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American National Red Cross Activities in European Theater of Operations

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
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STUDY AND REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

CHAPTER 1

AUTHORITY FOR AMERICAN RED CROSS SERVICES WITH THE ARMED FORCES

1. Act of Incorporation. The American National Red Cross (ARC) was created and chartered as a corporation under the laws of the United States by an Act of Congress dated 5 January 1905. According to the terms of the charter, the ARC was formed for the following purposes:

a. "To furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies in time of war, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva of October, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and also of the treaty of the Red Cross, or the treaty of Geneva, of August twenty-second, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to which the United States of America gave its adhesion on March first, eighteen hundred and eighty-two".

b. "And for said purposes to perform all the duties devolved upon a national society by each nation which has acceded to said treaty".

c. "To succeed to all the rights and property which have been hitherto held and to all the duties which have heretofore been performed by the American National Red Cross as a corporation duly incorporated by act of Congress June sixth, nineteen hundred, which act is hereby repealed and the organization created thereby is hereby dissolved".

d. "To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accord with the military and naval authorities as a medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their Army and Navy, and to act in such matters between similar national societies of other governments through the "Comite International de Secours" and the Government and the people and the Army and Navy of the United States of America".

e. "And to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same".

2. Act 24 April 1912. Thereafter, by an act dated 24 April 1912, Congress amended the terms of the charter to include:

a. "That whenever in time of war, or when war is imminent, the President shall find the cooperation and use of the American National Red Cross with the land and naval forces to be necessary, he is authorized to accept the assistance tendered by the

said Red Cross and to employ the same under the land and naval forces in conformity with such rules and regulations as he may prescribe".

b. "That when the said Red Cross cooperation and assistance with the land and naval forces in time of war or threatened hostilities shall have been accepted by the President, the personnel entering upon the duty specified in section 1 of this Act shall, while proceeding to their place of duty, while serving thereat, and while returning therefrom, be transported and subsisted at the cost and charge of the United States as civilian employees employed with the said forces, and no passport fee shall be charged or collected for any passport issued to such personnel so serving or proceeding abroad to enter upon such service, and the Red Cross supplies that may be tendered as a gift and accepted for use by the land and naval forces shall be transported at the cost and charge of the United States. Act 24 April 1912 (37 Stat. 90; 36 U. S. C. 10, 11) as amended by act 29 June 1943 (Public Law 99, 78th Cong.)".

3. Central Committee and War Council. "The charter of the American National Red Cross provides for a central committee of 18, of which 6 and the chairman are appointed by the President of the United States; it also provides for the audit of the organization's accounts by the Secretary of War. The by-laws of the organization provide that the President of the United States shall be the president of the American National Red Cross and that, in time of war, a war council, all members of which, save one, are appointed by the President, shall have certain supreme authority".

4. Army Regulations. AR 850-75[1], 30 June 1943, implements the authority set forth above; and constitutes, "such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe", which power was delegated by Congress to the President of the United States. In addition to the normal functions of the ARC, paragraph 12 of this regulation authorizes certain services to the able-bodied outside the continental United States but therein mentions specifically that the primary purpose of the Red Cross in time of war is the care of the sick and wounded. The authorization includes the following:

a. "To transmit funds to soldiers' beneficiaries living in the United States, in cases of individual emergencies, This will be done only when postal or cable facilities are available".

b. "To aid military authorities in securing information regarding missing or captured men".

c. "To furnish comfort articles when need has been established".

d. "To meet the emergency needs for athletic and recreation material and to assist with the recreation program for able-bodied troops. It is not intended that the Red Cross will duplicate or parallel the work of the War Department in these activities".

e. "In areas assigned to the Red Cross by the War Department, to provide feeding, housing, and recreation facilities adjacent to military concentrations when requested by the proper military authorities. It is not intended that the Red Cross will duplicate or parallel the work of the War Department in these activities".

5. Responsibility. a. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, is the staff officer responsible for all policy decisions concerning relations between the Red Cross and the Army.

b. The details of recreational operations under policy decisions concerning relations between the Red Cross and the Army are to be carried out through the Director, Special Service Division.

c. In connection with ARC activities, paragraph 12a (5), AR 850-75 states in part, "when requested by the proper military authorities". This provision makes it mandatory that such services be limited to instances where same are requested, and places upon the Theater Commander the responsibility for overall supervision and coordination of ARC activities within the European Theater of Operations.

6. Policies. a. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, by letter dated 19 December 1941,[2] to the Chairman of the ARC, outlined the War Department policy with respect to ARC activities in overseas theaters. It provided:

(1) "The Army will direct the operation of welfare and recreational activities on military reservations outside the continental United States. The Red Cross may be requested to assist".

(2) "The operation of recreational buildings off military reservations outside continental United States by the U.S.O. will be regarded as satisfactory if staffed with U.S.O. personnel. However, the War Department will arrange for their operation by military and/or Red Cross personnel when military or other requirements make such operation desirable".

(3) "The Red Cross is recognized as the sole non-military agency to operate with an expeditionary force during war".

(4) "The Chief of the Morale Branch is designated as the representative of the War Department to advise the ARC of any decisions as to the carrying out of the above policies and General Headquarters will be in direct contact with the ARC in connection with their operations".

b. A War Department memorandum dated 15 March 1943 further implemented the policies by announcing the following provisions.

(1) "The Army will direct, and will itself conduct, the operation of welfare and recreational activities on military reservations outside the continental United States. The Red Cross, which, because of its Federal charter powers, is recognized as the sole non-military agency to operate with an expeditionary force during war, may be requested to assist".

(2) "In the conduct of welfare and recreational activities off military reservations outside the continental United States, the Army will

deal with only one civilian agency in each theater. That agency will be the U.S.O. in Hawaii, Panama, Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Caribbean, those parts of Alaska which the U.S.O. are now serving and, subject to any contrary ruling in a particular case by the War Department, South America. The Red Cross will be the agency dealt with everywhere else overseas. For welfare and recreational purposes, the War Department does not at this time regard Canada as an overseas area. Recreational buildings operated by the U.S.O. in accordance with the above will be staffed with U.S.O. personnel".

(3) "Requests by overseas commanders for welfare and recreational services by the Red Cross or U.S.O. within the specific areas respectively designated to them above will be handled in the field. Any departure from those designations will require prior authority of the War Department".

(4) "The sole agency for the procurement of professional theatrical talent in the United States for showing to troops overseas will be U.S.O. -Camp Shows, Inc."

(5) "The War Department (Special Service Division, Hq, Army Service Forces) will operate with U.S.O.-Camp Shows, Inc., in the procurement of American troupes to give performances outside the continental United States. Upon arrival at ports or airports of embarkation for overseas, such troupes will pass to the control of the Army for transportation, housing, and subsistence. The presentation of camp performances will be an Army function, performed through special service officers. When a commanding officer desires, USO-Camp Shows may be made available for showing in USO or Red Cross installations. If such presentation is made in a Red Cross installation, due credit will be given to the fact that it is a USO-Camp Shows unit".

CHAPTER 2

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THEATER COMMANDER AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

7. Chief, Special Services. The Chief of Staff, US Army, on 19 December 1941, designated the Chief of the Morale Branch, i.e., Special Services of the Army, as the representative of the War Department to advise the ARC of any decisions as to the carrying out of established policies. Therefore, coordination of ARC activities in this Theater became the responsibility of the Theater Chief of Special Services.

8. Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Upon the reorganization of the Theater on 21 March 1943, the responsibility for coordination of ARC activities was transferred to the Commanding General Services of Supply. As the result of a conference between G-1 representatives of ETOUSA and G-1 representatives of Services of Supply, it was decided that only the broadest of policy decisions would be referred to Headquarters, ETOUSA and that Headquarters, Services of Supply would be responsible for coordinating the routine operating activities.

9. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. Shortly thereafter, Headquarters, SOSETO, recommended that the responsibility for ARC coordination be placed at general staff level in G-1 sections. The War Department concurred and on 30 June 1943, published in AR 850-75 a statement to the effect that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, would be the staff officer responsible for all policy decisions concerning relations between the ARC and the Army. However, it was further directed that the details of recreational operations under policy decisions concerning relations between the ARC and the Army were to be carried out through the Director, Special Service Division.

10. Conflict of Interest. During the period that Special Services Division, ETOUSA, was the coordinating agency for ARC activities, certain complications in that arrangement became apparent, The basic weakness of this arrangement was that it placed the Director of Special Services in the position of coordinating the activities of an agency engaged in a program similar to that performed by his own section. Naturally, conflicts of interests were bound to, and did arise, with the result that relations between the two agencies were practically at a stalemate by March 1943. Among the points on which interests conflicted were the ARC athletic programs, which duplicated or paralleled similar programs being arranged by Special Services; the ARC "Live" entertainment program, which contemplated shipment of professional talent from the U.S. for shows at ARC Clubs, and the recruiting of professional talent in the U.K. for this purpose, which conflicted with the Special Services plan for exclusive employment of USO-Camp Shows; the ARC motion picture program, which paralleled the Special Services project in a field where there was already an acute shortage of projectors and film; and, the ARC "On-Site" Club program, which provided recreational facilities within the confines of posts, camps, and stations. In this case, the point at issue was the extent of participation and supervision, if any, that post special services officers would exercise in the recreational activities of the club.

The views of the ARC Commissioner in this regard were that Special Services, being engaged in a similar program, could not approach a problem from a sufficiently detached point of view to assure that they were acting for the mutual best interests of both agencies and the Army. In view of these difficulties active supervision of ARC was transferred to G-1.

11. Comments. Following the transfer of responsibility, ARC operations appeared to be expedited and ARC-Army relations improved. The difficulties Special Services were confronted with in their own establishment and operation in the Theater at that time, contributed to the difficulties existing and prompted the decision to transfer responsibility to G-1.

12. Decentralization of Authority of Headquarters, American Red Cross. As our armies advanced to the East complications manifested themselves. With the advance, the distance between ARC Headquarters at Paris and the location of the troops increased causing communications between them to become extremely difficult. Thereupon excessive delay and confusion arose as a result of the necessity of communicating with the Paris Headquarters in order to obtain final decisions concerning ARC activities. Further, it was necessary for ARC personnel to travel to Paris to attend scheduled meetings. It was not until December 1944 that such adverse conditions were alleviated. This was accomplished by setting up regional executive offices at each Army Group Headquarters. A regional executive was then appointed and was vested with authority to act for and in place of Headquarters, ARC. Thereafter, final decisions, as far as the ARC was concerned, were made at regional headquarters and the submission of problems to the Paris Headquarters was eliminated.

13. Conclusions. In March 1943 when the responsibility for ARC operations was transferred from Special Services to G-1 the Special Services Division of the Theater were unable to adequately handle ARC supervision under the then existing circumstances. The transfer of responsibility for operations was contrary to War Department directives but an expedient adapted in this Theater for operational reasons; primarily the inability of Special Services due to organizational difficulties to cope with the problem. The relationship between ARC and the army improved after supervision had been placed at general staff level. The decentralization of authority from Headquarters, ARC to regional headquarters in the field was delayed excessively which was reflected in the resulting inefficient operating procedures.

14. Recommendations. It is recommended that the Assistant Chief of Staff of G-1 of each headquarters retain the responsibility for all policy decisions concerning relations between the ARC and the army but that Special Services retain the responsibility for ARC operations as contemplated by War Department directives; that for future planning ARC authority be decentralized with sufficient rapidity so as to keep abreast of advancing troops.

CHAPTER 3

PROCUREMENT OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES AND FACILITIES FOR THE AMERICAN RED CROSS

15. Responsibilities. a. The procurement of supplies, services, and facilities for the ARC, with exception of certain peculiar items, i.e., doughnut flour and book matches, was the responsibility of the Theater Commander. This included supplies, services, etc., obtained as reciprocal aid from Allied governments. The working agreement provided that supplies, services and facilities requisitioned through British supply agencies would be channeled through the Theater Commander except that out of consideration of administrative efficiency, the ARC was authorized to requisition directly on the appropriate British supply agency, after a basic agreement had been reached. In effect, the US Army was in fact the recipient of reciprocal aid.

b. The basic understanding in connection with handling of reciprocal aid arrangements, particularly with the British, was based on the theory that the ARC, having been designated to discharge a portion of the responsibility of the Theater Commander, was therefore entitled to be provided with such supplies, services and facilities as might be required in carrying out its mission. Also this method of procurement obviated any possibility of post-war liability on the part of the ARC to the Government of Great Britain.

c. The Quartermaster service was responsible for the procurement, storage and issue of supplies of a quartermaster nature for the ARC in approved quantities subject to the availability of stocks. The Quartermaster, Services of Supply, ETO, was responsible for the preparation and transmission to the US or UK of requisitions covering requirements as submitted by ARC. The Quartermaster Service also stored and issued items owned by ARC, i.e., doughnut flour and book matches.

d. The ARC was responsible for submitting its requirements for clothing, equipage, regular supplies, subsistence and comfort articles (PX items) to the Quartermaster, Services of Supply, on a quarterly basis four months in advance of the period to be covered.

e. Subsistence items for use by ARC Clubmobiles, Doughnut Dugouts, Field Clubs, Service Clubs, and Aero Clubs were on a sales basis with the exception of doughnut flour.

f. Subject to availability of stocks, the Chief Quartermaster was authorized to issue in bulk on memorandum receipt to designated ARC representatives certain items of individual clothing and equipment, and organizational equipment. Expendable supplies such as cleaning and preserving items were made available to the ARC on a sales basis.

g. POL products for the ARC was furnished free of charge at Quartermaster POL supply points.

h. Maintenance on standard US Army vehicles was performed at US Army ordnance shops on request of ARC. Maintenance on all other equipment was the responsibility of the ARC.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in maintenance problems as most of the drivers were women and under rigorous winter conditions were unable to properly perform first and second echelon maintenance. The repair of British equipment was a continuing problem due to lack of spare parts and trained personnel. Mobile generators used by clubmobile groups were deadlined as much as 50% of the time. Much ingenuity and improvisation by ARC and Army personnel was necessary to keep the equipment in operation.

i. Items of personal clothing and equipment stocked in sales stores were available to male and female ARC personnel on a sales basis. Items and quantities were as prescribed by the Chief Quartermaster, Services of Supply.

j. Billeting and messing of ARC personnel were Army responsibilities. Also, the procurement of buildings for ARC activities on the continent was charged to army agencies.

16. Transportation. a. The transportation of ARC supplies including those procured by the army, those procured by the ARC, those donated to and accepted by the ARC for use of the armed forces, from the point of procurement to the various depots in the European Theater of Operations was the responsibility of the army. Transportation of these supplies from depots in the Communications Zone to army depots was the responsibility of the Commanding General, Communications Zone. Transportation from these depots was an ARC function and responsibility. It was the common practice, however, for army units to assist in moving the supplies from these points. During the rapid advance across France, it was impossible for the army to allot sufficient tonnage to move ARC supplies forward, and the ARC undertook to move its own supplies forward from the beaches by truck. It required approximately 60 tons of supplies per week per army to maintain ARC activities. In order to move ARC supplies to army depots, a certain amount of tonnage must be allotted in the daily telegram for the movement of such supplies.

17. Civilian Labor. In the United Kingdom, by mutual agreement between the army and the ARC,[3] the required civilian labor was procured directly and paid from ARC funds. For reasons peculiarly applicable on the Continent, it was agreed between the Commanding General, Communications Zone, and the ARC that civilian labor requirements for welfare and recreation services to United States forces would be obtained by the army as reciprocal aid and provided to the ARC. In Germany, civilian labor was procured and paid for through army agencies.

18. Conclusions. a. The procurement of all ARC supplies[4] with the exception of doughnut flour, book matches, and certain other few items as the responsibility of the army was sound.

b. The maintenance of standard US Army vehicles used by the ARC was the responsibility of the army and maintenance was not entirely satisfactory in that the army did not have control over ARC vehicles to insure adequate maintenance.

c. The maintenance of other equipment was an ARC responsibility, and was generally unsatisfactory.

d. The transportation of ARC supplies to issuing depots as an army responsibility was sound.

e. During fast-moving periods the supply of ARC items in army areas could not be maintained without ARC assistance.

f. On the Continent procurement of ARC civilian labor requirements through army agencies eliminated competition for the available labor.

19. Recommendations: a. That the procurement of ARC supplies continue to be a responsibility of the army.

b. That only standard US Army equipment be utilized by the ARC, to facilitate maintenance.

c. That vehicles used by the ARC be brought under army supervision so as to maintain their operating efficiency.

d. That Army Commanders allot tonnage on supply trains for ARC supplies, and that in plans for any operation, provision be made to lift ARC supplies.

e. That the army continue to recruit, and assume responsibility for payment of, civilian labor used by the ARD in a theater of operations.

PART TWO

AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

CLUB DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

20. Establishment. a. Prior to the entry of the United States into the war, there was one American Field Service Club in existence in London. This club was established with a lounge, snack bar, and dormitories for the recreation of Americans serving with the British and Canadian Forces.

b. Shortly after the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, representatives of the ARC arrived in the United Kingdom to survey recreational facilities and to consult with Army and State Department authorities preliminary to the establishment of ARC recreational facilities in larger cities, and areas of unusual recreational or historical interest. Tentative arrangements were made at this time to establish two clubs in Northern Ireland to serve troops due to arrive there in April 1942. From this beginning the number of ARC Clubs increased until there was a total of 304 clubs in operation at the same time, requiring a staff of 887 Americans and 20,524 persons of other nationalities.

c. At this time the ARC negotiated their own arrangements with appropriate British agencies when securing 'off-site' club facilities and British operating staffs. Coordination of the ARC club program was effected by the Commanding General, Services of Supply. As the troop strength mounted in the Theater, it became necessary to maintain rigid control over the number of clubs established and the locations, therefore, instructions were issued that all requests for establishing ARC Clubs would be acted upon by the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

21. Types of Facilities. a. The ARC maintained two types of clubs in the United Kingdom, 'off-site' and 'on-site' service clubs.

b. 'Off-site' facilities were service clubs established off of military posts, camps or stations and were further classified as follows:

(1) Class "A" clubs had every facility, with sleeping accommodations for a substantial number of men.

(2) Class "B" clubs were similar to Class "A" except that sleeping accommodations were limited to not more than 50 beds.

(3) Class "C" clubs provided messing facilities, snack bar, and recreational facilities but no sleeping accommodations.

c. The class of club established, as enumerated above, was an ARC decision after the request for facilities had been approved by the Army.

d. 'On-site' facilities were provided by the American Red Cross within posts, camps and stations at the Army's request and were classified as:

(1) Aero Clubs for Air Corps installations.

(2) Camp Clubs for the Field Forces and Communications Zone.

(3) Donut-Dugouts were initiated in late 1944 and were similar to the camp clubs but less elaborate.

e. The various type clubs listed in d above did not have sleeping accommodations and were limited to snack bars and the customary welfare hut facilities.

22. Charges for American Red Cross Food and Facilities. a. In February 1942, Major General James E. Chaney, Commander of the US Army Forces in the British Isles, which was subsequently redesignated European Theater of Operations, recommended to War Department that a moderate charge be made for ARC food and facilities for the following reasons:

(1) The principle of free "handouts" to American troops who receive higher pay than any others in the UK was undesirable.

(2) All other Army clubs for Allied forces in the UK, without exception, made such charges varying from thirty cents to fifty cents with bed and breakfast.

(3) It was considered impracticable for the army to operate canteens and dormitories in ARC clubs especially in cities outside American military areas where special detachments would be required.

(4) Troops on leave prefer change from army camp atmosphere, and they would ascribe to the Red Cross the charges paid in the clubs regardless of what agency, army or ARC, eventually collect.

(5) A certain amount of reciprocal hospitality toward Allied troops would be necessary and desirable, and a policy of complete gratuity would overtax available food supplies.

b. In making these recommendations to the War Department, General Chaney stressed the point that any decision made by the National Headquarters should be made strictly on the basis of "practicability and desirability" and not because the army requested it.

c. On the basis of these recommendations the Secretary of War, in a letter to the Chairman, American National Red Cross, dated 20 March 1942, recommended that the Red Cross authorities in the British Isles be authorized to provide these services at such cost as they deemed appropriate. Again the Secretary of War pointed out that this procedure should be adopted solely on the basis of its merit rather than the fact that the local military commander requested that charges be made for the proposed services.

d. When this became the policy of the ARC, a standard list of prices for meals, snacks, and billets was worked out between ARC and Headquarters, ETOUSA.

23. Use of American Red Cross Clubs by Members of Allied Forces.

a. The policy adopted by the ARC with regard to admitting members of Allied forces to 'off-site' clubs was that any member or members of an Allied force would be admitted with accompanied by a member of the US Forces. This policy was formulated at American Red Cross Headquarters in Washington and coordinated with the Commanding General, EROUSA, and it had the full approval of the British Ministry of Information, the official government agency designated to represent the British Government in its relations with the ARC.

b. This policy was subjected to criticism from both British and American sources from time to time, especially in view of the fact that no restriction was placed on the use of British Service Clubs by American troops. There were, however, many factors which entered into the formulation of this policy, among which were:

(1) Service clubs were primarily established to provide accommodations for American troops while on furlough, since hotel accommodations or other lodgings were practically impossible to obtain on an individual basis.

(2) The service club program was scaled to meet leave and furlough requirements for American troops, and the club program was closely coordinated with the build up of American forces in the UK. Opening these clubs to Allied forces without restriction would have introduced an uncontrollable factor into the plan.

(3) The largest number of Allied troops affected by this restriction were British, all of whom received regular leaves in which they could visit their homes.

c. In one or two instances an exception to this policy was made and an unrestricted "open door" policy was instituted, with results which only served to prove the wisdom of the more restrictive policy. In both cases, the number of Allied troops using Red Cross facilities outnumbered American troops by a ratio of 3 to 1, with very undesirable results. In one case it led to American troops virtually boycotting the club.

d. However, Allied military personnel serving at American posts, camps and stations were allowed unrestricted use of Areoclub and similar 'on-site' facilities on the same basis as American troops.

24. Use of American Red Cross Clubs by Negro Troops. The Theater policy with respect to use of ARC facilities by Negro troops was determined between the Theater Commander and Mr. Harvey Gibson, ARC Commissioner, in September 1942. It provided that white and negro troops would be equally welcome at all ARC clubs, canteens, or recreation centers, as well as being recipients of any other ARC services rendered. It further provided that clubs for Negro personnel, staffed by negro workers, would be established in localities where negro troops were concentrated in relatively large numbers, particularly in the port cities.

25. Allocation of Quotas. The Theater Commander delegated authority to allot quotas for the various ARC clubs to the Base Section Commanders in whose area the clubs were located. With the exception of facilities located in the London area, nearly all accommodations were apportioned to nearby troops. The allotment of beds in London was made on the basis of the relative strength of each major command in the Theater.

SECTION 2

ON THE CONTINENT

26. General, a. The ARC was requested by the army to operate 'off-site' facilities in Paris only. All other club facilities were of the 'on-site' type with the class of club established being based on the number of troops in the area to be served.

b. There was a total of 311 clubs in operation at the same time on the continent, requiring a staff of 1,163 Americans and 12,430 persons of other nationalities.

(1) The difference in the number of foreign personnel required can be ascribed to the fact that the ARC was operating only a fraction of the number of sleeping accommodations it maintained in England.

c. The same general policies for ARC operations that were developed in Great Britain were maintained on the continent with the following exceptions:

(1) ARC services in the Army areas were provided without cost to personnel. This practice resulted in considerable adverse comment regarding troops on leave, furlough or pass from the forward areas, by those stationed in the rear areas, who were required to pay for ARC services.

(2) Allocation of sleeping accommodations to the Major commands was arranged by the Commanding General, Communications Zone.

(3) Equal privileges in use of ARC facilities were accorded to all Allied troops serving on the Continent. Use of sleeping accommodations in Paris by Allied troops was controlled by the Theater Commander.

27. Train Halts. Upon inauguration of leave and furlough trains it was found desirable to establish food and rest halts, and upon request of the Theater Commander facilities to serve hot coffee and doughnuts were placed in operation on the rail lines running from the Army areas to Paris, the Riviera, and the United Kingdom staging areas.

28. Conclusions. a. The ARC discharged part of the Theater Commander's responsibility for welfare and recreation activities in the European Theater of Operations.

b. The ARC welfare and recreation program was expanded as the troop strength in the Theater increased.

c. The ARC had various types of units to meet practically all requests.

d. A small charge for ARC services was desirable, but on the continent where the services were free, in certain areas criticism was leveled at the ARC by troops when required to pay in other areas.

e. In the British Isles it was necessary to limit the number of Allied troops using ARC facilities.

f. Negro troops were not barred from any ARC facility.

g. It was desirable to invest authority to allot quotas in the central headquarters.

h. On the Continent, outside of Paris, all sleeping accommodations for troops on leave and furlough were operated by the army.

29. Recommendations. It is recommended that the policies indicated for the operation of ARC clubs under operating conditions applicable to this Theater be continued.

CHAPTER 2

CLUBMOBILES AND RANGER UNITS

SECTION 1

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

30. Clubmobile Service. a. In order to provide ARC service to widely scattered units from a base in a particular geographical location, mobile units to dispense hot coffee, doughnuts and comfort items were devised. These units were known as clubmobile units and were constructed with an electric doughnut machine, fire unit to heat water for coffee, portable phonograph, and necessary equipment to distribute comfort items. Power to operate the doughnut machine was generally drawn from existing power lines. In locations where this power was not available mobile generators mounted on trailers were used. A variation of this type of equipment was the use of 3/4 ton trucks to carry coffee, doughnuts and other items to troops, the doughnuts and coffee being made in static kitchens.

b. The maximum number of clubmobiles operating at one time in Great Britain was 94 requiring 486 American personnel to operate. The magnitude of clubmobile operations can be gained by the following statistics:

(1) The average number of doughnuts served daily in England prior to 15 July 1944 was 201,135. After 15 July 1944 the daily average was 161,347.

(2) The average number of cups of coffee served daily in England prior to 15 July 1944 was 65,295. After 15 July 1944 the daily average was 44,826.

31. Ranger Service. Ranger service was a form of clubmobile service and was primarily designed to bring ARC welcome to troops arriving at ports in the United Kingdom from the United States.

32. Charges. No charge was made for ARC services rendered by mobile units.

33. Supply and Maintenance. See Chapter 3, Part One for supply and maintenance of ARC activities.

SECTION 2

ON THE CONTINENT

34. Organization. a. Prior to D-Day 10 clubmobile groups were organized in England and attached to units under First US Army jurisdiction for training. Each group consisted of eight clubmobiles, one cinemobile, two 2 1/2-ton GMC supply vehicles, one generator on trailer, two Hillman Vans (British), one 250 gallon water tank trailer, eight 1/4 ton trailers. This organization varied as the Hillman Vans were replaced by 1/4 and 3/4-ton standard army vehicles. Each group had 32 ARC girls assigned, and approximately 12 enlisted men attached to act as drivers, mechanics, and electricians.

(1) As operations progressed the attached enlisted men were gradually relieved of their duties. Each unit using clubmobiles, however, generally attached enlisted men to assist in operating the clubmobiles.

(2) In addition to the personnel listed above, it was the common practice to use indigenous labor for the menial work.

b. The 80 clubmobiles contained in the original 10 groups were increased by converting other vehicles into clubmobiles until there was a total of 170 such vehicles in operation on the continent.

35. Operation. a. The first clubmobile group landed on the continent 23 July 1944 with the remaining nine groups ashore by the end of August.

b. Originally all 10 groups were attached to First US Army.[5] but as the Third and Ninth US Armies became operational redistribution was accomplished by 12th Army Group. The basis for attachment was one group per Corps and one group for Army troops. One group was retained by 12th Army Group in order that a mobile reserve would be available to cover units pulled out of the front lines.

c. Clubmobiles, being designed to move into a location, cook doughnuts and then serve them, were able to keep abreast of the advancing armies. When the advance across France became very rapid, it was impossible at times for the clubmobiles to set up, cook doughnuts, serve them and then be ready to move with the unit to which attached. During other periods the clubmobiles were able to cover the units, sometimes serving as far forward as battalion command posts.

d. Experience in operations showed that the original method of using a single vehicle for both cooking and serving was not the most efficient means of operation. The best results were obtained by removing doughnut machines from clubmobiles, and setting up kitchens separately, utilizing clubmobiles for delivering and serving only. The kitchen, when separate, and employing civilian labor can produce approximately 14,000 doughnuts in a 12 to 14 hour day, whereas four clubmobiles can produce but 5,000 a day prior to serving. Since, for security and billeting reasons, clubmobiles operate in a group and usually are attached to corps and divisions, no advantage was obtained in the use of a single clubmobile for both cooking and serving.[6]

(1) Another important factor in advocating static kitchens was the fact that the doughnut machines were not too strongly constructed and being transported over many miles of rough roads, the upkeep was at times impossible. Also the generators mounted trailers suffered undue wear and tear when being towed to new locations. These two factors alone at times had as many as 50% of the clubmobiles inoperative at one time. In December 1944, permission was granted to clubmobiles by the ARC to take some of the machines out of the clubmobiles and operate from a static kitchen.

e. The cinemobile unit or vehicle with each clubmobile group were equipped to show 16mm motion pictures and also put on impromptu "live" shows. Each cinemobile had two talented ARC girls as a crew who were trained to operate the motion picture projector and organize impromptu shows among the troops. In inclement or severe weather it was found that the use of cinemobiles was impractical and they were withdrawn from use. The motion picture equipment and ARC girls were used in the rest centers by the various armies.

36. Security. Due to their mission, clubmobiles necessarily worked with forward troops, and the security of these units was one of continuing concern to commanders. When enroute to and from serving troops it was the practice to provide guards and guides. Difficulty was experienced at times, however, with individual ARC clubmobile girls making journeys without either guards or guides. These problems became increasingly serious as the armies advanced deeper in captured territory.

37. Supply and Maintenance. See Chapter 3, Part One for the supply and maintenance of ARC activities.

38. Ranger Units. Ranger service on the Continent was similar to that performed in Great Britain.

39. Conclusions. a. Clubmobile units and Ranger service were designed to service widely scattered units and troops in a moving situation.

b. Clubmobile groups contained both standard US vehicles and British equipment.

c. It was necessary to augment the ARC personnel with enlisted men.

d. The clubmobiles as originally designed were not as efficient as they might have been.

e. The doughnut machines in clubmobiles and the mobile generators were not sufficiently durable to withstand hard usage over an extended period of time.

40. Recommendations. a. That clubmobile groups and Ranger Units be equipped with standard US Army equipment.

b. That clubmobiles be redesigned to permit more efficient operation.

c. That consideration be given to including clubmobile units in special service companies with female personnel assigned or attached.

CHAPTER 3

FIELD SERVICE DEPARTMENT

41. Duties. The duties of the Field Service Department in the European Theater of Operations were to handle and counsel on the personal problems of the military personnel. Specifically, some of the duties were:

a. Reporting home conditions of families and relatives of military personnel in the United States.

b. Securing data to support requests for emergency furloughs, dependency discharges and hardship cases.

c. Marital problems.

d. Assistance in the form of loans to men and families.

e. Counsel on allotments and allowances.

f. Distribution of comfort items (PX items) to military personnel who are unable to provide them for themselves.

42. Personnel. Field Directors were assigned either on an area basis (i.e., they would provide services to all units in a geographical area) or they were attached to military units and served only personnel attached and assigned to the particular units. Generally, the field directors were ARC male personnel with male or female assistants, female personnel generally being utilized in hospitals. The largest number of Field Directors serving with the military in Great Britain was in May 1944, with a total of 288, and on the Continent there were 365 with the Army as of 1 June 1945. Each Field Director serviced from 3,000 to 50,000 troops each. The desirable maximum number of troops that each Field Director should serve is approximately 5,000.

43. Operation a. Most of the Field Director's work was by personal contact with the individual soldier--handling each case on the facts presented. It was necessary for the Field Director to operate in very close conjunction with the Special Service Officer and the Chaplain. The Field Director would assist the Special Service Officer in recreational and athletic programs. He would assist the Chaplain and in turn be assisted by the Chaplain in handling cases of a welfare nature. In all cases it was very necessary that the ARC Field Director work in close conjunction and harmony with the commanding officers of the units being serviced. The total number of cases being handled each month in England averaged approximately 55,000, while a typical three-month average on the Continent would be approximately 99,280 per month. Immediately prior to D-Day the ARC was handling 20,675 emergency messages per month in England, while an average three-month period of operations on the Continent produced 74,378 emergency messages per month. The large number of emergency messages handled by the ARC greatly aggravated communication facilities, especially on the Continent. It was necessary to channel these messages to one central point on the Continent, thence by Army facilities to War Department from the War Department to the National Headquarters, ARC, thence to the chapter that would secure the necessary information. The return message used the same procedure as the original communication.

In addition to the numerous headquarters through which the messages passed, the rapid movement of troops, the changing of organizations from one command to another, and security restrictions greatly handicapped rapid handling of these emergency messages. The delay became so serious that on 26 March 1945 a meeting was held at Communications Zone Headquarters to determine if anything could be done to reduce the number of messages being handled, and the length of time it took to close a case. It was agreed at this conference that the ARC would:

(1) Use teletype and cable service only to Washington and certain other specific locations.

(2) Appreciate the advantages of other types of communications available in the Theater.

(3) Have a small pouch available each day via air courier to Washington.

(4) Not have Air Dispach Letter Service used by or for it.

However, recent experience in the Theater indicates that undue delay still remains in processing requests for emergency communication or handling emergency applications.

b. The main value of ARC Field Directors was that they formed a civilian link with the serviceman's relatives in the United States. Personnel felt free to consult with the ARC on more intimate subjects than they cared to discuss with military superiors. The ARC worker in turn respected the confidence placed in him but could present matters to the military authorities if necessary.

44. Supplies. (See Chapter 3, Part one, for Supplies.)

45. Transportation. In England transportation for Field Directors did not present a serious problem; however, during the period six months subsequent to D-Day, there was a serious shortage of transportation for Field Service Department, some directors going for as long as six months without a vehicle. This severely handicapped their work, when units which they were servicing were scattered over a large area or when they were trying to service more than one air field. Part of the transportation shortage can be ascribed to the fact that it was impossible to bring sufficient vehicles from the UK to the Continent for ARC use.

46. T/Os and Es. While the Army was charged with the responsibility of subsisting, billeting and procuring supplies for the ARC, no provision was made to equip Field Directors on the Continent with necessary office equipment such as typewriters, field desks, safes, etc. In most of the cases this equipment was furnished by the Army on a purely friendship basis. In the event the Field Director was not on good relations with the supply officer or commanding officer, the procurement of such items was awkward. The same fact held true in obtaining clerical assistance. The result of the lack of clerical personnel was that much of the Field Director's time was spent in performing routine clerical duties in the office. These duties necessarily reduced the amount of time Field Directors could spend in interviewing military personnel and fulfilling other obligations of the service.

47. Conclusions. a. ARC Field Service Department counseled on personal problems of service personnel which military personnel found awkward.

b. There were insufficient ARC Field Service personnel available. In the field ARC Field Directors were handicapped by slowness of communications.

c. The morale of service personnel was enhanced by the presence of ARC Field Directors.

d. There was a severe shortage of transportation for Field Directors on the Continent.

e. Field Directors lacked definite T/Es for office equipment.

48. Recommendations. a. It is recommended that Field Service Department personnel be continued in their present capacity.

b. That a study be made at War Department level on the problem of handling emergency communications and that a standing operating procedure be developed that will drastically cut down the delays in handling such communications.

c. That appropriate tables of equipment be drawn up so that suitable office equipment and supplies can be made available to Field Service personnel.

CHAPTER 4

HOSPITAL WELFARE SERVICE

49. Purpose. The primary purpose of the ARC Hospital program was to supplement the Army's medical care program by meeting certain social needs of the individual patients through its social case work and recreational services performed by ARC personnel. These programs were in all instances medically approved and planned within the framework of army policies and practices. ARC personnel, although under the general overall supervision of the Medical Department, were administratively responsible to the hospital commanders and abided by the regulations applicable to the nurses at the various installations.

50. Personnel. a. The ARC had a maximum of 1,073 personnel on duty in 256 hospitals (80 in the United Kingdom and 176 on the continent) in May 1945. Each type of hospital had a T/O that was in conformity with the T/O that was established by National Headquarters, ARC, Washington, and the Surgeon General's Office.

b. Standards for each classification of personnel were established, and personnel recruited in the United States were classified prior to their assignment overseas. These standards were adhered to as strictly as possible. The standards for recreation workers were the least strictly maintained due to inability to obtain sufficient workers.

51. Staff Relationship. In addition to the direct relationship that existed between the ARC and the hospital commander, indirect relationship was maintained with G-1 Sections, Chaplains, Special Services Sections, Transportation, and Finance. These contacts were generally either to obtain supplies and assistance for the ARC program or in a liaison capacity in attempting to solve individual problems presented by troops.

52. Value. The value of ARC workers in hospitals is attested to by the many favorable comments contained in annual reports submitted to the Chief Surgeon's Office, European Theater.

53. Conclusions. The ARC work in hospitals was an important adjunct to hospital operations.

54. Recommendations. It is recommended that the ARC Hospital Service Department be continued in all hospitals in a Theater of Operations.

CHAPTER 5

CIVILIAN WAR RELIEF

55. Responsibility. Civilian war relief activities of the ARC at all military headquarters was under the direct supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, while other ARC activities were the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. ARC supervisors and staff members were attached to army groups, armies, and in some instances corps, while field representatives were assigned to Civil Affairs-Military Government detachments. During full scale operations there were as many as 34 such field representatives under the jurisdiction of 12th Army Group.

56. General Plan. The general plan concerning ARC-Civilian War Relief activities was announced by SHAEF in a letter published on 10 August 1944. The terms of the directive set forth an agreement between the Allied Forces and the American and British Red Cross Societies concerning emergency welfare and relief programs in Europe. Representatives of the ARC were given a status equivalent to that of an Army officer. Red Cross personnel were associated with Civil Affairs organizations and detachments and were prohibited from operating as an independent relief agency. The duty of the ARC-Civilian War Relief was to assist the military and render such reports as the Army required. It was not entirely clear as to channels available to the ARC, it did not limit Red Cross communications to such channels.

57. Gratuitous Clothing Issues. In France and other liberated countries ARC-Civilian War Relief rendered invaluable assistance in connection with the handling and the presentation of gratuitous issues of civilian clothing. The issue was made either by the Red Cross or more often through indigenous welfare agencies. This major task was expertly and efficiently performed and was of great assistance to the military.

58. Limited Services. In Germany, service of the ARC was, prior to the transfer of responsibility to USFET on 10 July 1945, limited to Allied Nationals, such as United Nations Displaced Persons. In general, all activities pertaining to clothing issues to said persons were handled by Red Cross personnel and were not delegated to other agencies. Moreover, the ARC gave assistance to Military Government in many other ways. An example is the organization of playgrounds in Aachen for children under twelve years of age, and the investigation, for Military Government courts, of the families of juvenile delinquents.

59. Communications. Some difficulty was encountered in transmitting reports. The procedure followed by the ARC-Civilian War Relief was as follows: field representatives attached to Civil Affairs-Military Government detachments made their reports direct to Red Cross supervisors or directors, who in turn forwarded these reports to ARC Headquarters in Paris. A carbon copy of the report was then submitted to the commander of the detachment to which the field representative was attached. This procedure necessarily entailed potential violations of security regulations.

60. Conclusions. It is concluded that the services of ARC-Civilian War Relief were of immeasurable assistance to the military; that the regulations governing such activities were completely adequate and effective; and that the only serious complications which arose were in connection with communications and possible violations of security regulations.

61. Recommendations. It is recommended that in any similar operation, the services of the ARC-Civilian War Relief be secured and be integrated with army activities; that as such it continue to be a responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5; that all communications be transmitted through military channels.

CHAPTER 6

PRISONER OF WAR PROGRAM

62. Establishment. American Red Cross Prisoner of War Relief was initiated in early 1941 to handle relief shipments of prisoner of war packages, medical supplies, bulk tobacco, etc., to prisoners of war of foreign nations engaged at that time in war against Germany. With the entry of the United States into war in December 1941, the ARC entered into agreements with the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department to provide supplementary food, clothing, comfort articles and medical supplies to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in the European Theater.

63. Activities. a. To implement the plan of the ARC PW Relief, the ARC in the United States established five centers where approximately 1,500,000 standard food packages and medical kits were produced monthly. Likewise, it was found necessary to operate a group of eight relief ships and some 200 motor vehicles to transport this equipment to the various Prisoner of War camps in the European Theater.

b. Prior to the Allied invasion of Southern France in 1944, all relief supplies to the continent came through Marseille and Switzerland, but after military operations commenced in Southern France, shipments were routed through Goteborg, Sweden and Lubeck, Germany.

c. With the expansion of the PW program and the rapid advance of our forces, the Theater Commander requested a technical advisor from the ARC. Mr. Henry W. Dunning, prominent in ARC activities in this department was made available to SHAEF and attached to the G-1 office (Prisoner of War Branch) to assist in planning for the distribution of ARC parcels and relief to released PWs.

d. In addition to the distribution of packages and medical articles to camps, the ARC likewise granted welfare services, consistent with the military situation, to released PWs of the Allied nations in the European Theater.

64. Conclusions. The scope of the prisoner of war activities of the ARC in the European Theater was sufficiently wide to render service to the large number of PWs held by the Axis in the Theater, and was of advantage to the military in coping with this difficult problem.

65. Recommendations. It is recommended that the basic plans of operation of the prisoner of war program and ARC PW plan be continued in future operations on the basis described herein.

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2. Letter, War Department, Office Chief of Staff, to the Honorable Norman H. Davis, Chairman, American Red Cross, 19 December 1941.

3. Letter, Office General Purchasing Agent, "Reciprocal Aid - American Red Cross - Civilian Labor", 25 December 1944.

4. Continental Operating Instructions, Office Chief Quartermaster, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

5. Memorandum, Headquarters, First US Army, "American Red Cross Clubmobiles", 1 October 1944.

6. Letter, Headquarters, First US Army, 080 (A), "Future Equipment for American Red Cross Clubmobiles", 30 April 1945.

7. Minutes of meeting held Headquarters, Communications Zone, 26 March 1945 on ARC messages.

8. Letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, to Director, International Division, ASF, WD, "Procurement of Supplies, Services and Facilities by the US Army on behalf of the American Red Cross", 9 May 1944.

9. Memorandum, Headquarters, 12 Army Group, "ARC Supplies and Maintenance", 2 October 1944.

10. Letter, General Headquarters, American Red Cross, 25 October 1945, with five inclosures containing factual material on ARC activities.

11. Report of American Red Cross Activities in European Theater of Operations, submitted by Commanding General, United States Air Forces in Europe, 30 November 1945.

12. History of American Red Cross prepared by Lt. D. Williamson, G-1 Section, Theater Service Forces, European Theater.

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17. Field Service Manual, American Red Cross Commission to Great Britain, 1 March 1944.

18. Letter, American Red Cross, "Revised Procedure for Operation of American Red Cross Activities in the 12 Army Group Area", 17 November 1944.

19. Letter, European Theater of Operations, AG 080 OpGA, "American Red Cross Activities", 22 May 1944.

20. War Department Memorandum Number W850-9-43, "Welfare and Recreational Activities of the Red Cross and USO and United States Army Forces Overseas", 15 March 1943.

21. Letter, SHAEF, AG 080-6 GE-ADM, "Use of American and British Red Cross Personnel", 10 August 1944, with one inclosure, "Plan of Operation of American and British Red Cross in Civilian Relief and Welfare Activities in Areas under Control of Allied Military Forces".

22. Carrier Sheet, G-5 to G-1, "American Red Cross - Civilian War Relief", 14 December 1945.

23. A summary report of ARC War Occasioned Service in Foreign lands since September 1939, dated 1 October 1944, filed Insular & Foreign Operation, ARC, Washington, D.C.

24. Ltr, from DC/S, ETOUSA, dated 22 June 1944, to Mr. Harvey D. Gibson, ARC, in charge Clubs on Continent and in UK.

APPENDICES

1. Memorandum, Headquarters, First US Army, subject: "American Red Cross Clubmobiles", to Colonel Miller, G-1, dated 1 October 1944.

2. Memorandum to Colonel O'Hare from Major J. Temple, subject: "ARC Supply and Maintenance", dated 2 October 1944.

3. Letter, Office General Purchasing Agent, subject: "Reciprocal Aid - American Red Cross - Civilian Labor", to Commissioner, American Red Cross in Europe, dated 25 December 1944.

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230

1 October 1944

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: American Red Cross Clubmobiles.

TO : Colonel Miller, G-1.

1. I desire to call your attention to several facts that now exist in connection with the above subject, viz:

a. Equipment: Clubmobile Groups use mobile electric generators and electric doughnut machines of British manufacture. After a few weeks of operation on the continent it became apparent that the equipment, particularly the generators, was incapable of standing up to the constant usage necessary in the operation of Clubmobiles. I know that the various group supervisors have on several occasions called this matter to the attention of Headquarters Zone 5, American Red Cross; also I myself have on several occasions recommended that positive action be taken to entirely replace the British generators with U.S. generators or to provide an adequate maintenance set-up. Various First Army units have, while being served by these Clubmobiles, been most cooperative in helping to keep the equipment in operation and have in fact done all possible repair work except the installation of replacement parts and other materials — which can be provided only by Continental Headquarters of ARC (to the best of my knowledge). Approximately 30 days ago I was informed by Headquarters Zone 5 that a Red Cross maintenance man with an adequate supply of replacement parts would be attached to Rear Echelon, this headquarters, for the purpose of servicing all Clubmobile Groups in this command. However, to this date this has not been done and in fact Red Cross has made no apparent effort whatsoever in this direction. At the present time 5 generators of a total of 8 used by our groups are out of operation. This requires that doughnuts now be made by hand -- a slow, laborious operation.

b. Approximately two weeks ago Continental Headquarters ARC ordered each of the 4 Clubmobile groups of this command to dispatch 2 2½-ton trucks with 4 girls to assist in moving Headquarters Zone 5 to Paris. These trucks with the personnel were to be returned as quickly as possible following the move. These instructions were given direct to each group supervisor and this headquarters had no knowledge of the deal until several days after it transpired. To date vehicles and personnel have not been returned, thus seriously impairing the operational efficiency and mobility, and adding greatly to the problem of supply.

c. Supplies: At the present time there are no Red Cross supplies of any kind on hand in the Army Quartermaster Depot. Weekly requirements in this command are 20 tons for field directors and 20 tons for Clubmobiles -- 40 tons in all. I don't know what Headquarters Zone 5 is doing about this matter but I do know that the Red Cross supply man attached to Army headquarters depot feels that his headquarters has left him "high and dry". Lt. Col. McNally of Army Quartermaster Office is in Paris at the present time attempting to work a solution with ARC Headquarters. Two of the group supervisors have told me that if ARC Headquarters returns their trucks

and personnel they could and would be only too willing to haul their own supplies from the Paris area, or elsewhere, in order to keep operating fully.

2. The conditions ennumerated above have resulted in a very serious curtailment of Clubmobile service to troops of this command, and just at a time when the maximum service should be given. Being forced to make doughnuts by hand, these girls are able to serve only from one-quarter to one-half the number of troops that could ordinarily be served. This has been most disappointing to both troops and the Red Cross girls, especially during the past 10 days. As an example, one officer, when informed that due to failure of equipment certain Clubmobiles could not completely cover his unit as planned, said: "I'll be damned if I ever give one cent to the Red Cross again. This is a hell of a way to treat my men".

3. I have on three different occasions called these matters to the attention of G-1 Section, Twelfth Army Group, but as yet no definite answer has been given. It is necessary that immediate action be taken to alleviate these conditions, in the interest of the morale of our men and in consideration of the many millions of dollars provided the Red Cross by the people of the United States for welfare work in the Army.

S.A.A.

2 October 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel O'Hare.

SUBJECT : ARC Supply and Maintenance.

1. The level of ARC supplies in the command are as follows:

a. First Army -- Has no supplies whatsoever on hand at Army depots and needs all items immediately.

b. Third Army -- Is not getting all supplies, but enough to operate. Coffee is particularly short.

c. Each Army needs approximately 5 tons of ARC supplies and 5 tons of Quartermaster items per group per week. In addition, each Army needs approximately 20 tons of Field Directors' supplies (items for all types hospitals and other distribution) per week. These items are critical in First Army with Third Army not reporting. Attention is invited to the attached TWX from Com Z recommending that needed supplies be placed in daily telegram in second priority.

2. Maintenance is becoming a major problem in all of the groups. First Army reports that about 60% of the mobile generators are out at the present time and Third Army reporting one generator out of each group deadlined 50% of the time. There is generally needed throughout the command a re-supply of parts, particularly those items of British manufacture (Hillman cars, generators, electric doughnut machines, etc.). Each Army has by improvision, been able to keep these units functioning, but some items are now needed which cannot be produced locally. Information has been obtained informally that a Mr. Casey of the ARC is at present attempting to arrange delivery of parts from the British for units of British manufacture.

3. It is recommended that the ARC be requested to review their maintenance program with the view of making frequent inspections of equipment and replacing items of British manufacture with American in order to facilitate local repairs. It is further recommended that Zone V of the ARC make frequent visit to Army headquarters in order that it may be kept informed of the current existing supply and maintenance situation.

4. The question of delivery of supplies to Army QM dumps is primarily a Communications Zone responsibility and each Army should request adequate stocks of ARC items insofar as the tactical situation will permit.

J. TEMPLE,
Maj Cav.

BCS/ssr

25 December, 1944

SUBJECT: Reciprocal Aid - American Red Cross - Civilian Labor

TO : Commissioner, American Red Cross in Europe.

1. On May 9, 1944, the Commanding General, Com Z, ETOUSA, addressed a letter to the War Department outlining the relationship between U.S. Forces, ETOUSA, and the American Red Cross with respect to the supply of facilities, equipment, and services required by the American Red Cross in connection with the welfare and recreational functions performed by them for U.S. Forces. This letter was based upon the agreements and practices which were in effect in the United Kingdom, and set forth in some detail the principles governing the extension of Reciprocal Aid supplies to the American Red Cross.

2. The principles in effect in the United Kingdom, as set forth in the letter above referred to, were specifically approved by the letter of September 18, 1944, from Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to Mr. Basil O'Conner, Chairman, American Red Cross. Mr. McCloy's letter also confirms the fact that "except as otherwise agreed or mutually understood between the Red Cross and the Theater Commanders, and except for possible claims arising from misapplication of property by the Red Cross, the Red Cross will not be called upon to compensate the Army for any property (which term includes services) heretofore or hereafter made available to the Red Cross at the instance of or the request of the Army (whether or not such property was originally obtained at the request of the Army through Reciprocal Aid)."

3. In the main, the principles set forth in the letter of May 9 from the CG, CZ, ETOUSA, to the War Department are applicable to the relations between U.S. Forces and the American Red Cross on the Continent. There is, however, one important factual difference in the operating understanding on the continent. In the UK, by mutual agreement between U.S. Forces and the American Red Cross, civilian labor required by the Red Cross was hired directly and paid from Red Cross funds. For reasons peculiarly applicable on the Continent it has been agreed between the CG, CZ, and the American Red Cross that civilian labor required by the Red Cross on the continent in connection with its welfare and recreation services for U.S. Forces will be obtained by the Army as Reciprocal Aid and provided to the American Red Cross by U.S. Forces. On the continent, therefore, civilian labor will be added to the Reciprocal Aid services received by A.R.C. and will fall within the principles governing the provision of Reciprocal Aid to U.S. Forces for use by the American Red Cross.

(s) WAYNE R. ALLEN
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
General Purchasing Agent.

cc: Chief of Staff, Com Z
AC of S G-1 Com Z
Director, Int. Div., W.D.
Assistant Secretary of War