



# Notes

1. "Escalation, 1990 Style," *The New York Times*, 27 October 1990, 22.
2. George Gallup, Jr., and Dr. Frank Newport, "Approval Ratings of Bush and Congress at New Lows," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* (October 1990): 34-35.
3. Theodore Draper, "The True History of the Gulf War," *New York Review of Books* 39, no. 3 (30 January 1992): 38-45. The Award-Winning Staff of *U.S. News & World Report* [Brian Duffey et al.], *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Times Books, 1992), viii, 414-15.
4. "U.N. Gives Iraq Until Jan. 15 to Retreat or Face Force: Hussein Says He Will Fight [headline]." Paul Lewis, "Warning by Council: Foreign Ministers Vote 12 to 2 for Resolution—China Abstains," *The New York Times*, 30 November 1990, 1.
5. *U.S. News & World Report*, *Triumph Without Victory*, 182, 184, 199 et seq.
6. "Authorization for Use of Military Force (Joint Congressional Resolution of January 12, 1991)," in Sifry and Cerf, *The Gulf War Reader*, 287-89.
7. Andrew Rosenthal, "Americans Don't Expect Short War," *The New York Times*, 15 January 1991, A11.
8. Sean D. Naylor, "Flight of Eagles," *The Army Times*, 22 July 1991, 12.
9. Concepts and Analysis Agency Document CAA-SR-91-18, HQDA After-Action Report (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), Appendix E: Chronology of Events, E-Chronology-52.
10. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 180300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT// MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/001/JAN, PERID/170300Z/TO: 180300Z/ASOF:180300Z, 7-8.
11. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's daily) Memorandum for Record, Subject: Daily Memo, 16 January 1991, dated 16 January 1991. (Executive Officer's memoranda will be retired with General Yeosock's private papers to the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
12. Schwarzkopf, *Doesn't Take a Hero*, 416-21. Schwarzkopf states one-third of the strategic air was diverted to Scud hunt. Figures vary.
13. De la Billiere, *Storm Command*, 156, 191-92, 221-27, 235-49.
14. Comment based upon discussion in an ARCENT morning briefing at which the author was present and frequent mention in ARCENT SITREPs and executive officer daily memoranda during the period of the move. See report from 1st Cavalry Division on 22 January, for example, in HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 230300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT// MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/006/JAN, PERID/220300Z/TO:230300Z/ASOF:230300Z, 8.
15. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 230300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT// MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/006/JAN, PERID/220300Z/TO:230300Z/A

SOF:230300Z, 10.

16. C. D. B. Bryan, *Friendly Fire* (New York: Bantam Books, 1977). Although Schwarzkopf's battalion was the unit involved, Schwarzkopf himself was not blamed for the incident that involved an artillery error. Indeed, the author of the book dealing with the incident clearly had nothing but the highest respect for then-Lieutenant Colonel Schwarzkopf and defends him at some length from charges made by the victim's parents.
17. Dr. Roger Spiller, Professor of Combined Arms Warfare, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, to author.
18. For history of fratricide, see Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader, *Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War*, Research Survey No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, December 1982).
19. Comment by General John Yeosock, quoted in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 18 January 1991, dated 18 January 1991. (Executive Officer's memoranda will be retired with General Yeosock's private papers to the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
20. *The Army* report is summarized in Sean D. Naylor, "Friendly Fire: The Reckoning," *Army Times*, 26 August 1991, 4 and 6.
21. Statistical roll-up taken from *ibid.* Two incidents involved battalion commanders fighting their systems, as well as commanding their units. See Robert Johnson and Rick Wartzman, "Inquiry Sought on Army Account of Soldier's Death," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 November 1991, A7; and Barton Gellman, "Felled by Friendly Fire," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 11-17 November 1991, 9-11.
22. See interview with Lieutenant General Calvin A. H. Waller by Brigadier General Timothy J. Groggin, et al., dated May 1991, 49-50, 60. General Waller's interview must be used with some care as he does not lack confidence speaking about some actions in theater about which he was obviously ill-informed, not the least the planning process prior to his arrival in November and the ARCENT order of battle during Desert Storm. He is, obviously, the best source on his own activities as deputy CINC. Interview with Brigadier General Steven Arnold at Eskan Village on 15 March 1991, 29-31. In the end, General Glossen was probably the victim of being a salesman prevented by conditions beyond his control (the CINC's desire to centralize control) from living up to his promises. The transcript of his briefing at the school house shows his remarks to be highly optimistic about air power available to ground commanders in light of what followed. Transcript of ARCENT MAPEX, tapes D and E in author's files.
23. A judgment by the author based upon comments made to him when discussing the friction over control of air support. Interestingly enough, General Yeosock is conspicuous by the extent of his confidence in the good intentions of the Air Force leaders, no doubt a consequence of his close association with General Horner. Author's discussions with General Yeosock and undated memorandum, Subject: CG Comments on the Context of ARCENT Operations, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall. Memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's personal papers. Memorandum reflects views expressed to author.

24. Colonel Joe Purvis to author.
25. Transcribed from film *San Pietro* by author.
26. Major Mark B. ("Buck") Rogers, USAF, Desert Storm Planner, CENTAF, quoted in Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, 11 November 1991, 68.
27. Generally the Air Force divides air support of the land battle in two categories: close air support (CAS), which is targeted and controlled by the Army, and air interdiction (AI), which is targeted and controlled by the Air Force. The Army argues for a subcategory called battlefield air interdiction (BAI), targeted by the Army and controlled by the Air Force. One of the best discussions is Lieutenant General Merrill A. McPeak, "TAC Air Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line," *Air University Review* 36, no. 6 (September-October 1985): 65-72. McPeak was Air Force chief of staff during Desert Storm.
28. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, USCINCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm, dated 16 December 1990. The OPLAN provided for four phases, strategic air campaign, air supremacy in the KTO, battlefield preparation, and ground offensive. The issue, of course, was who would control the fires in Phase III, battlefield preparation. The ground commanders assumed they would. They were wrong, as it turned out. Until about G-8 (assumed), the CINC fought the air-attrition operation in the KTO with air alone. The order is silent about the need to refer to the secretary of defense and president for permission to initiate the ground offensive. It was this that constituted the major breakwater subdividing the third phase.
29. Waller interview, 2 May 1991, 51-53. General Schwarzkopf's centralization of the early air operations in the KTO is itself the best indication that this was the case.
30. Undated memorandum, Subject: CG Comments on the Context of ARCENT Operations, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall. Memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's personal papers. Colonel Daniel M. Ferezan, Memorandum for Commander, Third U.S. Army, Attn: G3, APO NY 09772, Subject: Project 5/Liaison Team Gulf After-Action Report, dated 31 March 1991. Colonel Ferezan describes the role of LNO parties.
31. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Notes from Huddle Meeting, 1 February 1991. Memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's personal papers.
32. Waller interview, 2 May 1991, 58.
33. HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, AFZA-GT-P (G3 Plans), Memorandum for Record, Subject: After-Action Brief for Operation Desert Storm, dated 8 July 1991, paragraph 12: "During the Air Campaign, we had great success in striking our priority targets. Although XVIII Airborne Corps was a supporting attack, we were able to keep our nominations visible to the Army and Air Force Targeteers. We took advantage of the SCUD-hunting effort and diverted air missions to achieve attacks against our targets."
34. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Deep Operations and Targeting Cell, After-Action Report, n.d., 2.

35. See interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart J. Engram, ARCENT, G3 Deep Operations Cell, 27 March 1991, 2-3. Lieutenant Colonel Engram took a great deal of time at the end of the war to walk the air war down to the execution level with the Air Force wings that had supported ARCENT. His interview should be one of the primary sources in addressing Army-Air Force coordination.
36. HQ, VII Corps, Memorandum from AETSFA-FSE, Subject: Corps Fires After-Action Report, dated 15 March 1991, 5. Report states: "With hindsight, it appears that targets key to Corps plan were ultimately hit (222 targets)—over time—but not as fast as Corps expected. . . . Bottom line is that the effect of air delivered fires did clearly set the stage for minimum exploitation." Document is in VII Corps Archive, Corps Artillery Notebook, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
37. The author attended ARCENT command briefings and observed the periodic revision of the formula for BDA to fit the existing cumulative estimate of strength remaining, which was derived from a variety of sources. This is good Kantian deductive reasoning (deciding what process *must* exist to produce the observable outcome), but it is bad science, failing to account for other possible hypotheses. In the end, the process in fact consisted of making a cumulative estimate and finding a way to explain how it got that way. That, of course, is probably the best that can be done, and if there is an error in the process, it is in the demand of maneuver commanders for something that cannot be delivered.
38. General Yeosock to author. The Air Force began using radar-equipped planes called "pointers" to scout forward and verify targets or locate alternatives for less-sophisticated A10s.
39. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 5 February 1991. CG comment: "Key issue is to have the air campaign start west of the Wadi. My mission. G3: Receiving a max of 20% of requested sorties." Assumed date for G-day (unofficial) was 21 February. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 8 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
40. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+25 (11 February 1991), Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT SITREP. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+27 (13 February 1991), Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT SITREP. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 13 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
41. Message, 140300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+27/FEB//, PERID/130300Z/TO:140300Z/ASOF:140300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S EVALUATION/, 14.

42. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 16 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
43. Message, 170300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+31/FEB//, PERID/160300Z/TO:170300Z/ASOF:170300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S EVALUATION/, 19, 43.
44. Message, 180300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+32/FEB//, PERID/170300Z/TO:180300Z/ASOF:180300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S EVALUATION/, 17.
45. HQ, ARCENT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+37 (23 February 1991), AFRD-DT, Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT SITREP. Another source for reading ARCENT G3's frustration is series of COMUSARCENT Planning Guidance messages that were dispatched daily to various addressees.
46. Letter to author from Office of the Program Manager (AMCPM-NGT-O), U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, dated 6 October 1991. The letter provided the author with an account of the battle, maps, and roster of OPMSANG members as well as other supporting documents.
47. "The Terrible Toll," *Newsweek, Commemorative Edition: America at War* (Spring-Summer 1991): 81-82. Typically, perhaps, the Marine Corps observers were interviewed on CNN upon linkup with relieving forces.
48. Letter to author from the Office of the Program Manager (AMCPM-NGT-O), U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, dated 6 October 1991.
49. Letter from Major Joe Pencoast (with PMSANG Support Group) to Dr. Roger Spiller, dated 21 February 1991.
50. CENTCOM reported Khafji was declared liberated at 311100Z. Message, 312115Z JAN 91, FM USCINCENT, MSGID/SITREP/USCINCENT/175/JAN//, section 4 of 7, 2 (paragraph 2C(2)(A)). OPMSANG chronology gives end date/time as 011900 (C) February 1991: Letter to author from Office of the Program Manager (AMCPM-NGT-O), U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, dated 6 October 1991. Related missions would go on for some time.
51. Message, 012115Z FEB 91, FM USCINCENT, MSGID/SITREP/USCINCENT/176/FEB//, GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION, FINAL SECTION OF 7, 3-4. Schwarzkopf's postwar comments on the conclusions he drew were in the transcript of the interview with David Frost, dated 22 March 1991, 16 (in possession of author). The ARCENT G2 estimate at the time was that the events indicated "that the Iraqi force is a disciplined one. It understands basic military maneuvers and can execute some relatively complex operations. However, we question the forces capability to control multiple division operations (perhaps with the exception of the RGFC) or to maintain momentum under well-executed fire."

- Message, 010300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 15/FEB, 2. Schwarzkopf, *Doesn't Take a Hero*, 424-27.
52. Some Saudi detachments did fight in the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1973. See Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 23, 48, 94, 302; and Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 227.
  53. Pancoast letter.
  54. Quoted in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 1 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
  55. HQ, U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization AMCPM-NGT-O, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Subject: Recommendation for the Valorous Unit Award, dated 30 April 1991. Proposed citation. Numbers are much larger than CENTCOM report for 1 February. The question probably involves a variation in the period covered and the normal difficulty with precision in such matters.
  56. Message, 012115Z FEB 91, FM USCINCCENT, MSGID/ SITREP/ USCINCENT/176/FEB//, GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION, FINAL SECTION OF 7, 3-4.
  57. From the author's own observations as well as comments reflected in Executive Officer's Daily Memos throughout this period.
  58. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 7 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.) Observation by Major General Arnold in HQ, CAC-T, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commander's Observations at the ARCENT AAR, DSSN112, 6.
  59. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive Officer's) Daily Memos, 7 and 13 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
  60. *Ibid.*
  61. *Ibid.* Interview with Lieutenant General Calvin Waller by Brigadier General Timothy J. Groggin, et al., on 2 May 1991, 93. General Waller believed he had made the initial decision on this question. In fact, the issue was one of many revisits that were presented to him during his period of command in ARCENT. In an Army where commanders change with some frequency, no issue ever gets a final answer.
  62. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April 1991, 20-23.

63. Interview with General Frederick Franks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March 1992, 15-19. General Yeosock had expressed his intention to commit the 1st Cav to VII Corps if released by the CINC. The question for General Franks was when and where.
64. General Peay discussed this issue with the author when the latter visited the headquarters of the 101st Airborne in the field prior to G-day. Assessment of his confidence is author's own judgment based on this and other discussions.
65. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April 1991, 16-17.
66. Ibid. Appendix 8 to Annex N to COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001, 181300ZFEB91, Contingency Plan 1A: Destruction of RGFC (Phase IIID); Positional Defense in Place Template, and Change 1 to Appendix 8 to Annex N to COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001, 241900ZFEB91, Contingency Plan: Destruction of RGFC (Phase IIID); Positional Defense in Place Template COA6. This contingency plan is a metaphor for the way planning was done. The plan had a number of fathers in ARCENT and VII Corps, principally Major Kevin Reynolds, a BCTP augmentee to ARCENT G3, Major Dan Gilbert, an augmentee to G3 Plans at ARCENT, and Major Tom Goedkoop, VII Corps G3 Plans.
67. Change 1 to Appendix 8 to Annex N to COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001, 241900ZFEB91, Contingency Plan: Destruction of RGFC (Phase IIID); Positional Defense in Place Template COA6.
68. Message, 261500Z, FM CDRUSARCENT, Subject: FRAGO 058 to ARCENT OPOD 001 (Desert Storm) Destruction of the RGFC.
69. For the nonspecialist: The assignment of a zone of operations is a restrictive technique to prevent adjacent units from shooting or otherwise interfering with each other. Assignment of a zone of action to a commander gives him freedom of action within the area so designated but denies him attack or movement across the boundary without coordination and permission. Daring commanders have achieved notable success by ignoring boundaries, notably Rommel in World War I, but on other occasions, ignoring boundaries has led to incidents of fratricide and confusion. Coordination of action by adjacent units is the responsibility of their common higher headquarters.
70. Schwarzkopf's notorious criticism of Franks rests upon the premise that VII Corps had sole responsibility for destruction of the RGFC. This criticism ignores the territorial limits within which Franks operated, the role of Third Army and, coincidentally, his own responsibility for trying air interdiction into the ground offensive. Schwarzkopf, *Doesn't Take a Hero*, 450-78.
71. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 13 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
72. Ibid.

73. Message, 030300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREPUSARCENT/D+17/FEB//PERID/020300Z/TO:030300Z/ASOF:030300Z, 9, 12.
74. Message, 040300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+18/FEB//PERID/030300Z/TO:040300Z/ASOF:040300Z, 10.
75. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 8 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
76. Message, 100300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+24/FEB//PERID/090300Z/TO:100300Z/ASOF:100300Z, 9. Message, 110300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+24/FEB//PERID/100300Z/TO:110300Z/ASOF:110300Z, 9.
77. Message, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//G3//, Subject: FRAGO 036 to OPLAN Desert Storm 001: Cross Border Operations.
78. Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for *Desert Storm*," *Military Review* 72, no. 1 (January 1992): 15. HQ, ARCENT, Unclassified Desert Storm Command Briefing, dated 5 August 1991, shows movements on 15, 16, and 17 February.
79. HQ, 3d Armored Division, Overlay, Appendix 2 (Division Standard Movement to Contact Formation) to Annex C to 3AD OPOD 91-1 (Operation Desert Spear (Draft)), dated 22 January 1991. See also command briefing titled, "Vanguard Brigade (2d Brigade) 24th Infantry Division, Operation Desert Shield/Storm" (briefing has no date but about half the slides show 14 March date), slide titled, "Brigade Formation." The second brigade showed a formation of seventy kilometers in depth from reconnaissance line to support battalion and ten kilometers in width. The VII Corps G2/G3 log for 21-22 February indicates that the 1st Cavalry Division(-) (2 Brigades) was eighteen kilometers wide by twenty kilometers deep. HQ, VII Corps, G2-G3 Daily Staff Journal, 23 February, item 29 (1715). The 1st Armored Division's postwar briefing showed a division formation (division wedge) fifty to eighty kilometers deep by twenty to twenty-five kilometers wide. None of these are precise figures, but they do give an order of magnitude.
80. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+29 (15 February 1991), Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear.
81. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 16 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
82. Message, 180300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+24/FEB//PERID/170300Z/TO:180300Z/ASOF:180300Z, 12. Robert Johnson and Rick Wartzman, "Inquiry Sought on Army Account of Soldier's Deaths," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 November 1991, A7. Robert Johnson and Caleb Solomon, "Gulf War Casualty: 'Friendly Fire' Downs the Soaring Career of a Gung-Ho Colonel," *The Wall Street Journal*, 10 September 1991, A1 and A8. On 1st Cavalry Division, see HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, *Battle of the Ruqi Pocket*, 7.

- HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, DTAC, *Daily Staff Journal*, 16 and 17 February 1991, 10-12 (16th), 1-3 (17th). To imagine the sort of confusion that could exist in this situation, one should remember that, in conditions of darkness, there were elements of at least five separate units operating in a relatively small area and trying to control the situation—troops from two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division (2-8 and 2-5 Cavalry) and three battalions of the 1st Infantry Division (1-4 Cavalry, 1-41 Infantry, and the 1st Aviation Battalion). The problem was compounded by occurring on a boundary between two divisions.
83. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210300Z, 12-13.
  84. HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, paper and briefing titled, "1st Cavalry Division in the Battle of the Ruqi Pocket" (hereafter referred to as HQ, "1st Cavalry Division, Battle of the Ruqi Pocket").
  85. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210300Z, 11. (ARCENT SITREP has a typo that indicates the incident took place on the 21st after issue of SITREP. The 1st Cavalry Division's records indicate the 20th.) "HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, Battle of the Ruqi Pocket," 9.
  86. Message, 210500Z FEB 91, FM CDRARCENTMCP//G3//, Subject: FRAGO 043 to OPOD 001 (Desert Storm).
  87. HQ, ARCENT, ARCENT Morning Brief, 23 February 1991 (D+37), slide titled, "EPW/CI Status and Location." Slide was prepared by ARCENT PMO Office for the daily briefing as of 222400Z February 1991.
  88. Message, 200300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+34/FEB//PERID/190300Z/TO:200300Z/ASOF:200300Z, 4.
  89. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210300Z, 4-5.
  90. Message, 240300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, M S G I D / S I T R E P / U S A R C E N T / G - DAY/FEB//PERID/230300Z/TO:240300Z/ASOF:240300Z, 4.
  91. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker and Dole Disagreeing On Warning by Gorbachev," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1991, A13.
  92. Rick Atkinson and Dan Balz, "Iraq Offers Conditional Withdrawal: Bush Rejects Proposal as 'Cruel Hoax,'" *The Washington Post*, 16 February 1991, A1, A12.
  93. Serge Schmemmann, "Gorbachev Gives Iraqi a Peace Proposal: Seeks a Pullout, Pledging Help Afterward," *The New York Times*, 19 February 1991, A1; and Paul Lewis, "U.S. and Britain Fault Soviet Plan: Allies Tell Moscow Iraq Must Agree to Pullout Deadline," *The New York Times*, 21 February 1991, A1.

94. Serge Schmemmann, "7-Point Initiative: Moscow Proposal Omits Mention of Mideast Peace Conference," *The New York Times*, 22 February 1991, A1. Maureen Dowd, "Pressing Demands: U.S. Says New Proposal Fails to Meet Crucial U.N. Resolutions," *The New York Times*, 22 February 1991, A1. Andrew Rosenthal, "Ground War Vowed: Iraqis Say Ultimatum Is Shameful, but Show Signs of Wavering," *The New York Times*, 23 February 1991, A1.
95. Schwarzkopf's account is that he came under increasing pressure to advance the date of attack lest the Soviets should broker an Iraqi withdrawal that would allow Saddam's army to escape unpunished. Schwarzkopf, *Doesn't Take a Hero*, 440-45. De la Billiere, *Storm Command*, 278.
96. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 18 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
97. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 19 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
98. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 20 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
99. Aside from the PERSCOM commander's prediction of losses noted above, see James Blackwell's *Thunder in the Desert* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 106; and an exchange of letters from Colonel Trevor Depuy and Theodore C. Taylor in *Parameters* 22, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 96-98, for what civilian simulators were predicting. Certainly the prewar forecasting by attrition-based models, no less the military's uncritical fascination for such, should be shaken by this experience. Senator Edward M. Kennedy's estimate in the Senate debate of January 1991 was for 3,000 American casualties a week with 700 deaths. Kennedy's estimates are extrapolations from the Arab-Israeli wars and were not unreasonable. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts speaking against war in the Persian Gulf, 102d Congress, 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (10 January 1991), vol. 137, no. L, S127.
100. The red stripe on the trousers was the mark of the members of the German General Staff whose ideal SAMS presumes to emulate.
101. In a letter to the author, General Rhame wrote that corps estimates of losses for his division in the breaching operation were from 25 percent to 40 percent. Nonetheless, Rhame had sought the follow-on mission, sometimes in spite of reluctance by the corps to count on a division they expected to be seriously hurt penetrating the enemy defenses.
102. Message, 220300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+36/FEB//PERID/210300Z/TO:220300Z/ASOF:220300Z, 10.
103. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 22 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

104. Message, 240300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, M S G I D / S I T R E P / U S A R C E N T / G - DAY/FEB//PERID/230300Z/TO:240300Z/ASOF:240300Z, 10-12.
105. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 16 December 1990, USCINCCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm, 14 and 18.
106. HQ, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 5 January 1991, COMUSARCENT Operations Plan Desert Storm 001, 8, C-3, C-4.
107. Ibid., C-4.
108. The identification of Iraqi brigades was fairly accurate. There was less agreement on their divisional assignments. In this case, ARCENT continued to associate the armored brigades in tactical reserve behind the Iraqi front line with the 12th Armored Division. The VII Corps' postbattle analysis identifies it as the 52d. At this time, the VII Corps' analysis seems more convincing. For that reason, the author has adopted the device of using the VII Corps' reconstruction of the battlefield as the authoritative assessment. Where ARCENT addresses units under other identities, the ARCENT identification is followed by the VII Corps' assessment in parentheses (e.g., ". . . the 12th (52d) Armored Division" in the text refers to the brigades of the tactical reserve identified in ARCENT documents as the 12th Armored Division but found by VII Corps to be the 52d Armored Division). This device does not affect the content of the actions described, as the Iraqi brigade clusters fought as brigades, not coordinated divisions. The document accepted as authoritative is, HQ, VII Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AETSCB memorandum, Subject: The 100 Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1991.
109. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 23 February 1991, 3. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 24 February 1991, 2. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
110. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 16 December 1990, USCINCCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm, 15.
111. HQ, VII Corps, OPLAN 1990-2, Operation Desert Saber, 13 January 1991, 5-6.
112. There were actually two division artilleries, the 1st Infantry Division's and the 1st U.K. Armored and three artillery brigades, the 42d, 75th, and 142d (National Guard).
-




Certain Victory

Lieutenant General John Yeosock, commanding general, U.S. Third Army



Dr. Richard M. Swain collection

"Long ball hitters" at Fort McPherson awaiting movement to Saudi Arabia, December 1990. Kneeling are Maj. Clay Newman, Maj. Larry Pippin, Maj. Rich Halbleib, (unknown), Maj. Dan Gilbert, and (unknown). Standing are Maj. John Combs, Maj. Brad Smith, Maj. Bob Wegman, Maj. Tom Polmateen, Lt. Col. David Mock, Maj. Mark Wagner, Maj. Paul Hughes, (behind Wagner), and (rest unknown)



Certain Victory

General Schwarzkopf and three of his planners: Lieutenant Colonel Greg Eckert, Major Dan Roh, and Colonel Purvis




Courtesy of Byron G. McCary

Helicopter pilots had to learn to fly in the Saudi desert



Military Review

Troops eating in austere desert conditions




Military Review

Russia foreign minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, addressing the UN Security Council in the debate on the use of "all necessary means" to ensure Iraq's compliance with the UN resolution ordering it to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1990



Military Review

M1 tanks driving in column in the Saudi desert



Certain Victory

A sand-table exercise conducted by the 1st Infantry Division just before the breaching operation



Certain Victory

Soldiers from the 24th Infantry practicing a dismount from a Bradley tank



Crusade

Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, commander of VII Corps, and his senior commanders: seated from left, Major General John Tilelli, Jr., 1st Cavalry Division; Major General Ronald H. Griffith, 1st Armored Division; Franks; Major General Tom Rhame, 1st Infantry Division; Major General Paul E. Funk, 3d Armored Division; and Major General Rupert Smith, U.K. 1st Armoured Division.



Military Review

A 5th Special Forces trainer instructing Qatari soldiers before the ground phase of Desert Storm