

The United States and the World Military Scene Since 1945



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WORLD WAR II marked the end of an era in the military history of the world. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all nations would live under the shadow of atomic power, with its potential destructiveness multiplied enormously by the development of the hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb and increasingly sophisticated methods of delivery by plane and missile. Yet if the development of nuclear weapons threatened to change the whole nature of warfare, it failed to do so immediately. Wars continued to be fought by the older conventional methods and with conventional weapons, even while a nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union proceeded apace, and other nations acquired nuclear weapons. Much of the arena of conflict was in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as native peoples threw off the dominance of their European colonial masters; and indeed a good deal of this conflict featured the least sophisticated of methodology—guerrilla war.

The development of increasingly varied and terrible nuclear weapons was justified largely in terms of their effect in deterring war, rather than in prospect of waging it. Under the panoply of this "great deterrent," even the United States and the Soviet Union pursued their rivalry in other ways. In contrast to its prewar isolation, the United States became intimately involved in the affairs of nations in all corners of the globe—so much so that the most practicable approach to the postwar era for the American student of military history is to consider United States and world military history as a single entity.

There has been a veritable avalanche of literature produced in the United States since 1945 which both develops new military theories to meet new conditions and details the course of military events. Much of this literature belongs to the realm of the political scientist, the journalist, the military theorist, the operations analyst, the sociologist, and the economist rather

than to that of the historian. Definitive histories are yet scarce. They must await the passage of time to give perspective and allow historians access to documents still classified in the files of various governments. Even then the immense complexity of technology and the rapidity of both technological and social change in the post-1945 era may well defy the simple analyses that historians have often applied to earlier epochs. From the vantage point of the late-1970s, in any case, it is far easier to find historical literature on almost any conceivable aspect of the postwar period than to select the works of greatest value to the student of military history, the difficult task to which this chapter must perforce turn.

Occupation

The immediate aftermath of World War II saw the occupation of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea by the victorious Allies. On the American occupation in Europe, Harold Zink's *American Military Government in Germany* (1947) and a volume edited by Carl J. Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (1948), are contemporary accounts by scholars that retain much value for their insights. Earl F. Ziemke in a volume in the Army Historical Series, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (1975), provides a thorough study of the evolution of policy and of the first year of the occupation. A similar work from the British viewpoint is F. S. V. Donnison's *Civil Affairs and Military Government, Northwest Europe, 1944-1946* (1961). The head of the American military government in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, has rendered his own account of stewardship in *Decision in Germany* (1950). John Gimbel's two works, one a general account, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (1968), and the other a study of a locality, *A German Community under Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952* (1961), are both good studies. The occupation of Austria is covered in William B. Bader's *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955* (1966). On the occupation of Japan, William J. Sebald's *With MacArthur in Japan* (1965) is essentially the memoir of the Supreme Commander's political adviser. The best general accounts of that occupation are Kazue Kawai's *Japan's American Interlude* (1960) and Shiguru Yoshida's *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (1973). Most of the general histories of the Korean War provide,

as background, material on the American occupation of Korea between 1945 and 1948 (see below under Korean War).

The Cold War

Occupation soon merged into what came to be known as the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union that involved both a nuclear arms race and a struggle for influence, with the United States assuming the leadership of an alliance of free nations of the Atlantic area in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The most dramatic early episode of the cold war came a year earlier, in 1948, when the Russians blocked overland access to Berlin, a crisis covered by W. Philipps Davison in *The Berlin Blockade* (1958) and by Jean E. Smith in *The Defense of Berlin* (1963).

The origins of the cold war have given rise to one of the more spirited historical controversies of the postwar epoch. The standard American interpretation, first developed contemporaneously with the events, was that the cold war was an outgrowth of the Soviet effort at military and ideological expansion and the American response a brave and necessary one. Most of the American participants who have written memoirs, including Harry S. Truman in *Years of Decision* (1955) and *Years of Trial and Hope* (1958), have espoused this view. This interpretation was further developed in such scholarly writings as William McNeill's *America, Britain, and Russia* (1953), George F. Kennan's *Russia, the Atom and the West* (1957), John Lukacs's *A History of the Cold War* (1961), Louis Halle's *The Cold War as History* (1967), and Herbert Feis's *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War* (1970), all of which support, in greater or lesser degree, the thesis of Soviet intransigence.

Beginning in the 1960s a school of revisionist historians, usually characterized as belonging to the New Left, challenged this view and charged that the economic imperialism of the United States and not the expansionist drive of Soviet communism was responsible for the cold war. Truman was as much villain to this group as he was hero to the other. The spiritual father of the New Left interpretation was William Appleman Williams, a diplomatic historian whose *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* appeared in 1959. Williams's attack was closely followed by a two-volume work by D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins* (1961). And in the era of the Vietnam

War a veritable flood of books found what the authors considered an unwise American Vietnam involvement stemming from the foreign policy that originated with the Truman administration in 1945. Representative are Gabriel Kolko's two books, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (1969) and *The Limits of Power* (1972); Walter LaFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War* (second edition 1972); Gar Alperowitz's *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (1965); and Thomas G. Paterson's *Soviet-American Confrontation: Post War Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (1975).

Rebuttals have come from Robert W. Tucker in *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (1971) and Robert J. Maddox in *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973), the first of which questions the ideological assumptions and the second the sound scholarship of the New Left school. In the *United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (1972), a work that lays the blame for the cold war on both sides, John L. Gaddis also points up the basic ideological assumptions that lay behind the New Left writings and questions whether their conclusions do not derive almost automatically from their assumptions. In all the writing on the origins of the cold war the essential element lacking is any research in Soviet sources that would permit something more than conjecture on the motives of Soviet leaders.

The cold war has had many aspects, diplomatic and military, and has generated much writing on its course as well as its origins. On the broad aspects of the course of the cold war, Paul Y. Hammond's *The Cold War Years* (1969) and *Cold War and Detente* (1975) are solid works; other works of this genre are George Quester's *Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years* (1970), David Rees's *The Age of Containment: The Cold War 1945-1965* (1967), and Ronald Steel's *Pax Americana* (revised edition, 1970). Of these works, David Rees's is most outspoken in support of the theme of Communist aggression, while Ronald Steel's is highly critical of American policy.

The best accounting of the nuclear balance up to 1971, based entirely on unclassified sources, is a Brookings Institution study by Harland B. Moulton, *From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race* (1971); Edgar Bottome covers much the same ground in *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race* (1972). Both demolish the myth of a "missile gap" in the early 1960s and stress the reality of the increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities in the late 1960s and early 1970s that has created virtual nuclear parity between the superpowers.

Of the numerous crises that the cold war has produced, beginning with the Berlin blockade in 1948, the most chilling was the confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Robert F. Kennedy's *Thirteen Days* (1969) is a firsthand account of American policy making. The most complete and balanced secondary accounts are Elie Abel's *The Missile Crisis* (1966) and Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971).

The obverse side of the coin from the arms race has been the effort to limit the growth of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Bernhard Bechhoefer's *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (1961) is an excellent detailed history and analysis of the first decade and a half of postwar negotiations; Chalmers M. Roberts, an observant newspaperman, has covered an additional decade in *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-70* (1970). Mason Willrich presents a thoughtful study of the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in *Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control* (1969), and John Newhouse in *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (1973) deals effectively with the development of policy on strategic arms limitation within the United States government and talks with the Soviet government leading to the first strategic arms limitation treaty.

New Military Philosophies

The new postwar technology raised questions about military theory that had hardly been visualized in the writings of the classical military philosophers from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz (see Chapter 4). With technological developments came new theories of war and new strategies, and, in contrast to the pre-World War II period, the majority of theorists were Americans. Few were actually practitioners of the military art; most came from either the academic world or the operational research organizations, think tanks as they were called, that proliferated in the 1950s to produce studies under government contract.

P. M. S. Blackett, a British Nobel prize winning physicist, and Vannevar Bush, an American scientist prominent in military research in World War II, were among the first to theorize about the future of war in the atomic age. Bush in *Modern Arms and Free Men* (1949) and Blackett in *The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (1948) argued that in the

immediate future atomic energy would not affect warfare as much as laymen thought. Blackett, however, did note that whereas the chief purpose of military establishments in the past had been to win wars, in the future their *raison d'être* would be to avert them. And Bernard Brodie's essay in a collection called *The Absolute Weapon* published in 1946 was prescient enough to explore many of the implications of the use of atomic power as a deterrent to war.

The appearance of the hydrogen bomb, with its vastly greater destructive power, and its possession by both the United States and the Soviet Union, stimulated the search for a new military philosophy and brought the whole idea of deterrence into its own. The decade of the 1950s was a period of great intellectual ferment in the study of defense policy in Great Britain and the United States. Both countries adopted deterrence as the basis of their military policies, the Eisenhower administration espousing a "new look" philosophy which stressed the threat of "massive retaliation" not only to deter atomic attack but also to prevent Communist expansion in outlying areas in Asia and Africa. Sir John Slessor, then the chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff, gave expression to the fundamental ideas of deterrence in 1953 when he pointed to the bomber as the "great deterrent." His book under that title appeared in 1957.

The theory of massive retaliation to deter small wars was unpalatable in a growing number of academic defense studies institutes that sprang up in the 1950s. There is, in fact, no good theoretical defense of massive retaliation in all the military literature of the fifties. And there soon appeared a barrage of books whose primary theme was that limited war rather than massive retaliation was the only way to prevent Soviet encroachments in many parts of the world (in contrast to a massive attack on the West). The two most influential of these books appeared in 1957, Robert E. Osgood's *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* and Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. By adopting massive retaliation, the Eisenhower administration had sought to avoid future Koreas. But Osgood, in particular, pointed to the Korean War as an example of the uses of limited war in a period when resort to massive nuclear weapons could only produce mutual destruction. Both Osgood and Kissinger stressed that large nuclear weapons could not be effective (as the massive retaliation doctrine seemed to imply) for the conduct of foreign policy in peripheral areas. Both argued that American policy had been traditionally too rigid in waging absolute war for absolute peace

and that the nuclear age would no longer permit it; given the destructive power of hydrogen bombs, no absolute war was possible. Kissinger went somewhat further than Osgood in advocating the waging of limited war with the smaller tactical nuclear weapons then being developed. Indeed, some of the force of his logic for limited war was vitiated by a highly unrealistic scenario of a nuclear "tournament" in central Europe in which limitations on the nature and size of weapons would be observed.

The doctrine of limited war gained an almost complete dominance in intellectual circles in the late 1950s and in somewhat modified form became the basis of the Kennedy-McNamara "flexible response" policies. And almost all the theorists of the fifties favored use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts, a doctrine that led to the development of the Pentomic division in the U.S. Army with an emphasis on capability for either conventional or nuclear warfare. Bernard Brodie, whose 1959 book summed up much of the thinking at the leading operational research organization, the Rand Corporation, concluded that the theory "that nuclear weapons must be used in limited wars has been reached by too many people, too quickly, on the basis of too little analysis of the problem" (*Strategy in the Missile Age*, p. 330). A reaction soon set in. In *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960) Thomas Schelling, a Harvard political scientist, argued forcefully that the break between conventional and nuclear weapons was the natural dividing line between limited and absolute war. Kissinger himself at least partially recanted his earlier enthusiasm for limited nuclear war in *The Necessity for Choice* (1961). The pendulum by the early sixties had thus swung the other way, and the limited war forces of the Kennedy-Johnson period were largely geared to the use of conventional weapons, with the Pentomic division giving way to the ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Division). But the debate did not end; Brodie in 1966 (*Escalation and Nuclear Option*) defended the use of tactical nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

Meanwhile, the work of other Rand specialists on the technical requirements of deterrence shifted some of the emphasis from limited war to the question of nuclear balance. The limited war theorists of the fifties had generally assumed that mere possession of the thermonuclear bomb and means of delivery by one side created a "balance of terror" with the other. That this assumption was not necessarily valid was demonstrated by Albert Wohlstetter of Rand in an article entitled "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in *Foreign Affairs* in early 1958. Wohlstetter

stressed the vulnerability of the American bomber force and first generation missiles to surprise attack and maintained that a deterrent force existed only if it could absorb this first strike and then inflict reprisals. He laid down a number of requirements for such a deterrent force, and his line of thought heavily influenced the Kennedy-McNamara defense policies.

This thinking also led to the theory of Oscar Morgenstern, set forth in *The Question of National Defense* (1959, pp. 75-76), that it was "in the interest of the United States for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa." This theory of mutual deterrence, with the conflicts of the cold war taking lesser forms under the umbrella of nuclear stalemate, dominated the military thinking of the sixties. One of the leading practitioners of operations research did dare to tackle the unthinkable—what if deterrence failed and thermonuclear war did break out? Herman Kahn in *On Thermonuclear War* (1960) predicted that the social and political structure of the United States and a large proportion of its population would survive a thermonuclear exchange, particularly if necessary civil preparations were made. Kahn's rather optimistic and light approach to such a macabre subject produced something of a revulsion against his work, but in reality much of his argument was on the need for military forces to meet a whole range of options in what he viewed as a world of continuing conflict between nations.

During the 1960s the emphasis shifted to conflict at the lowest point on the spectrum—wars for national liberation pursued primarily by guerrilla methods, what the French writer, Raymond Aron, aptly characterized as "poor man's total war." The theories of this type of war were in fact much older and originated mainly with the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung whose *Selected Works*, written much earlier, appeared in English translation in 1954-55. A translation of the North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* appeared in 1962 and Ho Chi Minh's *On Revolution: Selected Writings*, translated and edited by Bernard Fall, in 1967. The theorist of revolutionary guerilla warfare in the western hemisphere was the Cuban leader Che Guevara, whose *Guerrilla Warfare* (1961) contains the essence of his doctrines.

Mao's thought (the other writers were essentially disciples who adapted his philosophy to areas outside China) was based on the Marxist-Leninist world view but adapted to the conditions of a peasant society. The mobilization of the people behind Communist leadership to overthrow oppressive colonial or capitalist overlords was the central theme of Mao's doctrine.

"With the common people of the whole country mobilized," he wrote, "we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it, remedy our shortage in arms and other things, and secure the prerequisites to overcome every difficulty in war."¹ Once the masses had been indoctrinated and mobilized, Mao postulated certain stages of conflict beginning with guerrilla war, proceeding through positional warfare during which the revolutionary forces would organize a conventional army and pursue a war of attrition, and ending with a conventional army taking the offensive and achieving final victory. While Mao's doctrine was not one of exclusive guerrilla war, he and his successors (particularly Che Guevara) emphasized the use of guerrilla tactics in all stages and the waging of protracted war in which the indomitable spirit of the masses would finally prevail against any odds. As Giap wrote:

Guerrilla warfare is the form of fighting of the masses of people, of the people of a weak and badly equipped country who stand up against an aggressive army which possesses better equipment and technique. . . . Success in many small fights added together gradually wears out the enemy manpower while little by little fostering our forces.²

The doctrines of Mao, Giap, and Ho Chi Minh came to be studied in the West largely in an effort to find means of combating what appeared to be a new and diabolical method of spreading Communist power and influence. In formulating doctrine, it was the French, with bitter experience in wars of national liberation in Indochina and Algeria, who took the lead. French writers coined the term *revolutionary war* to describe this type of conflict and developed a theory of combating it by destroying the base of guerrilla support with a combination of force and an effort to meet the legitimate grievances of the people. Their views are well summarized in Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1964) and Peter Paret's *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indo-China to Algeria* (1964).

The theories of revolutionary war and of counterinsurgency took their place in the intellectual scene of the sixties—in a scenario that saw a whole range of conflict, from relatively primitive yet politically sophisticated revolutionary war at the lowest end of the scale to full-blown thermonuclear war at the highest. The French scholar Raymond Aron's *On War* (1959)

1. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1954-55), 2:204.

2. Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 105.

covered much of this range and neatly fitted the French theory of revolutionary war with the limited war theories of writers such as Kissinger and Osgood.

For those interested in a quick summary of the strategic thinkers of the postwar period, Michael Howard has provided a cogent analysis in "The Classical Strategists," *Adelphi Papers* 54 (February, 1969). Another overlook is that of Harry Coles, "Strategic Studies since 1945: The Era of Overthink" in *Military Review* (April, 1973). A book-length treatment is Roy Licklider's *The Private Nuclear Strategists* (1971); Urs Schwartz, in *American Strategy, a New Perspective: The Growth of Politico-Military Thinking in the United States* (1966), provides a look by a European at American strategic thinking and doctrine both before and after World War II. Morton Halperin's *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (1971) is a good summary of the state of American strategic thinking as the Vietnam War was drawing to a close. And Alexander George and Richard Smoke's *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (1974) includes a series of case studies which serve as a basis for analyzing the deterrence theory as applied to limited wars.

American Defense Organization and Policy

The new role of the United States in world affairs after 1945 brought unprecedented problems in defense organization and policy. Reorganization in 1947 produced a single Department of Defense and a separate Department of the Air Force to join the Departments of the Army (formerly War) and the Navy. But the powers of the Secretary of Defense actually to direct the activities of the three services were only gradually strengthened in successive defense reorganizations. These culminated, in legislative terms, with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, but Robert S. McNamara's term as secretary saw many innovations and a significant strengthening of the Secretary of Defense's position within the framework of the 1958 legislation. On the broader patterns of defense organization, the best works are Paul Y. Hammond's *Organizing for Defense* (1961), which covers the period since 1900; William Kintner's *Forging a New Sword* (1958); and C. W. Borkland's *The Department of Defense* (1968). On the original unification act of 1947, the most important study is that of Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (1966). Edward Kolodziej details the congressional role in

making defense policy in *The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963* (1966).

The emphasis in most of the writing by political scientists has been on political factors in the making of defense policy. Samuel P. Huntington's *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (1961) is a provocative study of policy making in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Studies by Hammond, Warner R. Schilling, and Glen H. Snyder of major decisions leading to a new national security policy during the Korean War and of the genesis and meaning of Eisenhower's "new look" appeared in *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (1962). More thorough studies are unlikely until the basic documents have been declassified. Morton Halperin's *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974) is another provocative study ranging over the entire postwar period and emphasizing organizational factors. Harold Stein's case book of essays by various authorities, *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963), and the collaborative work of Stein with Walter Millis and Harvey C. Mansfield, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (1958), both develop the theme of interaction of civilian and military officials in making decisions on national defense.

For the early postwar period and the problem of defense policies, Walter Millis has edited *the Forrestal Diaries* (1951), revealing on the dilemmas faced by the first Secretary of Defense. Arnold A. Rogow's *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (1963) is the only full-length scholarly biography of a Secretary of Defense yet to appear, although the journalist Carl W. Borklund has presented brief sketches of the secretaries from Forrestal to McNamara in *Men of the Pentagon* (1966). The work and thought of Robert S. McNamara have attracted much attention, but no biography of any worth has yet emerged. William W. Kaufman's *The McNamara Strategy* (1964) represents an early effort to appraise the direction of the secretary's policies. A later work by two of his aides, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (1971), is more comprehensive though less objective. The work of another aide, Charles J. Hitch, *Decision Making for Defense* (1965), is best on the economics of defense policy making in the McNamara regime. Hitch's earlier work with Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (1960), a product of research at Rand, is essential to understanding the whole McNamara approach. Henry L. Trewhitt's *McNamara: His*

Ordeal in the Pentagon (1971) is an early appraisal by an outsider. McNamara's own *The Essence of Security* (1968) consists mainly of his official statements.

All of the American presidents between 1945 and 1968 have written memoirs except John F. Kennedy, and these memoirs, although by their nature not unbiased, form a basic source for the study of defense policy during their administrations. On the Kennedy period, works by his close associates, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *A Thousand Days* (1965) and Theodore Sorenson's *Kennedy* (1966) are a partial substitute.

A number of books by Army leaders who participated in decision making on defense policy in the period mix argument and memoir, reflecting particularly the controversies of the 1950s. Most notable are the works of two former Chiefs of Staff: Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (1956), and Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1960), *Responsibilities and Response* (1967), and *Swords and Ploughshares* (1972). Both were in the forefront of the struggle for adequate forces for limited war. Two other works by lesser figures, James M. Gavin's *War and Peace in the Space Age* (1958) and John B. Medaris's *Countdown for Decision* (1960), deal primarily with the Army's struggle to find a role in the development and use of missile technology.

NATO

In the post-World War II years, the United States became involved in a whole series of alliances, the most important and binding with the nations of western Europe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This alliance became the centerpiece of American policy, and its history, as well as controversies regarding NATO strategy, have generated a considerable literature. Lord Ismay, one of the founders, presented a factual account of NATO's origins and early history in *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954* (1955). An especially interesting appraisal is the British military theorist B. H. Liddell-Hart's *Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position* (1960). (On Liddell-Hart as military philosopher and historian see Chapter 4.) Other analyses of the continuing problems of NATO include Edgar McInnis's *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War* (1959); Alastair Buchan's *NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence* (1960); a book of essays edited by Klaus Knorr, *NATO and American Security* (1959); Robert E. Osgood's *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (1962); Henry A. Kissinger's

The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1965); William T. R. and Annette Fox's *NATO and the Range of American Choice* (1967); and a series of essays edited by William Fox and Warner R. Schilling, *European Security and the Atlantic System* (1967).

The World of Limited and Revolutionary War

New theories of limited and revolutionary war reflected the real world, for the incidence of armed conflict continued high in the thirty years following World War II, although there were no wars between major powers. Seymour Deitchman in *Limited War and American Defense Policy* (1964) counted over thirty in various parts of the world in the 1945-63 period, and there have been many more since. The most important of these wars were the civil war in China after World War II,³ the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Korean War, the long conflict in Indochina involving first France and then the United States, and the revolutionary uprising against France in Algeria. But there were also others, including civil conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and brief wars involving India and Pakistan.

Reserving for the moment consideration of those wars in which American forces were involved in Korea and Vietnam, there is a considerable body of literature on the others, although practically none of it can be called definitive history. The four Arab-Israeli wars occurred in 1948-49, 1956, 1967, and 1973. All but the first were extremely brief and were waged with conventional weapons using traditional Western battlefield tactics. The best work on the 1948-49 war in which the Jewish state was won is Nathaniel Lorch's *The Edge of the Sword* (1961). There are a number on the Suez War of 1956, including S. L. A. Marshall's *Sinai Victory* (1956), A. J. Barker's *Suez: The Seven Day War* (1965), and Paul Johnson's *The Suez War* (1957). Edgar O'Ballance has written on the first three wars: *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (1958), *The Sinai Campaign of 1956* (1959), and *The Third Arab-Israeli War* (1972). J. Bowyer Bell's *The Long War: Israel and the Arabs since 1946* (1969) also covers the first three wars. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter deal with the 1967 war in its overall context in *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967* (1967), and the London Times Insight Team has provided the best coverage to date of the 1973 conflict in *The*

3. This civil war actually began in the 1920s, and the 1945-48 war was simply the last stage. For coverage see Chapter 6.

Yom Kippur War (1974). Chaim Herzog in *The War of Atonement: October 1973* (1975) offers an Israeli view.

French defeat in Indochina (covered in connection with the American involvement there) was followed by the long ordeal of the French Army in Algeria where it was able to defeat armed rebellion but never to win a war of national liberation. The Algerian War, following so closely on the defeat in Vietnam, brought home to the French more than to any other nation the difficult problems involved in combating revolutionary war. And it led to the crisis that ended the Fourth Republic and brought General Charles de Gaulle back into power. De Gaulle disappointed the very military figures who had placed him at the head of the French government, provoking an army revolt against the Fifth Republic he founded. The fighting in Algeria is best covered in Michael K. Clark's *Algeria in Turmoil* (1959), and Jean Gillespie's *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (1960). The vicissitudes of the French Army throughout the period are explored in John Stewart Ambler's *The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962* (1966), and the specific crisis arising out of the withdrawal from Algeria in Edgar S. Furniss's *De Gaulle and the French Army* (1964) and in Orville D. Menard's *The Army and the Fifth Republic* (1967).

There are useful works on conflicts where insurgency was not always successful. Sir Robert Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966) is an account of the British success in Malaya by a principal director of the counterinsurgency effort. An outsider's view is Lucien Pye's *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (1956). Uldarico S. Baclagon's *Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines* (1960) and Col. N. D. Valeriano and Lt. Col. C. T. R. Bohannan's *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (1962) treat the successful antiguerrilla campaign in the Philippines. Richard Gott's *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (1971) deals with a broad range of conflict in the American subcontinent including some uprisings that were not successful as well as the Castro revolution in Cuba. John De St. Torre covers a major civil war in Africa in *The Brothers War: Biafra and Nigeria* (1972). J. Bowyer Bell attempts to dispel the legend of invariable guerrilla success engendered by Vietnam and Algeria in *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice* (1971). Perhaps the most sophisticated treatment of guerrilla warfare is Walter Laqueur's *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (1976).

The Korean War

From the American viewpoint, the wars in Korea and Vietnam were the major conflicts of the post-1945 period and the best examples of the persistence of limited war in the nuclear age. The U.S. Army plans five official volumes on the Korean War, of which three have been published: James F. Schnabel's *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (1972), which chronicles the major policy decisions and planning actions in Washington and Tokyo until the start of truce negotiations in mid-1951; Roy E. Appleman's *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1961), a detailed account of the first five months of the fighting; and Walter G. Hermes's *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966), which covers the frustrating truce negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom from mid-1951 and the fighting that took place during that time. A projected fourth volume will tell of the fighting from the Chinese Communist intervention in November 1950, to the start of truce negotiations, and a fifth volume will be devoted to logistics. The Army has also published three separate studies: Maj. Robert K. Sawyer's *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (1963); Russel A. Gugeler's *Combat Actions in Korea* (revised edition, 1970), a series of representative small unit actions; and John G. Westover's *Combat Support in Korea* (1955), an account of the work of small combat support units.

The official U.S. Navy history is in one volume, James A. Field, Jr.'s *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea* (1962), as is that of the U.S. Air Force, Frank B. Futrell's *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (1961). The Marine Corps published five volumes: Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, *The Pusan Perimeter* (1954), *The Inchon-Seoul Operation* (1955), and *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign* (1957); Major Hubard D. Kuokka and Major Norman W. Hicks, *The East-Central Front* (1962); and Lt. Col. Pat Meid and Maj. James M. Yingling, *Operations in West Korea* (1972).

Among several good one-volume surveys of the war, David Rees's *Korea: The Limited War* (1964) is the best treatment of policy in its relation to military operations. Harry J. Middleton's *The Compact History of the Korean War* (1965) is brief but well written and reliable. Robert Leckie's *Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-53* (1962), largely combat history, is up to the author's usual standards of style and accuracy. T. R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War* (1963) focuses in the main on the men who fought and depends in large measure on postwar interviews

and personal narratives. Glen D. Paige's *The Korean Decision* (1968) is a valuable detailed study of America's week of decision in June 1950.

The memoir literature is important, including President Truman's *Years of Trial and Hope*, previously cited, and President Eisenhower's *Mandate for Change* (1956). The Secretary of State during most of the Korean War years, Dean Acheson, covers political and diplomatic aspects of the war in *Present at the Creation* (1969), while Douglas MacArthur's account is in *Reminiscences* (1964). The U.S. Army's Chief of Staff during the period, J. Lawton Collins, wrote *War in Peacetime* (1969), which is less a reflection of General Collins's personal views and actions than a general history from the Washington viewpoint. Matthew B. Ridgway's *The Korean War* (1967) is a similar work from the viewpoint of the Eighth Army commander and MacArthur's successor as United Nations commander.

In addition to biographies of MacArthur noted under World War II writings, three other works make noteworthy contributions to the controversy resulting from his relief. In his usual readable style, Trumbull Higgins provides a penetrating analysis of the conduct of the war in terms of MacArthur's role in *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (1960). Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (1951) is less than favorable to MacArthur. The most exhaustive and probably the most balanced treatment of the controversy is John W. Spanier's *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korea War* (1959).

The best educated guesses on the reasoning of the Chinese Communists in entering the Korean War are in Allen S. Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu* (1960). Although without reliable evidence from China itself, Whiting assumes that the Chinese leaders carefully calculated the risks and arrived at a rational decision. Robert R. Simmons in a more recent work, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (1975), approaches the Korean conflict from the Communist side, treating it in rather novel fashion as a civil war, not as an eruption of the larger cold war.

Except for the official histories, battle narratives are few. Particularly well done are two by S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (1953) which focuses on the 2d Infantry Division's fierce fighting against Chinese Communist attack across the Congchon River in November 1950, and *Pork Chop Hill* (1956), a detailed account of a battle for outposts by the 7th

Infantry Division in April 1953. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., provides an account of the Inchon invasion and capture of Seoul in *Victory at High Tide* (1968).

Two differing views of the controversial conduct of Americans held captive by the Communists are available. Eugene Kinkaid in *In Every War But One* (1959) suggests that almost a third of the prisoners collaborated actively and that a majority yielded in some degree to Communist pressure, arguing, as the title implies, that American soldiers in Korea behaved quite differently from those in other wars. A sociologist, Albert D. Biderman, in a much more careful study, *March to Calumny* (1963), effectively refutes Kinkaid, concluding that the conduct of American prisoners in Korea differed little from that of prisoners of war, American or otherwise, in other times and places, and that brainwashing affected them little.

The War in Vietnam

Spanning about a score of years, depending upon when one chooses to begin counting, the war in Vietnam spawned a plethora of writings, and because of controversy surrounding American involvement, many of the works are polemical. Yet for all the abundance, a sound military history of American participation has yet to appear. Although all the services are working on official histories (the U.S. Army plans around twenty volumes), only one has been published, Edwin Bickford Hooper, Dean C. Allard, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald's *The Setting of the Stage to 1959* (1976), the first volume of *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*.

There have been a number of preliminary monographs. An Army publication is John A. Cash, John N. Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum's *Seven Firefights in Vietnam* (1970), which consists of lively accounts of representative small unit actions. The Navy's History Division published *Riverine Warfare: The U.S. Navy's Operations on Inland Waters* (1968). The Office of Air Force History published a comprehensive account of mammoth air operations in support of the besieged U.S. Marine Corps combat base at Khe Sanh: Bernard C. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (1973). The Marine Corps covered the Khe Sanh fight in Moyers S. Shore, II's *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (1969), and also published Francis J. West, Jr.'s *Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Summer 1966* (1967).

The official reports of the two senior American commanders

during the early years of major American commitment—U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—were published in one volume, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (1969). The Department of State from time to time published speeches by government officials and special reports on various aspects of the war, and printed reports of hearings of a number of congressional committees are also available.

Despite some serious limitations, the so-called Pentagon Papers constitutes an invaluable source. This is a detailed study of the involvement in Vietnam from the Washington viewpoint prepared in 1967-68 at the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara by a committee of officers and scholars with no attempt at overall assimilation and with minimum coordination among the writers. Not intended for publication, the narrative is of uneven quality and on occasion reflects the persuasion of the authors; but extensive quotations from original documents and a number of reproduced documents nevertheless make the study an indispensable aid for any serious student of the war.

Following unauthorized disclosure of the study to a number of newspapers, three "editions" were published, all in 1971. The *New York Times* produced a truncated version known simply as *The Pentagon Papers*, in essence a summary of the original study done by members of the *Times* staff, who added a heavy layer of personal attitude. After entering a copy of the original study in the official record of a Senate subcommittee, U.S. Senator Mike Gravel arranged publication under the title *The Senator Gravel Edition—the Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*. The third edition is an offset reproduction of the original typescript study, officially released by the Department of Defense under the title *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*. An occasional paragraph or page that was deleted for security reasons from the official version may be found in the Gravel edition.

The works of three historians have come to be accepted as standard for the early history of Vietnam and for the French Indochina War of 1945-54: Ellen Hammer's *The Struggle for Indochina* (1954), which focuses on the failure of the French to come to terms with the rising nationalism of the Indochinese states; Bernard B. Fall's *Street Without Joy: Indochina at War* (1961) and *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (1967), which explain French failures in the words of a

naturalized American who was a former French guerrilla fighter; and Joseph Buttinger's *Vietnam: A Political History* (1968). The last is in effect a distillation of two of the author's somewhat wordy earlier works, *A Smaller Dragon* (1958) and *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (two volumes, 1967), but with an added look at what Buttinger calls "The Americanization of the War," the period following the death of the South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 to the beginning of peace talks in mid-1968, a period about which the author is critical. Another excellent study of events leading to the French Indochina War is John T. McAlister, Jr.'s *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (1971), and Bernard Fall contributed the definitive account of the final French battlefield defeat in *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (1967).

A scholarly look at an early event, President Eisenhower's decision to resist French pressures to intervene militarily at Dien Bien Phu, is Melvin Gurtov's *The First Vietnam Crisis: Chinese Communist Strategy and U.S. Involvement, 1953-1954* (1967). Victor Bator in *Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy* (1965) focuses on the Geneva Accords of 1954 which unintentionally but actually created two Vietnams, as do George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis in *The United States in Vietnam* (1967), the latter containing valuable documents in an appendix. Also valuable for its documents is Marvin E. Gettleman's (ed.) *History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis* (1965). Robert Scigliano studied the early problems of the Republic of Vietnam in *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (1963). A fascinating sociological look at Vietnamese culture is in Gerald Hickey's *Village in Vietnam* (1964).

Two diametrically opposite views of the American role are Frank Trager's *Why Vietnam?* (1966), which applauds American intervention, and Theodore Draper's *Abuse of Power* (1967), which theorizes that "the escalation of force required an escalation of theory" until the United States was no longer defending the freedom of South Vietnam but engaging in another "war to end all wars, this time 'national liberation' wars."

There are five good works on the enemy. Douglas Pike became established as an authority in this field with *The Viet Cong* (1966), *War, Peace, and the Viet Cong* (1969), and a monograph written for the United States Mission in Saigon, *The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror* (1970). Also noteworthy are George Tanham's *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina* (1961) and *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong* (1967).

Questions of legality and morality run through much of the literature. The student who wishes to delve seriously into the matter should turn to two works, John Norton Moore's *Law and the Indochina War* (1972) and Richard A. Falk's (ed.) *The Vietnam War and International Law* (three volumes, 1968-72), an anthology of varied writings on the subject. Although both Professors Falk and Moore are authorities on international law, it would be difficult to find two more divergent views on American involvement in Vietnam, Falk deeming it illegal, Moore arguing its legality.

Some of the most informative and, in some cases, provocative books on the war are by journalists, many of whom worked long assignments in Saigon. After close to twenty years' experience in Vietnam, Robert Shaplen wrote an astute and objective account of the French era and early American involvement, *The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966* (1966). Highly critical of early American policy yet in general sympathetic to the American presence is David Halberstam's *The Making of a Quagmire* (1965), which covers the period immediately preceding Diem's death, a period for which Halberstam shared a Pulitzer Prize for reporting. In a later work, *The Best and the Brightest* (1972), Halberstam can find little right with the American role. Through sharp, sometimes severe portraits of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their aides and through dialogue that is more inferred than actual, he tells the story of growing American involvement from the Washington viewpoint generally up to mid-1965 and the decision to commit U.S. combat troops. A well-written book is Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake* (1972). Ms. Fitzgerald provides a detailed description of Vietnamese culture but strays outside her field when she analyzes military strategy and tactics.

A number of journalists have dealt with specific events. Among several who visited Hanoi, Harrison Salisbury reported on the effect of American bombing in *Behind the Lines—Hanoi* (1967). Jonathan Schell in *The Village of Ben Suc* turned a critical eye on the evacuation of residents of a Communist-dominated village and the razing of their homes. Seymour M. Hersh dealt with American atrocities in *My Lai 4* (1970), but Richard Hammer told the story better in *One Morning in the War* (1970).

One of the better books by a journalist and the only authoritative account of the enemy's violent Tet offensive of 1968 is Don Oberdorfer's *Tet!* (1971). Oberdorfer is sometimes critical of the methods of some of his colleagues in press and television. The definitive work on the reaction of the news media

to the Tet offensive is Peter Braestrup's *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (1976). Braestrup also is sharply critical. Herbert Y. Schandler focused on the Tet offensive in *The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (1976) but from the viewpoint of decision makers in Washington.

The war spawned a series of hybrid memoir-histories written, for the most part, by men who served for varying periods at the second or third echelon of government. The most notable is Walt W. Rostow's *The Diffusion of Power* (1972). Under President Kennedy, Rostow was chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council; and under President Johnson, first a deputy to the President's special assistant for national security affairs and later the special assistant. One of the main architects of Johnson's Vietnam policy, Rostow defends it vigorously.

In *To Move a Nation* a former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, deals only partly with Vietnam, but the work is important as a sober, straightforward account of the decision making process during the brief Kennedy era, including the decision to give tacit support to a coup to overthrow President Diem. Similarly useful is a study by one who held various special assignments with the State Department and the White House, including attendance at a number of international conferences dealing with Indochina, Chester L. Cooper's *The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam* (1970).

Several other works are more in the true memoir tradition. President Johnson's *The Vantage Point* (1971) contains a host of information but is less candid than one might have hoped for; the frontier flavor of the president fails to emerge. More satisfying is the memoir of a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Ambassador to Saigon at the time of President Johnson's decision to commit American combat troops. In *Swords and Plowshares* (1972) he takes issue with the strategy of "graduated response," noting that it predictably assured "a prolonged war which gave time not only for more men to lose their lives but also for the national patience to wear thin, the antiwar movement to gain momentum and hostile propaganda to make inroads at home and abroad."

The American military commander in Saigon during 1964-68, General William C. Westmoreland, wrote *A Soldier Reports* (1976), in which he defends his fighting a "large-unit" war because large North Vietnamese units could not be ignored. His

strategy of attrition, he writes, was the only strategy open to him in view of the restrictions imposed by political authorities in Washington. Written after the South Vietnamese defeat, the memoir contains one of the few authoritative accounts yet published of the final collapse.

For tactical studies the reader must depend almost entirely on the workhorse of battlefield historians, S. L. A. Marshall. His first and most comprehensive work on Vietnam, *Battles in the Monsoon* (1967), provides detailed accounts of a number of engagements in the Central Highlands during the summer of 1966. An intriguing work is Francis J. West, Jr.'s *The Village* (1972), the story of the efforts over seventeen months of a U.S. Marine Corps combined action platoon, composed of marines and South Vietnamese militia, to defend a village and win the confidence of the villagers. West's is a human story, told without ideological filter, of the actions and motivations of men at war. Marine Col. William R. Corson's *The Betrayal* (1968), generally highly critical of the American effort in Vietnam, found a ray of hope in the methods of these combined action platoons. In *A Rumor of War* (1977), a firsthand account of the experiences of a Marine Corps platoon leader, Philip Caputo provides a searing indictment of the brutalizing effect of the war on the men who fought it. Two works of fiction that provide insight into tactical methods are Josiah Bunting's *The Lionheads* (1972) and William Turner Huggett's *Body Count* (1973).

Robin Moore's *The Green Berets* (1965) is nominally fiction, but it is based in large measure on fact, the story of the U.S. Army's Special Forces in their early days in South Vietnam. The incredibly harsh ordeal of those Americans who were prisoners of war of the North Vietnamese is told in Stephen A. Rowan's *They Wouldn't Let Us Die; The Prisoners of War Tell Their Story* (1974).

Military Sociology and the Social Impact of the Military

The new and important place of the military establishment in American government and society after 1945 generated both analysis and criticism. Critics charged that the United States was becoming a militaristic state dominated by a power elite with vested interests in the perpetuation of cold war and its attendant arms race. While the wave of criticism of the military

establishment and of the military industrial complex that supported it reached its height during the Vietnam War, it had antecedents. The spiritual godfather of the critics was the sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose *Power Elite* (1956) and *The Causes of World War III* (1958) painted a picture of an "establishment" of capitalists and military men who together ruled the country. Other works of this genre include Fred J. Cook's *The Warfare State* (1962), Ralph E. Lapp's *The Weapons Culture* (1968) and *Arms Beyond Doubt* (1970), Noam Chomsky's *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1969), and Richard J. Barnet's *The Economy of Death* (1970). The economist Seymour Melman's *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (1970) holds a special place in the critical literature in that Melman directs his main fire at the "overkill" capacity of the American nuclear weapons arsenal.

Although some of the critics generated more heat than light, they outproduced explicit defenders of the military establishment by a considerable margin. John Stanley Baumgartner, however, does undertake the defense of Mills's power elite in *The Lonely Warriors: Case for the Military-Industrial Complex* (1970). Various books of essays and readings—Herbert I. Schiller and Joseph D. Phillips's (eds.) *Readings in the Military Industrial Complex* (1970), Sam Sarkesian's (ed.) *The Military Industrial Complex: A Reassessment* (1972), Carroll W. Pursell, Jr.'s (ed.) *The Military Industrial Complex* (1972), and Steven Rosen's *Testing the Theory of the Military Industrial Complex* (1973)—attempt to present balanced assessments. And Adam Yarmolinsky, a civilian Defense Department official in the Kennedy years, analyzes the whole problem of the military's place after World War II in *The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society* (1971).

Among the works on the sociology of the military profession itself (a relatively new field of investigation) Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960) holds a special place as an analysis of the career military officer in the period since 1945. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. has attempted to do something of the same thing for the ordinary soldier in *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military* (1970). Maureen Mylander's *The Generals* (1974) and Ward Just's *Military Men* (1970) are both iconoclastic and popular in tone but not without a measure of realism.

The status of blacks in the armed forces underwent momentous change in the postwar era. Jack D. Foner's *Blacks and the Military in American History* (1974) accurately though briefly

summarizes these changes. Richard M. Dalfiume's *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces* (1969) is a more comprehensive account that emphasizes the role of the civilians, particularly in the Truman administration, in promoting racial equality in the military services. An official Department of Defense volume, *The Integration of the Armed Forces* by Morris MacGregor of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, focuses on the services themselves, analyzing in considerable detail the often conflicting influences of the civil rights movement and military tradition on their evolving racial policies.

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