THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

Report

on

LEAVES, FURLOUGHS AND PASSES

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on the Administration of Leaves, Furloughs and Passes in the European Theater.

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REPORT ON LEAVES, FURLOUGHS AND PASSES

Prepared by:
Colonel Charles Van Way, Jr., AC of S, G-1, Theater General Board.
Lt. Col. John I. Ladd, Asst AC of S, G-1, Theater General Board.

Principal consultants:
Major General B. M. Sawbridge, Chief of Special Services, Theater Service Forces, European Theater.
Colonel L. A. Ayers, Chief of Transportation Section, Theater General Board.
Colonel T. G. Riley, Assistant AC of S, A-1, United States Army Air Forces in Europe.
Colonel J. A. Norrel, Assistant AC of S, G-1, Theater Service Forces, European Theater.
Captain Edward Latham, Assistant Special Services Officer, Theater General Board.

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5. Letter headquarters 12 Army Group, 220.711 (CG) "Rotation of Combat Soldiers", 14 March 1945.

6. Memorandum Headquarters 12 Army Group to Brigadier General O'Hare "Air Transportation for Leave Purposes" 10 March 1945.

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LEAVES, FURLOUGHS AND PASSES

CHAPTER 1

LEAVES AND FURLOUGHS, ROTATION AND TEMPORARY DUTY FOR REHABILITATION, RECUPERATION AND RECOVERY IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR.

1. General. Authorized methods of permitting military personnel on duty in the Theater to leave it temporarily for various purposes during the period of active operations were:

a. Leaves and Furloughs.

b. Rotation.

c. Temporary Duty for Rehabilitation, Recuperation and Recovery.[1]

2. a. Policy on Leaves and Furloughs. Leaves and furloughs as contemplated by Army Regulations 605-115, and Army Regulations 615-275, were necessarily greatly curtailed in the Theater during the period of active operations. The urgent need of maintaining immediately available manpower and the equally urgent necessity for conserving transportation space from the United States caused the adoption of a policy restricting the granting of even emergency leaves and furloughs for the purpose of visiting the Zone of the Interior to those cases in which it appeared that the presence of the individual would save or prolong a life, or alleviate actual family hardship, especially where small children were involved.[2] In exceptional cases individuals were returned for short periods of temporary duty at the conclusion of which leave for a maximum period of 30 days was given. The usual length of such leave granted by the European Theater was ten days.

b. Procedure and Operation. Requests for emergency leaves and furloughs originating in the Theater were forwarded, with supporting data, through channels to Headquarters, European Theater, where final action was taken. Applications originating in the Zone of the Interior requesting that military personnel serving overseas be returned to the United States because of illness in the family, or for other reasons which would have justified an emergency furlough if the individual had been on duty in the United States, were forwarded by the War Department to the appropriate overseas commander with instructions to report what action was taken. In some cases these instructions from the War Department were misconstrued as directives requiring affirmative action, and cases occurred of soldiers being returned when the actual circumstances did not justify it. To avoid such occurrences the practice was inaugurated, in July 1944, of advising individuals submitting such requests to contact the local chapter of the American Red Cross.

That organization then was to investigate the facts of the case and submit a report, through its own channels, to the overseas commander. However, complaints were received from the families of service personnel claiming that their requests were not being adequately handled. It developed that there had been failures to notify the Red Cross of the action taken on requests submitted through it, and specific directives were then issued requiring unit commanders to advise their American Red Cross representatives promptly when a decision was reached on an application for emergency leave or furlough.[4]

3. Rotation is the term used for a mutual exchange of personnel between an overseas command and the Zone of the Interior, as authorized in Circular Number 56, War Department, 9 February 1944. In principle, replacements are on the basis of individual for individual and, when practicable, grade for grade and specialty for specialty. Because of the nature of the operations in the European Theater and the critical situation with respect to transport space from the United States, rotation was not put into effect for the Theater during the campaign, and the only persons returned to the Zone of the Interior, exclusive of air-crew personnel, were officers who were returned for specific assignments.

4. Temporary Duty for Rehabilitation, Recuperation and Recovery.[1]

a. Nature and Purpose.

(1) This was a method authorized under date of 29 November 1944 by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, by which individuals could be returned to the United States for definite periods, without replacement and either with or without contemplation of return to their units. It was intended to supplement the rotation policy, and did provide a means by which personnel scheduled for indefinite retention in the Theater might be given an opportunity to return home temporarily. Individuals selected were to be returned to the United States for a 30-day period of recuperation. The first group was assembled at the appropriate replacement depot by 9 December 1944. From the replacement depots individuals were sent to a port of embarkation for transportation to the reception station nearest to the place selected by the individual as the place where he desired to spend the period of his temporary duty. Upon expiration of the period the individual returned to the reception station for return to his proper overseas station.

(2) The length of time an individual would be absent from his unit under this system was estimated at about three months, depending upon the availability of transportation, based upon the 30-day period of temporary duty originally contemplated. That period was increased, however, to 45 days effective 14 March 1945, it having been decided by the War Department that the 30-day period of recuperation was inadequate.[8]

b. Basis of Selection.

(1) Under original instructions individuals were eligible for temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, if falling within the following categories and in order of priority as given:

(a) Persons twice hospitalized for wounds.

(b) Persons twice decorated for bravery.

(c) Persons with over six months service in combat areas who could present adequate proof of emergency situations at home requiring their presence.

(d) Other persons with over six months service in combat areas.

(e) Exceptional cases of persons with less than six months service in combat areas of such serious nature as to warrant waiver of the six months service requirement.

Comments on the above instructions from Army G-1s showed the requirement of being "twice hospitalized for wounds" to be difficult to apply, and it was recommended to Theater that it be changed to read "Persons receiving two Purple hearts".[7] Before this change could be made, however, these instructions were rescinded.

(2) Greater latitude was allowed unit commanders in selecting individuals for return to the United States when, under date of 24 December 1944, the Theater Headquarters extended eligibility to all persons having extended overseas service with efficient performance of duty, and provided for inclusion of exceptional cases of a compassionate nature. An example of authoritative interpretation of the whole policy within major commands is found in a letter from the Commanding General 12 Army Group, dated 14 March 1945, to army and division commanders,[9] in which the view was expressed that the principal purpose of the program was to furnish relief to men suffering from combat fatigue, and not to return men merely because they had been away from home a long time. The letter directed that approximately 90% of personnel selected be from lettered companies of infantry units and from among other individuals habitually in close contact with the enemy over long periods of time, and specifically authorized division commanders to transfer the selected individual from lettered companies to other units of the division immediately prior to their departure for the United States. This was in order to avoid depletion of the combat strength of the lettered companies without authority for replacements, and was subject to the proviso that such transfers did not create overstrength in any unit beyond that previously authorized. Upon return from the United States the individual was to retain the new assignment unless he specifically requested return to his old unit. All concerned were to be informed of this policy prior to their departure for the United States.

(3) Suballotment of quotas received from higher headquarters under this system was made according to various methods. Some were allotted on a straight prorate basis according to strength, while in other cases account was taken of the number of days subordinate units had been in combat. Individual selection was generally made in accordance with the recommendations of company commanders. Some difficulty in the way of making the best selection of individuals was experienced throughout the campaign because of insufficient time being allowed from the time quotas were announced until the individuals were required to be in designated replacement depots - a factor which, in some cases, prevented selection of the most deserving cases.

c. Reassignment while on temporary duty under this program was not contemplated, since the basic purpose was the maintenance of the combat efficiency of the unit to which the individual belonged. This was not clearly understood in the beginning, and in March 1945 advices from the War Department indicated that the individuals selected for return were being given to understand, prior to departure from the Theater, that if a vacancy were found available for them in the Continental United States and requests were initiated for their release by the Theater for the purpose of assignment to such vacancy, such requests would be given favorable consideration. Although such action would, as stated, be contrary to the fundamental purposes of the program, the misunderstanding produced

an adverse effect upon the morale of individuals when they were informed that they must go back to their overseas stations. It was thereupon directed that individuals who were returned to the United States for temporary duty of this nature be definitely instructed, prior to departure, not to seek reassignment, and that requests for such reassignment emanating from the United States would not be given favorable consideration. However, anticipating that V-E Day would find large numbers of individuals in the United States whose return to the European Theater would be unnecessary, the Theater Commander directed, under date of 15 April 1945, that personnel whose return after V-E Day was considered essential would be specifically so indicated.[11] On 8 May 1945 the Commanding General, European Theater, requested authority from the War Department to drop from unit rolls individuals returned to the United States on 45 days temporary duty. This was approved, and effective 21 May 1945, only individuals specifically designated as essential were thereafter required to return to the Theater upon termination of the temporary duty.

d. The Value of the program as actually carried out is difficult to estimate, but reliable reports and sources indicated that a lift in the morale of combat divisions ensued which was greatly out of proportion to the number of individuals who received personal benefit. The relatively slight loss of numerical strength immediately available for combat was much more than offset by improvement in the spirits of the troops and by decrease in disciplinary problems which resulted from the definite expectation of a break in the routine of war and a chance to go home for a while.[13]

5. Summary.

a. Manpower and shipping requirements in the European Theater of Operations during the period of active campaigning prevented the granting of emergency leaves and furloughs to visit the Zone of the Interior except in cases where the presence of the individual was necessary to save or prolong a life, or alleviate actual family hardship.

b. In exceptional cases individuals were returned to the Zone of the Interior for short periods of temporary duty, at the conclusion of which a leave or a furlough for a maximum period of 30 days but a usual period of ten days was granted.

c. Usual military channels were inadequate for the satisfactory handling of requests for emergency leaves and furloughs to the Zone of the Interior, and the facilities of the American Red Cross were used in the investigation of each case.

d. Full benefit of the Red Cross channels for transmission and investigation of requests for emergency furloughs and leaves, was not achieved until a definite procedure for liaison with that organization on all levels concerned was prescribed, including immediate notification to the Red Cross representative when action had been taken in each case.

e. The program of rotation of personnel contemplated by Circular Number 58, War Department, 9 February 1944, was not put in effect on a general basis in the European Theater during the hostilities against Germany.

f. In lieu of and to supplement the rotation policy, a system of selecting individuals for a period of temporary duty in the Zone of the Interior for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery was inaugurated on 29 November 1944. The initial period was 30 days of actual stay in the selected location, and the total period of the absence of the individual from his unit was estimated at three months. The period of recuperation was later increased to 45 days.

g. Initially individuals were designated for temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery on a combined basis of length of service in combat areas, wounds incurred, decorations for bravery awarded and emergency home conditions. Later greater latitude was allowed, and combat fatigue in the cases of individuals in units in habitual close contact with the enemy was emphasized.

h. In order to provide against depletion of front line combat units without replacement, division commanders were given authority in most cases to transfer individuals selected for temporary recuperation duty to other units under their commands up to previously authorized over-strength limits in the latter units. Individuals so transferred were not returned to their original units upon termination of the temporary duty except at their own requests.

i. Detailed operation of the system of selection of individuals for temporary rehabilitation duty in lower units differed considerably and completely equitable selection was often impossible because of lack of time.

j. In order to maintain the basic purpose of the system of temporary duty for rehabilitation, etc., it became necessary to advise selected individuals that transfers to vacancies that might exist in the Zone of the Interior during the tour of temporary duty could not be approved, and to disapprove requests for such transfers originating in the Zone of the Interior. This policy was reversed in immediate anticipation of V-E Day, after which such individuals were not returned to the Theater unless specifically indicated as key personnel.

k. The initiation of the program of temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery produced a very favorable effect upon the morale of troops in the European Theater.

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CHAPTER 2

LEAVE CENTERS, RECREATIONAL AREAS AND REST AREAS

SECTION 1

LEAVE CENTERS AND RECREATIONAL AREAS

6. a. Leave Centers were cities, or other localities, specifically set aside for military personnel on leave, furlough, or pass. They were designated by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and quotas were allocated by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to the several major commands of the Theater.

b. Recreational Areas were established and operated by military agencies to accommodate personnel on leave and furlough. Their establishment was announced by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and quotas for leave and furlough personnel allocated by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to the several major commands of the Theater.

7. Facilities. a. Prior to the assault on the European Continent, recreational areas and leave centers were organized and operated by the American Red Cross under supervision by the Army, and maximum use was made of the 42,555 bed spaces maintained by that organization in London and other locations in Great Britain. Quotas for these facilities were allotted by the Commanding General, Communications Zone. Leave and furloughs could not exceed ten days, passes 48 hours, and were limited in numbers by the availability of lodging in the area to be visited.[3]

b. The first leaves and furloughs for combat troops on the Continent to be granted, except for emergency reasons, were to Great Britain, in January 1945, and were of seven days duration exclusive of travel time. Travel to and from destination was on a duty basis and was made without expense to the individuals concerned. The actual time spent on leave or furlough, however, was chargeable against the accrued leave or furlough time due the individual. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, allotted quotas and, through Base Section Commanders, established processing camps on the Continent and in Great Britain. Rail and water transportation from the forward areas to destination and return was provided by Chief of Transportation, Communications Zone. Personnel could designate any point in Great Britain to be visited upon confirmation of private lodging with friends or relatives, or to points where adequate American Red Cross facilities were in operation. The average round trip to the United Kingdom required approximately 21 days.

c. Paris was the first large leave center to be established on the Continent, being officially opened on 22 October 1944,[4] with a peak capacity of 10,000 beds. Requisitioned hotels were utilized mainly to accommodate pass personnel. The supervision of the project was under the Commanding General, Seine Section, with actual operation under the American Red Cross. In addition to the Red Cross operation, however, Special Service Section, Seine Section, augmented the facilities by maintaining motion picture theaters and other recreational facilities. The Army exchange service operated augmented post exchanges for pass personnel. The greater part of the accomodations were allotted to the two army groups operating on the Continent and occupancy was limited to 48 hours. Due to the distances of the troops from Paris, it was found that 48 hours was inadequate, and in January 1945, the time was increased to 72 hours.[5] A longer period was not considered desirable as it was the policy to

afford as many troops as possible relief from combat and an opportunity to visit Paris.

d. Brussels was the second large leave center to be established, opening 28 January 1945, with a planned capacity of 3,000 beds. Hotels and remodeled buildings were used to house the troops. The leave center at Brussels differed from Paris in that it was operated directly by the Army, with the American Red Cross establishing 'on-site' club facilities. Allocation of quotas and periods for which available were the same as for Paris.

e. The next large recreational area to be opened was the United States Riviera Recreational Area (USRRA).[11] This area consisted of that part of the French Riviera District bounded as follows:

> "CANNES via highway N 567 northwest to GRASSE; thence via highway N 85 northeast to its junction with highway N 210 (near CHATEAUNEUF); thence via highway N 210 northeast to PONT-DU-LOUP, VENCE, GATTIERES, to PORT-DE-LA-MONDO; thence southeast to FALICON and junction of highways N 204 and N 204A; thence via highway N 204A to junction with highway N 7; thence via highway N 7 to MENTON. All towns and routes are inclusive, except that the principality of MONACO is excluded. Reference: Sheet 84, Marseilles-Menton, Europe Road Map, 1:200,000, War Office, 1943".

The entire area was operated by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, through the Commanding General, Delta Base Section. All large hotels and villas within the area were requisitioned for the use of troops going there on leave. The necessary overhead was made available by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, maximum use being made of local civilian labor. In general, officers were billeted in Cannes and enlisted personnel quartered in Nice. An elaborate special service program was organized, and agreements entered into with managers of some local night clubs to control prices of liquor. The American Red Cross established 'on-site' clubs. Everything was done to avoid any form of regimentation, the policy being to afford personnel in the Riviera complete relaxation from military duties. Leaves and furloughs for this area were of seven days duration, exclusive of travel time, and were chargeable against the accrued leave and furlough time of the individuals concerned. Travel was without expense to personnel.

f. As means of providing rest for general officers, senior combat commanders and staff officers and thus help to maintain their combat efficiency, arrangements were completed in November 1944 for army commanders to detail such personnel to 72 hours temporary duty in the United Kingdom, and air transportation was provided by United States Strategic and Tactical Air Forces.[13] Similar accommodations were provided in Paris.[14] In addition to the above, villas were set aside for the use of such personnel in the USRRA.

8. Operating Personnel. Personnel to operate the installations listed in paragraph 7 were provided from sources available to the Commanding General, Communications Zone, local civilian labor being exploited to the maximum.

9. Policies on Leaves and Furloughs within the European Theater.

a. In April 1944 authority to grant leaves and furloughs in excess of 24 hours was cancelled by the Commanding General, European Theater. This restriction continued until 17 August 1944, when normal leaves and furloughs were again authorized with the limitation that

personnel on the Continent could not return to the United Kingdom for other than emergency reasons.

b. (1) Army commanders of 12 Army Group were, on 4 September 1944, authorized to place cities and towns on the Continent 'on limits' and to grant passes of 48 hours duration, provided there were established overnight facilities available, otherwise passes involving overnight stay were not authorized. Leaves and furloughs, except for emergency reasons, were prohibited. On 20 March 1945, the above policy was relaxed to permit the granting of leave and furlough privileges in accordance with Theater directives. In addition to the seven-day leaves and furloughs previously authorized to recreational areas and leave centers within quotas allotted, leaves and furloughs to other destinations on the Continent were permitted provided prior arrangements had been made for mess and lodging. Purchase of food from civilian sources was prohibited.

(2) The Commanding Generals of 21 Army Group (British), 12 Army Group, 6 Army Group, and Communications Zone mutually agreed to permit members of their commands to visit places in rear of corps boundaries in each other's area after prior clearance had been obtained.[20,21]

c. In order to broaden the opportunities for leaves and furloughs, authority was given by European Theater on 23 March 1945 to grant leaves and furloughs to localities not used as recreational areas or leave centers. If meals were not available at conveniently located American Red Cross Clubs, established US Army messes could be used provided prior concurrence of the unit had been obtained.[21] In addition to the cities where overnight accommodations were provided, commanders were authorized and did grant passes from 0600 to 2400 daily to individuals to visit nearby communities. Where the towns were of sufficient size to accommodate a sizeable number of troops, arrangements were made to provide hot meals. In other communities it was necessary for men to carry C or K rations.

10. Summary. a. Although passes for up to 72 hours were granted sooner, leaves and furloughs for other than emergency reasons for troops on the Continent did not commence until eight months after landings were made on the Continent.

b. Personnel to operate leave centers and recreational areas in the Communications Zone had to be provided within the Theater troop ceiling basis, and local civilian labor had to be exploited to the maximum.

c. Army Commanders were given authority to arrange periods of rest for general officers, senior combat commanders and staff officers outside of the combat zone.

SECTION 2

REST AREAS

11. Ground Forces.

a. General. Rest areas[1] and rest homes were operated as directed by the commander concerned for the rest, recreation, and rehabilitation of personnel of his command. Normally, personnel were sent to rest areas and rest homes on a duty status. This and the fact that rest areas and rest homes are operated by units rather than by the Theater are the principal difference between them and leave areas.

b. There was no uniform procedure established for unit rest areas. Most units placed the operation under the special services officer who operated under the supervision of G-1. The successful operation of each rest area depended upon the ingenuity and initiative of the local commander, using such personnel and equipment as was available to him. The largest number of rest areas in the European Theater were established under the policies promulgated by the several army commanders. Depending upon available facilities and personnel, rest areas were operated by organizations down to and including battalion level. The small installations were operated under supervision of the unit special service officer and ranged in size up to those necessitating an entire company to supervise their operation. Quotas were allotted by the organizations operating the rest area, with unit commanders selecting individuals to fill the quotas. Preference was given to personnel who had been in combat the longest, or those whose physical and nervous condition made a period in a rest area desirable. The usual time spent in rest areas was 72 hours but in exceptional cases the length of time could be increased to 96 hours.

c. Facilities. Rest areas operated by divisions and higher units were located in larger communities and had the following similar physical set-ups.

(1) Billets - Requisitioned hotels operated by civilian staff, permanent buildings with canvas cots and blankets with civilians to perform the necessary police. Hot water for bathing a necessity.

(2) Mess halls with chinaware, waitresses, music during meal hours, with A and B rations being served.

(3) Theater for motion pictures and stage shows.

(4) American Red Cross clubs to include game room, snack bar, library, writing room, music room, lounge, parcel wrapping service and a Field Director's office.

(5) Postal facilities.

(6) Post exchange with local products for sale as gift items, beer parlor, barber shop, etc.

(7) Clothing exchange facilities.

(8) Ordnance shop. Troops could turn individual weapons in for reconditioning or replacement if necessary.

(9) Finance - For partial payments or exchange of funds.

(10) Chaplains - To provide daily religious services.

(11) Recreation halls - Dances held, local hostesses being employed after screening by military police.

(12) Athletic equipment was available but organized athletics were not instituted as the emphasis was placed on rest. For the same reason, all formations and schedules were dispensed with.

(13) Smaller rest areas work on a less elaborate scale, generally providing only a warm billet with facilities for clothing exchange, hot baths and warm meals.

d. Personnel.

(1) Finding competent personnel for overhead purposes was one of the major problems encountered. Various methods were used to solve it. For the larger areas an entire company or battery was used. In other instances a tactical group headquarters was used. Some commanders required the using units to furnish the administrative staff, while others selected personnel who were near "battle exhaustion" for this duty. For efficient operation, the use of an entire unit was found most satisfactory, but the one great disadvantage of this plan was the liability of the unit to reassignment by higher headquarters, thereby interrupting the efficient operation of the camp. It provided continuity in operation but diverted military personnel from their primary mission. As areas were developed, increasing use was made of local civilian labor which, after the civilian labor was trained, greatly lessened the drain on army personnel.

(2) In addition to the necessary overhead detachment, it was found desirable to have the following personnel: special service, army exchange service, medical department, quartermaster, chaplain, army postal service, and American Red Cross personnel to operate 'on-site' Red Cross clubs.

e. Supply.

(1) Special service supplies were always in great demand at rest centers and considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping an adequate stock on hand. Maximum use was made of captured material to supplement the regular issue. Expendable supplies such as writing material, playing cards, dice, small games, magazines, books and similar items were consumed faster than the normal rate due to constant use, pilferage and other damage. Non-expendable supplies such as pianos, radios, phonographs and other musical instruments had to be placed on a controlled distribution basis, as the demand always exceeded the supply.

(2) Quartermaster and ordnance supplies were generally available in sufficient quantity to satisfy the demand, the exception being coal for heat and hot water.

f. Divisional Rest Areas. In the latter part of July 1944, a divisional rest area was organized in the Barneville (T-0395)-Carteret (T-0094) area, Normandy Peninsula. Before this area could be utilized, however, the tactical situation became so fluid and the front lines advanced so far that it was impracticable to make use of it, and the project was abandoned. In some instances, divisions were withdrawn from the line for training and refitting, at which time every effort was made to create a temporary rest area, but the priority of training and normal duties prevented the personnel from actually obtaining much rest and relief. In addition there were few available towns of sufficient size on the Continent to house a full division in permanent buildings and to provide the comfort that was found in the smaller rest areas. In some regions location of a division rest area at a bathing beach might have been practicable in good weather. While such an area might not have had the attractions of a large city, the recreational features of a beach area would offset many of the disadvantages. However, due to the difficulties above mentioned, the use of divisional rest areas was never exploited.

12. Air Forces.

a. Authority. Shortly after the Army Air Forces commenced operations over Europe, it became apparent that some form of a rest area would be necessary to combat operational fatigue. As a result of studies

prepared by the Air Staff Surgeon, the establishment of "rest homes" was proposed and authority obtained from European Theater Headquarters to proceed with the project.

b. Facilities.

(1) Large estates were secured in various parts of Great Britain. These estates were taken over completely furnished, and with the civilian staff whenever possible. When the civilian staff could not be retained, any available civilian help was utilized. In order to provide the necessary military supervision, one replacement battalion was used exclusively in the operation of rest homes. At the peak of the program there were ten such homes in operation, with a total capacity of 890 individuals. The program continued in operation until V-E Day when the need for it no longer existed, after which the installations were turned back to the owners.

(2) Every effort was made to create an atmosphere of home life. Civilian furnishings were utilized and, as far as possible, civilian clothing was available to the personnel during their stay. The provision of a superior mess was stressed. It was not considered enough to serve army rations tastefully prepared. As varied a diet as possible was offered and luxury items provided as often as possible. This was considered of extreme importance. Local civilian population was of great assistance in providing recreation and in helping to divert the personnel's thoughts.

(3) It was necessary to develop a recreation program that would keep the individual's mind occupied and diverted from his own condition. Maximum use was made of special service facilities and American Red Cross personnel. Special mention should be made of the careful selection of, and cooperation by, the American Red Cross hostesses. The personal attention given each individual was a material factor in the success of the program. In addition to personnel for the normal duties, each rest home had one hostess with disbursing authority, for the purpose of providing items that could not be procured through regular supply channels. The plan was designed to make recreation available to fit an individual need.

c. Personnel.

(1) Personnel ordered to these rest homes were selected by unit medical officers. Only air-crew personnel who were actually flying combat missions over Continental Europe were eligible for selection, and then only when, in the opinion of an air surgeon, a change was necessary to prolong the operational life of the individual. Seven days was the normal period of duty in the rest homes, with 14 days permitted when specifically authorized by medical corps personnel. No individuals were permitted a longer stay and if they were not fit to return to duty at the end of that period other disposition was made of them. The air corps rest home program was one of psychological treatment, and the 890 accommodations provided were inadequate to meet the needs. Lack of personnel to operate additional homes was the main limiting factor.

(2) Other air corps personnel used recreational facilities established by Commanding General, Communications Zone, within quotas allotted to them.

13. Summary. a. Rest areas were established in the army area as a means of prolonging the combat effectiveness of troops through regular withdrawals from the line for rest and relaxation.

b. Rest homes were found necessary for air-crew personnel, for the purpose of enabling such personnel to fly a larger number of combat missions through affording individuals who needed it periods of relaxation under an environment free of mental or physical strain.

c. No organization or prior authorization of personnel and facilities for rest areas, recreational areas or rest homes was available, and it was necessary to divert service personnel from their regular duties for this purpose.

d. No central provision for or control of rest areas was in effect, each commander being responsible for their establishment and operation within his own area.

e. Facilities for rest areas and rest homes were provided on the basis that they should be the best available and should be maintained as lavishly as possible, maximum use being made of civilian personnel, and maximum freedom from routine.

f. The length of stay in rest areas was normally 72 hours for ground force personnel and seven days for air-crew personnel.

g. Special service supplies were in great demand and in critical supply.

h. The rest home facilities established for air-crew personnel were not adequate to accommodate eligible personnel, due mainly to lack of operating personnel.

CHAPTER 3

TRANSPORTATION FOR LEAVE AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES

14. Truck. At the beginning of the Recreational and Leave Center program in the European Theater of Operations it was necessary for units themselves to transport all personnel affected by the program in assigned or attached motor transport. This created problems that added extra responsibilities to already overburdened staffs. The first and foremost of those was that of allocating sufficient vehicles to move the individuals. As the armies advanced and the distances increased, it became necessary to request the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to provide overnight accommodations enroute. Wear and tear on vehicles was greatly increased necessitating a greater maintenance burden and the replacement of vehicles much earlier than normally would have been necessary. During the winter months the long ride in trucks was so exhausting that much of the benefit derived from a short pass was nullified, and individuals returning from such passes required from 24 to 48 hours for recuperation before being sent into combat. When the spring thaw commenced early in 1945, it was necessary to reduce, and in some cases entirely eliminate, heavy truck traffic over the main routes of France. No other transportation being available, all passes requiring motor movement were suspended for a short period.

15. Rail. a. The first large scale use of rail transportation for recreational purposes commenced on 1 March 1945 between Luxembourg City and Paris. This was gradually increased until leave trains were running to all large leave centers and recreational areas. The equipment usually consisted of antiquated third class coaches and outmoded locomotive power. The railway systems of the liberated countries had suffered enormous losses of rolling stock, and various sections of the rail lines had sustained severe damage through repeated bombings and from other causes.

b. In the early stages of using rail transportation, the distances involved were so short that intermediate halts for meals were unnecessary. As the railheads were pushed forward, however, it became necessary to provide stops enroute for hot meals.

c. As the armies pushed deeper into Germany, the density of freight and other high priority traffic and shortage of rolling stock and locomotives precluded any displacement of leave train railheads across the Rhine River and, in order to permit personnel to take advantage of recreational facilities in the Communications Zone area, it was often necessary for the armies to establish transient accommodations on the truck routes as well as to provide overnight accommodations at the railheads to care for leave personnel. It again devolved upon the tactical commanders to provide equipment and personnel for these activities at the expense of combat troops.

d. After a short period of rail service, it was decided by the Transportation Corps that a more efficient method was desirable for handling and controlling personnel on trains. The first method adopted was to appoint casual officers as train commanders. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, therefore made available a pool of field grade officers to be used as train commanders for trains operating under his control. The train commander's duties were to maintain discipline aboard the train, advise the Rail Transportation Officer at destination of the number of arrivals in sufficient time to permit adequate preparations to be made

to receive them, to take charge in case of any emergency, and to assist the troops so that maximum benefit would be derived from leaves, furloughs and passes.

16. Air. a. Outside of the air corps which used its own facilities, 12 Army Group was the only large scale user of air transportation for leave, furlough and pass purposes. Beginning 9 November 1944, when authority was granted to army commanders to place general officers and senior grade field officers on 72 hour temporary duty in the United Kingdom and arrange air transportation for them with USSTAF, the service was steadily increased until V-E Day, at which time a total of 96, C-47 aircraft per week was being used, 88 to the USSTAF and eight to the United Kingdom. These aircraft were furnished by the Ninth Air Force Troop Carrier Command and were made available by Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) at SHAEF.

b. The operation of this program was not entirely satisfactory for the following reasons:

(1) Unsuitable flying weather.

(2) Commitments of a higher priority for aircraft.

(3) Absence of suitable facilities for servicing aircraft and processing personnel at points of destination.

(4) Difficult communications between using agencies and CATOR.

c. Theater Headquarters did not attempt to establish a theater-wide policy for the use of leave aircraft, and each subordinate command made whatever local arrangements were possible. The use of aircraft for transporting key personnel was highly advantageous as it reduced the length of time individuals were absent from their units.

17. Summary. a. It was necessary to divert large numbers of motor vehicles from their primary assignment to transporting personnel for recreational purposes.

b. Overnight accommodations enroute had to be established requiring extra personnel and equipment.

c. Long truck rides largely nullified the benefit derived from short passes.

d. It was approximately four months after leave center and recreational areas were established in the Communications Zone that rail transportation became available.

e. Rail transportation was superior to motor transportation, although the equipment was inadequate and antiquated.

f. As rail lines reached maximum capacity, a command decision was necessary to allocate space to freight and passenger traffic.

g. Air transportation was frequently the most desirable mode of travel but was hampered by lack of a theater-wide policy on the use of aircraft for leave purposes, lack of adequate servicing and processing facilities, and at times, unfavorable weather conditions.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Conclusions.

a. The ordinary military machinery and channels for handling applications for emergency leaves and furloughs are unsuited to the requirements of a force engaged in active operations in an overseas theater, and supplementary machinery officially set up and recognized for impartial investigation, with the most direct channels possible, is essential.

b. Decentralized responsibility for, and authority over, the granting of emergency leaves and furloughs under clearly defined policies published for the theater as a whole is necessary for the effective handling of individual cases.

c. A reliable civilian agency, such as the American Red Cross, is the most effective agency for investigating the merits of individual applications for emergency leaves and furloughs in an overseas theater.

d. Regardless of what auxiliary agency is depended upon for the investigation and transmission of requests for emergency leaves and furloughs, the adoption and publication of a definite operating procedure to co-ordinate its procedure with the corresponding military administrative action is necessary, including prompt notification to the representative of that agency of the action taken in each case.

e. The program of rotation of personnel between an overseas theater and the Zone of the Interior, as provided for by Circular 58, War Department, 9 February 1944, is inapplicable and impracticable during a period of active military operation except in the case of certain classes of Air Force personnel.

f. During a period of active operations in an overseas theater the early initiation of a definite program for the return of individuals to the Zone of the Interior for a period of temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, based upon the needs of the individual, the nature, character and length of his combat service, wounds received in action and family conditions, is a valuable supplement to any program for emergency leaves and furloughs, and constitutes a powerful factor in the maintenance of morale among combat troops. A desirable minimum duration for such temporary duty is 45 days, exclusive of travel time and delays enroute.

g. Individuals selected for return to the Zone of the Interior on a temporary duty status for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery should be definitely instructed, prior to departure from their units, concerning the approved policy regarding their reassignment during their stay in the Zone of the Interior.

h. It is essential to the full success of a program of temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery that sufficient time be allowed between the announcement of quotas and the day of actual departure to permit a careful selection of the most deserving cases.

i. The transfer of individuals of front line units selected for return to the Zone of the Interior for temporary duty to other units within a division in order to permit their replacement is necessary for the maintenance of the strength of combat units.

j. In overseas theaters during war time, the provision on a theater-wide basis of systematically organized and conducted leave centers and recreation areas in which military personnel may spend the period of normal passes, furloughs and leaves granted them, free from military routine, is essential to the morale, well-being and combat effectiveness of troops.

k. Full effectiveness of leave centers and recreational areas in an overseas theater can be achieved only if proper plans and arrangements are made in advance on a theater-wide basis, for the provision of operating personnel, equipment, supplies and facilities. The diversion of troops from their regular military duties for the operation of such establishments produces inefficient operation, lack of continuity and undesirable diversion of troops from their primary mission.

l. In the establishment and operation of leave centers and recreational areas in an overseas theater, the facilities and personnel of the American Red Cross can be depended upon for valuable cooperation and assistance, and, under certain conditions, civilian personnel may be effectively employed after proper training.

m. In addition to the leave centers and recreational areas provided on a theater-wide basis, unit rest areas, in closer proximity to the front, to which individuals or units may be withdrawn from combat for short periods of rest and relaxation are necessary as a means of prolonging the combat efficiency of troops.

n. The establishment of unit rest areas may properly be left to the judgment and initiative of the various unit commanders, but the promulgation of a definite policy and the establishment of a procedure governing them, as well as provision or authorization of personnel, supplies and facilities should, in the interests of uniformity, be a theater function and should be the subject of advance planning and arrangements.

o. Special rest homes for air-crew personnel habitually flying combat missions, to which such personnel may be sent on recommendation of medical personnel as a means of prolonging their operational life and which partake of the nature of hospital facilities for psychological treatment, should be planned and provided for in advance on a logistical basis.

p. Successful execution of any program for preserving the combat efficiency of troops through the provision of opportunity and facilities for rest, recreation and relaxation within an overseas theater requires a very extensive amount of truck, railway and air transportation and above that required for actual military operation, together with clear-cut plans and adequate personnel and facilities for feeding and housing en route, and can only be achieved if such program has a definite place in the overall plan for the operation.

q. During a rapid and continued advance the difficulty of transporting combat personnel granted passes and furloughs to and from rest areas and the actual physical hardships to individual attendant upon the travel involved reduce, and under some conditions, entirely cancel, the value of such passes and furloughs in maintaining combat efficiency, unless adequate transport equipment, personnel and facilities are provided.

r. The question of the amount and kind of transport to be devoted to the needs of personnel granted passes, leaves and furloughs from combat units is inseparably tied up with other tactical and logistical factors entering into the plan of operations, and should be treated

on a co-ordinate basis with them and made the subject of definite command decisions.

19. Recommendations.

a. That definite policies and regulations for the adequate and expeditious handling of emergency leaves and furloughs, fully utilizing the facilities of the American Red Cross under clearly defined procedures, be adopted and published in advance for all major military operations.

b. That rotation of individual military personnel between combat units engaged in active operations and the Zone of the Interior, be considered impracticable for an overseas theater, in view of transportation requirements involved, and that it be given no place in future planning as a means of counter-acting battle-fatigue, except in the case of certain classes of Air Force personnel.

c. That a definite policy be established and plans made in advance for a program of returning selected individuals from the combat zone to their homes for a minimum period of 45 days temporary duty for re-habilitation, recuperation and recovery, and that selection of individuals for such return be based upon the needs of the individual, the duration, nature and character of his combat service and upon conditions in his family.

d. That in any plan for a program of maintaining the combat efficiency of front line troops through selective temporary duty at their homes for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, adequate provision be made for the immediate replacement of individuals selected for such temporary duty, for the disposition of the selected individuals upon their return to duty, for fully apprising them in advance of any conditions and restrictions as to reassignment during such temporary duty, and for the elapse of sufficient time between the announcement of quotas and the actual departure of persons selected to fill them to permit a careful and just selection to be made by the immediate unit commander.

e. That any plan for a program of returning military personnel from an overseas theater to the Zone of the Interior, either on an emergency leave or furlough status or on temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, include, as an integral part of the logistical plan of operations, definite provision for the allotment of adequate air or surface transport for personnel concerned.

f. That plans for the establishment and operation of leave centers and recreational areas within a theater of operations to which individuals of combat units may be sent for brief periods of rest, recreation and relaxation, be considered as essential and integral parts of the overall plan of operation, with priorities in supplies, facilities and personnel commensurate with those accorded other military functions.

g. That the provision of rest-homes to which air-crew personnel engaged in flying combat missions may be sent for short periods of nervous and physical rehabilitation at the instance of responsible medical personnel, be considered a medical problem, and that plans for operating personnel, supplies and facilities be planned for in advance on the same footing as other logistical problems.

h. That the provision of adequate air, rail and motor transport equipment, personnel and facilities, including those necessary for intermediate halts, for personnel on pass, leave or furlough from combat units, be considered an essential element in the planning of future military operations.

A P P E N D I C E S

HISTORY OF G-1 IN THE ETO

* * * * * *

Furloughs to the United States. Requests for leave of absence or fuloughs to return to the United States were received from time to time usually for the purpose of arranging legal and financial matters arising from the death of a family member or other relative, or similar important personal reasons. When the question of publishing a policy to the command arose on 9 April 1943, the decision was made that it would be the unpublished policy of the theater commander ordinarily not to grant leaves and furloughs to visit the U. S. When the new ETOUSA circular on leaves, furloughs, and passes was published on 21 December 1943, (Cir 99) it contained a specific prohibition against leaves and furloughs to the United States.

Exceptions to this policy were made from time to time when requests were supported by recommendations of American Red Cross Home Service. (Ref Item #75, Vol I, AG 210.711, 120 1943). Requests of this nature, originating with relatives in the US became more frequent after arrival of units which had participated in the campaigns in North Africa and Sicily. The procedure adopted at that time was to secure the recommendation of the division or similar unit commander, and these recommendations were followed to a great extent in granting exceptions.

Riviera Leave Center

CG thru 24
(1) G-4 G-1 Oct GHS/2091
(2) DC/S 1944

1. DISCUSSION

1. Many proposals have been advanced recently with regard to a leave center in the area of the French Riviera. Upon that area was first occupied by the Seventh Army, one hotel in Cannes, the Martinez, was requisitioned. At this time, it is operated by ASC, NTO for the Air Forces of the Mediterranean Theater under their general leave policies.

2. The CG, USSTAF, is very anxious to institute a similar leave facilities for personnel of his command, and informal arrangements have been completed whereby at the appropriate time, the operation of the Martinez would be transferred from NTO to the CG, USSTAF.

3. Attached is a plan of operation for the Center, prepared by G-1 in consultation with representatives of USSTAF, and the CG, Twelfth Army Group. Using the proposed policies contained therein as a guide, representatives of G-4 and G-1 have made a reconnaissance of the area and have found that all of the principal hotels, while at present unoccupied, are available for use by the US Forces. Civilian owners have exerted every effort to keep their staffs intact and have expressed extreme willingness that their properties be used for a leave center.

4. The CG, Delta Base Section, has verbally expressed his general approval of the project and had previously initiated steps to secure on requisition certain additional hotels in the Cannes and Nice area. On a whole, the civilian owners have indicated that within three weeks from the date of requisition, the individual hotel would be ready to receive guests.

5. The present difficulty with the extensive operation of the area as a leave center is the matter of transportation. It is appreciated that the whole project is dependent upon the availability of rail transportation from the area of Northern France. However, the CG, USSTAF, has indicated that a limited amount of facilities exist for travel by air, and to that extent, immediate operation of the center would be feasible. Active operation of the center, however, would not be instituted until after administrative control of the area concerned is assumed by headquarters.

II ACTION RECOMMENDED:

1. That the general plan of operation of the Riviera Leave Center, attached, be approved.

2. That the AC of S, G-4, institute, as soon as consistent with operation requirements, rail facilities to the Riviera area.

3. That upon assumption of administrative control of the area by this headquarters, the actual establishment of the center be completed by appropriate publication of this headquarters.

AC of S, G-1

RIVIERA LEAVE CENTER

INTRODUCTION

24 October 1944

1. Extensive leave center accommodations for combat forces of the theater will be needed shortly.

a. Ground Forces: The CG, Twelfth Army Group, has indicated the desire to make extensive use of leave centers in the event of:

(1) Surrender.

(2) Indications of a long campaign of fortified positions and little movement.

b. Air Forces: Immediately, with particular reference to battle exhaustion cases.

2. Present estimates from G-4 and the Chief of Transportation indicate that rail connections to the Riviera area should be rehabilitated by 15 November. In the case of rail connections Paris-Dijon-Marseilles, motor transportation (preferably contract civilian) would be required from Marseilles to Cannes, or in the event rail transportation is available to Nice, then from Nice to Cannes. Special through leave trains would then be available.

3. In the meantime, a limited air shuttle service may be established by the CG, USSTAF, for the ferrying of personnel to the Riviera Leave Center. Three air strips are available, Nice, San Raphael and Cannes. None of these strips, however, are hard surfaced and will accommodate only a limited amount of traffic. They are susceptible to becoming inoperational in the event of rain, and the hard surfacing of one of these three strips would be required. San Raphael being the most centrally located would probably be the most desirable one to hard surface.

4. Present theater leave policy (Cir 34, Tab "A") will be modified to the extent necessary.

PROCUREMENT OF FACILITIES

5. General Purchasing Agent, ETOUSA, has initiated preliminary steps with appropriate French Ministries to requisition under reciprocal aid the properties in question. All of the hotels listed in Exhibit "A", attached report to AC of S G-4(Tab "B"), would be desired and are included in the requisition now under study by the General Purchasing Agent.

6. The hotels that are at present vacant are standing by, and in the majority of the cases the civilian owners are extremely desirous that their properties be requisitioned. Some owners have kept intact their civilian staffs and all owners have indicated an extreme willingness to reassemble their staffs with a minimum of delay.

7. Only one hotel, the Martinez, is operating. This hotel was secured upon requisition by the 7th Army, and later turned to the CG, ASC, ETO for use in the ETO rest center program. Present policy of the CG, ETO with regard to rest centers is contained in Cir 102, ETOUSA, 15 Aug 44(Tab "D"). In addition, the CG, Delta Base Section has instituted action to requisition the more desirable hotels in the Riviera area, and later information indicates that approximately ten hotels have been secured.

PROPOSED PLAN OF OPERATION

8. The operation of the leave center will be a function of the military establishment rather than the American Red Cross, and will be the responsibility of the Base Section Commander concerned. However, ARC facilities are authorized to the extent deemed appropriate.

9. Full use will be made of civilian personnel, and to the maximum extent possible, the center internal management, staffing and domestic housekeeping of the individual hotels will be under the supervision and active control of the civilian owners. It is not contemplated that extensive use of military personnel for the internal operation of the hotels will be required.

10. All area control, military supervision, disciplinary control, post exchange facilities, special service, and other arrangements are the responsibility of the Base Section Commander. General rules applicable to all hotels pertaining to such matters as hours of meals, guests, bar facilities, gratuities, etc., will be promulgated by the Base Section Commander in order to insure uniformity throughout the center. A finance disbursing section to serve all transient personnel of the center will be provided by the Base Section Commander for all necessary finance service.

11. The Theater Commander will allocate to the major subordinate commanders of the theater certain blocks of accommodations, with authority to send personnel to the center for leave or furlough not in excess at any one time of the total allotted accommodations.

12. Each of the major subordinate commanders to whom blocks of accommodations are allotted will maintain at the Center Headquarters a small billeting and personnel administrative staff, whose function it will be, under the supervision of the Base Section Commander, to meet arrivals of that command, arrange for the personnel accounting during the stay at the center, assign billets within the hotels allotted to that command, and handle other administrative personnel accounting details incident to the individuals concerned.

13. Leave or furlough will become effective upon arrival of the individual at the center and will terminate upon his departure.

14. Total stay at the center will not exceed five days.

15. Within the broad allocation of accommodations made by the Theater Commander, individual hotels will be designated or earmarked for the major subordinate commanders concerned. Thus, certain hotels will be for the use of Air Force personnel, others for Ground Forces, etc. Distinction between officers and enlisted personnel will be observed as to allocation of single hotels, thus one hotel will not house both officer and enlisted personnel. In general hotels at Nice and vicinity will be reserved for enlisted personnel, and accommodations at Cannes will be for officer personnel. Certain hotels will be designated, however, for all personnel of the Women's Service of the theater and separate hotel allocation will not be made for the Women's Services of the major subordinate commands.

16. Monaco, being a neutral country, will be "off limits" to all personnel.

17. A nominal charge will be made for all personnel using the facilities of the center. This charge will be collected at the hotel upon the individuals' departure and will defray incidental expenses, gratuities, and expenses in connection with the operation of the hotels that are not covered by reciprocal aid.

18. All messes will be "B" type mess (see par 5, Cir 96, HTOUSA, as Tab "C"). A charge will be made for each meal which may be paid upon departure from the hotel. Enlisted men will be entitled to ration allowances while on furlough.

AMERICAN RED CROSS
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND WESTERN EUROPE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
APO 887 U. S. ARMY

October 25, 1945

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE FACT FINDING SURVEY OF THE ARMY IN ITS REPORT OF WORLD WAR II

* * * * * *

CLUB DEPARTMENT

2. How many bed spaces, and how are they allocated?

England: There were 42,555, bed spaces booked daily in England.

Continent: There were 11,123, bed spaces booked daily on the continent.

* * * * * *

WILLIAM L. PHINOS
Director
Field Service Dept.

Subject: Privilege Leave on the Continent

21 A Gp/3747/23/A(PS2)

12 Feb 45

Headquarters,
6 Army Group
12 Army Group
Com. Z ETOUSA

1. There are a small number of men in this Army Group who, while wishing to spend their privilege leave on the continent, do not wish to stay in official leave establishments. Such men have friends or relations living in the theater and apply to stay with them.

2. The number of applicants is not likely to exceed ten per week.

3. Accommodations presents no problem and it can always be arranged that rations for the period of leave are carried by the soldier.

4. SHAEF have agreed in principle to the granting of such leave subject to concurrence of the Command or Zone to be visited.

5. To avoid submitting individual applications, it is requested that you should give a covering approval to the granting of such leave in the areas concerned.

/s/ L. G. KEAT, Col
(For) Major-General,
i/c Administration,
21 Army Group.

Rear Hq,
21 Army Group,
B.L.A.
/AS.

Copy to: SHAEF (Your AG 210.711-1 GAP-AGX dated 9 Feb refers).

(Ltr, 21 A Gp/3747/23A(PS2), 12 Feb 45, subj: Privilege Leave on the Continent)

210.711 ECD/ed
x220.711(AG-P) 1st Ind
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, U S Army, 21 February 1945.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.

1. Pursuant to the request contained in paragraph 5, basic communication, approval is granted to personnel of your command to proceed to points in rear of corps rear boundaries within the Twelfth Army Group area. It is requested that prior clearance be obtained from this headquarters for personnel whose destinations are forward of Corps rear boundaries.

2. It is requested that similar authority be given to this headquarters to grant leaves, furloughs and passes to points in rear of Corps rear boundaries within the 21 Army Group area.

For the Army Group Commander:

C. E. HAYS,
Lt Col, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen.

14 March 1945

220.711 (OG)

SUBJECT: Rotation of Combat Soldiers

TO : Commanding Generals, First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth Armies, 66th Infantry Division.

1. In my opinion, the principal purpose for returning personnel to the United States for rest, relaxation and recuperation is to furnish some relief for men suffering from combat fatigue, and is not designed to give such return to men just because they have been away from home for a long time. The same general policy is followed by the Air Force.

2. It is my desire, therefore, that approximately 90% of returning personnel be from lettered companies of infantry and other individuals who are habitually in close contact with the enemy over long periods of time.

3. In order to maintain lettered infantry companies at maximum efficiency, Division Commanders are authorized to transfer personnel from these units to other units of their command immediately prior to their departure to the United States, provided that such transfers do not create overstrengths, other than previously authorized, in these units. When the man returns from the United States, he will retain this new assignment unless he specifically requests a return to his old company.

4. It is desired that personnel be informed of this policy prior to their departure for the United States.

O. N. BRADLEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding.

Page 1, Appendix 5.

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
G-1 SECTION
Morale Branch

10 May 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: General O'Hare

SUBJECT: Air Transportation for Leave Purposes.

1. The present allotment of aircraft to this command for leave purposes is as follows:

a. RIVIERA

(1)	Third US Army	2 round trips per day	336 Off & EM per week
(2)	Ninth US Army	4 round trips per day	672 Off & EM per week
(3)	Fifteenth US Army	1 round trip per week	24 Off & EM per week
(4)	12 Army Group	1 round trip per week	24 Off & EM per week
			1056

b. UNITED KINGDOM

(1)	Third US Army	2 round trips per wk	48 off per week
(2)	Ninth US Army	4 " " " "	96 " " "
(3)	15th US Army	1 " " " "	24 " " "
(4)	12th Army Gp	1 " " " "	24 " " "
			192

2. At the time the above flights were set up, fifty-two (52) aircraft per week were required. As the armies advanced deeper into Germany, aircraft were unable to make round trip flights in one day to the Riviera, therefore, necessitating double the number of aircraft used for Riviera leaves. At the present time this command is using eighty-eight (88) planes per week for Riviera leaves and eight (8) planes per week for United Kingdom leaves or a total of ninety-six (96) planes.

3. On 20 April 1945, a request was submitted to G-4 to increase the number of planes flying to the Riviera to ten (10) planes per day from the armies and one plane per week for this headquarters, including the eight (8) planes per week to the United Kingdom. This would involve the use of one-hundred and fifty(150) aircraft per week. In view of the critical supply situation at that time, G-4 would not approve the use of additional aircraft.

4. Recently CATOR advised that supplies would now be handled in the normal manner, ie, rail and truck and that priority for the employment of aircraft would be the evacuation of released prisoners of war. Any increase in the number of aircraft used for leave purposes would reduce the number available for the evacuation of released prisoners of war.

5. Each Army has requested additional airlift to both the Riviera and the United Kingdom, stating that it is one of the most effective means of transporting personnel on leave and of maintaining morale.

6. At the present time this command is allotted 4600 accommodations per week in the Riviera, of which 1824 per week are used by personnel transported by rail.

JOHN L. AMES, Jr.
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Morale Branch.