radios)
3-Armd cars
8-2 1/2 T Trucks
6-1 1/2 T Trucks
27-1/4 T Trucks
3-L-5 Airplanes
6-L-4 Airplanes

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
2-75mm Guns (in tanks)
3-37mm (or larger) Guns in armd cars
18-.50 cal MGs
5-.30 cal MGs (co-axial)
20-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mount)

c. SERVICE TROOP, CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

TROOP HEADQUARTERS

Comd Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-Sgt, Com
1-Driver, armd car
2-Operators, radio
1-Operator, switchboard
1-Lineman, (driver)
1-Bugler (driver)

1-Armd car
2-1/4 T Trucks

1-Officer
7-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Adm, Mess & Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-Armorer
1-S/Sgt, Mess
4-Cooks
2-Cooks' helpers
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply asst
2-Drivers, truck, light
9-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-1 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-2 1/2 T Truck, supply
1-1 1/2 T Truck, supply
2-1/4 T Trucks

1-Officer
23-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, Maint
4-Mechanics
1-Mechanic, driver

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

6-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Total, Troop Headquarters:
2-Officers
36-Enlisted Men
11-Vehicles

S-4 SECTION
1-Major, S-4
1-Capt, Asst S-4
1-WO, Supply
1-M/Sgt, Supply
1-S/Sgt, Supply (rations)
1-Clerk, record
1-Clerk, supply
1-Clerk, driver
5-Drivers, truck
2-Handlers, ration

3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
2-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
1-Warrant Officer
12-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

(c. Service Troop, Cavalry Regiment, Contd)

TRANSPORTATION PLATOON

Comd Section
1-Lt, transport
1-T/Sgt, transport
1-Cpl, dispatcher
3-Drivers, truck, light

3-1/4 T Trucks

1-Officer
5 Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Sq Section (3)
1-Sgt, Truckmaster
6-Drivers, truck, light
2-Handlers, am

6-2 1/2 T Trucks

9-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

Total, Transportation Platoon:
1-Officer
32-Enlisted Men
21-Vehicles

ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL SECTION
1-Capt, Pers adj
2-WO Personnel
1-T/Sgt, Personnel
3-Sgts, Personnel
2-Clerks, classification
2-Clerks, mail
1-Clerk, typist
1-Clerk, driver

3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
2-Warrant Officers
10-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

MAINTENANCE PLATOON
1-Capt, Motor O
3-Lts, Asst Motor Os
1-WO, Motor
1-M/Sgt, Motor
3-T/Sgts, Motor
2-S/Sgts, Motor
4-Sgts, Recovery veh
1-Sgt, parts

3-Armorers
1-Driver, armd car
2-Operators, radio
20-Mechanics, motor
11-Mechanics, tank
4-Mechanics, artillery
4-Operators, 10 T wrecker
4-Drivers, recovery veh
4-Welders

1-Armd car
4-10 T Wreckers
7-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
4-1/4 T Trucks
4-Tk recovery vehs

4-Officers
1-Warrant Officer
64-Enlisted Men
21-Vehicles

NOTE: Sq Maint Sec consists of:
1-Lt, Motor O
1-T/Sgt, Motor sgt
1-Driver, recovery veh
1-Sgt, recovery veh comdr
1-Driver, 10 T wrecker
1-Mechanic, artillery
1-Armorer
1-Welder
5-Mechanics, motor
3-Mechanics, tank

1-Tank recovery veh
1-10 T Wrecker
2-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
15-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

SPECIAL SERVICE AND CHAPLAINS
1-Capt, Special Service
1-Lt, Athletic Instr
3-Attached Chaplains
1-Major
2-Capts
1-Sgt, Special Service
1-Athletic asst (driver)
2-Assts (drivers)
3-Chaplains' drivers

2-1 1/2 T Trucks
4-1/4 T Trucks

(c. Service Troop, Cavalry Regiment, Contd)

2-Officers
3-Attached Chaplains
7-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

BAND
1-WO, Band
28-Musicians
2-2 1/2 T Trucks

1-Warrant Officer
28-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

TOTAL, SERVICE TROOP:
12-Officers
3-Attached Chaplains
5-Warrant Officers
189-Enlisted Men
72-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
2-Armored cars
36-2 1/2 T Trucks
7-1 1/2 T Trucks
19-1/4 T Trucks
4-10 T Wreckers
4-Recovery vehs

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
2-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
28-.50 cal MGs
2-30 cal MGs (co-axial)
22-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mt)

d. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS SECTION
1-Major, Surgeon
1-Capt, Asst surgeon
1-M/Sgt, 1st sgt
1-Det Clerk
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-S/Sgt, Surgical
1-Sgt, medical
2-Surgeon's assts/1 Med asst
3-Drivers, ambulance
3-Drivers, asst, ambulance
4-Drivers, light truck
2-Aid men

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1 1/2 T Truck
3-3/4 T Panel ambulances
3-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
20-Enlisted Men
8-Vehicles

DENTAL SECTION
2-Capts, Dental offs
2-T/5 Dental techns

2-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
2-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

SQUADRON SECTION
(Identical in regimental and separate squadrons)
1-Capt, MC
1-Lt, MAC
1-T/Sgt, Surgical
2-Surg techns
1-Medical techn
6-Drivers, 1/4 T truck, aid men
5-Aid men
1-Driver, 1 1/2 T truck
2-Drivers, ambulance
2-Asst drivers, aid men

1-1 1/2 T Truck
2-Panel ambulances
6-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
20-Enlisted Men
9-Vehicles

TOTAL, MEDICAL DETACHMENT:
10-Officers
82-Enlisted Men
37-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
1-2 1/2 T Truck
4-1 1/2 T Trucks
9-3/4 T Ambulances
23-1/4 T Trucks

e. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS

Comd Section
1-Lt Col, Sq Comdr
1-Major, Ex O
1-Driver, armd car
2-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
2-Operators, radio
1-Messenger
1-Orderly

1-Armd car
2-1/4 T Trucks

2-Officers
7-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

S-1 Section
1-1st Lt, Adj
1-M/Sgt, Sgt major
2-T/5, Clerks, typists
1-Clerk, mail
1-Clerk, driver
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck

1-1 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
6-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

S-2 Section
1-Capt, S-2
1-T/Sgt, Int
1-Clerk, typist
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio

1-Pers carr

1-Officer
5-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

S-3 Section
1-Major, S-3
1-Capt, Ln & asst S-3
1-1st Lt, Ln & I&E
1-T/Sgt, Operations
1-Draftsman
1-Clerk, typist
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio
2-Drivers, 1/4 T truck

1-Pers carr
2-1/4 T Trucks

3-Officers
8-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

S-4 Section
1-Capt, S-4
1-T/Sgt, Supply
1-S/Sgt, Supply asst
1-Clerk, supply
4-Drivers, truck

2-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
7-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON
1-Capt, Com O
1-T/Sgt, Com
1-Sgt, Car comdr
1-Sgt, Msg cen chief
1-Sgt, Msgr dispatcher
1-Cpl, Asst dispatcher
2-Clerks, code
2-Drivers, armd car
1-Driver, pers carr
4-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
4-Messengers
6-Operators, radio
1-Repairman, radio
1-Sgt, wire chief
2-Operators, switchboard
3-Linemen

1-Pers carr
2-Armd cars
1-1 1/2 T Truck
4-1/4 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck w/reel

1-Officer
31-Enlisted Men
9-Vehicles

Total, Headquarters:
9-Officers
64-Enlisted Men
22-Vehicles

HEADQUARTERS TROOP

Comd Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr

(e. Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Squadron Cavalry Regiment, Contd)

1-Bugler, driver
1-Messenger

1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
2-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Adm, Mess & Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex & Motor O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
3-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply asst
1-Armorer
1-Driver, truck, light
5-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, mess
1-2 1/2 T Truck, supply
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
16-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, Motor
3-Mechanics
1-Mechanic driver

1-2 1/2 T truck
1-1/4 T Truck

5-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Security Section
1-S/Sgt, Sec leader
2-Sgts, Sqd ldrs
1-Cpl, Asst sqd ldr
3-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
13-Riflemen & machine gunners

1-2 1/2 T Truck
2-1/4 T Trucks

20-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Total, Headquarters Troop:
2-Officers
43-Enlisted Men
9-Vehicles

TOTAL, HQ & HQ TROOP:
11-Officers
107-Enlisted Men
31-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
3-Armd cars
3-Pers carrs
6-2 1/2 T Trucks
3-1 1/2 T Trucks
16-1/4 T Trucks

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
3-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
8-.50 cal MGs
3-.30 cal MGs (co-axial)
7-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mt)

f. CAVALRY TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON

Comd & Com Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-S/Sgt, Com
3-Operators, radio
1-Operator, switchboard
1-Lineman & driver, 1/4 T truck
2-Repairmen, radio
1-Sgt, Armd car comdr
1-Driver, armd car
1-Driver, pers carr
1-Bugler, 1/4 T truck drive
2-Drivers, 1/4 T truck, ln
3-Agents, ln

1-Pers carr
1-Armd car
3-1/4 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck w/reel

1-Officer
17-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-1st Lt, Ex O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk

(f. Cavalry Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Contd)

1-S/Sgt, Mess
3-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply, am
1-Cpl, Supply, gasoline
1-Handler, am
3-Drivers, truck, light
2-Armorers
7-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-2 1/2 T Truck, gasoline & am driver
1-1 1/2 T Truck, supply
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
23-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, motor
4-Mechanics
2-Drivers, truck, light

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

7-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Total, Hq Platoon:
2-Officers
47-Enlisted Men
12-Vehicles

CAVALRY PLATOON (3)

Comd & Support Section
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-S/Sgt, Plat sgt
1-Driver, armd car
1-Operator, radio, & asst driver
1-Operator, radio, & gunner
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck
1-Sgt, Sqd ldr
1-Cpl, Asst sqd ldr
1-Mortar gunner
1-Asst mortar gunner
1-Driver, pers carr
1-BAR man
5-Riflemen

1-Armd car
1-1/4 T Truck
1-Pers carr

1-Officer
16-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Cavalry Section (2)
1-Sgt, Sec Ldr
1-Driver, armd car
1-Operator, radio, & asst driver
1-Operator, radio, & gunner
2-Drivers, 1/4 T truck
2-Gunners, (MG, 1/4 T truck)
2-Riflemen

1-Armd car
2-1/4 T Trucks

10-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Total, Cavalry Platoon:
1-Officer
36-Enlisted Men
9-Vehicles

TOTAL, CAVALRY TROOP:
5-Officers
155-Enlisted Men
39-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
10-Armd cars
4-Pers carrs
3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
21-1/4 T Trucks (1-W/real)

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
10-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
18-.50 cal MGs
10-.30 cal MGs (co-axial)
15-.30 cal MGs (vch & grd mt)
3-81mm mortars

g. DRAGOON TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON

Comd & Com Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-S/Sgt, Com
3-Operators, radio
1-Operator, switchboard
1-Lineman & driver, 1/4 T truck
1-Repairman, radio
1-Driver, pers carr
1-Sgt, Armd car comdr
1-Driver, armd car
1-Bugler & driver, 1/4 T truck
2-Drivers, 1/4 T truck, lnt
2-Agents, ln

1-Armd car
1-Pers carr
3-1/4 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck w/reel

1-Officer
15-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-1st Lt, Ex O & motor O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
4-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
2-Armorers
1-Cpl, Supply, am
1-Cpl, Supply, gasoline
1-Handler, am
2-Drivers, truck, light
9-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-2 1/2 T Truck, gasoline & am
1-1 1/2 T Truck, supply
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
25-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, Motor
3-Mechanics
2-Mechanics, drivers

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

6-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Total, Headquarters Platoon:
2-Officers
46-Enlisted Men
12-Vehicles

DRAGOON PLATOON (3)

Comd Section
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-S/Sgt, Plat sgt
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck
1-Agent, ln

1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
3-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Dragoon Squad (3)
1-Sgt, Sqd Ldr
1-Cpl, Asst sqd ldr
1-Driver, pers carr
2-BAR men
8-Riflemen

1-Pers carr

13-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Total, Dragoon Platoon:
1-Officer
42-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

MORTAR PLATOON

Comd Section
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-S/Sgt, Plat sgt
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck
2-Observers

1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
4-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Mortar Squad (3)
1-Cpl, Sqd Ldr

(g. Dragoon Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Contd)

1-Gunner, mortar
1-Asst gunner, mortar
1-Handler, am
1-Driver, pers carr

1-Pers carr

5-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Total, Mortar Platoon
1-Officer
19-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

TOTAL, DRAGOON TROOP:

6-Officers
191-Enlisted Men
28-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
1-Armd car
13-Pers carrs
3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-1 1/2 T Truck
9-1/4 T Trucks (1-w/reel)

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
1-37mm (or larger) gun (in armd car)
10-.50 cal MGs
1-.30 cal MG (co-axial)
12-.30 cal MGs(veh & grd mt)
3-81mm mortars

h. LIGHT TANK TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON

Comd & Com Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-Sgt, Com
1-Sgt, Tk comdr
2-Cannoneers
2-Drivers, tk
1-Gunner, bow
1-Gunner, tk
1-Operator, radio
1-Operator, radio, and gunner
1-Repairman, radio
1-Driver, pers carr
1-Bugler, driver 1/4 T truck
1-Operator, radio & switchboard

2-Light tanks, M24
1-Pers carr
1-1/4 T Truck w/reel

1-Officer
14-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
3-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
2-Armorers
1-Cpl, Supply
5-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-2 1/2 T Truck, gasoline & am
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
16-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-Lt, Maint O
1-T/Sgt, Motor
1-Sgt, Tank recovery veh
3-Mechanics
2-Mechanics, drivers

1-Recovery veh
1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
7-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

TANK PLATOON (3)

1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-S/Sgt, Plat sgt
3-Sgts, Tank comdrs

(h. Light Tank Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Contd)

5-Drivers, tank
5-Gunners, bow
5-Gunners, tank
5-Cannoneers

5-Light tanks, M24

1-Officer
24-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
17-Light tanks, M24
1-Pers carr
3-2 1/2 T Trucks
1-Tank recovery veh
3-1/4 T Trucks

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
17-75mm guns (in tanks)
4-.50 cal MGs
17-.30 cal MGs (co-axial)
37-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mt)

TOTAL, LIGHT TANK TROOP:
6-Officers
109-Enlisted Men
25-Vehicles

. HOWITZER TROOP, CAVALRY SQUADRON, CAVALRY REGIMENT

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON

Comd & Com Section
1-Capt, Tr Comdr
1-Sgt, Com
1-Bugler, driver, $\frac{1}{4}$ T truck
1-Repairman, radio
1-Driver, pers carr
1-Operator, radio
1-Operator, switchboard
1-Lineman, driver, 1/4 T truck
3-Operators, fire control

1-Pers carr
2-1/4 T Trucks
1-1/4 T Truck w/reel

1-Officer
10-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

1-Officer
16-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, Motor
1-Sgt, Tank recovery veh comdr
1-Mechanic, artillery
1-Driver, tank recovery veh
2-Mechanics, auto
2-Mechanics, tank

1-Tank recovery veh
1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

8-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex O & motor O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
3-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply, gasoline & am
1-Armorer
1-Driver, truck, light
5-Basics

1-2 1/2 T Truck, kitchen
1-2 1/2 T Truck, gasoline & am
1-1/4 T Truck

Total, Headquarters Platoon:

2-Officers
34-Enlisted Men
10-Vehicles

HOWITZER PLATOON (3)

Platoon Headquarters
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-Sgt, Plat sgt
2-Drivers
1-Tender, radio
1-Rifleman

(i. Howitzer Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry Regiment, Contd)

1-Pers carr
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
5-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Gun Section (2)
1-Sgt, Chief of sec
1-Driver
1-Asst driver
1-Cannoneer
1-Gunner

1-105mm How motor carr

5-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Ammunition Section
1-Sgt, Chief of sec
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Handlers, am

1-Pers carr

4-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Total, Howitzer Platoon:
1-Officer
19-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

TANK DESTROYER PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters
1-Lt, Plat Ldr
1-Sgt, Plat sgt
1-Driver, 2 1/2 T truck
1-Driver, 1/4 T truck
1-Cpl, am
1-Handler, am

1-2 1/2 T Truck
1-1/4 T Truck

1-Officer
5-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Gun Section (6)
1-Sgt, Chief of sec
1-Driver
1-Asst driver
1-Gunner
1-Asst gunner

1-Tank destroyer, M18

5-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

Total, T.D. Platoon:
1-Officer
35-Enlisted Men
8-Vehicles

TOTAL, HOWITZER TROOP:
6-Officers
126-Enlisted Men
33-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
6-105mm Howitzer motor carriages
6-Tank destroyers, M18
1-Tank recovery veh
7-Pers carrs
4-2 1/2 T Trucks
9-1/4 T Trucks

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
6-105mm howitzers, SP
6-76mm guns (in TDs)
18-.50 cal MGs
7-.30 cal MGs (co-axial)

j. CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION AND INFANTRY DIVISION

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

	Cav Tr	Total Cav Trs (3)	Drag Tr	Tk Tr, L	Hos Tr	Hq, Hq & Sv Tr	Med Det	Total
Officers	(5)	15	6	6	6	14	2	49
WOs	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
Enlisted Men	(155)	465	191	109	110	157	20	1052
Atchd Chaps	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Totals	(160)	480	197	115	116	175	22	1105
Tanks, light M24	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	17
Mot Carrs, 105mm how	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	8
Armored Cars	(10)	30	1	-	-	4	-	35
Pers Carrs	(4)	12	13	1	9	3	-	38
Recovery Vehicles	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	3
10-T Wrecker	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
2½ T Trucks	(3)	9	3	3	3	16	-	34
1½ T Trucks	(1)	3	1	-	-	4	1	9
1/4 T Trucks	(21)	63	10	3	9	19	6	110
3/4 T Ambulances	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Totals	(39)	117	28	25	30	48	9	257
105mm Hows (SP)	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	8
75mm Guns, (in Tanks)	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	17
37mm (or Heavier) Guns (in Armd Cars)	(10)	30	1	-	-	4	-	35
.50 Cal MGs	(18)	54	10	4	16	17	-	101
.30 Cal MGs (Co-axial)	(10)	30	1	17	-	4	-	52
.30 Cal MGs (Veh & Grd Mt)	(15)	45	12	37	7	15	-	116
81mm Mortars	(3)	9	3	-	-	-	-	12
Totals	(56)	168	27	75	31	40	-	341

k. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARMORED DIVISION AND INFANTRY DIVISION

(Appendix 14, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HEADQUARTERS

Comd Section
1-Lt Col, Comdr
1-Major, Ex O
1-Driver, armd car
2-Drivers, ¼ T truck
2-Operators, radio
1-Messenger
1-Orderly

1-Armd car
2-¼ T Trucks

2-Officers
7-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

S-1 & Personnel Sec
1-1st Lt, Adj
1-Lt, SSO
1-WO, Personnel
1-M/Sgt, Sgt major
2-T/5, Clerks, typists
1-Clerk, mail
1-T/Sgt, Personnel
2-T/4, Classification
1-Clerk, records
2-Clerks, drivers, truck
1-Cpl, Sp service
1-Driver, chap asst
2-Drivers, ¼ T truck

(k. Headquarters and Headquarters and Service troop, Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division, contd)

1-2½ T Truck
2-1½ T Trucks
2- ¼ T Trucks

2-Officers
1-Warrant Officer
14-Enlisted Men
5-Vehicles

S-2 Section
1-Capt, S-2
1-T/Sgt, Int
1-Clerk, typist
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio

1-Pers carr

1-Officer
5-Enlisted Men
1-Vehicle

S-3 Section
(Operations, Ln, I&E)
1-Major, S-3
1-Capt, Ln, asst S-3
1-1st Lt, Ln & I&E
1-T/Sgt, Operations
1-Draftsman
1-Clerk, typist
1-Driver, pers carr
2-Operators, radio
2-Drivers, ¼ T truck

1-Pers carr
2-¼ T Trucks

3-Officers
8-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

S-4 Section
1-Capt, S-4
1-WO, Supply
1-T/Sgt, Supply
T-Sgt, Asst supply
2-Clerks, supply
4-Drivers, truck, light

2-2½ T Trucks
1-1½ T Trucks
1- ¼ T Truck

1-Officer
1-Warrant Officer
8-Enlisted Men
4-Vehicles

Communications Platoon
1-Capt, Com O
1-T/Sgt, Com
1-Sgt, Car comdr
1-Sgt, Msg cen chief
1-Sgt, Msgr dispatcher
1-Cpl, Asst dispatcher
2-Clerks, code
2-Drivers, armd car
1-Driver, pers carr
4-Drivers, ¼ T truck
4-Messengers
6-Operators, radio
1-Repairman, radio
1-Sgt, Wire chief
2-Operators, switchboard
3-Linemen

1-Pers carr
2-Armd cars
4-¼ T Trucks
1-¼ T Truck, w/reel
1-1½ T Truck

3-Officers
31-Enlisted Men
9-Vehicles

Total, Headquarters:
10-Officers
2-Warrant Officers
73-Enlisted Men
25-Vehicles

HQ & SV TROOP

TROOP HEADQUARTERS

Comd Section
1-Capt, Comdr
1-Bugler, driver

1-¼ T Truck

1-Officer
1-Enlisted Man
1-Vehicle

Adm, Mess and Supply Section
1-Lt, Ex O
1-1st Sgt
1-Cpl, Tr clerk
1-S/Sgt, Mess
4-Cooks
1-Cooks' helper
1-S/Sgt, Supply
1-Cpl, Supply asst
1-Armorer
1-Driver, truck light
7-Basics

(k. Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, Cavalry Squadron, Armored Division and Infantry Division, contd)

1-2½ T Truck, kitchen
1-2½ T Truck, supply
1- ¼ T Truck

1-Officer
19-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

Maintenance Section
1-T/Sgt, motor
3-Mechanics
1-Driver, mechanic

1-2½ T Truck
1- ¼ T Truck

5-Enlisted Men
2-Vehicles

Total, Troop Headquarters:
2-Officers
25-Enlisted Men
6-Vehicles

MAINTENANCE PLATOON
1-Capt, Mtr O
1-WO, Asst Mtr O
1-M/Sgt, Motor sgt
2-S/Sgt, Crew chief
1-Sgt, Recovery vehicle comdr
1-Driver, mechanic
1-Sgt, Wrecker
1-Driver, mechanic
1-Driver, armd car
2-Operators, radio
1-Driver, truck, light
1-Cpl, Parts clerk
1-Driver, asst parts clerk
2-Welders (1 driver)
1-Clerk, tool
1-Driver, mechanic
1-Clerk, typist
1-Armorer
6-Mechanics, auto
4-Mechanics, tank

1-Tank recovery veh
1-10T Wrecker
1-Armd car
1- ¼ T Truck
3-2½ T Trucks

1-Officer
1-Warrant Officer
29 Enlisted Men
7-Vehicles

Security Section
1-S/Sgt, Sec Ldr
2-Sgts, Sqd ldrs
1-Cpl, Asst sqd ldr
3-Drivers, truck, light
13-Riflemen & machine gunners

1-2½ T Truck
2- ¼ T Trucks

20-Enlisted Men
3-Vehicles

TRANSPORTATION PLATOON
1-Lt, Trans O
1-S/Sgt, Trans
7-Drivers, truck, light
2-Handlers, am

6-2½ T Trucks
1- ¼ T Truck

1-Officer
10-Enlisted Men
7-Vehicles

TOTAL, HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE TROOP:
14-Officers
1-Atchd Chaplain
3-Warrant Officers
157-Enlisted Men
48-Vehicles

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES
4-Armd cars
3-Pers carrs
16-2½ T Trucks
4-1½ T Trucks
19- ¼ T Trucks
1-10 T Wrecker
1-Tank recovery veh

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS
4-37mm (or larger) guns (in armd cars)
17-.50 cal MGs
4- .30 cal MGs (co-axial)
15-.30 cal MGs (veh & grd mt)

APPENDIX 15

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF OPINIONS OF SENIOR OFFICERS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

(NOTE - Sources are letters addressed to Chief of Armored Section, the General Board, in reply to requests for opinions, unless otherwise stated.)

a. Army Commanders

(1) Lt Gen A. M. Patch, USA — CG, Seventh Army

"Perhaps the squadron should be given an additional troop whose mission would be dismounted action only. I see no justification for the organization of the group."

"More attention might be given to rocket fire from the armored car and recoilless weapons could readily be used therefrom. The assault gun troops should be equipped with the same type of weapon as that of armored field artillery battalions and its primary role should be indirect fire."

(2) Lt Gen W. H. Simpson, USA — CG, Ninth Army

"The solution seems to be a medium sized unit capable of great mobility, but possessing enough penetrating power to secure information. . . . I feel very strongly that we should return to the regimental organization . . . and eliminate the use of group headquarters with attached squadrons. Two squadrons should be assigned organically to a regiment and on such occasions when an additional squadron is needed it may be temporarily attached from another regiment. The regiment thus possesses the flexibility of organization now present in the group, and it has the important added advantages of permanence and the increased esprit resulting therefrom. The cavalry squadron should be increased by the addition of an organic troop of riflemen."

b. Corps Commanders

(1) Maj Gen John Millikin, USA — CG, III Corps

"The three-squadron regiment will give the commander a reserve force in order to influence offensive situations, or a covering force for leap-frogging in delaying actions. Since there are always two flanks to be covered, and sometimes a front, three squadrons are essential if a force capable of independent action is to be employed on each. Furthermore, two squadrons should always be available to the commander for the major effort, whether it be offensive, pursuit, exploitation, or delaying action, or filling a gap. . . . ."

(2) Maj Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA — CG, III Corps

"I think that the reconnaissance troop in the infantry division should be the same as in the proposed regiment. These troops were invaluable. I have yet to hear a division commander fail to give this troop anything but the highest praise."

(3) Maj Gen C. R. Huebner, USA — CG, V Corps

". . . There should be about 65 men available to support each cavalry troop. . . . I am afraid the rifle troop with the squadron might be a little short of manpower."

(4) Lt Gen L. K. Truscott, Jr, USA — CG, VI Corps

"As to armament and equipment, I doubt the advisability of going 'whole hog' for either the armored car or light tank at

the present time. . . . For the time being, . . . a proper answer would probably be a combination of both armored cars and light tanks."

(5) Maj Gen S. Leroy Irwin, USA — CG, XII Corps

"I see no necessity for 'light tank destroyers' if the M-24 light tank is available. . . I favor the inclusion of armored infantry, but I am not sure it should be in the squadron. Possibly one or two troops in regimental (group) headquarters, for attachment as needed would be a solution. Putting infantry in the squadron might tend to clutter them up when mobility is paramount . . . I have noted a tendency to recommend elimination of the reconnaissance troop from the infantry division. I do not agree to this, as I consider the troop invaluable in a division. Its organization should conform to the other mechanized cavalry troops."

(6) Colonel Harry Knight, GSC — C of S, XVI Corps

"It is believed that the regiment should consist of two squadrons. Each squadron should consist of the following units: three cavalry troops, one light tank troop, one assault gun troop, one rifle troop (similar to armored infantry company) . . . In addition to the rifle troop . . it is recommended that a rifle squad be added to each reconnaissance platoon in the cavalry troop . ."

"Liaison type aircraft are considered highly essential to the efficient functioning of mechanized cavalry. . . . Wire communications from the regiment to the squadron are considered essential and from the squadron to the troops are considered highly desirable."

"The present half track personnel carrier has proven to be more dependable than full track vehicles and has fulfilled its role in a satisfactory manner. However, an improved full track personnel carrier would have many advantages, particularly in cross-country mobility, over a half track vehicle, and should be adopted when it has been perfected sufficiently."

(7) Maj Gen Walton H. Walker — CG, XX Corps

"It is believed that experimentation with a suitable 105mm Howitzer on a modified M-24 light tank chassis (should) be conducted. In any case, it is strongly recommended that the vehicle so developed not exceed 20 tons. It is also important that the weapon furnished for the assault gun troop be a howitzer and not a gun."

(8) Maj Gen E. N. Harmon — CG, XXII Corps

"I believe the group should be abolished and that the regimental organization should be re-established. However, I question whether or not each squadron should be administratively complete. I think we are setting up too much of an overhead by that. I believe one of the values of the regiment should be to carry the overhead for the squadrons and that this overhead should be possible of being divided so as to give the squadron, when it acts independently, its proper share of the service for supplies, etc. One of the values of the regiment is to consolidate supply, maintenance, etc. and thereby cut down the overhead in the squadrons."

"Each squadron should have . . . three reconnaissance troops, one light tank troop, and an assault gun troop as at present. . . . . More than that makes an unwieldly organization. . . . I disagree with a rifle troop, as . . . we will be organizing a task force instead of a reconnaissance unit. I think there should be tank destroyers in the regiment sufficient to give each

squadron a platoon of five at least. I repeatedly had to bolster up the mechanized cavalry groups either with tank destroyers or medium tanks so as to give them gun power to meet the heavier tank which they practically always encountered. When the enemy is retreating and the cavalry is pursuing, if a few tanks or self-propelled guns are placed at advantageous points, they must either be knocked out or the pursuit is stopped. Also, the cavalry is called upon to cover the flanks and very frequently is attacked by small groups of heavy tanks which it must be able to destroy or the flank will be penetrated."

"I am in favor of the armored car with support of the light tank. The armored car is silent, it is splendid against small delaying detachments of infantry and light armored vehicles, and the light tank troops can furnish the punch necessary to get the reconnaissance through. If the resistance is so heavy that it cannot do the job, then heavier tank units must be brought up from the rear."

"I certainly would not use a full track vehicle for command and personnel carrier work. I would have as few track vehicles as possible of any kind."

c. Division Commanders

(1) Maj Gen I. D. White, USA — CG, 2d Armd Div

Extract from letter, Headquarters, the Cavalry School, 3 November 1945, to chief of mechanized cavalry subsection, Armored Section, The General Board:

"I have no use whatsoever for the M-8 armored car and favor a full tracked personnel carrier. . . . . There is under development a full track carrier built in general on the M-24 tank chassis and known as the T16. . . . . I have proposed that they build a version of this model for the cavalry, but with a smaller body and providing for about a 12 man load, as I do not believe reconnaissance elements can afford to put so many men in one vehicle. My other principal non-concurrence . , is in the addition of the so-called rifle troop. . . . That was tried out back in 1940 and 41. I commanded a reconnaissance battalion which was organized with two reconnaissance troops, a tank troop, and an infantry rifle company, and it did not work out at all and the infantry company was converted to form a third reconnaissance troop. . . We should by all means go back to the regimental organization which can be two or three squadrons, but preferably two, since supporting troops will generally be added or attached, and two squadrons reinforced is plenty big enough for any one man to handle."

"The cavalry mechanized unit must be trained and organized for considerable dismounted action. Our present reconnaissance troop . . . does not lend itself to dismounted action. The bulk of the troop is composed of crewmen, and , . . there is little time to train them as riflemen for dismounted combat. The armored car is a fairly good means of transportation on favorable terrain and on roads until aimed enemy fire is brought against it. It then has little value as a vehicle to support dismounted action. . , . I believe that we must have the bulk of the personnel of the squadron capable of performing dismounted combat effectively and supported by light tanks and assault guns. I would, therefore, make the basic troop of the squadron a rifle troop . . . and capable of going anywhere that a tank can go and thus giving considerable maneuverability to the riflemen before they are required to dismount. . . . I do not subscribe to the principle of the necessity for huge cruising distances for mechanized cavalry vehicles, and I do not concur that quietness of operation is an essential for a mechanized cavalry vehicle, although

desirable. . . . Any organization which does not provide for the maximum number of men available for dismounted combat is inefficient and will always require us to call for additional infantry to perform our own assigned mission."

NOTE - Major General White's proposed squadron comprises a headquarters and service troop, three rifle troops (each comprising three platoons of six 1/4 ton trucks and three armored personnel carriers), two light tank troops and a support troop (comprising six vehicles mounting high-velocity weapons and six vehicles mounting 105mm howitzers).

(2) Maj Gen John W. Leonard, USA — CG, 9th Armd Div

"I am not favorably disposed towards groups. Theoretically, they are a solution and maybe they save manpower. Fundamentally, a man wants a home; a group or a squadron wants a home. My observation is that the group is not a home - regiments and squadrons are. . . It is quite possible that over a long period of peace-time training with groups this objection might disappear. . . . Whether the groups, as organized due to their flexibility, created a saving in manpower and utilized the various battalions or squadrons more efficiently can be determined from factual data. . . "

"The quarter-ton truck should be armored to afford protection on reconnaissance. . . . The assault gun troop might well be replaced by an armored rifle troop, perhaps with an 81mm mortar platoon. A proportion of about one infantry platoon per reconnaissance troop is needed."

"I am strongly in favor of replacing the armored car, M8, with the new light tank, M24. . . I still believe that the principle behind the development of the armored car, that is, a wheeled vehicle with great mobility and some protected fire power, is sound. There is probably a place in the reconnaissance squadron or troop for such a vehicle if one can be developed to meet the desired specifications. In considering whether the wheeled vehicle is essential, I feel this can be determined after careful analysis of recommendations secured from many sources. Then the breakdown should be: Is it desirable? Is it essential? We are prone to include many desirable elements that are not essential. I feel we should prune down to essentials."

(3) Maj Gen Orlando Ward, USA — CG, 20th Armd Div

"The general organization of mechanized cavalry units . . . is . . . sound, but equipment is not appropriate. . . . The M8 armored car should be eliminated. A full-track 105mm Howitzer on a light tank chassis should be substituted for the 75mm assault gun. All half-tracks should be changed to full-track vehicles."

(4) Maj Gen W. M. Robertson, USA — CG, 2d Inf Div

"It appears obvious that the principles of administration set forth by the War Department, which resulted in efforts to centralize administration of all separate units in armies, bypassing groups and corps, has been proven faulty. Corps has of necessity been required to administer the units under its command. . . . The group likewise has been required to administer its squadrons and battalions with makeshift means. From an administrative standpoint the control exercised by group headquarters over any given assignment of squadrons or battalions has neither been successful nor entirely satisfactory to the individual soldier whose esprit and whose will to fight have often been materially affected by frequent changes in operating headquarters. These faults often resulted in morale-shaking losses of promotions to which men were entitled, in failure to process awards and

decorations, in loss of certain privileges, and in other failures which if overcome would operate to the continued support and benefit of the individual. The regimental organization on the other hand knits the squadrons together in a cooperative group, and through such an organization, it is possible to procure a consistent policy with regard to administration and functioning of the subordinate units; it further fosters building up a strong and active tradition and history which assists the individual in his efforts to absorb the shock of war. It does not materially matter whether the name 'group' or 'regiment' be used, provided the prospect of more or less permanent assignment of units to headquarters be accepted and that group or regimental facilities be made available for the administration and control of subordinate units. . ."

"The regimental organization should provide for a headquarters and headquarters troop, a service troop (which should likewise include maintenance elements capable of supporting the organic squadron maintenance sections), a troop or similar organization capable of performing normal combat engineer tasks and containing light bridging equipment, and an ambulance company or equivalent agency similar to a collecting company. The regiment should definitely contain at least three cavalry squadrons. Operations on the continent have unquestionably demonstrated the necessity for greater strength in the mechanized cavalry unit of the corps than has been available. Further, the third squadron in the group would provide an opportunity for rotation of elements for maintenance not presently available. . . ."

"The cavalry troop should contain in each platoon at least a squad of riflemen mounted in armored personnel carriers to supplement and extend the activities of the mechanized elements. However, there should be in the hand of the squadron commander a rifle troop for employment as and where it might be necessary within the squadron's zone of action."

"The . . . cavalry . . . should be provided with vehicles of low profile, low visibility, high speed, armor proof against small arms fire, heavily armed with weapons now being developed employing the recoilless principle, and automatic weapons, and having ground pressures not exceeding 4 to 5 pounds per square inch. Cavalry so equipped should be employed in conjunction with dismounted personnel carried in carriers of the same type who operate hand in hand, and by the energy, viciousness and speed of their attack defeat heavily armored units possessing lesser mobility. . . ."

"It is believed that, with proper armament in the light tank troop and in the armored cars of the cavalry troop, tank destroyer strength will not be necessary as soon as the new equipment is provided. . . ."

"The question of personnel carriers and command vehicles being tracked or half tracked is a matter of development. . . None of the full tracked personnel carriers or command vehicles have been satisfactory for those requirements now filled by the half track . . . Our advantage in inventive ingenuity will solve this problem. . . Insofar as combat experience has indicated, the present half track vehicle has furnished all the mobility necessary."

(5) Maj Gen Frank A. Keating, USA — CG, 102d Inf Div

Extract from Action of Appointing Authority, Report of Proceedings of Board of Officers, Recommendations for Changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment, Hq 102d Inf Div, 4 Oct 1945:

"Whether or not a cavalry reconnaissance squadron (mechanized) should be substituted for the present reconnaissance troop (mechanized) is a moot question. A single reconnaissance element such as a

troop is definitely not adequate; while larger units are cumbersome, increase supply and maintenance problems, and are generally road-bound. Actually, we received little value from . . . . the reconnaissance troop during offensive operations. The troop proved its worth on the defensive due to its excellent automatic weapons fire power, and as a reconnaissance element in rear of our advance elements in searching for andlocating by-passed enemy forces. Mechanized cavalry, as we now know it, is not properly organized or equipped to perform its missions. We need a reconnaissance unit of much more mobile form and with a greater increase of foot elements. It must be able to fight dismounted for information. The present types of armored vehicles cannot be employed against modern defenses, nor are they expected to: nevertheless, their road-bound qualities and limited turn-around range makes them totally unsuitable and is a field of effort for major improvements. I favor a light reconnaissance battalion with excellent cross-country mobility, and one that can be employed dismounted, if necessary, in offensive and defensive operations. It must be equipped with troop carriers and a small number of light armored vehicles capable of operation off roads."

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

EXAMPLES OF OPINIONS OF OFFICERS WHO COMMANDED MECHANIZED CAVALRY UNITS IN COMBAT CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY

(NOTE - Sources are answers to questionnaires, unless otherwise stated.)

a. Mechanized Cavalry Group Commanders

(1) Col James H. Polk, Cav — CO, 3d Cav Gp, Mecz

(a) "A security platoon (for regimental headquarters) is essential . . . . However, it should be a standard type platoon. (For squadron headquarters) this is not (a) pressing problem, as tank, assault gun or reserve units are generally close by for protection."

"Most emphatically (we should retain the armored car). Our only excuse for existance is to be faster and more mobile than an armored division--we have now reached our top limit on tanks."

"Improve the half-track (as a command vehicle). Radio reception will always be difficult in a full-track vehicle."

(b) Extract from letter, Hq 3d Cav Gp, 23 Oct 1945, to Chief of Mechanized Cavalry Subsection, Armored Section, The General Board:

"I think you should keep the two following factors in mind: first, the danger of becoming too heavy or too big and thus trying to take over a job which an armored division might better do and, secondly, attempting to be able to do everything, that is, assume the functions of engineers, tank destroyers, and infantry. . . . I believe the reorganization should be along the lines of a simple, clean cut, triangular formation as follows: three sections to a platoon, three platoons to a troop plus a mortar platoon, three troops to a squadron plus assault gun and tank troops. The headquarters troop of a squadron should be a small mobile unit along the lines of the present group headquarters. A service troop is needed for administration and to operate the rear echelon. The question of more manpower and specifically more riflemen is a pressing one and was constantly before all of us in combat. However, I believe now that the proper solution to this question is solved by the activation of an 81mm mortar platoon. This solution, although not actually increasing the manpower of the (cavalry) platoon, does permit rearming the platoon properly and solves many of the difficult training problems of a platoon leader. I believe the activation of an infantry platoon or infantry company in the troop or squadron would make us very unwieldy and let us in for a lot of missions we are not prepared to do. Our reconnaissance platoons did do the job and did it well."

(2) Lt Col Edward C. Dunn, Cav — Ex O, 4th Cav Gp, Mecz

"This group kept its old regimental band throughout combat, and got continuous valuable use out of it, not only as a morale builder, but for strictly military duties as well."

(3) Col Edward M. Fickett, Cav — CO, 6th Cav Gp, Mecz

See Section IV, Report After Action Against Enemy, 6th Cavalry Group, April, 1945, for a very thorough and sound coverage of deficiencies in present organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry, and recommendations for changes. (NOTE - This material is also contained in inclosure to AGF Report No 1007, 5 June 1945.)

(4) Lt Col Robert J. Quinn, Cav — CO, 15th Cav Gp, Mecz

"I favor the (anti-tank) gun on the light tank. We have our artillery in the assault gun. I see no great advantage in adding a tank destroyer element to an already complicated group of vehicles and crews."

"My idea of an armored car is that of a radio carrier and light fighting vehicle, with great mobility. If we add (an anti-tank) gun (to the armored car), we must necessarily reduce its speed and mobility because of the added weight and size."

(5) Colonel George W. Busbey, Cav — CO, 16th Cav Gp, Mecz

Extract from letter, Hq 16th Cavalry Group, 4 December 1945, to chief of mechanized cavalry subsection, Armored Section, The General Board:

"The need for wheeled vehicles is constant. The need for track vehicles is intermittent. At no time was the success of my mission threatened by the inability to maintain and keep moving my wheeled vehicles. But there were occasions when every tank of one of my squadrons was unable to move because of the sheer inability to find time to change tracks. Had I been equipped with nothing but track vehicles, the combat efficiency of the group would have ceased temporarily. I continuously calculated my mobility in terms of: "How fast can I move my tanks?"--never, "Can I move my armored cars?" Until a tank is invented or developed which can move on roads quietly, be maintained and driven with the ease of a wheeled vehicle, then I cannot agree that our basic vehicle should be the tank."

(6) Colonel Vennard Wilson, Cav — CO, 106th Cav Gp, Mecz

(a) "I believe that the squadrons should be administratively independent. The regimental commander can always control administration to any extent necessary. It is foolish to have all administration bottleneck through his headquarters, and impracticable when squadrons are widely separated."

"We carried more mortars more miles and got less pay from them than any other weapons. They are useful primarily in defense, too slow for offense. The need of the troop is for additional rifle strength, not more mortar strength. The platoon should have one supporting weapon, either a mortar or a 75mm recoilless rifle. The latter is too new to appraise its merits properly."

"Contrary to many, I have a great deal of respect for and appreciation of the capabilities of the armored car M-8. It

is far from ideal, yet has performed a great service for us. The soldiers themselves like it. Perhaps my appreciation of the armored car is due to my method of fighting. I invariably fought the reinforced troop, in which the armored cars acted as the reconnaissance agency of the troop, with the punch coming from the tanks, assault guns, and one completely dismounted platoon. I can readily understand how those who depended upon the armored car to carry the burden of the fight felt the inadequacy of its fire power and its lack of cross-country mobility. The primary advantage of a wheeled vehicle is in its extended cruising radius as compared to a track vehicle. I feel that either a wheeled or a track vehicle is workable in the organization, and that future development should be along the lines of a track vehicle with greater cruising radius. The light tank would also be a thoroughly satisfactory vehicle, but would require an additional vehicle within the platoon for gas supply. I also feel that the choice of a vehicle depends upon operating conditions. When I held 115 miles of flank of Third Army, with constant patrolling, the armored car was undoubtedly superior. In the Foret De Parroy, I would gladly have traded all my armored cars for light tanks. Therefore I feel that we should specify an "armored vehicle", with the understanding that if we should have to go into action at this time, we should take either the M-8 armored car or the M-24 light tank, in accordance with the enemy and terrain, and that future development be a track vehicle."

"The proportion (of individual weapons) should be roughly: 80 rifles, nine carbines, nine sub-machine guns, two pistols; total, 100."

(b) See also letter, Hq 106th Cav Gp, Mecz, 2 Nov 1944, to CG, XV Corps, subject: "Changes in Equipment for 106th Cavalry Group, Mechanized" (NOTE - This letter is an inclosure to AGF Report No 685, 26 February 1945.)

(7) Colonel Garnett H. Wilson, Cav — CO, 115th Cav Gp, Mecz

"With the addition of two rifle (troops) to the regiment (regiment of two cavalry squadrons, each similar to present cavalry reconnaissance squadron, and one headquarters squadron, including a service troop and two rifle troops), all usual cavalry missions can be performed. Special missions will require attachments of other arms. . . . We will be properly equipped to do more than our share of the fighting and at the same time have adequate staffs to employ attachments of other arms for special missions and operations."

b. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders.

(1) Lt Col John F. Rhoades — CO, 4th Cav Ren Sq, Mecz

"The regiment is greatly preferable . . . . I watched the regimental esprit completely disappear and be replaced by squadron competition of an unhealthy type . . . ., with the result that, particularly administratively, the squadrons no longer helped each other, despite the efforts of the two squadron and the group commanders."

"Habitually, . . . the 4th Cavalry had to commit both squadrons, with the result that neither squadron was able to refit and train replacements unless the entire group was relieved. I know my casualties were higher than necessary due to lack of opportunity to absorb replacements and due to fatigue of personnel."

"From our experience, regiment should be able to lay 20 miles of wire."

"Communications section (in squadron headquarters) should include wire section capable of laying and maintaining at least 10 miles of wire."

"It is my opinion that a squadron maintenance section can become familiar with the characteristics of troop motor personnel, drivers, and vehicles and consequently give a more personal, interested, and efficient service. A regimental section. . . would deny to a squadron commanding officer free exercise of his command function with respect to maintenance. Regiment should have sufficient personnel to permit the regimental (commander) to exercise supervision and control."

"Squadron (commander) should have control, supervision, and complete freedom of command with respect to his supply. Regiment S-4 section should have adequate personnel to permit complete supervision and maintenance of records of squadron supply activity and situation."

"In our experience a wheeled vehicle is preferable to a tracked vehicle. In the pursuit across France and Belgium the squadron was never delayed or stopped due to vehicle failure; however, the light tanks had to be repeatedly left behind for maintenance, change of tracks, etc. In addition, in pursuit, a typical cavalry role, road mobility, dependability and quiet operation is more valuable than cross country mobility. When the latter is needed, the tank troop carrying dismounted personnel from the rifle troops, produces sufficient mobility."

"(If a light weight 105mm assault gun is not developed, it is desired to retain the M-8 assault gun.) Upon several occasions a battery of armored field artillery (self-propelled) was attached to the squadron; (and) it was found that supporting artillery should have a wide traverse, as the troops were habitually widely separated and fire had to be delivered rapidly on two or more troop sectors almost simultaneously. . . . The M-4 tank mounting the 105mm howitzer (is) too slow, to heavy. Several times medium tanks were attached to my squadron. Each time, even though the rate of march decreased below that desired, to accomodate the medium tanks, the mediums still burned out bogies and had other maintenance failures."

"There is a definite need for a light-weight tracked vehicle, armed with a high-velocity anti-tank gun; however, it is my opinion that the role of tank destroyer should remain with tank destroyer units, and that a battalion should be attached to the regimental task force as needed. Proper tank destroyer employment calls for depth of weapons which means that too many of those weapons must be available for this number to be supplied by the few that it is feasible to incorporate organically in the regiment."

"We traveled a good many combat miles - from Normandy through Germany - and I never felt or heard of the need for armor plate on the jeep. The first burst usually misses, and without armor plate there is no tendency to huddle behind the jeep - it isn't meant to be a tank, armored car, or large gun platform."

"I don't think much of the carbine - I either want to shoot accurately at mid or long range, or else I want to put out maximum fire power of heavy slugs at short range; i.e., do away with the carbine and arm with the M-1 rifle or a lightweight 'tommygun'.

The officers should have pistols and will usually pick up a rifle or tommy gun as needed."

"Half track is preferable (as a) personnel carrier and command vehicle. (They) must be able to roll with the armored cars and jeeps. Cross country mobility of half track is sufficient for this purpose."

"The only deficiency in T/O that ever presented unduly difficult obstacles was the lack of dismounted rifle strength and a means of rapid communication when dismounted. We need badly an increase in rifle strength, wire communication, and light, pack-type, portable radios like the infantry SCR 300. . . . The other deficiencies. . . were by no means insurmountable. . . . An increase in rifle strength, and a three squadron regiment which would have permitted reasonable and normal rotation and rest, would have saved my organization casualties which resulted from fatigue and from an understrength battalion being called upon to do a regimental size job. . . . I do not believe that any drastic changes are either necessary or desireable."

(2) Lt Col Lawrence E. Schlanser, Cav — CO, 19th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"It is believed that a four cavalry troop squadron, with appropriate increases in the tank and assault gun troops, is necessary for any mechanized unit, this in order to provide proper maintenance of vehicles and equipment. It has been the experience of the undersigned that cavalry units are seldom pulled out of the line for maintenance, rest and rehabilitation and (that) therefore (these activities) must be carried on in the forward areas, to the detriment of this work. A four cavalry troop squadron would enable the squadron to continue to cover the frontages which have normally been assigned, and still hold one troop and a portion of the special troops to the rear to accomplish these important functions."

(3) Lt Col Frederick H. Gaston, Cav — CO, 24th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"If more (dismounted) strength (than the equivalent of one troop) is necessary for a mission, I favor attaching an infantry company or battalion. . . . (The rifle strength should not be added as one troop in squadron, because) although this would be ideal for purposes of defense and attack, I feel sure this troop would be forced to bear the brunt of the fighting and casualties, and consequently would go downhill fast in any protracted campaign."

"In a normal artillery role, (the limited traverse of the M37 howitzer motor carriage) is sufficient. Even with 360° traverse, pieces in battery must be moved for large deflection changes."

"In general, I am against adding specialized weapons or services to the cavalry organically, and in favor of attaching them as needed. A normal number of attachments for (any given) theater will soon become SOP, and if the same units remain together they become teams. And when reinforcements or special equipment are needed, it can be obtained through the headquarters of the attached unit, thus making for a more flexible team."

(4) Lt Col Thomas B. Hargis, Cav — CO, 42d Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"The half track vehicle makes an ideal personnel carrier . . . The present or an improved half track vehicle makes an excellent command vehicle. A full tracked vehicle is not necessary."

(5) Lt Col Charles J. Hodge, Cav — CO, 117th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"I submit that the very fact that dismounted riflemen were so obviously needed by squadrons as a unit and not as extensively by platoon as a unit, makes the addition of a squad to the platoon most restrictive in relation to the use of the rifle element by a (higher) commander."

(6) Lt Col Jeff Hollis, Cav — CO, 125th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"I favor an organization, from platoon up to and including the regiment, with one-third of the line units being riflemen; i.e. one rifle (squad) per (cavalry) platoon, one rifle platoon per cavalry troop, one rifle troop per cavalry squadron, one rifle squadron per regiment. . . . I favor (a regiment of) two (cavalry) squadrons and one rifle squadron. (The cavalry squadron would comprise, in addition to the light tank and assault gun troops, two cavalry troops and) one rifle troop (organized with . . . two rifle platoons, one cavalry platoon, and one weapons platoon). (The rifle squadron would include) two rifle troops and one cavalry troop (comprising two cavalry platoons and one rifle platoon)."

"It is my opinion that development of arms and equipment envisioned and experimented with during latter months of this war will be carried on to completion within the next few years. I, therefore, feel that any reorganization agreed upon should specifically point out that such organization must be considered only temporary and subject to change as developments occur in equipment and arms. I believe a set-up which increases the proportion of riflemen to a minimum of one rifle unit to each two mechanized units will be basically sound; and around such an organization, any improvements in equipment and arms can be utilized efficiently."

(7) Lt Col Anthony F. Kleitz, Cav — CO, 125th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

"It is believed that the rifle squads could be given the same basic training as the old pioneer and demolition squads and could thus implement the attached engineers."

"Six and eight wheeled armored cars have been built and tested thoroughly by the Americans and Germans. Two very bad disadvantages have appeared in all armored cars, very poor flotation and very poor maneuverability. The first cannot be remedied except by adding tracks or appreciably lightening the armor. Maneuverability can be completely remedied by mechanical means, but so far these means are not rugged enough, small enough, or simple enough for military usage. . . . It is believed that . . . the improved light tank will have the required anti-tank gun as well as a high-speed silent track (or a detachable track). . . .The desired vehicle is more of an M24 (light tank) with certain armored car features (silent movement and high road speed) rather than an armored car with (attachable) tracks and greatly increased maneuverability."

c. Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Commanders, Armored Division.

(1) Lt Col George C. Benjamin, Cav — CO, 85th Cav Ron Sq, Mecz

Cavalry Platoon

"A command section of one armored car and one 1/4 ton truck; and two cavalry sections, each with one armored car, one infantry squad (in armored personnel carriers), and one 1/4 ton truck."

(2) Lt Col Harry C. Prindle, Cav — CO, 86th Cav Ren Sq, Mecz

"I should like to see the tanks and assault guns (or better, tank destroyers substituted for assault guns) an organic part of the troop. The troop commander is the one that must fight them when the chips are down, and better team work, spirit and cooperation could be attained if they were organic. I believe there should be four cavalry troops. . . . Our assault gun troop proved to be only artillery and attached artillery was probably more efficient because they had forward observers and replacements, plus proper transportation."

APPENDIX 17

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

MECHANIZED CAVALRY ORGANIZATIONS PROPOSED

BY HEADQUARTERS FIRST, THIRD AND SEVENTH ARMIES

a. Headquarters First Army.

(1) A recommended table of organization for mechanized cavalry was issued by Armored Section, First Army, on 1 March 1945.

(2) The proposed organization differed from the organization now existing, essentially as follows:

(a) Regiment (of two squadrons).

(b) Following administrative activities centered in regiment: personnel (personnel section, regimental headquarters and headquarters troop); medical (regimental medical detachment, with squadron sections).

(c) Security ("combat") platoon and squad in regimental and squadron headquarters, respectively.

(d) Rifle ("support") squad ("section") in reconnaissance platoon, including two BAR men.

(e) Command vehicle in each troop headquarters.

(f) Wire to squadron level.

b. Headquarters Third Army.

(1) (a) A board of officers met at Headquarters, Third Army, on 1 June 1945, and proposed changes in the existing tables of organization and equipment for mechanized cavalry.

(b) The composition of the board: Colonel Vennard Wilson, CO, 106th Cavalry Group; Colonel Lawrence G. Smith, CO, 14th Cavalry Group; Colonel Charles H. Reed, CO, 2d Cavalry Group; Colonel J. H. Polk, CO, 3d Cavalry Group; Lt Col Paul L. Burke, Executive Officer, 102d Cavalry Group.

(c) The findings of the board were: approved by Headquarters, Third Army, and were recommended by Headquarters, 12th Army Group, for study (see copy of forwarding letter and extract from indorsement, attached to this appendix as Annex A (1)); referred by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, to the General Board, for study.

(2) The essential changes which were proposed were:

(a) Regiment (of two squadrons) to replace group.

(b) Car, half-track, to replace: armored car, utility, M-20; two armored cars, M8, in each reconnaissance troop headquarters.

(c) Platoon of six tank destroyers to be added to light tank company.

(d) Rifle troop (armored infantry company, less AT platoon) to be added to squadron.

(e) 105mm assault gun to replace 75mm assault gun.

(f) Wire to squadron level.

(g) SCR 528 to replace SCR 510.

(h) Additional 2 1/2 ton trucks in regimental and squadron headquarters.

(i) Following to be added to regimental headquarters: three liaison planes; security platoon; two liaison officers; two SCR 499.

(j) Following changes in reconnaissance troop: light truck added; four SCR 300 added; rifles increased, and carbines decreased, 200 percent.

c. Headquarters Seventh Army.

(1) (a) A recommended table of organization for mechanized cavalry was issued by Armored Section, Seventh Army, on 1 September 1945.

(b) This table of organization resulted from a conference of combat-experienced mechanized cavalry officers conducted on 24 August 1945. For attendance at this conference, see list, attached to this appendix as Annex A (2).

(2) The proposed organization differed from the organization now existing, essentially as follows:

(a) Regiment, of three squadrons.

(b) Following administrative activities centered in regiment: personnel (personnel section, regimental headquarters and headquarters troop); medical (regimental medical detachment, with squadron sections).

(c) Following added to regimental and squadron headquarters: security ("combat") platoons; air liaison sections; four and three liaison officers, respectively.

(d) Following changes in cavalry troop: light tank to replace armored car; rifle section (two squads, including two BAR men) added to cavalry platoon; mortars organized into a platoon; command vehicle provided.

(e) Light tank company eliminated.

(f) Following changes in assault gun troop: name changed to "support troop"; six high-velocity self-propelled guns added, organized into three platoons.

(g) Wire to troop level.

(h) SCR 522 (VHF) for squadron headquarters and SCR 499 for headquarters of squadron in armored division.

(i) Carbines replaced by rifles.

(j) SCR 300 added and SCR 510 eliminated.

(k) Number of cargo vehicles increased.

ANNEX A

(Appendix 17, Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

(1) COVERING LETTER AND FIRST INDORSEMENT TO REPORT OF BOARD OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY OFFICERS, HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY, 1 JUNE 1945

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 320.2 Cav GNMCC 3 June 1945

SUBJECT: Re-Organization of Mechanized Cavalry Units - Changes in Existing T/O and T/E of Mechanized Cavalry.

TO : Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Washington, D. C. (Thru Channels).

1. I concur without reservation in recommended changes of Mechanized Cavalry as contained in the inclosure.

2. I strongly urge that vigorous action be taken in the immediate future to finalize the organization of the "Cavalry Regiment (Mecz)" so that Mechanized Cavalry can even more efficiently serve the large commands during the present or any other war.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
/t/ G. S. PATTON, JR.
General, U. S. Army
Commanding

322 (G-3) 1st Ind
Headquarters, 12th Army Group, APO 655, U. S. Army, 13 June 1945.

TO: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U. S. Army.

1. The recommendations contained in the attached Board Report represent changes the need for which has made itself felt in combat in this theater, as evidenced by the fact that previously submitted recommendations have included many of the changes proposed in the inclosure. It is pointed out, however, that the proposed organization and equipment for the cavalry "regiment" and squadron are predicated on the assumption that the missions performed in this theater can now be considered normal to mechanized cavalry units.

2. This headquarters feels that all the recommendations contained in the basic communication have merit, but believes that the extent to which they should be adopted depends upon the future organization of the army and the contemplated role of mechanized cavalry. The organization and equipment proposed definitely increase the capabilities of the present cavalry group, making it a light counterpart of the combat command of an armored division. Recommendations to effect such a reorganization must take into consideration the contemplated future organization of the army.

3. It is recommended that the attached Board Report be held for

study by the board which it is understood your headquarters contemplates establishing, or forwardedd for study by appropriate War Department agencies. It is further recommended that the rifle troop for the squadron be considered for inclusion in the squadron organic in the armored division.

* * * * * * * *

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:

/s/ C. R. Landon
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

(2) LIST OF OFFICERS ATTENDING CONFERENCE ON MECHANIZED CAVALRY AT HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY, 24 August 1945

Name	Organization
Colonel George W. Busbey	16th Cavalry Group, Mecz
Colonel John C. Macdonald	Asst Div Commander 78th Inf Div. (Formerly with 4th Cav Gp, Mecz)
Colonel Charles B. McClelland	101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
Colonel David Wagstaff, Jr.	15th Cavalry Group, Mecz
Lt Col A. D. Hulse	113th Cavalry Group, Mecz
Lt Col Thomas O. Rooney	81st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, 1st Armd Div
Lt Col E. C. Dunn	4th Cavalry Group, Mecz
Major W. E. Hudson	17th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major Thomas H. Stewart	28th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major George W. Ridenook	92d Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major Charles W. Bennington	85th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major John M. Brown	117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major Everett E. Orman	125th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Major Charles J. Girard	82d Armd Rcn Bn, 2d Armd Div.
Major Richard L. Bradley	83d Armd Rcn Bn, 3d Armd Div.
Major Howard C. Bone	759th Light Tank Bn.
Major James W. Cocke	Armd Section, Hq Seventh Army
Captain B. A. Douglas	G-3 Section, Hq Seventh Army
Captain G. R. Dunn	4th Cavalry Group, Mecz

APPENDIX 18

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS (from Questionnaires)
MECHANIZED CAVALRY ORGANIZATION

Questions	Answers	Army Corps and Div Comdrs	Mecz Cav Group Comdrs	Mecz Cav Rcn Squadron Comdrs	Others	TOTALS
a. Should mecz cav regt replace mecz cav group?	YES	18	13	10	5	46
	NO	0	0	0	0	0
b. How many squadrons should there be in regt?	THREE	10	8	5	2	25
	TWO	7	5	4	2	18
c. (1) Should rifle strength be added to mecz cav?	YES	19	12	10	5	46
	NO	0	1	0	0	1
(2) Should a rifle troop be added to squadron?	YES	14	9	9	3	35
	NO	3	4	5	1	13
(3) Should rifle strength be added to cav plat?	YES		12	12	7	31
	NO		1	1	1	3
(4) Should rifle strength be added as platoon in cav troop?	YES		1	0	2	3
	NO		12	11	6	29
d. Should tank troop be retained in squadron?	YES	6	13	11	6	36
	NO	0	0	1	2	3
e. Should assault gun troop be retained in squadron?	YES	15	13	15	8	51
	NO	2	0	0	0	2
f. (1) Should squadron in regt be administratively self sufficient?	YES	4	10	12	4	30
	NO	5	3	3	4	15
(2) Should there be a service troop in (a) Regiment?	YES	5	4	3	2	14
	NO	3	9	11	4	27
(b) Squadron?	YES	2	0	0	1	3
	NO	5	13	11	5	34
g. Should there be a pioneer element within regt or squadron?	YES	2	5	9	4	20
	NO	3	8	6	4	21
h. Should security plat be provided for regt and squadron hqs?	YES		12	15	12	39
	NO		1	1	2	4
i. Should there be a mortar platoon in cavalry troop?	YES		4	7	8	19
	NO		9	7	2	18
j. Should there be a TD platoon in sq?	YES	9	3	5	2	19
	NO	4	7	9	5	25
k. Should ground liaison sections be increased?	While this question was not directly asked in questionnaire, more than 50 per cent of the answers included request for an increase, in both regimental and squadron hqs					
l. Should there be a band in regt?	YES					44
	NO					1

Questions	Answers	Army Corps and Div Comdrs	Mecz Cav Group Comdrs	Mecz Cav Rcn Squadron Comdrs	Others	TOTALS
m. Should cavalry with armored division be						
(1) A Normal Squadron?			5	5	2	12
(2) An Augmented Squadron?			7	7	16	30
n. Should cavalry with infantry division be:						
(1) Cavalry Troop?			2	0	2	4
(2) Reinforced Cav Troop?			4	2	9	15
(3) Cavalry Squadron?			10	9	8	27

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF EMPLOYMENT OF 316TH PROVISIONAL MECHANIZED CAVALRY BRIGADE IN COMBAT

On 8 March 1945, the 3d Cavalry Group of the XX Corps, composed of the 3d and 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, was in the area south of the MOSELLE River just east of TRIER (WL2129). It was in the process of taking over the positions held at that time by the 417th Infantry Regiment; and for the next few days it was mainly occupied in securing a suitable line of departure for participating in an offensive operation being prepared by the corps.

In order to assemble the 94th Infantry Division in preparation for this offensive, XX Corps was obliged to leave a wide gap between its left (north) flank and the XII Corps, then north of the MOSELLE River. Mechanized cavalry was the ideal arm with which to fill this gap and to conduct an offensive in this zone. To augment the mechanized cavalry strength of the corps in preparation for such an operation, therefore, Third Army attached to XX Corps an additional group, the 16th, composed of the 16th and 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons. As this group had had no previous combat experience, and in order to insure coordination of the mechanized cavalry effort, the corps commander decided to form, for the execution of this mission, a provisional cavalry brigade, and to give it the experienced leadership of Colonel James H. Polk, Commanding Officer of the 3d Cavalry Group. Accordingly, by corps order dated 9 March 1945, the 316th Provisional Cavalry Brigade, comprising the 3d and 16th Cavalry Groups, was constituted. Also attached to the brigade were the 241st Field Artillery Battalion, the 245th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A 818th Tank Destroyer Battalion (self-propelled) and an air support party. The 416th Field Artillery Group was to be in direct support and the 558th Field Artillery Battalion in general support.

The mission of the brigade was to attack in conjunction with the corps, protecting XX Corps' north flank, and to maintain contact with the 94th Infantry Division on the south. The projected date for the attack was 13 March. The 16th Cavalry Group, upon its arrival from VECKERING (WQ0484) on 12 March, was given the mission of taking over the right of the brigade sector from the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and of maintaining contact with the 94th Infantry Division. Accordingly, on the day preceding the attack, the brigade was disposed with cavalry groups abreast, the 16th Cavalry Group on the right. In each group, squadrons were disposed abreast, so that the brigade front was, in order from right to left: the 16th and 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, from the draw at (WL2723) on the south (the north boundary of the zone of action of the 94th Infantry Division), north to the RUWER River; and the 43d and 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons from the RUWER River north to the MOSELLE River. The width of the front was approximately seven miles.

The primarily dismounted phase of the attack began on 13 March and continued through 15 March. As it progressed, the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was pinched out and passed into brigade reserve, its sector being taken over by the 16th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. When the advance reached the RUWER River, all bridges were found destroyed, but the 94th Infantry Division discovered a ford near GEIZBURG (WL2720). On 14 and 15 March, the 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron succeeded in crossing tanks at this ford to support its dismounted at-

tack on SOMMERAU (WL2824) and MORCHEID (WL2826). On 16 and 17 March, when the 94th Infantry Division had taken REINSFELD (WL3820), the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was sent mounted, across the ford, to attack north from that point. By the end of the day, 17 March, it had advanced as far north and east as BURTSCHEID (WL4426).

The terrain in the zone of action of the brigade, in the foothills of the HUNNSBRUCK Mountains, was found difficult for mechanized cavalry operations. The streams and high, heavily-wooded ridges ran generally north and south, perpendicular to the direction of advance. Accordingly, the enemy's defensive and delaying tactics were favored and he was afforded excellent observation posts for directing his artillery fire.

In the attack, the main effort was invariably made with the cavalry reconnaissance troops advancing dismounted, closely supported by the light tanks, tank destroyers and engineers. The light tanks and tank destroyers were brought up in defilade and supported the attack with fire or stood by for use in the assault. The attached engineers were employed with the cavalry troops in the removal of road blocks and in the clearing of mine fields. The assault guns were generally employed in battery, in close support of the attack; and through the air support party, attacks by light bombers against enemy-occupied towns, prior to their being assaulted by the mechanized cavalry, were arranged.

In the assault, mechanized cavalrymen, mounted on tanks, were employed in the same manner as tank-infantry teams. When a town or high ground was seized, it was immediately organized for all-around defense. As the roads were opened, by the capture of the towns and high ground along their routes, the mechanized cavalry troops were able to send rapidly-moving mounted teams to cut off and harass the retreating enemy.

On 18 March, the corps offensive having been successful and the enemy having started a withdrawal along the entire front, the provisional cavalry brigade was dissolved. The 3d Cavalry Group, which had been committed for over three months without rest, was withdrawn to TRIER in SHAEF reserve, and the 16th Cavalry Group assumed full responsibility in the zone.

Thus, over a period of eight days, a mechanized cavalry brigade had fought on a seven mile front, against stiff opposition and over difficult terrain, to advance ten miles while inflicting many casualties against the enemy. An important road, running through the zone, had been opened, and the way had been cleared for a combat command of the 12th Armored Division to exploit the 94th Infantry Division's attack.



316TH PROV CAV BRIG:

Attack, E. of TRIER, on North Flank of XX Corps 10 - 17 March 1945

APPENDIX 20

(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

CAVALRY BRIGADE



(Report on Mechanized Cavalry)

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS (from Questionnaires)
MECHANIZED CAVALRY EQUIPMENT

Questions	Answers	Army Corps and Div Comdrs	Mecz Cav Group Comdrs	Mecz Cav Rcn Squadron Comdrs	Others	TOTALS
a. Should armd car be retained in cav tr?	YES	8	9	11	5	33
	NO	9	2	5	3	19
b. (1) Is it essential that light weight 105mm assault gun be developed to replace 75mm how. carriage M8?	YES	17	8	13	6	44
	NO	1	3	0	0	4
(2) Should such assault gun have open turret?	YES		6	7	1	14
	NO		3	8	5	16
(3) Pending such development, what 105mm how. carriage should replace 75mm?	M-37		9	7	3	19
	M-4		1	7	2	10
c. Is it essential that a tank destroyer be developed for mecz cav?	YES	9	2	5	2	18
	NO	3	8	9	5	25
d. (1) What vehicle should be used as mortar carrier?	WHEEL		5	6	3	14
	H/T		4	3	2	9
	F/T		1	4	3	8
(2) What vehicle should be used as personnel carrier?	WHEEL	1	0	0	0	1
	H/T	2	3	3	0	8
	F/T	11	8	11	7	37
(3) What vehicle should be used as CP vehicle?	WHEEL	1	0	0	0	1
	H/T	4	8	4	4	20
	F/T	9	3	10	4	26
e. Should ¼ ton truck be armored (windshield w/wings)?	YES		8	12	8	28
	NO		4	3	1	8
f. (1) To what extent should issue of carbines be decreased?			80%	82%	92%	85%
(2) To what extent should issue of rifle, M-1, be increased?						Replace carbines
(3) To what extent should pistols, cal .45, be issued?	YES	Increase to include all officers, sgts and tank crews?				27
	NO					6
(4) Should issue of SMG be:			INCREASED?			5
			DECREASED?			8
			UNCHANGED?			11
g. To what level should wire coms be provided?*	SQ	8	0	0	0	8
	C TR	5	9	4	2	20
	C PL	0	3	11	6	20
h. How many liaison aircraft should there be in:	REGT	5	3	3	3	3
	SQ	2	2	2	1	2

* NOTE: 36 officers favored wire communications to include platoon in assault gun troop.

APPENDIX 22

(REPORT ON MECHANIZED CAVALRY)

ASSIGNMENT AND ATTACHMENT OF MECHANIZED CAVALRY GROUPS AND SEPARATE MECHANIZED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS IN EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Group	Normally Atchd Sqs	Date Entered Active Combat In ETO As Group	Army(ies) to which Assigned	CORPS TO WHICH ATTACHED					
				CAMPAIGNS					
				NORMANDY	NORTHERN FRANCE	SOUTHERN FRANCE	ARDENNES	RHINELAND	CENTRAL EUROPE
2nd		19 Jul 44	THIRD	ADSEC	VIII XII		XII XX	XII	XII
	2nd		THIRD	ADSEC	VIII XII		XII XX	XII	XII
	42nd		THIRD	ADSEC	VIII XII		XII XX	XII	XII
3rd		10 Aug 44	THIRD		XX		XX	XX	XX
	3rd		THIRD		XX XII		XX	XX	XX
	43rd		THIRD		XX		XX	XX	XX
4th		18 Jun 44	FIRST	VII	VII		VII	VII	VII
	4th		FIRST	VII	VII		VII	VII	VII
	24th		FIRST	VII	VII		VII	VII	VII
6th		2 Aug 44	THIRD	Army	Army		III	VIII	VIII
	6th		THIRD	Army	Army		III	VIII	VIII
	28th		THIRD	Army	Army		III	VIII	VIII
11th		14 Dec 44	NINTH					XIII	XIII
	36th		NINTH					XIII	XIII
	44th		NINTH					XIII	XIII
14th		11 Dec 44	FIRST (until 18 Apr) THIRD				VIII	XVIII III	III
	18th		FIRST (until 18 Apr) THIRD				VIII	XVIII III	III
	32nd		FIRST (until 18 Apr) THIRD				VIII	XVIII III	III

Group	Normally Atchd Sqs	Date Entered Active Combat In ETO As Group	Army(ies) to which Assigned	CORPS TO WHICH ATTACHED — CAMPAIGNS: NORMANDY	NORTHERN FRANCE	SOUTHERN FRANCE	ARDENNES	RHINELAND	CENTRAL EUROPE
15th		19 Jul 44	THIRD (until 22 Sep) NINTH	ADSEC	ADSEC VIII			XVI	XIX XVI
	15th		THIRD (until 22 Sep) NINTH	ADSEC	ADSEC VIII			XVI	XIX XVI
	17th		THIRD (until 22 Sep) NINTH	ADSEC	ADSEC VIII NINTH ARMY			XIX XIII XVI NINTH ARMY	XIX XVI
16th		10 Mar 45	THIRD (until 1 Apr 45) FIFTEENTH					XX	XII XX XXII
	16th		THIRD (until 1 Apr) FIFTEENTH					XX	XII XX XXII
	19th		THIRD (until 1 Apr) FIFTEENTH					XX	XII XX XXII
101st		9 Feb 45	SEVENTH					XV XXI	XXI
	101st		SEVENTH					XV XXI	XXI
	116th		SEVENTH					XV XXI	XXI
102nd		12 Jun 44	FIRST SEVENTH (Atchd 16 - 28 Mar)	V	V		V VII XIX	V VI	V
	38th		FIRST SEVENTH (Atchd 16 - 28 Mar)	V	V		V	V VI	V
	102nd		FIRST	V	V		V VII XIX	V	V
106th		6 Jul 44	FIRST (until Aug) THIRD	VIII	XV XII		XV	XV	XV
	106th		FIRST (until Aug) THIRD	VIII	XV XII		XV	XV	XV
	121st		FIRST (until Aug) THIRD	VIII	XV XII		XV	XV	XV

Group	Normally Atchd Sqs	Date Entered Active Combat In ETO As Group	Army(ies) to which Assigned	CORPS TO WHICH ATTACHED					
				CAMPAIGNS					
				NORMANDY	NORTHERN FRANCE	SOUTHERN FRANCE	ARDENNES	RHINELAND	CENTRAL EUROPE
113th		4 Jul 44	FIRST (until 22 Oct) NINTH	XIX	XIX			XIX XIII	XIX XIII
	113th		FIRST (until 22 Oct) NINTH	XIX	XIX			XIX XIII	XIX XIII
	125th		FIRST (until 22 Oct) NINTH	XIX	XIX		NINTH ARMY	XIX XIII	XIX XIII
115th		12 Mar 45	FIFTEENTH SEVENTH (Atchd from 25 Apr)		66th Inf Div				VI
	104th		FIFTEENTH		66th Inf Div				
	107th		FIFTEENTH SEVENTH (Atchd from 25 Apr)		66th Inf Div				VI
	117th	15 Aug 44	SEVENTH			VI		VI	VI

NOTE: Extract from Standing Operating Procedure, First US Army, 1 December, 1944: "34b(3) The cavalry group will normally remain attached to the same corps."