

## MILITARY REPORTS.

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### THE WAR IN BOHEMIA AND THE PRUSSIAN WAR.

*Report dated 8th September, 1866.*

THE many questions arising from the war between Prussia and Austria just terminated, may be studied to great advantage in Bohemia, where the greatest portion of the Prussian army is at present in cantonments. On leaving Berlin I proceeded to Prague, the Head-Quarters of Prince Frederick Charles, from which place, thanks to the assistance given to me, I have travelled through the country in every direction, and obtained information on those points which appeared to me desirable to study.\*

During three weeks I have seen almost the entire Prussian army, and I have been allowed to obtain information as to incidents of the war and other matter from a great number of officers of all ranks, as well as from non-commissioned officers and soldiers, prisoners, and wounded men. The following report is a summary of my observations.

The armies of a power that had not made war for 50 years, encamped in Saxony and Silesia, forced the defiles of Bohemia in the face of an Austrian army of more than 200,000 men, drove back, after several bloody engagements, all the corps which attempted to oppose them, and crushed in a single battle, eight days after the beginning of the campaign, the whole of the hostile army; and, finally, in two months, dictated peace to Austria under the walls of Vienna. These results appear marvellous. But, for those who study the character and phases of the great struggle, the marvellous disappears, and the causes of this dazzling and rapid success may be stated as follows :—

An army, taken as a whole, is nothing more than a weapon put into the hand of one man. In this war, on one side (that of Austria), an inferior weapon was put into the hands of a General incapable of using it. On the other side (that of Prussia) a

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\* Towards the end of July, 1866, the Emperor had sent Colonel Stoffel, his orderly officer, to Bohemia, with directions to study and report on the history of the war. The Minister, with the view of facilitating this object, gave M. Stoffel the title of Military Attaché. He afterwards received orders to remain in Berlin fulfilling the duties of this office. He remained there for four years, leaving on the 18th July, 1870. [Ed.]

superior weapon, carefully prepared for many years, was placed in the hands of an able leader. Or, on one side, there was an army inferior in every respect, commanded by a man who did not possess the qualities requisite for a Commander-in-Chief. On the other side, an army superior in every respect, commanded by able, well-taught, and energetic leaders. It is requisite, therefore, that the following questions should be discussed:—

Was the Austrian Leader really incompetent?

Was the Prussian Army really superior to the Austrian?  
How, and why?

### I. The Incapacity of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief.

I would not have thought it requisite to enter into this subject if public ignorance in France, and elsewhere, had not attributed the success of the Prussian army, almost entirely to the needle-gun. Nevertheless, to those who really know the facts, the cause of this success lies far deeper, and without wishing to deny the advantage that the breech-loader gave the Prussians, I feel convinced that the result would have been the same had the Austrians possessed a similar weapon.

At a future time I will explain the general cause of the disasters of Austria. At present I will confine myself to the enumeration of many acts which prove the incompetence of the Austrian General.

[In this Report, an account of, and an examination into, many acts which demonstrate the incapacity of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief is given. We omit this, as we will in general omit in the following reports all details which do not treat directly of the Prussian army, and which, from their purely technical character, would not interest the reader.]

### II. On the Superiority of the Prussian Army.

I do not pretend, after my short visit to Bohemia, to thoroughly understand the Prussian army; however, a cursory examination shows at once, its undeniable superiority over the Austrian army.

The political and social institutions of the two countries, their moral state, their military organization, are evidently the chief causes of this superiority. They require deep study; and I confine myself at present to point out in a general way the effects which these have produced, and which at once strike an observer:

The superiority of the Prussian army is displayed in every grade. The body of officers is superior, especially the higher officers and company commanders. The non-commissioned officers are superior. The soldiers are superior.

*Officers.*—I have been surprised to find such a large number of well educated, thoughtful, and distinguished men. I do not allude so much to military education (although this is very complete with them), but rather to general education. They have a taste for their profession, know it thoroughly, and reason

well about it; and, above all, show themselves anxious to know the progress that is being made by, and the improvements introduced into, foreign armies.

*Non-Commissioned Officers.*—The non-commissioned officers are excellent: their military instruction leaves nothing to be desired. The non-commissioned officers, it appears to me, excel ours, because of their superior education.

*Soldiers.*—The military organization of Prussia should be known from the reports of my predecessors. Without examining the inconvenience which it offers, it is impossible to deny that the principle on which it is founded, universal compulsory service, puts in the ranks of the army an element of the highest value.

The application of this principle places in the ranks of the army a large number of persons well brought up and educated, belonging to the better classes, and thus increases the intelligence and moral value of the army by the aggregate of the intelligence and moral value of these individuals, to which should be added the healthy and direct influence which these persons bring to bear on the soldiers of an inferior class. I bring this particularly to notice, because it gives the Prussian army an element of superiority which no other European army possesses.

The Prussians like to call their army *the nation in arms*. Universal military service renders the description a just one, and they do not deceive themselves as to the great power the army derives from the presence in its ranks of persons well educated and well brought up, belonging to the better classes, who, as officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, devote to the defence of their country their intellects and lives.

When I expressed to several General Officers my regret that in France the richer classes do not bring into the army their quota of intellectual and moral faculties, one of them replied to me very gravely, although smiling, "Do not adopt the principle of universal military service, for, if you do, you will once more dictate laws to all Europe."

It is requisite to acknowledge the fact that our army, whatever qualities may distinguish it, is not the best that France could produce.

Without adopting the principle of compulsory military service as in Prussia, could it not at least be applied to those drawn by lot? This at least would be a first step on the road to equality, justice, and a better constitution of the army. At the present moment the young men of the richer classes escape military service by the system of substitutes. If the army cannot be with us, as in Prussia, *the nation in arms*, at least it should represent *the miniature of the nation*, that is to say, that all classes without exception should in proportion to their numbers serve in the ranks, at least so far as the ballot would render this possible.

By these means young men of the rich classes could not legally escape military service by the length of their purses; and

the French Army, whatever may be said of it, would not then be a mass of the poorest and most ignorant Frenchmen, on whom the more favoured classes had thrown the task of fighting for the nation. I will not here refer to the dangers produced by our military organization at periods of internal trouble as June 1848, when a civil war filled the streets with blood. Our soldiers were called on to fight with men who, like themselves, were disinherited by fortune, and who did not fail to spread in the army, by all methods, doctrines subversive of everything.

[The report here touches on the fact that Prussia, as compared with Austria, is inhabited by a homogeneous race, which is peopled by different races; on the social state of the two countries; on the qualities which distinguish the two nations; on the degree of education so elevated in the one, so inferior in the other. Which considerations can explain the causes of the moral and material superiority of the Prussian army.]

The superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian army is undeniable and great in every respect. This, and the incapacity of the Austrian General, were the two main causes of the Prussian victories.

#### *On the Influence of the Needle-Gun.*

People have assigned to the weapons of the Prussian Infantry the greatest share in its victories. But it is a great error. The superiority of the weapons has been only a secondary cause. Indeed, it may be said that it is only another proof of the intellectual superiority of Prussia, for it cannot be denied that a nation which alone in Europe, fifteen years ago, dared to adopt, an improved rifle, has manifested by that very fact that it excelled the others in judgment, in warlike knowledge, one had almost said in boldness. I will now describe the kind of influence the breech-loader has had on the battle-field.

The advantages that the Prussian army has obtained from the superiority of the arms of its infantry, while much exaggerated are undeniable. But they are due less to the rapidity of fire than to the confidence the Prussian soldier has in his weapon. I will explain. For more than fifteen years every effort has been made in Prussia to convince the soldier that he possessed an unrivalled weapon, and what brought home this conviction to him was the great care taken in rifle practice. Each Infantry soldier fired annually more than 100 rounds of ball cartridge. Thanks to these efforts, the most complete confidence in his weapon has been given to the soldier, and this confidence has produced results, the importance of which cannot be over-estimated. It cannot be described better than by saying that the Prussian infantry, composed of young soldiers who never before made war, had the calm and steady fire of veteran troops. Being desirous of obtaining a fair opinion of how much the Prussian success is due to the needle-gun, I sought information from numbers of officers of all grades. I have interrogated (more

particularly at Prague and elsewhere) a great number of lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, who, when actually under fire, are most in contact with the soldiers. I have spoken with Austrian prisoners and Austrian wounded, and, allowing for the wounded self-love of the one, and the excited vanity of the others, I have, as the result of this examination, arrived at the conclusion that the influence the needle-gun exercised in 1866 was that described above.

It would be a mistake, then, to believe that if the Austrians never attacked the Prussians hand-to-hand, it was on account of the rapid firing of the latter. It was rather due to the firmness and coolness which the conviction that they could not be approached gave to the Prussian troops, armed as they were with a rifle, which the first shot fired gave them, thanks to the rapidity of the loading a second, and, if needs be, a third. Let us repeat. It was this coolness and steadiness, sprung from that confidence in his weapon, which for fifteen years had been instilled into him, which enabled the Prussian infantry, composed of soldiers having no experience in war, to fire as calmly and accurately as if they had been veteran troops. Such a thing is too important for us to pass it lightly by.

The Prussians distinguish volley firing, which they term *salvoes* (section, company, or battalion fire) from independent firing, which they term *rapid fire* (*schnell feuer*). Usually they receive an enemy with a volley, followed at once by independent firing. It is these volleys that are so formidable. It is impossible to quote a single instance where the Austrians have attacked with the bayonet, notwithstanding the advice given by General Benedek in his proclamations. The first Prussian volley always stopped the Austrian advance, and they generally retired in disorder, when, thanks to the rapidity of loading, the independent fire completed their defeat. It is easy to conceive the effect of this last on troops already broken and decimated by the volley. The enormous Austrian losses during this war may be thus explained.

#### *Attacks of Cavalry against Infantry.*

As a proof of the confidence possessed by the Prussian Infantry in the effect of its fire, I must not forget to refer to the attacks of cavalry which have been repulsed without forming square; I believe this to be the first instance of such a feat in the history of war.

Colonel Berger, an excellent officer, and a man worthy of credence, told me the following incident which happened during the battle of Jicin. He commanded the 8th Grenadier Regiment of the 5th Division; he went forward to the top of a small rising ground to reconnoitre the country, when he saw ten Austrian squadrons which, with a front of two squadrons, advanced at a trot towards him. He rejoined, as quickly as possible, the only battalion of his regiment that was then at hand; and which the rising ground had until previously

concealed from the enemy. He allowed the cavalry to advance within 200 paces, receiving them with a volley from the entire battalion, followed at once by independent firing. At the first volley 50 to 60 Austrian troopers fell, and the two squadrons at the head of the column turned tail. Independent firing was kept up on the next two squadrons which came within 100 paces of the battalion, and then dispersed, drawing the entire column after them in confusion.

I would add that for a long time the Prussian infantry has, in time of peace, been taught that it has nothing to fear from the attacks of cavalry, which may be received in line without forming square. The order being to allow cavalry to approach within 200 paces, and to receive it with a volley, followed by independent firing.

I have been assured that at other battles, as well as that of Jicin, the Prussian infantry has succeeded in this way in repulsing cavalry.

[We suppress the end of this report, the information here given as to the Prussian cavalry and artillery, as well as the part it played in the war of 1866, does not now offer the same interest as when it was written.—ED.]

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#### ON RAILWAYS FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

*Report of the 4th October, 1866.*

It has been said that during the war of 1866, the Prussian armies manœuvred on entirely new principles, seizing important points situated on railways, and that this was the great cause of their success. This is an error, which disappears when facts are inquired into. The Prussians, as we will see, have acted very simply, and only as circumstances required.

When the Prussian armies, the 1st or Prince Frederick Charles's, the 2nd or the Crown Prince's, were in Saxony and Silesia, they used without hinderance not only the Prussian railways, but also that from Dresden to Breslau. It may be here remarked that this latter railway was of the greatest use to them, as it allowed them to send troops and stores from Saxony to Silesia, or *vice versâ*. There being no other cross line between the two railways from Berlin to Dresden, and from Berlin to Breslau. If, therefore, the Prussians had not been masters of this railway, they would have been compelled to send everything round by Berlin, an immense circuit. Had Saxony preserved her neutrality at the beginning of the war, the Prussians would have found some reason for violating it with the sole object of seizing the line from Dresden to Breslau.

From the 23rd of June, the day the first army crossed the Bohemian frontier by marching on Reichenberg, until the 3rd July, the day the battle of Königgratz was fought, railways

played no part in the war, the Prussians confining themselves to repairing that at Reichenberg, which the enemy had cut between that town and Zettau.

After Königgrätz Benedek hastened to rally the fragments of his army at Olmutz. The various corps were moved by railway from Pardubitz to Olmutz, and the 9th July they were united at that place, having broken up the line and destroyed the bridges behind them. On their side, the Prussian army marched on Pardubitz, as it was evident they must do, this important railway junction being on the road they wished to take leading on Olmutz and Vienna.

Having crossed the Elbe at Pardubitz and Prelauc, they divided, the 2nd Army forming the left marched on Olmutz to attack the Austrian army, while the other two armies marched on Vienna, the 1st or centre by Brünn, that of the Elbe or right by Iglau. These bold but (viewing the demoralized state of the Austrian army) well-conceived movements could not fail to produce one of the two following results. If Benedek remained at Olmutz, the Crown Prince would watch and cut him from Vienna; if, on the other hand, he marched to help the capital threatened by the right and centre Prussian armies, the three united would advance freely into the valley of the Danube. The Austrians began to evacuate Olmutz on the 13th July; and during the 13th and 14th trains took troops incessantly to Vienna. But on the 15th this was stopped, for the advance guard of the Crown Prince had passed Olmutz, and by the action at Tobitschau had seized Prerau, cutting thus the communication between Olmutz and Vienna. As for the first army, its advanced guard, proceeding by ordinary marches, occupied Lundenbourg on the 16th July, upon the railway between Olmutz and Vienna. There was nothing extraordinary in this movement. It was quite natural that the Crown Prince, entrusted with the duty of containing the Austrian army at Olmutz, should try and cut the Vienna Railway, by which the Austrian army could, in two days, be moved to the Danube. It was equally natural that Prince Frederick Charles should seize Lundenbourg as quickly as possible, it being an important point on the Vienna line. The Crown Prince, by occupying Prerau, succeeded in preventing three Austrian Army Corps from reaching Vienna; these corps made forced marches towards Kremsier and Hradisch, and as Lundenbourg was already occupied by Prince Frederick Charles, they were prevented from advancing between the Carpathian Mountains and the Marchfeld, and consequently had to retire into Hungary by the Jawornik pass.

The manœuvre by which the Prussians thus cut the railway between Olmutz and Vienna was creditable, but I repeat it was a self-evident operation. The Austrian army might have been all moved to Vienna had it begun its movement three days sooner.

### *Railway Corps.*

But while it is quite true that the Prussians have been guided by the simplest principles, the means they adopted to rapidly repair destroyed railways should be described. Each army corps has a detachment composed of 1 officer, 1 serjeant-major, 3 serjeants, 6 master artificers, and 48 men of the engineers, 1 superior employé of a railway company, 2 architects, 2 fitters, and 7 platelayers, or 74 men in all. This detachment is placed under the orders of the commanding engineer of the Army Corps. Its special functions are to repair railways and put them into working order. These companies, called "Railway Corps," are most useful during a campaign.

The Prussians attach so much importance to this duty that in peace time troops placed near railway stations select annually from each battalion of infantry 2 non-commissioned officers, who receive for a month the instruction requisite to enable them to replace ordinary railway employés.

### *Advantage of Elementary Instruction in an Army.*

It is a universal principle in Prussia to instruct soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and even officers to some extent in certain special duties. Thus each year every regiment sends 1 lieutenant and 2 non-commissioned officers to a battalion of engineers, where they are taught, for two months, road-making and field fortification, &c.

Similarly each infantry battalion sends 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 soldier to an artillery command, where they learn how to pack and unpack infantry ammunition boxes. This instruction is useful, for in war each battalion is accompanied by its ammunition wagon. The rule which directs that the wagon follows the battalion everywhere has undoubtedly both advantages and disadvantages. The general officers whose opinions I have sought, on this subject, are not agreed as to its advisability. Some approve of the rule, and think that the wagon should be, during an action, always within reach of the battalion; others would rather see it with the reserve artillery.

I have already said in my first report that elementary instruction is more generally diffused in the Prussian than in any other European army; this gives it a very great superiority. Almost all the men know how to read and write, a consequence of compulsory education; hence it is very easy to teach them certain details.

Models are shown to them, or chalk drawings of things are made for their instruction. In this way they are given ideas as to encampments, the construction of field kitchens and huts, &c. How many soldiers are there in the French army capable of understanding and profiting by such lessons?

The most striking proof of the intelligence of the Prussian Army is given by the way, they use the breech-loader.

What have foreigners generally thought, would result from

the introduction of this arm? They believed that the men would quickly expend their ammunition, by an ill-judged fire, and that the weapon would deteriorate from rough usage, &c., &c. The needle-gun has done good service, and the number of rounds consumed has been very small, being on an average only 7 cartridges per man actually engaged, and only 3 if the whole number of troops employed is taken into account. These numbers were given to me by General Hindersin, who commanded the Prussian artillery. The cause of this astonishing result can only be sought in the education and consequent intelligence of the Prussian soldier, who has understood the improved weapon given to him, and known how to avoid its ill effects.

This is a new proof of the advantage which elementary education, diffused amongst non-commissioned officers and men, confers on an army. It would be folly to give a needle-gun to an army of savages, but it may be entrusted to the Prussian army. And the more the soldier is educated the more can the rifle he is armed with be improved.

*Lessons to be Learnt from a Study of the Prussian Army.*

What useful hints can we obtain by a study of the Prussian army?

*Material condition of the Army.*—From this point of view our soldiers are in a better state than the Prussians, being better clothed, paid, and fed.

*Discipline.*—Our interior economy is better. But it may be fairly asked, Is it not advisable to alter our rules of discipline? Do we not punish the French soldier too much? Can we find no means of increasing, amongst our non-commissioned officers and soldier, that feeling of duty, which so distinguishes the Prussian army, and which causes punishment to be so rare? I am astonished at the small quantity of punishment which is given in the Prussian army, and yet no one can say that it is ill-disciplined. It is well known that in Prussia neither the non-commissioned officers nor the subalterns can inflict punishment. This duty devolves on the company commanders, who cannot even punish a subaltern. The commanding officers of regiments alone can punish an officer. I do not urge that we should adopt the Prussian system in its integrity. I confine myself to observing that the number of punishments inflicted in the French army is prodigious when compared with those of the Prussian army.

*Administration.*—Under this head we have nothing to learn from Prussia, our own is, I think, based on better principles, it has more unity and is less complicated. The Sous-Intendant Bagès, now at Berlin, is employed in studying this subject, and will doubtless place in a clearer light what I here merely touch on.

To foreigners, great praise is bestowed, on the Prussian

Intendance and the services it rendered during the last war, but, by degrees, it has leaked out that there is ample room for improvement. During my journeys in Bohemia I have been often told that during the first eight days of the campaign neither food nor forage could keep up with the army, and that it was forced to live on the country; and it is now understood that this state of things lasted for three weeks, that is to say, for the greater part of the campaign. During all this time the issues, when they did not entirely fail, were made in an irregular manner. Certain cavalry brigades have, on several occasions received no forage for days together.

*Medical Service.*—The medical service can give us useful hints. During the war, the number of surgeons was, it is true, insufficient; but the Austrians abandoned all their wounded, who had to be looked after.

In every way the medical service has acted well. The organization of both the small and large ambulances was well understood. The places selected were suitable; chosen near streams of water and railways. The removal of patients from the small to the great ambulances, always a difficult thing, was well carried out.

M. Bagès is collecting all the information requisite for the study of this important matter.

*Company of Bearers of the Wounded.*—Each Army Corps has attached to it a company of 180 men, whose duty it is to give the first help to the wounded on the field of battle, and carry them to the ambulances. These companies are composed of Landwehr men, selected for previous good conduct, and thus affording an assurance that the duty will be properly performed.

Each Company is commanded by a captain of the train battalion belonging to the Army Corps, and is divided into three sections; these sections are told off, one to each division, and one to the advanced guard, and are each commanded by an officer and a surgeon; the men wear the infantry uniform and carry a carbine.

The following are their duties: They go on the battle-field and give the first care to the wounded, apply dressings to stop bleeding, and arrange bandages and splints in case of broken limbs, select the wounded from the dead, carry the former with as much care as possible on stretchers to where they can receive attention. The men forming these companies receive a special education in peace time upon all these details.

Exact models of the carriages, barrows, stretchers, and other things employed in the service, will be sent when I can procure them; meantime I send herewith a rough drawing of the means of transport used for badly wounded men.

Some such organization should be thought of in France. The musicians, who perform this duty with us, are evidently not a sufficient provision. For, as soon as a man is wounded, three or four of his comrades quit the ranks under pretext of

helping him. The great irregularities caused by this would be much diminished, if we had a special service well organized for the purpose.

*Railway Corps.*—I have already described the composition of the detachments charged with repairing, destroying, or putting in working order the various lines of railway. The Prussians, in adopting them, have copied the corps organized by the United States during the war of the Secession.

But the most important lesson to be obtained by a study of the Prussian army is that connected with its *morale*. Two things are very striking :—

1. The intellectual value of the army.
2. The principle of justice and morality which is the basis of its organization.

#### I. THE INTELLECTUAL VALUE OF THE ARMY.

This is due to the intellectual state of Prussia, which is very high, and to the effects produced by the law of compulsory service, which causes all the talent of the country without exception to serve in the army.

Prussians are not remarkable for either the elevation or nobleness of their ideas. Greatness of soul, generosity, and the attractive gifts of mind are not their inheritance. But they possess, in a marked degree, sterling qualities: industry, a strong sense of duty, a love of order, economy, and obedience. Their Electors and their Kings have almost always been an incarnation of the national character. Wanting nobleness and greatness of soul, this nation would never have produced a Louis XIV. But it must be admitted that neither would it have produced a Louis XV. The army represents the nation much more than the French army does the French nation, and it possesses all the sterling qualities I have named.

Under the head of general education it is far superior to the French army, and, as I have already pointed out in my first report, this superiority is to be found in every grade. The officers are better educated than ours, so are the non-commissioned officers; and finally, the soldiers surpass the French not by their natural intelligence, which is certainly as great amongst us, but because their primary education is less superficial.

I have said that Prussian officers are generally better educated than those of the French army. One cause of this is the system, by which these officers are obtained, which rarely allows a non-commissioned officer to attain the rank of officer; but it should be added that, as might be expected amongst a people, so much in earnest, the greater part of the officers continue to study after leaving school, while the French officers rest contented with what they there learned. In Prussia officers are encouraged to study by every possible means. For this purpose most garrisons have societies called Military Societies, where the officers often meet together for lectures.

The King and the Princes belong to the Berlin Military Society, and visit it frequently.

I will here give an instance which seems to me to be very characteristic of this difference between Prussian and French officers. There is a military book—none more valuable has ever been produced by the brain of man; Marshal Marmont says of it, "He who thinks over, and understands it, will have an instinctive knowledge of war;" I allude to the "Memoires de Napoléon." How many French officers are there who have studied this book. It is sad to say that officers of high rank, even those in command of divisions and brigades, are ignorant even of its existence. Very few assuredly have read it. The number who have thought over it may be counted on the fingers.

Now (I do not wish to exaggerate) I have found in Prussia, during the time I have been here (two months), more officers who have studied the Memoires of Napoleon than I have found in France during 25 years.

The Prussian staff officers are, above all others, well taught. The greater number know the history of all wars thoroughly, and reason on military matters in a remarkable manner.

## II. PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE AND MORALITY.

Prussia has given the brightest example of justice and morality, by applying the principle of compulsory service for all her citizens. On this basis her military institutions rest.

How is it possible to compare an organization based on a principle so just, so pregnant with valuable results, with the French organization, bearing on its face the horrible stain of substitution by means of money payments. A thing which demoralizes the army, nay the nation itself. We do not reflect on the dangers of this fatal institution; men gifted with common sense have long ago discerned, and said all that can be said against a principle so unjust, so immoral, and which, in the long run, saps the very foundations of the nation.

Prussia has proclaimed loudly that military service is the first duty of the citizen; that nothing is more demoralizing to a nation than allowing the rich, by reason of their wealth, to free themselves from this duty. For, say they, how can a nation but believe that all duty may be bought and sold, if this the most sacred of all duties is so treated? What a gulf do not such principles open between the rich and the poor? How can it be hoped, if such principles are allowed, that the army can enjoy that respect and that consideration, which is so essential to its very existence? It is impossible to describe, how the consideration in which Prussia holds her army strikes one; it can only be explained by the application of universal military service, which fuses, as it were, the nation and the army. The army monopolizes all the honours, all the favours, and all the advantages in the State. A man who (for whatever reason) has not served in the army obtains no employment. In the country he is an

object of ridicule and contempt to his fellows. As there are very few families who have not a son, a brother, or a relation serving in the army, it follows in exact opposition to what is the case in France, that the army is not viewed as an institution apart from the country; but, on the contrary, all classes of the population, men, women, and children are deeply interested in, devoted to, and ready to make all kinds of sacrifices for their army.

The recent Austrian war has afforded a remarkable proof of this. Prussia has offered the edifying sight of a great State, looking after 30,000 sick and wounded men without its costing one sixpence, thanks to voluntary gifts coming from all parts of the Empire.

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#### REPLIES TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LANDWEHR.

*Report, 15th October, 1866.*

I reply to the questions sent to me by the Emperor.

I.—Q. How are the Landwehr Officers chosen and appointed?

A. These officers are taken—First, from amongst “the volunteers for one year,” who, having served that year, have received a certificate of fitness to discharge the duties of Landwehr Officers; secondly, from amongst officers of the army, who, having reached the age fixed for the Landwehr, wish to quit the army.

“Volunteers for One Year.”

The institution of volunteers for one year is as follows:—Every person who wishes to serve for one year *only* in place of three, goes before a Departmental Committee of Examination, before which he is compelled to prove either by a certificate or actual examination that he possesses the knowledge laid down in the fixed programme. They are less severe on those young men who are studying some science or art which demands their whole time, than on those who labour in a workshop or manufactory.

Those who pass satisfactory examinations receive a certificate, and have then the right to perform one year only of military service, either as privates in the ranks, as surgeons, as veterinary surgeons, or apothecaries in some hospital. They are further allowed to choose the branch of the service, the regiment, the garrison, or military establishment they wish to join. They are free to perform this year of service when they please between the ages of 21 and 24. During the year they must clothe, equip, feed, and lodge themselves at their own cost, arms alone being supplied by the corps in which they are serving; but they are bound to keep these in repair, and return them in a good state at the end of the year.

The number of these volunteers who enter each year into

the army is about 2,000\*; each company or squadron can receive only four such volunteers annually.

During their service these volunteers learn the duty of a soldier, the duty of a non-commissioned officer, and in part that of a Lieutenant of Landwehr. One officer in each battalion is entrusted with their education, both theoretical and practical; those who manifest zeal and intelligence are appointed supernumerary lance corporals, after six months' service.

Before the expiry of the year, the volunteers are examined, by a board composed of one captain and two lieutenants; those who are considered capable of performing the duty of Lieutenant in the Landwehr receive a certificate to that effect from the commanding officer.

But before being appointed officers they have to serve during a training of 8 to 15 days with the Landwehr, or six weeks with a Line regiment; their fitness for the position being acknowledged, they receive at first the grade of non-commissioned officer, then are (if approved of by the officers of the battalion in which they wish to serve) nominated as Second Lieutenants, and finally commissioned as such by the King.

Of the 2,000 volunteers who enter each year into the army, about 700 receive certificates as officers, and from amongst these the greater number of Landwehr officers are selected.

#### Officers Leaving the Army.

Officers (that is to say captains and lieutenants) who have reached the landwehr age, 27, and who are in good health, may quit the army, and join the Landwehr, preserving their grade.

Applications to this effect are made sometimes in the infantry, but more generally in the cavalry, when officers who have estates desire to live on them.

#### VOLUNTEERS FOR A YEAR AS OFFICERS.

I have pointed out in a former report the advantages and disadvantages of the system of "Volunteers for a Year." The advantages are of various kinds. As for the disadvantages they are shown when the army is mobilized.

In the Prussian army, for economy and other reasons, the number of officers in peace is not sufficient; for example, there are only four instead of five officers per company.

It follows, then, that when the army is mobilized, field officers are selected to command battalions and squadrons of Landwehr, and a large number of subalterns are transferred from the Army to the Landwehr, to give the latter more steadiness; in addition to which the army has to provide officers for garrisons, depôts, and various military establishments. All these vacancies in the army, some due to the common peace

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\* This figure refers to the Prussian army before 1866; for in a subsequent Report the number of these Volunteers for a year is stated to be, in 1868, for the army of the North German Confederation, about 12,000.—[Ed.]

footing, others produced by the mobilization, are filled either by promotion, or by transferring from the Landwehr to the Army, the number of subalterns removed from the latter to the former.

These alterations, which a change from a peace to a war footing entails, constitutes a great disturbance amongst the the officers, and presents manifest disadvantages. However, many Prussian officers do not wish to alter the system. They say that the presence of officers of the line in the Landwehr, give it a steadiness which makes it equal to the Regular Army, and that the latter does not sensibly suffer by the introduction of a certain number of volunteers for a year as officers.

But many officers who commanded battalions of landwehr in the last war have, on the other hand, declared that with some exceptions the "volunteers for a year" have not shown themselves fitted to perform the duties of an officer.

II. Q. How are the Non-commissioned Officers of the Landwehr obtained?

A. The non-commissioned officers of the Landwehr come—

1. From non-commissioned officers supplied from the Regular Army.

2. From private soldiers who, during their third year of service in the army, have received the instruction requisite to enable them to fulfil the duties of a non-commissioned officer of Landwehr (each company in the army trains two men for this purpose during their last year of service).

3. From men of the Landwehr; those who display zeal and fitness for the post being selected.

III. Q. What is the composition of the Cadres of the Landwehr?

A. *Infantry*.—In time of peace, the 32 Infantry and 4 Guard Regiments of Landwehr, have neither staff nor permanent cadres, the officers and men being on furlough, but each battalion has a *depôt*, composed as follows:—

- 1 Commandant (always an Officer of the Army).
- 1 Lieutenant.
- 4 Serjeants-Major.
- 6 Non-Commissioned Officers.
- 4 Lance ditto.
- 2 Privates.

Total, 2 officers and 16 men.

In war time the Cadres of Landwehr regiments are assimilated to those of regiments of the line.

*Cavalry*.—There are 12 Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry, but without staff or cadres. Each squadron in peace time has a *depôt*, composed as follows:—

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 2 Non-Commissioned Officers.
- 2 Lance ditto.

Total, 1 officer and 4 men.

In addition, one officer of the regular army commands four squadrons, and there is also a paymaster and clerk to take charge of the accounts.

IV. Q. Are the Landwehr Horses bought and fed by the State?

A. Prussia (I do not here refer to the provinces recently annexed) is divided into eight great military divisions, in each of which an Army Corps of all arms, both Regular and Landwehr is stationed, and from which it recruits.

Each division is generally divided into 13 districts, called Landwehr battalion districts; this district is the true unit for recruiting the military forces of Prussia, for superintending the Reserve men, and those of the Landwehr, as well as for all other questions referring to the change from a peace to a war footing (mobilization as the Germans term it). The men composing the Landwehr, live at home on furlough, but can, during any portion of their service, be recalled for a training of 8 to 15 days.

Landwehr cavalry is formed in squadrons, which correspond with the districts of infantry battalions. The horses required during the manoeuvres are furnished by private persons, or by the parishes who buy them where they can. When the manoeuvres are completed the parishes sell the horses again. The loss which ensues represents the tax imposed on the different parishes.

The tax is much heavier in war time, for, in addition to the Cavalry of the Landwehr, the parishes must furnish the horses requisite for the baggage and hospital trains of the army.

In peace, as in war, the State feeds the horses.

In Prussia, horses as well as men are liable to compulsory military service. Every horse in the country, the horses of private persons not excepted, is borne on lists furnished officially to Government by the local authorities. During war, the State, to avoid public discontent, prefers to buy horses either in Prussia or elsewhere. But if the price is thought too high, horses are obtained from private individuals, at prices fixed by the Government itself.

Last spring, when the army was mobilized for war with Austria, the State purchased the horses requisite to place the Regular Cavalry and Artillery on a war footing. The horses for the Landwehr Cavalry, the parcs, hospitals, &c., were supplied by the parishes at their own expense.

VII. Q. What is the Uniform of the Landwehr?

A. It only differs from that of the regular army in the headdress. All the infantry of the army have a helmet, except the battalions of rifles, who have a leather shako, with a double peak of black leather. The Landwehr have the same shako with a white cross in front, as a distinguishing mark.

UPON A PERMANENT CHIEF OF THE STAFF, AND ON THE DECAY  
OF AUSTRIA.

*Report of the 25th October, 1866.*

I. THE ADVANTAGES WHICH A GREAT MILITARY STATE DERIVES  
FROM A PERMANENT CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

The Prussian Army, the brigades, divisions, and army corps of which are permanently formed, has also a permanent chief of the staff. Would not this institution have its advantages in other countries, even although their military organization may be entirely different from that of Prussia?

General Moltke is Chief of the Prussian Staff. He is looked on as the ablest military man in Prussia, and I have been much struck by the qualities which distinguish him. At a single glance, his correct and unerring judgment, his great common sense, and his very extensive military knowledge, may be detected. His well-known integrity, his great conscientiousness, and the services he has for many years rendered, have won for him the respect of all, King, Army, and Nation.

Not only does General Moltke understand the Prussian army completely, but he also understands the composition and organization of foreign armies, the resources of other countries their military genius, and history. Thanks to an unwearied industry, he knows the smallest details of the geography of all the countries in Europe, and his continual study of modern campaigns, has given him a very high degree of warlike knowledge. Such the man. The following are his duties: under his chief direction the officers of the Prussian staff are educated and formed. The organization of the Prussian staff differs entirely from ours. It is not, as in the French army, a distinct corps. The officers are, on the contrary, selected, without distinction, from all arms of the service. Having served for three years as Lieutenants in their regiments, and then for three years as pupils at the War Academy, these officers enter the head-quarter staff at Berlin, which is under the direction of General Moltke, who there makes them study the organization of foreign armies, modern military geography, history, topography, tactics, and strategy. He himself directs their studies, proposes problems to solve, and memoirs to draw up, examines and criticises their labours. He thus learns to know the merits and qualifications of all these officers. He nominates them for promotion, and appoints them to the staff of the various divisions and army corps.

The head-quarter staff at Berlin is perfectly organized for instructing officers. There is collected, everything requisite for the study of the different European armies, and the countries which may become the theatre of war. All the military books and newspapers, the pamphlets, publications, maps, and plans

which appear in Europe are there collected and classified. It possesses, in addition, the most complete information upon the countries contiguous to Prussia.

The foreign countries which actually bound Prussia have been examined in the most detailed manner. Reconnaissances of the most minute kind have been made, embracing the resources of the country, its topography, the roads, towns, villages, their population and their resources; watercourses, their direction, their depth, their width, the places for crossing, &c. I doubt much if the *Depôt de la Guerre* has anything so complete. If to-morrow, for example, a French army invades the Palatinate, how many French officers could supply the important information which constitutes the object of military reconnaissance? None doubtless; for either we have not got the requisite documents to study in peace time, or what we have are insufficient. The Prussian Staff, on the contrary, possesses and collects beforehand everything relative to neighbouring countries, and each day this information is improved by adding the roads, railways, and other changes that may have been made; consequently I have not been surprised to find that a large number of the Prussian staff officers know our north-eastern frontier better than any French officer, and others knew the frontier of Bohemia as well, doubtless, as the Austrian officers themselves.

But to return to General Moltke. He must be viewed as occupying a two-fold office: instructor to, and director of the entire staff of the army.

It is easy to understand the great services which such a man can render to his country both before and during a war, trained for so many years to perform the duty of chief of the staff, and aided in his duties by a chosen body of officers selected and taught by himself.

The French Army has no Permanent Chief of the Staff. When war is imminent, the Minister or Sovereign selects one from the available marshals or generals. But the selected person, how great soever may be his personal merit, cannot be sufficiently prepared to fulfil the important duties thus suddenly thrust on him. To make a good Chief of the Staff, a man must not only have a certain natural aptitude for the post, but he must have the most extensive and varied knowledge, such as can only be acquired by long study. No point concerning the organization, composition, and resources of his own or foreign armies should escape him. He must be intimately acquainted with military geography, topography, administration of troops, the principles of tactics and strategy, and of the probable theatre of war, &c. In addition to which he should know perfectly all the Generals of the Army, and more especially the Staff Officers, in order that he may detail officers possessed of the requisite knowledge for the Staff of the Divisions and Army Corps. How is it possible that any General can fulfil such a duty, if he is not prepared for it, by study and labour?

The advantages which accrue from having a Permanent Chief of the Staff are very evident. War suddenly breaks out. Nothing is then left to chance; no person is taken unawares. The Sovereign or Head of the Army is not embarrassed by having to select an officer for this most important post, at a moment that is always critical. He finds him there on the spot, ready to carry out well-defined duties, and capable of selecting, what at the present day are all-important, *good Staffs, general or special.*

Although our military organization differs in every essential point from that of Prussia, and although our army is not divided into divisions in peace time, there is nothing to prevent us, so far as I know, from instituting in our army an office so useful, so important as that of a Permanent Chief of the Staff.

## II. IS AUSTRIA IN A STATE OF DECAY?

The more light that is shed on the events of 1866, the more we are induced to ask if Austria has not begun to decline.

But we hesitate to reply, fearing lest we should assign to the magnitude of sudden disaster many deplorable evidences of decay, which are now known to us. The following mark a weakness of character and the beginning of moral disorganization:—

1. It is now an established fact, that, owing to the treason of the employés and Austrian officers, the Prussians were able to obtain before, and during the war, exact accounts of the effective strength and position, of the Austrian Army. At Florence the Italian Government knew by the same means the exact composition of the army of Verona; and I could name a Prussian officer who was sent to Florence before the war, and sent daily to Berlin an account of all the movements that took place round Verona.

2. The number of Austrian prisoners was enormous; amongst the officers more than 500 were made prisoners unwounded.

3. The following is a fact, for the truth of which I can vouch. The day after the battle of Sadowa the Crown Prince of Prussia, counting on the moral effect of that great victory, sent a major with a flag of truce to Königgratz, to demand its surrender. Whilst the officer waited for the Governor, an Austrian Captain entered into conversation with him, and told him that the place was not in a fit state to resist; that the garrison was demoralized; and that all the Austrian Army wished for peace. The Prussian officer was present at the Council of War, presided over by the Governor, which consented to the surrender of the town. One article only gave rise to discussion. He asked to refer it to the Crown Prince, and went to find him. As chance would have it, while these things were going on, General Gablenz, coming from the Prussian Headquarters, passed Königgratz. On learning what had taken place, he expressly forbade the Governor to surrender the town. But for this accident Königgratz would have capitulated on a simple summons that very day.

4. At the battle of Tobitschau, fought on the 15th July, a regiment of Prussian Cuirassiers captured two Austrian batteries. They included a captain, two lieutenants, 200 gunners, 16 guns, and as many wagons. They marched under escort of 25 Prussian cuirassiers upon Brunn, about four days march from Tobitschau. The fourth day, when the batteries were only three leagues from Brunn, they were met by a Prussian officer sent to the town by order of the Crown Prince. What was his astonishment to see two hostile batteries marching quietly on the road, as if route marching in peace time! Taking advantage of a halt, he opened some of the limber boxes; they were filled! To guard against accidents, and lest the Austrians should attempt to recapture them, he drowned the cartridges. Thus three Austrian officers, 16 guns, and as many wagons fully equipped, allowed themselves to be led quietly as prisoners, for four days, by 25 Prussian horsemen, without it coming into their heads, that they might get rid of their escort, break or burn, if requisite, the materiel, and rejoin their army!

5. I will finish by a fact which is not the least important of those I adduce. In the ambulances that I visited at Nachod, at Köningin视角, at Pardubitz, at Jicin, I have convinced myself that the conduct of the Austrian officers towards their men was by no means free from blame. They were there treated and looked after, side by side with Austrian soldiers, often men of their own battalions, without ever asking if they needed anything, or appearing to care about them. Officers and soldiers lived in the same ambulance as strangers to one another. I have heard Prussians speak of this conduct in severe terms.

Such things cannot be entirely attributed to the demoralization that great military disasters always produce. They point, rather, as I have already said, to a degradation of character, and a true moral decline.

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#### NOTE ON THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA.

##### *Report of November, 1866.*

Judging from the newspapers, the most erroneous ideas must prevail in France upon the military organization of Prussia. The object of the present report is to describe the general heads of this organization. It will be convenient to begin with that of 1814, which lasted, with but slight modifications, for 45 years, and then to point out the great changes which took place in 1859 and 1860.

##### *Organization of 1814.*

After our disasters in 1814, Prussia had a population of 10,000,000, and a revenue of 10,750,000 $\frac{1}{2}$  sterling. She could not then keep up a permanent army equal to that of the great

powers, her neighbours. The men whose duty it was to organize her military forces sought to compensate for her inferiority in men and money by the advantages which would follow from the application of principles of morality and justice.

THEY PROCLAIMED COMPULSORY SERVICE FOR ALL CITIZENS.

Witnesses of the great services which the Landwehr (thanks to its excited patriotism) had rendered in 1813 and 1814, they adopted a second principle (which is evidently erroneous), that men who had passed a certain portion of their youth with the colours could, when called on, at the moment war breaks out, take the place of regular troops. Hence the institution of the Landwehr of 1814. In consequence of this false principle the army was, in peace time, intended to be the war school of the nation. Its object was, in short, to train men for the Landwehr. It was consequently decided that the annual contingent should serve in the army for a certain time. But for how long? Three years were considered sufficient to give each man the requisite military instruction.

It is difficult to admit that this was really the conviction of the founders of this organization, and it is more reasonable to believe that so short a service was fixed for a double reason, viz., the number of the annual contingent (40,000 men in 1814), and the sum that Prussia could give to its military forces ( $3\frac{3}{4}$  millions). Whatever may have been the cause, three years were fixed as the period of actual military service. These three years being completed, the men then passed two years in the reserve, and were finally transferred to the Landwehr.

The law of the 3rd September, 1814, relative to compulsory service, and the order of the 21st November, 1815, relating to the Landwehr, direct that all men known as fit for service should serve as follows:—

In the Regular Army, 5 years, from 20 to 25 years	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \text{ years of actual Service.} \\ 2 \text{ years in the Reserve.} \end{array} \right.$
In the Landwehr, 14 years, from 25 to 39 years ..	

1. *Regular Army.*—The annual contingent, composed of all young men fit for service of 20 years of age, being 40,000 men. The regular army was three times as strong, or 120,000 men; to this adding the officers, workmen, &c., about, 130,000, it was composed of:—

- 45 Regiments of Infantry.
- 10 Battalions of Rifles.
- 38 Regiments of Cavalry.
- 9 Regiments of Artillery.
- 9 Divisions of Pioneers (Engineers and Pontoniers).

2. *Reserve.*—The men of the reserve should have been 80,000 ( $2 \times 40,000$ ); but deaths, invaliding, the necessity of leaving a certain number at the depôts, reduced the number to 60,000. The strength of the army could thus in war time be raised from 130,000 to 190,000.

3. *Landwehr* (1st class)—Was composed of men from 25 to 32 years of age. It could furnish 150,000 Cavalry and Infantry for War, viz. :—

36 Regiments of Infantry.  
34 Regiments of Cavalry.

represented, however, in peace, by but very weak cadres, the men being on furlough. The rifles, artillery, and pioneers of the *Landwehr* were not organized, estimated at about 20,000 men; they were scattered throughout the army at the moment of mobilization.

Regiments of Infantry, as well as regiments of Cavalry, were brigaded two regiments together. In consequence of the alteration, introduced by the law of 1852 these regiments, were brigaded each with a regiment of the Line.

The Regular Army, and the first class of the *Landwehr* united together formed the army for active operations in the field. Its strength was 360,000 men, or deducting 30,000 men, for garrisoning fortresses, there remained 330,000 men. The depôts were about 50,000 strong; these were partly composed of recruits and partly of reserve men.

4. *Landwehr* (2nd class.)—Had no cadres; during war it could supply 110,000 men, Infantry and Cavalry, who, with the 30,000 of the first class just referred to, were entrusted with garrisoning the fortresses.

The following table shows the strength of the Prussian military forces, during the period of this first organization :—

	Men.	Men.
A. Field Army ..		
1. Regular Army .. .. .	130,000	
2. Reserves .. .. .	60,000	
3. Rifles, Artillery, and Pioneers of the 1st Class of the <i>Landwehr</i> ..	20,000	
4. Infantry and Cavalry of the 1st Class of the <i>Landwehr</i> .. .. .	150,000	
Total .. .. .	360,000	
Deduct left for Garrisons ..	30,000	
Remaining for Field Army ..	330,000	330,000
B. Troops at the Depôts (Recruits, <i>Landwehr</i> 1st Class) .. ..		50,000
C. Troops intended for home de- fence. .. .. .		
1. 2nd Class of <i>Landwehr</i> .. ..	110,000	
2. Deducted above .. .. .	30,000	
Total .. .. .	140,000	140,000
General Total .. .. .		520,000

Of these 520,000 men, which represented  $\frac{1}{20}$ th of the then population of Prussia, one-fourth only composed the regular army paid by the State. The authors of this system believed that they had solved the problem of the best military organization for Prussia. They had a cheap army in peace, a large army in war.

What are the distinctive characteristics of this organization? The regular army, did not represent an independent military force, capable of acting in first line. Too weak numerically to act this part, since, reserve included, it was only 190,000 men, it was not sufficiently strong to take the field until it was united to the 1st class of the Landwehr, 170,000 men, which, formed in regiments brigaded with the Line, constituted, as has been shown, almost one-half of the whole force.

The regular army had really only one object, that of being a military school for the nation, or otherwise a training school for Landwehr men. In short, the system of 1814 was entirely a "Landwehrian system."

#### *Faults of the Organization of 1814.*

The faults of this organization are so patent that it may be asked, how did it last forty-five years? They showed themselves during the campaign of 1848 and 1849 in Schleswig, and the Grand Duchy of Baden, and also in the mobilization of 1850 and 1859, in the most deplorable manner.

The prime defect was the necessity, on the outbreak of war, of calling for, and brigading with the regular army 170,000 Landwehr men. Experience showed, that on account of losses of all kinds, it was requisite even to procure this number, to call on all the Landwehr men, of the 1st class, 25 to 32 years of age. How was it possible in war to place dependance on men who had left the army, some two, some three, and so on, up to nine years, and of whom one-half were married. Prussian statistics give the following figures:—

Married from 25 to 26 years	..	..	30 per cent.
" 29 30 "	..	..	46 "
" 31 32 "	..	..	63 "

A great number of these men were compelled to leave their families deprived of all support, and depending on the charity of the parish. Thus the Landwehr men replied with great reluctance, and discontent, to the summons in 1848, 1850, and 1859.

The most deplorable scenes took place; positive acts of insubordination occurred in presence of the enemy. As for those Landwehr men who continued faithful to their honour, they showed that they were entirely unfit for war. It was evident that the authors of the organization of 1814 were deceived in believing that the Landwehr would, on all occasions, display the enthusiasm it did in 1813. Another fault of this organization arose from the composition of the brigades. As each was composed of two regiments, one regular and one landwehr, it was impossible to form, if requisite, a body of select troops (either brigade or division) into the composition of which the Landwehr did not enter.

It should also be added that the want of military instruction amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Landwehr, rendered it necessary to transfer many to the regular

army, and *vice versa*. It was a manifest defect to have such a number of changes at the very moment of placing the army on a war footing.

Finally, it is requisite to point out that the organization of 1814 entailed, when a mobilization took place, enormous expenses, upon the parishes which were compelled to support the necessitous families of Landwehr men. In 1859, 55,000 families had to be supplied in this way at a cost of 40,000*l.* per month; in 1859 the amount rose to 80,000*l.* per month, not counting the voluntary gifts, which amounted to the same sum.

These marked defects were so serious as to render a reorganization of the army requisite. It was begun in 1859, and continued during the following years, despite the struggle so well known, which, since then, has placed the Prussian Assembly in antagonism with the Government.

#### *Reorganization of 1860.*

Before determining on the best means for correcting the faults of the old organization, the men whose duty it was to investigate this question, resolved to return to the rigorous application of the principle of universal compulsory service—a principle which had been continually violated since 1814. For while the population of Prussia had increased in an extraordinary manner during the 45 years that elapsed since 1814 (from 10,000,000 to 18,000,000), the strength of the regular army continued without alteration, never exceeding 130,000 to 140,000 men, so that the annual contingent (40,000 men) remained the same as in 1814. Hence it followed that every year a large number of young men, able to perform military service, never served with the colours. Thus, in 1859, the annual contingent was 63,000, but of this number more than one-third were exempted. The injustice of this became manifest in a striking manner when the army was mobilized; because Landwehr men of 25 to 32 years of age, who had already served, were compelled to march with the army, whilst young men from 20 to 25 years of age never paid their debt of service to the State.

The reorganizers determined to return first of all to the principle of universal compulsory service in its integrity.

It was determined that the whole annual contingent of 63,000 men should enter the army, and three years were fixed, as before, for the duration of active service. By this measure the regular army received at once a considerable augmentation, and the following additional cadres were formed:—

36 Regiments of Infantry.  
9 Battalions of Rifles.  
10 Regiments of Cavalry.  
5 Divisions of Artillery.

The regular army, then about 130,000 strong, was thus raised to 210,000, a force which Prussia could easily maintain,

as her revenue had increased from 10,750,000*l.* to 19,500,000*l.* They then sought to remedy the defects of the old organization. The Landwehr was indeed preserved, but its functions and its character were completely changed. *It was decided that it should cease to form an integral portion of the field army.* Up to this date the first class had formed one-half of the field army. For the future its functions were reduced to home defence, or the first class of the Landwehr was to perform, the duties that the law of 1814 assigned to the second class. As 370,000 men was considered the requisite number for the field army, without drawing on the Landwehr, it became requisite to increase the period men spent in the reserve from two to four years.

Thus all men fit for service were classed under the following heads:—

Regular Army, 7 years, 20 to 27 years of age .	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \text{ years in the Ranks.} \\ 4 \text{ years in the Reserve.} \end{array} \right.$
Landwehr, 12 years, 27 to 39 years .. .. .	
	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 5 \text{ years in the 1st Class.} \\ 7 \text{ years in the 2nd Class.} \end{array} \right.$

Before going further, let us compare the organization of 1814 with that of 1860.

There is common to the two the following:—

1. Compulsory service for all citizens.
2. Military instruction in the ranks for a fixed period.
3. Obligation to render further service until a fixed age, first in the reserve, then in the Landwehr.

As for the differences, they are striking. By the law of 1814, the regular army was only the military school of the nation; to form a field army, its strength had to be doubled, with regiments of Landwehr, composed of men of 25 to 32 years of age, unaccustomed to war, and one-half of whom were married. By the law of 1860, the regular army was equally the war school of the State; but it, itself, by the addition of the reserves, formed the field army. *The Landwehr no longer figured in that capacity, its part being limited to home defence.* This is the great modification introduced into the ancient organization. Prussia thus obtains the great advantage of having a larger field army, composed entirely of men from 20 to 27 years of age. Men from 27 to 32, who generally establish themselves in life or get married, no longer fear to be called on for a mobilization for an ordinary war, being entrusted with home defence only. They know that they need fight in second line to the regular army only in cases of great emergency. The results of these changes have been very favourable for the general interests of the country, especially for agriculture.

In France people appear to think that the Landwehr takes the same part as it did, prior to the reorganization. Because the Landwehr figured in the Danish war, and more recently in Bohemia, it is imagined that it forms a part of the army, and fights side by side with it. This requires explanation.

The law which fixed four years as the length of time to be spent in the reserve, came into force in October, 1860, consequently the reserve time of the various contingents is as follows:—

For the Contingent of	1859,	October	1862	to	October	1864.
”	”	1860	”	1863	”	1867.
”	”	1861	”	1864	”	1868.
”	”	1862	”	1865	”	1869.
”	”	1863	”	1866	”	1870.

Hence, when the last war broke out (June 1866), Prussia had only ready to hand the reserves of three years, or those of 1863, 1864, 1865. This is the reason why she was then compelled to draw on her Landwehr to complete the battalions of the regular army. 100 Landwehr men per battalion of 1,000 were generally taken.

But it should be remarked that they need not have taken these men if they could have put their hands on the reserves of four years. It is only from the end of the present year (1866) that the organization of 1860 comes fully into play. Prussia can now dispose of the reserves of four consecutive years. She will therefore (in theory) no longer draw on the Landwehr to complete the battalions and squadrons of the regular army. She will only use it for special purposes, such as railway companies, companies of sick bearers, telegraph companies, &c.

It is most important, therefore, to point out clearly that Prussia is now (end of 1866) in full enjoyment of the military resources conferred on her by the organization of 1860. The whole of her forces (not counting the recently annexed provinces) are shown in the following Table:—

	Men.
A. Field Army composed of—	
1. Regular Army .. .. .	210,000
2. Reserve of 4 years .. .. .	160,000
	<u>370,000</u>
B. Depôt Troops, partly Recruits partly Reserve .. .. .	110,000
C. Troops for Home Defence—	
Landwehr, 1st Class .. .. .	150,000
	<u>630,000</u>
Total .. .. .	<u>630,000</u>

In addition to which the 2nd class of the Landwehr could, if required, furnish 150,000 to 200,000 men.\*

Thus Prussia can put into the field 370,000 men, not counting 110,000 men at the depôts, or 480,000 men, without having recourse to the Landwehr. This number is greater than that mobilized in 1850 and 1859, or for small wars, as those in Baden

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\* This report, from our Military Attaché at Berlin, is dated the month of November 1866. No account is taken in it of the troops of the three provinces just annexed by Prussia, into which her military organization was being introduced. Prussia so enlarged, and the other States of the North German Confederation, can dispose of 960,000 men, whilst the length of service has been reduced from 19 to 12 years, the 2nd Class of the Landwehr being suppressed. [Ed]

and Denmark. But if Prussia had a great war on hand, for which its active army was not sufficient, or if she met with a disaster she could employ the 1st class of the Landwehr, either to fill up gaps, or as a second line, drawing from the 1st class, the youngest men (27 to 29 or 30 years.) In the last war, for example, when Prussia was compelled to place in line very large forces, many battalions and regiments of the Landwehr formed a portion of the army of the Main. Two Landwehr divisions occupied Saxony, and the division of Landwehr infantry of the guard 12 battalions (or about 10,000 men) entered Bohemia, when it joined the field army on the 2nd July; the 3rd July, during the battle of Königgratz, this division was a march in rear. If the Prussians had gained an undecided victory, or sustained a defeat, it would have rendered valuable services.

This division (Landwehr of the Guard) is composed of the finest troops that can be conceived. Composed entirely of men from 27 to 32 years of age, with a manly and powerful appearance, it offers a magnificent military spectacle. It is doubtful if it would support the fatigues of a long campaign, but well employed for a definite purpose, it would form a most valuable force.

#### REDUCTION OF THE TIME OF SERVICE TO 12 YEARS.

The period of service, which was 19 years in 1814, has been reduced to 12 by the law of the 9th November, 1867. This reduction of the number of years' service takes place in the Landwehr, in which men will now serve for 5 instead of 12 years. The period of service in the Federal Army is thus divided at present :—

In the Regular Army, 7 years ..	3 with the Colours.
In the Landwehr, 5 years ..	4 with the Reserve.
Total ..	<u>12</u>

But this new law does not entirely free the Landwehr men of 12 years' service. On the contrary, the Government reserves to itself the right of releasing them by degrees according to the necessities of the State, beginning with the older contingents.

I will, in another report, give fuller details of the important law of the 9th November, 1867.\*

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\* *Vide* the Report of the 14th June, 1869.—[ED.]

NEW DIVISION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION INTO LANDWEHR BATTALION DISTRICTS, AND REORGANIZATION OF THE LANDWEHR.

*Report 2nd December, 1867.\**

Prussia, while she is extending her military system to the territory annexed in 1866, and to the States which, with her, constitute the North German Confederation, is organizing her Landwehr and that of these States upon a new basis. I propose to point out the essential characteristics of this organization, and to be still more clear I will first recall the basis on which the military force of Prussia, was recruited prior to these annexations.

*Division of the Country into Landwehr Battalion Districts.*

The territory of the Prussian monarchy before 1866 was divided into eight large military districts, in each of which an army corps of all arms of the service was recruited and stationed. But these military districts were not conterminous with the eight Prussian provinces, as is generally believed in France, where, it is stated, each province furnishes an army corps. For example, the second corps is recruited partly in three provinces, embracing portions of Pomerania, Prussia, and Posen, while the fifth corps is recruited, one-half in Posen, one-half in Silesia, &c.

The administrative division of these provinces into districts for local government (there are 25 such districts to 8 provinces) has nothing in common with the divisions of the great military commands into military districts, which serve as the basis for recruiting all the forces of Prussia.

The number of these districts was fixed in 1842, in accordance with that of the infantry regiments of the line, and rifles which then composed the regular army, viz. :—

32 Regiments of Infantry of the Line of 3 battalions.  
8 Regiments of Rifles.†

The territory of the monarchy was divided in such a manner that there was one district for each battalion of infantry of the line and regiment of rifles, or  $96 + 8 = 104$  districts. These were termed Landwehr battalion districts to distinguish them from

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\* There are two other reports written in 1866 by our Military Attaché bearing the titles, "Parcs and Baggage of the Prussian Army;" the other, "Force Mobilized by Prussia in 1866 and force disposable in 1867." During the year 1867, the year of the Paris Exhibition, we have only two reports, the first is a detailed account of the Bohemian war, which has lost much interest since the publication of the official Austrian and Prussian accounts of the campaign. The second is that which we here give.—[Ed.]

† There were in addition five regiments of Infantry of the Guard.

the 25 districts for local government, and because each had to furnish, in case of mobilization,—

1	Battalion Landwehr, 1st Class.
1	"                  "          2nd Class.
1	Squadron          "

Of these 104 districts, 96 grouped in threes furnished the recruits for the 32 regiments of the Line, and 8 others furnished those for the 8 rifle regiments. The men having served three years with the colours, returned home on furlough with the obligation to serve for 2 years more in the reserve, and 14 more in the Landwehr. The three battalions of the Landwehr of the 1st class, belonging to a group of three districts, formed a regiment, as did the three battalions of the second class. The battalions and regiments had in each district the same number, both battalion and regimental, as in the corresponding regiment of the Line.

The Landwehr battalion district is the true territorial unit for recruiting and administrative purposes. To facilitate operations it is sub-divided into several company districts. It is by these Landwehr battalion districts that recruiting for the army is carried on, and the lists of the reserve and Landwehr men are kept there. A permanent depôt is formed in each Landwehr battalion district. Generally, it is charged with keeping the and preserving in a good state the great coats, accoutrements, and rifles of the Landwehr. It calls in and assembles the men and those of the reserve when the manœuvres and annual drills take place, and in case of mobilization it takes all measures requisite, to change the Army from a peace to a war footing, both as regards men and horses.\* When the army was reorganized in 1860, 36 new regiments of Infantry of the Line were formed, making a total of  $32 + 36 = 68$  or 34 brigades. But, as no change was made in the division of Landwehr battalion districts, it followed that the battalions of the Landwehr, which formerly corresponded with a regiment of Infantry, now corresponded with a brigade. The numbers of the newly formed regiments, were not then represented in the Landwehr.

#### *Necessity for a New Organization of the Landwehr.*

The first care of Prussia after the peace of 1866 was to introduce her military organization into the provinces she had annexed, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse, and before thinking of the civil organization, she divided the country into *Landwehr battalion districts*. This division was only provisional, it being always desirable that the military divisions should coincide as nearly as possible with the divisions for local administration, which could only be subsequently arranged.

As the civil administration came to be definitely arranged, the divisions into Landwehr battalion districts in the three

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\* *Vide* pages 35 and 36 for the composition of these depôts.—[Ed.]

provinces, where the new Army Corps (9th, 10th, and 11th) are recruited, was modified.

The necessity of numerous changes in the division into districts, of the military commands of old Prussia (prior to 1866) has been acknowledged as a necessary sequence, to the introduction of the Prussian military system into the small States of the North German Confederation.

A complete re-arrangement throughout the whole of Prussia of the Landwehr battalion districts is now in progress. It will be, perhaps, useful to observe that looking only to Prussia proper (before 1860), such a revision had become absolutely requisite on account of the inconveniences produced, as we shall see from the old territorial division.

### *Inconvenience of the Former Division.*

1. The number of Landwehr battalion districts fixed in 1842, was no longer sufficient, on account of the increase and removals of the population, in addition to which the annual contingent had been raised in 1859, on the reorganization of the army, from 40,000 to more than 60,000 men, from which it followed that a much larger number of men were sent on furlough each year into the reserve and Landwehr.\* For these reasons the duties of the commandants of districts had become very severe.

2. The increase of population since 1842 had been very different in the various districts, so that, at last, some company districts became more populous, than battalion districts belonging to the same regiment.

3. The boundaries of these districts, and the head-quarters of the depôts, had been fixed with reference to the means of communication existing in 1842, so that in case of mobilization the men on furlough, might be collected together and sent to their respective regiments as quickly as possible. These boundaries, and head-quarters were no longer the most convenient, owing to the great changes made in the network of roads, and especially by the construction of railways.

4. There was not that coincidence which is so desirable between the civil administrative divisions and circles (of which there are 340 in the eight provinces) and the division into Landwehr battalion districts. Thus it sometimes happened that portions of the same circle belonged, without any necessity, to several Landwehr battalion districts, from which inconvenience often resulted.

5. It was also much to be desired that each regiment of infantry of the line should have its own district for recruiting, which had not been the case since the reorganization of 1860, since which period three districts, recruited two regiments.

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\* The officers and men of the reserve, as well as those of the Landwehr, live at home. They are said in Prussia to be "en position de congé" on furlough.

This circumstance alone would have been sufficient, to necessitate an entire re-arrangement of these districts.

*New Organization Embracing the Entire Confederation.*

For these reasons it was determined, when extending the Landwehr system to the other states of the Confederation to reorganize the Prussian Landwehr on a fresh basis.

This basis, which now extends over the whole North German Confederation, is the following:—

1. To each regiment of Infantry of the Line of the Federal Army (there are 93 of three battalions each, in the 12 Army Corps) will be assigned a regiment of Landwehr of two battalions, which will have the same number and provincial designation as the line regiment, and to each regiment of rifles (there are 12 of three battalions) will correspond a battalion of Landwehr Reserve. Thus the Landwehr Infantry of the North German Confederation will count for the future, when its organization is completed:—

	Battalions.
93 Regiments of Landwehr of 2 Battalions each .. .. .	186
12 Battalions of Landwehr Reserve .. .. .	12
Total .. .. .	<u>198</u>

This number of battalions does not include those of the Grand Duchy of Hesse, which are not yet organized, nor those of the 12 battalions of Landwehr of the Royal Guard, which, as is well known, have no particular district for recruiting. The Kingdom of Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Hesse, have provisionally Landwehr regiments, composed of three battalions, namely, in Saxony four regiments, in Hesse two regiments. From which it follows that for some time the Landwehr of the North German Confederation will be composed as follows:—

	Bats.
In the 1st 11 Army Corps, 85 Regiments at 2 Battalions each .. .. .	170
In the 12th Corps, Saxon, 4 Regiments at 3 Battalions each .. .. .	12
In the 25th Division, Hesse, 2 Regiments at 3 Battalions each .. .. .	6
Total .. .. .	<u>188</u>

Adding to these 12 battalions of Landwehr Reserve newly created, there will be a grand total of 200 Landwehr battalions.

2. The North German Confederation will thus have 200 Landwehr battalion districts. The extent of these districts has been fixed by the population; so that the two districts which compose a Landwehr regiment can furnish the number of men requisite for recruiting, and placing on a war footing the corresponding regiment of the Line, as also the number of men requisite for recruiting the Guard, the Rifles, the special Arms, and the Marines, &c.

3. In fixing the boundaries of the new districts, the pro-

bable future increase of population of the various countries composing the Confederation has been considered. But it being quite impossible to foresee the alterations which the removals of the inhabitants may produce in the population of the various districts, and in case the population of many of these districts (perhaps the whole of those corresponding to an Army Corps) should increase only, by the diminution of others, it became requisite to provide some means to compensate, and allow for these alterations, so that the various Army Corps may be placed on a war footing. This difficulty has been met by forming in each of the great military commands a Landwehr Reserve battalion district, intended to supply the men requisite to complete those districts the population of which may have diminished.

Each of these Landwehr Reserve battalion districts furnishes any men that may be requisite to complete any Army Corps.

Drawing from all the Landwehr battalion districts to supply deficiencies is thus obviated. Those portions of the country where, according to experience, the population undergoes the greatest fluctuations, have been selected as Landwehr Reserve battalion districts, and are generally those where men, quitting their original district, come to live for a longer or shorter period, and who would, but for this arrangement, have had to join the corps to which they originally belonged.

The Commandants of these Landwehr Reserve battalion districts have manifestly more difficult duties to perform than those of common districts, consequently they are helped by a larger staff.

It is clearly understood that these Landwehr Reserve battalions will not be embodied if the other districts forming portions of the Army Corps have, after furnishing the requisite contingents, a sufficient number of men; hence these battalions are embodied only by a special order.

4. The boundaries of the Landwehr battalion and company districts will coincide with those of the administrative divisions; and for the future, parts of the same circle will never be included in several Landwehr battalion districts. In general, each circle will form one or two companies.

5. The adoption of this principle has necessitated a departure from the old plan by which each Landwehr battalion district was divided into four company districts; now the number of company districts varies from three to six in each battalion district. The total number of company districts is very much greater than formerly; hence the Commandants can keep the rolls of men on furlough much more exactly, and it is far easier for the men to attend roll-call before the district non-commissioned officer. There is one rifle regiment to each Army Corps. For the future Army Corps will recruit and complete when put on a war footing not only their Rifle regiment but also their Artillery and Engineers from their own districts.

I attach to this report a table, showing the division into Landwehr battalion districts of the entire Confederation. This new organization of the Landwehr of the North German Confederation, the chief peculiarities of which I have pointed out, comes into force on the 1st January, 1868.

The territorial divisions are fixed, the district Commandants and their Staff are named, and already perform their duties, making rolls, completing or forming magazines of clothes, accoutrements, and arms. The Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz (89th and 90th Regiments) are the only places where the division into Landwehr battalion districts is not yet quite settled.

Saxony (12th Corps d'Armée) has only 12 Landwehr battalion districts. But, as I have already said, this division is only provisional, and the number of districts will be very shortly increased and determined.

Thus, from the 1st January, 1868, the new division into Landwehr battalion districts will afford a basis for recruiting the entire military force of the Confederation, as well as for all the details of the organization of the Reserve, the Landwehr, and the Reserve Substitutes.

Before concluding, it is desirable to point out some other alterations. For the future the Landwehr will only present themselves *once a year* (in autumn) at the head-quarters of the district to verify the rolls; but the men of the reserve, the men on leave from the Regular Army, and those on whose position the councils of revision have passed no definite opinion, will present themselves *twice a year* (in spring and autumn). The men of the reserve substitutes are not obliged to present themselves to verify the rolls.

As a retrospective measure it has been decided that men can only enter the Landwehr after having completed, in accordance with the law of 1860, seven years' service, of which three must have been with the colours and four in the reserve. Accordingly those men, who under the old law had completed their five years' service, three with the colours and two with the reserve, and who had actually received their certificates as Landwehr men, are now obliged to serve two years more in the reserve. From the 1st January, 1868, the Landwehr will no longer be divided into first and second classes; the contingents of which it is composed, will be distinguished only by the years' service passed in the Landwehr. For example, Landwehr of the first year, Landwehr of the second year, and so on.

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